



# SUPPORTING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN EUROPE? DEVELOPING THE GOVERNANCE FOR DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT

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## **INTERACT: Researching Third-Country Nationals' Integration as a Three-Way Process Involving Immigrants, Countries of Emigration, and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration**

Approximately 25 million persons born outside the European Union (third-country nationals) currently live in EU member states and represent 5 per cent of the total EU population. Integrating these immigrants—enabling their participation in the destination society at the same level as natives—is an active process that involves both the receiving society and immigrants working together to build a cohesive whole.

Policymaking on integration is commonly regarded as primarily a matter of concern for the receiving state, with general disregard for the role of the sending state. However, migrants belong to two places: their origin and their destination. While integration takes place in the latter, migrants maintain a variety of links with the former. New means of communication facilitating contact between migrants and their homes, globalisation bringing greater cultural diversity to host countries, and nation-building in source countries that see expatriate nationals as a strategic resource have all transformed the way migrants interact with their home country.

The INTERACT project looks at how governments and nongovernmental institutions in origin countries, including the media, make transnational bonds a reality, and have developed tools that operate economically (to boost financial transfers and investments); culturally (to maintain or revive cultural heritage); politically (to expand the constituency); and legally (to support their rights).

The INTERACT project explores several important questions: To what extent do the immigrant integration policies of EU Member States and the expatriate-focused policies of governments and nonstate actors in origin countries complement or contradict each other? How do policies in origin and destination countries affect the successful integration of migrants, and what obstacles do they raise?

Researchers in the European Union have produced a considerable body of high-quality information and analysis on the integration of migrants. Building on existing research to investigate the impact of origin countries on the integration of migrants in the host country remains to be done.

INTERACT is cofinanced by the European Union and is implemented by a consortium built by the Center for Ethnic and Migration Studies (CEDEM), UPF, and MPI Europe.

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The governance of immigrant integration in European Union Member States is a complex process involving actors across multiple policy areas at national, local, and supranational levels of administration. In addition, origin-country actors are now increasingly involved in immigrant integration, mostly through engaging their diasporas in destination countries.

At the national level, dedicated integration ministries or ministerial offices, as well as departments in other ministries, deal with integration-related issues—including education and training, employment, social inclusion, access to nationality, civic and political participation, and religious practice. In all EU Member States, local authorities are also pivotal actors in delivering integration services, notably in the areas of housing and socioeconomic insertion. Furthermore, in a number of countries, due to the federal or highly decentralised administrative structure of the state, subnational authorities (like federated states, regions, or cities) also participate—to varying degrees—in the design of integration-related policies. At the supranational level, EU institutions play a role by supporting and influencing Member States' efforts through core funding, exchange of information, and coordination.

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## *Origin-country actors are now increasingly involved in immigrant integration.*

In addition to this complex and layered governance activity, a range of origin-country institutions also participate in the governance of immigrant integration in the European Union. In the past two decades, origin countries have widened their understanding of the diaspora's contribution to development in the homeland. These countries have increasingly acknowledged that the development effects of migration do not stem only from returns and remittances, but more broadly, from knowledge transfers, direct investments, and the capacity of emigrants and their descendants to 'market' their homeland abroad—thus contributing to the country's attractiveness for tourists and foreign investors, stimulating trade, or even channeling broader geopolitical benefits. As such contributions tend to be greater the more successfully integrated diaspora members are in their destination countries, the evolution of origin countries' understanding of the development returns of emigration has accompanied a positive shift in their approach toward the integration of their emigrants in receiving countries. The main origin countries of migrants residing in the European Union—such as Turkey and Morocco—have progressively moved away from rhetoric that stigmatises integration at destination, and have started to encourage integration as an instrumental process for leveraging greater development returns to emigration.

This INTERACT conceptual report offers a detailed mapping of origin countries' institutions responsible for the governance of diaspora engagement. It shows that in addition to the ministries and ministerial departments devoted to diaspora and emigration affairs, many other offices under various governmental portfolios also participate in the process, either directly or through liaison offices, embassies, and consular networks in receiving countries. The 'mainstreaming' of diaspora engagement policymaking across various general policy areas is similar to EU destination countries' efforts in the horizontal governance of immigrant integration.

The multiplicity of actors involved in origin and destination countries makes it extremely complex to identify and convene the relevant interlocutors for cooperation on immigrant integration governance. At the same time, this governance decoupling offers opportunities for an incremental and modest approach to cooperation, starting with technical collaboration in the more promising thematic areas and eventually expanding to the other dimensions of integration and diaspora engagement, once mutual trust and relationships between origin and destination countries are strengthened. Given the complexity of immigrant integration issues and the greater sensitivity of some dimensions—such as culture and religion—compared to others, a gradual and sectoral approach to cooperation on integration governance between origin and destination countries is likely to bear more fruit than attempting to establish comprehensive cooperation at once.

