

Towards a Global Compact for Migration: A Development Perspective

A Series to Inform the Debate

November 2017

Issue No. 1

The Global Compact for Migration How Does Development Fit In?

By Kathleen Newland

Executive Summary

Though inextricably linked, international migration has become part of mainstream development thinking only recently. Development, a common goal among UN Member States, has in turn served as the relatively uncontroversial entry point for migration to be addressed at the highest political level in the United Nations. In the process, a wider conception of development that extends beyond strictly economic parameters has gained acceptance in migration discussions, often beginning in the Global Forum for Migration and Development. This has allowed once-contentious issues such as migrants' rights and return migration to be debated constructively, without confrontation. As these policy areas converge around a common goal articulated in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and promised for the forthcoming Global Compact for Migration of facilitating safe, orderly, and regular migration, the international community is presented with an important opportunity.

The negotiation of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, slated for adoption in 2018, is a chance for UN Member States to translate abstract commitments into practical, cooperative action on specific migration issues. These may include the contributions of migrants and diasporas to sustainable development, international cooperation and migration governance, and irregular migration and regular pathways. The compact can be understood as a set of mutually reinforcing commitments involving resources, policy changes, and collaborative projects, designed to achieve a shared vision. The most practical arrangement for implementing the compact may be through a series of coalitions among origin, transit, and destination states, along with actors from civil society and the private sector—an approach that has been described as “mini-multilateralism.” The process of designing the Global Compact for Migration also represents an opportunity to strengthen and clarify the institutional framework for addressing migration within the UN system. While the critical task of successfully negotiating an effective compact is yet to be completed, doing so would be the culmination more than a decade of discussions and an important step toward making a real difference, both in the lives of individual migrants and for the countries that host them or that welcome them home.



I. Introduction

Development policy and migration policy are intimately linked. Development policies that successfully promote good governance, job creation, better health, and access to education should be seen as an intrinsic part of migration policy as these conditions influence the decisions people make about whether to leave or stay where they currently live. Similarly, policies that promote safe, legal, and orderly migration have been shown to contribute to development in countries of origin and destination as well as in the increasing number of countries that both send and receive migrants. Yet it is only recently that migration has entered the mainstream of development thinking. The convergence now is striking: the major global policy document on development, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (adopted in 2015), and the major global policy document on migration, the Global Compact for Migration (to be adopted in 2018) frame their ambitions for international migration in precisely the same terms: safe, orderly, and regular.¹

II. Migration and Global Development Goals

When announced less than 20 years ago, the United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) omitted any reference to migration as a factor in development.² The MDGs focused on the reduction of poverty and its most debilitating consequences, such as lack of education and ill health, but did not take into account that, at the level of individual decision-making, international migration is the most powerful and immediate means of poverty reduction known to man or woman. People who leave a poor country for a rich one and find work in their prior occupations are likely to multiply their incomes by a significant margin. At the country level, migrant remittances

can amount to more than three times of official development assistance and, for most developing countries, bring in more foreign exchange than earnings from trade in goods or services.³ On top of that, at least some trade flows can be attributed to the ties that migrants forge between their countries of origin and countries of destination.⁴ Yet MDG 8, which called for a global partnership for development, included targets on trade and on development assistance—but not on migration.

The international community has made progress since the formulation of the MDGs in 2000 in recognizing the connection between migration and development. Migration is mentioned in several places in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which the United Nations adopted in 2015, although it is hardly central to them. The SDGs, unlike the MDGs, are not directed only toward developing countries and, by including industrialized countries, acknowledge the interdependence inherent to issues such as international migration, which cannot be managed effectively without cooperation among countries of origin, transit, and destination. Such transnational issues are at the heart of the 2030 Agenda.

The SDGs⁵ include explicit references to migration in targets under three of its overarching goals:

- Goal 8 (promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all) includes Target 8.8 to “protect labor rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, particularly women migrants, and those in precarious employment.”
- Goal 10 (reduce inequality within and among countries) includes Target 10.7 to “facilitate orderly, safe,

regular, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies,” as well as Target 10.c to “by 2030, reduce to less than 3 percent the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 percent.”

- Goal 17 (strengthen implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development) includes Target 17.18 to, “by 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing states, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely, and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location, and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.”