Since origin countries' support for the integration of their emigrants in the destination country is typically aimed at enhancing the development contribution of emigration, it is no surprise that the main integration activities of diaspora engagement institutions are measures aimed at economically empowering emigrants in the receiving society. Thus, policies to protect the rights and welfare of migrant workers abroad—notably through bilateral labour and social security agreements—along with predeparture and post-arrival support measures to facilitate early labour market insertion of active migrants in occupations matching their skills, are among the most common integration-related actions that origin countries pursue. These are also the more promising areas for cooperation with destination countries.

At the vertical level, diaspora engagement governance in origin countries tends to be more centralised than integration governance in the EU Member States. Only a few countries—such as India and the Philippines—have diaspora and emigration offices at the subnational level that are responsible for policy formulation. In most cases, rather, these offices act as territorial branches of central institutions, with only implementation duties. Nonetheless, the involvement of origin countries’ municipal and regional authorities in the governance of the integration trajectories of their emigrants deserves further investigation. International migration is both a global and a local phenomenon. Migrants originating from the same localities and having similar educational and socioeconomic characteristics tend to concentrate in the same cities or regions in their countries of destination—at least in the first years after emigration. Thus, a better understanding of subnational authorities’ roles in the integration of emigrants at destination would help governments explore the potential for tailoring cooperation on integration management to the ‘diverse diversities’ increasingly observed across EU cities and regions.

EU institutions can play an important role in tackling the challenges and maximising the opportunities for cooperation between origin and destination countries on integration governance. Building on the already established instruments of the past decade for implementing the Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union, EU institutions can help bring together the numerous actors involved—across the different integration-related policy areas and at various administrative levels—in both destination and origin countries. Cost-effective potential initiatives include an expansion of the National Contact Points on Integration to the relevant institutional representatives of the main origin countries of migrants residing in the European Union, and an increased participation of diaspora associations and other origin-country actors in the meetings of the European Integration Forum. Also, the EU institutions could help convene thematic information exchange and cooperation tables between origin and destination countries in the more promising areas, starting with labour market integration.

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*EU institutions can play an important role in tackling the challenges and maximising the opportunities for cooperation between origin and destination countries.*

At a time when EU institutions are preparing for the future strategic guidelines and action plan for the Justice and Home Affairs area, this report’s analysis of the governance of immigrant integration calls for the formal acknowledgment of the cross-cutting dimension of migration and integration and for a reinforced commitment to the external dimension of these phenomena in the next multiannual programme.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Governing immigrant integration efficiently has become a converging interest across European Union Member States over the past decade. The governance of immigrant integration refers to the set of actors, structures, mechanisms, and processes of cooperation that make up the framework for integration policies and practices. It has gained increasing attention in the policy agenda of a growing number of EU Member States, while the scope of actions and range of actors involved are also broadening.

Structural changes—in the nature and the direction of migration flows into the European Union, as well as demographic and labour-market changes within countries<sup>1</sup>—have prompted this intensifying interest in immigrant integration governance. Policymakers have come to see immigrant integration as a key element of any policy plan aimed at securing a skilled labour force for economic growth and competitiveness.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile, contingent economic and social

1 After decades of growth, the decline of the European Union’s working-age population began in 2013, with Eurostat projections indicating a 12 per cent contraction by 2030. See Eurostat, ‘Eurostat Population Projections 2010-based (Europop2010): Methodology and results of a long-term scenario of demographic convergence’ (Luxembourg: Eurostat, 2011). Furthermore, according to a recent Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) analysis, the higher share of highly educated workers among retiring cohorts in 2010-20 compared with the previous decade will increase the demand for educated workers. See OECD, ‘Renewing the skills of ageing workforces: The role of migration’, *International Migration Outlook 2012* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012), [www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2012/renewing-the-skills-of-ageing-workforces-the-role-of-migration\\_migr\\_outlook-2012-7-en;jsessionid=etffqj3a9abm.delta](http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2012/renewing-the-skills-of-ageing-workforces-the-role-of-migration_migr_outlook-2012-7-en;jsessionid=etffqj3a9abm.delta). Shrinking workforce trends are expected to be on the rise, both in the EU-15 and in the Central and Eastern European countries that became EU Members in the past decade—particularly in Poland. See The Boston Consulting Group (BCG), \$15 Trillion at a Stake – The Looming Global Workforce Crisis (Düsseldorf: BCG, 2013).

2 In its 2011 ‘Communication on Migration’, the European Commission recognised the key contribution of international migration to

conditions—such as economic crisis—have also driven interest in integration issues.

As EU-level institutions become more involved in the governance of immigrant integration, this report offers a timely and systematic analysis of the wide range of institutional actors and structures involved in the integration process. Covering different levels of governance in destination and origin countries, the report assesses the design and implementation of initiatives affecting immigrant integration in multiple policy areas.

*Structural changes...have prompted this intensifying interest in immigrant integration governance.*

## A. *The context of integration policy development*

Most of the traditional immigrant-receiving countries of Northern and Western Europe had already begun to take a systematic approach to immigrant integration in the 1980s and 1990s, as a response to shifting migration patterns—from the prevalence of temporary labour migration to the dominance of family and humanitarian inflows and settlement following the mid-1970s ban on the recruitment of workers from third countries. Since 2000, the increased pace and diversity of migration flows has led the traditional receiving countries to adopt comprehensive institutional arrangements and integration frameworks to address the wide-ranging integration needs of different categories and groups of immigrants, and to continuously adapt their policies in response to new challenges.

In the Southern EU Member States and in Ireland, the migration transition—the switch from being countries of net emigration to net immigration—has happened in a significantly narrower timespan over the past three decades and was completed in the 2000s, as a result of an unprecedented surge in immigration.<sup>3</sup> As a result, only in the past decade have these countries initiated comprehensive integration programmes at the national level.

*Economic and social situations have also pushed governments and other stakeholders to call for the efficient management of immigrant incorporation.*

Most recently, among the Eastern European countries that have joined the European Union in 2004, Poland and the Czech Republic have also experienced increased immigration. Correspondingly, policymakers in these countries have shown new interest in immigrant integration issues—both socioeconomic and cultural—and have begun to create institutions and programmes to address them. So far, however, nascent integration-related activities in these and other Eastern European Member States are still largely driven by EU initiative and funding, rather than stemming from a strong commitment to facilitating immigrant inclusion among national and local authorities.

Across Europe, economic and social situations have also pushed governments and other stakeholders to call for the efficient management of immigrant incorporation. For example, the economic crisis of 2008 and its aftermath contributed to a greater policy emphasis on the socioeconomic aspects of immigrant integration. Indeed, the downturn has disproportionately challenged immigrants' attachment to the labour market and restricted their opportunities for upward occupational mobility and access to jobs that correspond to their qualifications. While integration efforts seek to tackle these problems, rising debt levels have prompted public budget cuts and reviews of expenditure programming in most Member States,<sup>4</sup> resulting in limited resources for integration projects across the European Union.<sup>5</sup>

meeting labour and skills shortages, both through the recruitment of labour migrants from abroad, and through better labour market integration of resident migrants. The latter is one of the key steps to achieve the headline employment target set in the Europe 2020 strategy. See European Commission, 'Communication on Migration', 4 May 2011, COM(2011) 248 final, [http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/1\\_EN\\_ACT\\_part1\\_v11.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/1_EN_ACT_part1_v11.pdf).

3 The unprecedented immigration surge in Spain and Italy in the past 15 years has transformed these former emigration countries into prominent immigrant destinations within the European Union. Although labour migration continues to account for the largest share of inflows of third-country nationals to Southern European countries, increasing shares of family migrants and growing stocks of second-generation residents reflect a stabilisation of the immigrant population in these countries. See OECD, *International Migration Outlook 2012* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012), [www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2012\\_migr\\_outlook-2012-en](http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2012_migr_outlook-2012-en).

4 For an in-depth discussion of the impact of the financial crisis on the integration policies in EU Member States, see Elizabeth Collett, *Immigrant Integration in Europe in a Time of Austerity* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2011), [www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/tcm-integration.pdf](http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/tcm-integration.pdf).

5 To meet the challenge of more cost-efficient management of immigrant integration, some governments have been experimenting



While EU Member States have engaged in varying types of immigrant integration actions in the context of deteriorating labour market conditions, many have simultaneously experienced the re-emergence of negative perceptions and attitudes towards immigrants and visible minorities, and the rise of xenophobic political parties. Ever since the terrorist attacks in several European countries in the early 2000s, nativist groups have depicted cultural and religious diversity as a threat to social cohesion. This continues to be one of the most debated and critical dimensions of integration governance.

## B. Mapping the increased engagement of EU institutions

Converging immigration trends and increased scrutiny over the effectiveness of integration management across EU Member States have gone hand in hand with the stronger engagement and initiative of the EU institutions in this area over the past decade.<sup>6</sup>

The adoption of the Common Basic Principles and the Common Agenda for Immigrant Integration—in 2004 and 2005, respectively—marked the first major turning point of EU-level engagement.<sup>7</sup> These documents framed immigrant integration as a ‘dynamic two-way process’ of mutual accommodation by immigrants and their host societies, and promoted ‘a holistic approach to immigrant integration’ in which integration is recognised as a cross-cutting issue whose governance requires initiatives in multiple policy areas. This approach presupposes the active role of a broad range of stakeholders in immigrant-receiving countries working to improve mutual understanding between immigrants and their destination societies; including public authorities in all levels of government as well as nonstate actors such as social partners, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), migrant organisations, businesses, and other private-sector actors.