Beyond these three specific mentions, migration is implicit in all of the SDGs, as migrants are both agents who must be enlisted to achieve these goals as well as beneficiaries states and other implementing actors must keep in mind if they are to realize Agenda 2030’s promise to leave no one behind. To give just three examples, displaced people are clearly central to SDG targets related to disaster preparedness and response, skilled migrants to those that aim to ensure access to critical skills, and migrant children are a population of particular interest for efforts to provide legal identity for all, including birth registration (Target 16.9).

III. Development as the Entry Point for Migration in the United Nations

The largely implicit presence of migration in the Sustainable Development Goals shows that

migration still plays a relatively minor role in international development thinking. By contrast, development has played a major role in international discussions of migration. For the United Nations, development was the gateway into migration policy: the first high-profile UN policy discussion dedicated to migration was the High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in 2006. Migration was considered too highly politicized and divisive for a general debate, but Member States could agree to talk about it in the context of development—a common goal—though the concept of development was rather narrowly defined, with a strong focus on the economic benefits of migration. Putting this boundary around the topic was intended to foreclose discussion of more controversial issues, particularly those concerning migrants’ rights.

The most significant outcome of the 2006 dialogue was the creation of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), which met for the first time in 2007. Migration, even accompanied by development, was still too dangerous a subject for the United Nations’ regular agenda, so the GFMD was instead convened by participating states, with a link to the United Nations via the involvement of Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Peter Sutherland (who had conceived of and promoted the GFMD in the first instance).

Set up as an informal process led by states, with no binding outcomes, the forum proved to be a safe space for discussion of migration issues. Gradually, its agenda expanded to other topics, including delicate subjects such as forced migration and the human rights of migrants. At the same time, the governments participating in GFMD discussions took the relationship between migration and economic development seriously, and helped bring into international policy discussions the empirical observations of stakeholders and the findings of researchers and development institutions such as the World Bank. Participation by stakeholders other than states also increased. The second GFMD meeting, held in 2008, was preceded by the first GFMD Civil Society Days;

it included migrant and diaspora organizations along with academics, trade unionists, human-rights advocates, and others. Private-sector participation in the GFMD gradually increased starting in 2009 and was consolidated in 2015, with the first formal session of the GFMD Business Mechanism taking place in 2016. The substantive interaction of actors from these sectors with the government participants greatly enriched the forum, bringing new information, perspectives, and practical suggestions into its discussions. Debates within the GFMD, and the commitment of its participants, played a significant part in getting migration into the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs.

One year after the adoption of the 2030 Agenda, the UN General Assembly convened a high-level plenary meeting (or summit) on large movements of refugees and migrants in September 2016. This was the first time a high-level UN meeting was devoted entirely to international migration, without the protective shield of development—a bold step that was largely the result of the migration shock European countries experienced with the surge of refugees and migrants across the Mediterranean and into Western Europe in 2015 and 2016. Up until this point, major destination countries had been reluctant to put the spotlight on migration at the highest political level, concerned that North-South polarization on the issue would prevent a constructive debate.

The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants that came out of the September 2016 meeting called for the negotiation of a global compact for safe, orderly, and regular migration, as well as a separate global compact on refugees.⁶ The compacts are meant to encompass a wide range of issues, described in the annexes of the declaration. Both are meant to be adopted in 2018.

IV. Kaleidoscopic Changes in the Role of Development in the Migration Debate

The New York Declaration is vague on what exactly a compact is, but rather lays out what it would do:

- “set out a range of principles, commitments, and understandings... regarding international migration in all its dimensions;”
- “make an important contribution to global governance and enhance coordination;” and
- “present a framework for comprehensive international cooperation on migrants and human mobility.”⁷

To meet these aspirations, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration should be understood as a set of mutually reinforcing commitments involving resources, policy changes, and collaborative projects designed to achieve a shared vision.⁸ In the case of the global compact, the shared vision is described in both the 2030 Agenda and the New York Declaration: safe, orderly, and regular migration.

Annex II of the New York Declaration gives an illustrative list of 24 possible “elements” of the compact.⁹ All of them have some bearing on development, broadly conceived. Eight of them are concerned with economic development, ranging from the quite specific (“Recognition of foreign qualification, education, and skills, and cooperation in access to and portability of benefits”) to extremely general (“International migration as a multidimensional reality of major relevance for the development of countries of origin, transit, and destination, as recognized in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”). Ten of the elements concern the governance of international migration, five relate to humanitar-

ian or human-rights issues, and one calls for improved, disaggregated data on migration.

Does this distribution mean that development has lost its leading role as the focus of international debates on migration? Economic development certainly has had to share the stage in recent years with other impacts and drivers of migration, including human rights and the particular vulnerabilities of migrants, environmental degradation associated with climate change, and efforts to control unauthorized migration. Since the turn of the 21st century, the migration-and-development debate has been an iterative one: first, development (in the narrower sense of economic development) was used as cover to get migration onto the international agenda; then development truly dominated policy discussions; then other issues that broadened the conception of development were allowed to enter mainstream discussions of migration in international forums—often, after the GFMD had demonstrated that they could be discussed without confrontation among actors with opposing views.¹⁰ This evolution has not led to a downgrading of development concerns, but the emergence of a broader conception of development that is cognizant of the critical role that factors such as human rights and the quality of the environment have in advancing *human* development. This broader notion of human development had evolved through the 1970s and 1980s with the pioneering work of Amartya Sen and, thanks to Mahbub ul Haq, was adopted in the UN Development Program’s first Human Development Report and its Human Development Index in 1990.¹¹ But it was much slower to enter the migration debate.

In recent international discussions of migration, a more sophisticated understanding has also emerged of the relationship that legality and orderliness have with safety, and therefore with the benefits of migration. A range of actors, from humanitarian responders to development practitioners to migrant advocates, are calling for states to open more legal migration pathways so that those migrants able to access them can avoid dangerous—

and, too often, lethal—journeys.

The New York Declaration is forceful in asserting its adopters’ appreciation for the “positive contribution made by migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development.”¹² But it is also clear that this appreciation was not the primary motive for the September 2016 plenary or the resulting call for a global compact for migration. The plenary took place following a year of what many societies perceived and what media and policy debates characterized as a migration crisis, most visible in the Mediterranean but affecting, at a minimum, North and sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and West and Southeast Asia. The impetus and focus of the 2016 summit and the declaration were on migration as a problem rather than an asset. The New York Declaration struggled to explain what was meant by its focus on “large movements.” It cited the numbers of people arriving, the capacity of receiving states to respond, and the impact of sudden or prolonged movements. It explicitly ruled out any concern about regular flows of migrants. While recognizing the benefits of safe, orderly, and regular migration, the declaration noted, with considerable understatement, that “[f]orced displacement and irregular migration in large movements...often present complex challenges.”¹³

The positive side of the preoccupation with forced and irregular migration is that certain policy narratives emerged or regained prominence as states struggled to cope with the large movements of 2014–16. Karen AbuZayd, the Senior Advisor to the UN Secretary-General charged with preparing the September 2016 summit, identified four such narratives:

- a new appreciation of the importance of addressing the root causes of large movements;
- the development potential of migrants and refugees if they are empowered to work and contribute in other ways;

- the possibility of reaching practical solutions through improved collaboration among states; and
- the promise of new global partnerships, with the involvement of the private sector, civil society, and other social partners alongside states.¹⁴

These and other narratives, AbuZayd said, would define the challenges and opportunities for the Global Compact for Migration. Each is important.

The root-causes debate, revived from the 1970s, casts development as a primary tool for addressing unwanted migration in the minds of some policymakers. Development is seen, quite rightly, as holding the potential to address many of the root causes of migration from poorer to richer countries; however, the connection drawn is often far too linear and immediate, setting expectations that may both overburden and distort development assistance. If development assistance is portrayed as the “cure” for migration, disappointment is bound to ensue. Considerable research has shown that, in fact, migration from a country in the early stages of economic development is likely to increase, as more people can afford to move¹⁵—particularly if the benefits of economic development are unequally shared. Comprehensive development can be spurred by external assistance, but the broad-ranging changes required for economic and human development must come from within a society. Development should be pursued for its own sake, rather than as a means of slowing (or even stopping) migration.

The economic benefits that migrants and refugees can bring to both transit and destination countries, though already well documented in research,¹⁶ have more recently gained resonance in the policy world. The care-and-maintenance model that helps refugees meet basic needs has proven to be unsustainable as most of the world’s refugees are trapped in protracted displacement, and migrant households that are not integrated into local labor markets or successful in entrepreneurial endeavors often

sink into poverty or dependence on public support. More importantly, the talents and energies of migrants can reward the countries that host them—especially those facing demographic distortions and labor shortages—while stopping the waste of human resources that enforced disengagement embodies.

The New York Declaration and the negotiation of the Global Compact for Migration illustrate the final two narratives. Both are premised on acceptance of the idea that international migration issues cannot be resolved by single states acting alone. By definition, international migration involves at least two states; none is completely isolated from the currents of today’s mobility trends. The global compact has the potential to put a larger frame around cooperation among states to help them reach and *implement* practical solutions to migration problems. These potential solutions are all the more promising because states have developed more systematic ways to expand cooperation with civil-society and private-sector actors, particularly through the GFMD.

V. What Does a Global Compact Have to Offer?

Though new to the migration arena, compacts have long been used as a vehicle for international development and humanitarian assistance. The concept, as defined above, is well suited to migration negotiations; it implies a balanced approach to the needs of origin, transit, and destination countries and accommodates the reality that many countries are all three. It also has room for the involvement of nonstate actors, as envisioned in the New York Declaration. What this conception of a migration compact lacks that development compacts include is a financing mechanism, and it is hard to see it functioning well without one—not only to provide incentives for cooperation, but to build the capacity of resource-poor states to deliver on the commitments they want to make. A monitoring mechanism will also be needed to allow states to track progress and ascertain

where help is needed in building capacity for implementation.

Most importantly, perhaps, a compact provides a framework for a portfolio approach to international cooperation on migration, in which different actors can deal with different issues while working toward the same broad goals. In discussions of the Global Compact for Migration, both at the International Organization for Migration (IOM) International Dialogue on Migration in 2016 and in subsequent thematic meetings, states have emphasized that one size will not fit all; different regions and states have diverse priorities and capabilities, even if all are committed to the principles of the New York Declaration. The elements under discussion for inclusion in the compact are explicitly based on the principles articulated in prior agreements such as the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development,¹⁷ the Paris Agreement on climate change,¹⁸ the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction,¹⁹ the UN human-rights treaties (which the treaty bodies have made clear apply fully to international migrants), and of course the bedrock principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.²⁰ This is a broad framework, and no country will be able to evenly pursue all the migration-related measures within it at the same time.

In setting out the procedures for moving toward the Global Compact for Migration in the “modalities resolution,”²¹ the co-chairs appointed by the President of the General Assembly gained a consensus of UN Member States on six main themes that will become the focus of the consultation phase and subsequent compact negotiations:

- the contributions of migrants and diasporas to sustainable development;
- the human rights of migrants, social inclusion, and antidiscrimination;
- international cooperation and governance of migration;
- drivers of migration, including climate change and environmentally induced migration and crisis migration;
- irregular migration and regular pathways, decent work, and labor mobility; and
- the smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons.

The most realistic way forward for the global compact would seem to be what SRS G Sutherland referred to in his report to the Secretary-General as “mini-multilateralism,”²² a process of building coalitions of interested parties around specific, practical, actionable issues. This approach has the advantage of not requiring simultaneous agreement on the same priorities from all states at once and of allowing groups of states to build coalitions around particular compact commitments and admit other stakeholders to their coalitions. It offers a way for parties to move from abstract commitments to concrete ones, from principles and understandings to action on particular issues. The danger in this approach is that states pick and choose among the goals of the compact, though this can be averted by insisting that the overarching principles and understandings of the compact remain intact while the parties move forward in selected policies and projects where their interests and capacities lie. This could result in a two-speed or multi-speed compact, but that is preferable to a no-speed compact.

Each compact coalition should adopt metrics to track progress toward its chosen objectives and invest seriously in monitoring and evaluation to make sure that efforts stay on course. For example, metrics could include:

- measuring the decline of remittance transfer costs toward the target of amounting to no more than 5 percent of a transaction in any important migration corridor, while also tracking the increase in the proportion of remittance flows that move through formal channels and are recorded in

national accounts, in accordance with the current International Monetary Fund (IMF) manual;²³

- monitoring declines in the proportion of international migrants who lack legal authorization to reside in their countries of destination;
- keeping track of the proportion of migrant children who have access to public education through the secondary-school level;
- counting the increase in the number of states with publicly accessible migration laws that provide legal migration channels to meet domestic labor-market needs; and
- tracking the development of well-formulated migration policies and the capacity of states to implement them.

Many other metrics are possible and can be built around specific actions to realize the agreed migration objectives. The main point is to provide a path for coalitions of states, with participation from other stakeholders, to cooperatively proceed with pragmatic, concrete actions. As SRSR Sutherland said in his message to the ninth meeting of the GFMD in December 2016, there is no need for more high-flown rhetoric that reaffirms existing commitments.²⁴ Many states concurred that the necessary norms exist in previous agreements and that action cannot wait for universal agreement on every aspect of migration. Such aspirations, as Sutherland noted, would lead either to no agreement or to an agreement with minimal practical follow-through.

VI. Multilateral Architecture for Migration

One of the more consequential topics the global compact will need to clarify is what the

institutional framework will be going forward for addressing migration within the UN system. At the September 2016 summit, the United Nations took an important step by formally accepting an agreement that made IOM a related agency—the same status as the World Trade Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The agreement gave the UN system substantial operational capacity on migration for the first time and created a logical lead agency to coordinate migration-related responsibilities within the system in order to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure coverage of needs. There is, however, opposition to IOM having been placed in this position, particularly from other UN agencies that have some role in the migration arena and from external observers. Twenty-one UN entities as well as the UN Regional Commissions are members of the UN Global Migration Group, and some appear to fear that their migration-related activities could be controlled or subsumed within IOM. Being a recent addition to the UN “family” (with all its family-like rivalries), IOM is seen by some as insufficiently integrated into the UN system to take on such a leading role. Moreover, some critics have charged that IOM has no normative basis for its work and therefore fits uneasily in the UN framework—a critique often based on the view that IOM, at best, makes the defense of migrants’ rights a peripheral rather than core element of its work. This charge persists even though the Migration Governance Framework formulated by IOM and adopted by its governing council in 2015 has as its first principle state “adherence to international standards and the fulfillment of migrants’ rights.”²⁵

Most UN Member States look to IOM’s decades of operational and policy experience as a solid basis for a central role on migration in the multilateral system, while recognizing the importance of partnerships with other programs and agencies. In fact, IOM has developed close working relationships with other agencies, including, most importantly, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Yet tensions persist. It is clear that if IOM is to assume a leading role, Member States will

need to support the development of many of its functions, including policy analysis and formulation, protection of vulnerable migrants, and collaboration with both national and multilateral development agencies. The role IOM comes to play will be increasingly important as states consider how to implement SDG Target 10.7, in which they committed to “facilitate safe, orderly, regular, and responsible migration and mobility including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.” The first review by the UN High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development of signatory states’ progress on implementing SDG Goal 10 and its attendant targets will take place in 2019.

The UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration is also scheduled to take place again in 2019, and likely every four years thereafter. It can and should be used to review progress toward realizing the commitments made in the Global Compact for Migration, which is slated for adoption the year prior. In the intervening period, states can use the Global Forum on Migration and Development to begin assembling the mini-multilateral coalitions in which to work collaboratively on the issues of highest priority to the coalition members—which may include civil-society, private-sector, and subnational (state/provincial or municipal) actors as well as governments.

VII. Conclusion

The successful negotiation of an effective, practical Global Compact for Migration would be the culmination of a process underway now for more than a decade, if one only counts from the first High-Level Dialogue on Migra-

tion and Development in 2006. Along the way, it has picked up steam through the series of nine GFMD meetings, the second High-Level Dialogue on International Migration in 2013, the inclusion of migration in the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, and the September 2016 General Assembly summit. The analysis, energy, and commitment put into these efforts has been enormous, but the most crucial task has not yet been completed.

The 2030 Agenda was a breakthrough in acknowledging the importance of migration for sustainable development, but it is not comprehensive: the migration targets and indicators it includes are quite limited (if still ambitious). While states committed in Target 10.7 to facilitating safe, orderly, and regular migration and to using migration policy to do so,²⁶ the agenda does not say how, in practical terms, this should be done, placing the emphasis instead on the policy choices of individual states. The New York Declaration goes farther in emphasizing the principles of shared responsibility, asserting that “International cooperation and, in particular, cooperation among countries of origin or nationality, transit, and destination, has never been more important; ‘win-win’ cooperation in this area has profound benefits for humanity.”²⁷ In the Global Compact for Migration, states have the opportunity to turn this vision into a concrete plan by working with each other and with other stakeholders on practical issues that need joint action. If this opportunity is wasted, it is unlikely the international community will be presented with another for a very long time. This effort must make a real difference in the lives of migrants and to the states that host them temporarily or permanently, or that hope to welcome them home.

This effort must make a real difference in the lives of migrants and to the states that host them temporarily or permanently, or that hope to welcome them home.

Endnotes

- 1 In 2015, Target 10.7 of the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) added the term “responsible” to this list of modifiers, but it has not been widely taken up, apparently out of some confusion (or lack of consensus) as to the meaning of the term.
- 2 United Nations, “Millennium Summit (6–8 September 2000),” accessed November 13, 2017, www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/millennium_summit.shtml.
- 3 Dilip Ratha, *The Impact of Remittances on Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2013), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/impact-remittances-economic-growth-and-poverty-reduction; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “Resource Flows beyond ODA in DAC Statistics,” accessed November 20, 2017, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/beyond-oda.htm.
- 4 Kathleen Newland, *What We Know about Migration and Development* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2013), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/what-we-know-about-migration-and-development.
- 5 United Nations, “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” October 21, 2015, www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E.
- 6 UN General Assembly, “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants,” September 19, 2016, www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/1.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 21.
- 8 This definition is adapted from a description of potential refugee compacts in the final report of the Forced Displacement and Development Study Group convened by the Center for Global Development (CGD) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC). See CGD and IRC, *Refugee Compacts: Addressing the Crisis of Protracted Displacement* (Washington, DC: CGD, 2017), www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/Refugee-Compacts-Report.pdf.
- 9 UN General Assembly, “New York Declaration,” 22–23.
- 10 This was particularly the case with issues concerning the human rights of migrants, such as the right to family life and the impact of migration on family members who remain in the country of origin.
- 11 Amartya Sen, “Chapter 2: The Ends and Means of Development,” in *Development as Freedom* (Oxford University Press, 1999); UN Development Program, “Human Development Reports—About Human Development,” accessed November 15, 2017, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev>.
- 12 UN General Assembly, “New York Declaration,” 1–2.
- 13 *Ibid.*, 2.
- 14 Remarks by Karen AbuZayd, Special Adviser of the UN Secretary-General, at the International Dialogue on Migration 2016: Follow-Up and Review of Migration in the SDGs, International Organization for Migration (IOM), New York, February 29, 2016.
- 15 This dynamic is discussed in more depth in another brief in this series, a partnership between the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) and the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ). See Susan Fratzke with Brian Salant, *Moving Beyond “Root Causes”: The Complicated Relationship between Development and Migration* (Washington, DC: MPI, forthcoming). See also Hein de Haas, “Migration Transitions: A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry into the Developmental Drivers of International Migration” (working paper, University of Oxford, International Migration Institute, Oxford, May 2010), www.imi.ox.ac.uk/publications/wp-24-10; Richard H. Adams, Jr. and John Page, “International Migration, Remittances, and Poverty in Developing Countries” (working paper, World Bank, Washington, DC, December 2003), http://econ.worldbank.org/files/31999_wps3179.pdf; Robert E.B. Lucas, *International Migration and Economic Development: Lessons from Low-Income Countries* (Northampton, MA and Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2005).

- 16 See, for example, Ron Skeldon, *Migration and Development: A Global Interpretation* (London: Longman, 1997).
- 17 United Nations, “Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development” (outcome document, United Nations, Addis Ababa, July 13–16, 2015), www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome.pdf.
- 18 United Nations, “Paris Agreement,” December 12, 2015, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=en.
- 19 United Nations, “Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015–2030” (framework document, United Nations, Sendai, Japan, March 18, 2015), www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/43291
- 20 United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” June 26, 1945, www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/; United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” December 10, 1948, www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.
- 21 United Nations General Assembly, “Modalities for the Intergovernmental Negotiation of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,” April 17, 2017, www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_71_280.pdf.
- 22 The concept is adapted from what Moisés Naim described in 2009 as “minilateralism.” See Moisés Naím, “Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get Real International Action,” *Foreign Policy*, June 21, 2009, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/18/minilateralism.
- 23 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) manual provides international accounting standards for reporting national balance of payments information. See IMF, *Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual*, 6th ed. (Washington, DC: IMF, 2013), <https://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2007/bopman6.htm>.
- 24 Speech by Peter Sutherland, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, at the ninth Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) summit, Dhaka, December 10–12, 2016.
- 25 IOM, “Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF),” accessed November 11, 2017, <https://emergency-manual.iom.int/entry/26102/migration-governance-framework-migof>.
- 26 As of late 2017, hardly any destination countries have taken up work on Target 10.7 or on Target 8.8, in which they committed to protecting labor rights and promoting safe working environments for migrant workers.
- 27 UN General Assembly, “New York Declaration,” 3.

About the Author



Kathleen Newland is a Senior Fellow and Co-Founder of the Migration Policy Institute (MPI). Her focus is on the relationship between migration and development, the governance of international migration, and refugee protection. She is also the Founding Director of the International diaspora Engagement Alliance (IdeA) during its incubation phase at MPI from 2011 to 2013; IdeA was established as a partnership among MPI, the U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development. She is a Member of the MPI Board of Trustees.

Previously, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, she was a Senior Associate and then Co-Director of the International Migration Policy Program (1994–2001). She sits on the Board of Overseers of the International Rescue Committee and the boards of directors of USA for UNHCR, the Stimson Center, Kids in Need of Defense (KIND), and the Foundation for The Hague Process on Migrants and Refugees. She also is a Chair Emerita of the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children.

Prior to joining the Migration Program at the Carnegie Endowment in 1994, Ms. Newland worked as an independent consultant for such clients as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Bank, and the office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. From 1988 to 1992, Ms. Newland was on the faculty of the London School of Economics. During that time, she also co-founded (with Lord David Owen) and directed Humanitas, an educational trust dedicated to increasing awareness of international humanitarian issues. From 1982 to 1988, she worked at the United Nations University in Tokyo as Special Assistant to the Rector. She began her career as a researcher at Worldwatch Institute in 1974.

Ms. Newland is author or editor of eight books, including *Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners in Home and Host Countries* (MPI and International Organization for Migration, 2012); *Diasporas: New Partners in Global Development Policy* (MPI, 2010); *No Refuge: The Challenge of Internal Displacement* (United Nations, 2003); and *The State of the World’s Refugees* (UNHCR, 1993). She has also written 17 shorter monographs as well as numerous policy papers, articles, and book chapters.

Ms. Newland is a graduate of Harvard University and the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. She did additional graduate work at the London School of Economics.

Acknowledgments

This publication results from a partnership between the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). It is part of the series "Towards the Global Compact for Migration: A Development Perspective," which aims to enrich the conversation around migration and development in the context of the ongoing discussions on the Global Compact for Migration.

The author is grateful to GIZ and BMZ for their support for this brief. Helpful comments on an earlier draft were received from Andrea Riester and Maksim Roskin of GIZ and Julian Pfäfflin of BMZ. From MPI, the brief benefitted from the advice of Michelle Mittelstadt, the skillful editing of Lauren Shaw, and the layout expertise of Sara Staedicke; Susan Fratzke provided both substantive input and project management.

© 2017 Migration Policy Institute.
All Rights Reserved.

Design and Layout: Sara Staedicke, MPI

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Migration Policy Institute. A full-text PDF of this document is available for free download from www.migrationpolicy.org.

Information for reproducing excerpts from this report can be found at www.migrationpolicy.org/about/copyright-policy. Inquiries can also be directed to: communications@migrationpolicy.org.

Suggested citation: Newland, Kathleen. 2017. *The Global Compact for Migration: How Does Development Fit In?* Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit think tank dedicated to the study of the movement of people worldwide. The Institute provides analysis, development, and evaluation of migration and refugee policies at the local, national, and international levels. It aims to meet the rising demand for pragmatic responses to the challenges and opportunities that migration presents in an ever more integrated world.

[BIT.LY/GLOBALCOMPACT](https://bit.ly/globalcompact)