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### *Enhanced cooperation with countries of origin can facilitate the first insertion of immigrants in their receiving society through predeparture measures.*

With the European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals<sup>8</sup> of 2011, the European Union and its Member States have moved a step further in conceptualising the comprehensive spectrum of actors and actions involved in the governance of immigrant integration. The new integration strategy in the Agenda explicitly acknowledges the beneficial contribution that transnationalism can bring to the integration process. Thus, the European Agenda for Integration has promoted a shift towards a three-way approach to immigrant integration, involving immigrants, countries of immigration, as well as countries of emigration. The Agenda recognises that enhanced cooperation with countries of origin can facilitate the first insertion of immigrants in their receiving society through predeparture measures. Additionally, such cooperation can later support migrants’ long-term integration by leveraging their close ties to their

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with innovative integration governance strategies, based on improved coordination of efforts and resources. In the Netherlands, for example, severe cuts to the integration budget have been accompanied by a deep reflection on how to mainstream integration in the related policy areas. See Elizabeth Collett and Milica Petrovic, *The future of immigrant integration in Europe: Mainstreaming Approaches for Inclusion* (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2014), [www.migrationpolicy.org/research/future-immigrant-integration-europe-mainstreaming-approaches-inclusion](http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/future-immigrant-integration-europe-mainstreaming-approaches-inclusion). In other countries affected by the crisis, however, the reduction of the national budget available for integration has not prompted more cost-efficient integration management, but has rather left the most crisis-vulnerable populations with almost no support from the central government.

- 6 While lacking legislative competence on legal migration and integration, the European Union has increasingly supported Member States in the governance of immigrant integration and contributed to the development of a common framework for integration since the Tampere Council and the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty (1999). This subsidiary role has been formally recognised in the Lisbon Treaty of 2009.
- 7 Council of the European Union, 2618<sup>th</sup> Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs (press release, 19 November 2004), [www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/82745.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/82745.pdf); European Commission, ‘A Common Agenda for Integration: Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union’, 1 September 2005, COM(2005)0389 final, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52005DC0389:EN:NOT>. See also European Commission, ‘Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment’, 3 June 2003, COM(2003)336 final, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0336:FIN:EN:PDF>.
- 8 European Commission, ‘European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals’, 20 July 2011, COM(2011)455 final, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/110720/1\\_en\\_act\\_part1\\_v10.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/110720/1_en_act_part1_v10.pdf). See also Council of the European Union, 3135<sup>th</sup> Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs (press release, 13-14 December 2011), [www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/126932.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/126932.pdf); European Union Committee of the Regions, ‘Draft Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the New European Agenda for Integration’, CIVEX-V-024, 15-16 February 2012, [https://bvstoad.cor.europa.eu/ViewDoc.aspx?doc=cdr%5Ccivex-v%5Cdossiers%5Ccivex-v-024%5CEN%5CCDR199-2011\\_REV2\\_PAC\\_EN.doc&docid=2813596](https://bvstoad.cor.europa.eu/ViewDoc.aspx?doc=cdr%5Ccivex-v%5Cdossiers%5Ccivex-v-024%5CEN%5CCDR199-2011_REV2_PAC_EN.doc&docid=2813596).

countries of origin. And it can help maximise the potential gains for migrants who return to their countries of origin with acquired experience and knowledge.

By recognising that migrants' countries of origin can have a role to play in immigrant integration, the European Agenda for Integration concurs with the renewed Global Approach to Migration and Mobility<sup>9</sup> to reinforce the external dimension of the EU migration policy. Like the Agenda, the Global Approach emphasises the need for EU Member States to cooperate with origin countries in preparing new immigrants for their destination society and labour market through predeparture measures like language tuition and training, and information on the socioeconomic and cultural context of the destination country. In addition, the Global Approach recommends increasing cooperation with diaspora groups as a way of exploring the role of diaspora communities and transnational networks for the integration process. This engagement is in line with the EU Migration and Development strategy<sup>10</sup> and, more broadly, with the flagship theme of the 2013 United Nations High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development.<sup>11</sup>

This report provides an overview of the wide range of institutional actors and structures—spanning different levels of governance in both destination and origin countries—involved in the design and implementation of immigrant integration initiatives in multiple key policy areas: education, language, labour market integration, residential integration, social interaction, civic and political participation, access to nationality, and religion.<sup>12</sup>

The report adopts a comprehensive definition of integration policy, which includes both specific integration measures that target newly arrived immigrants, and the broader policies addressing the longer-term integration needs of all persons with a migration background (first, second, and later generations) residing in the European Union.<sup>13</sup> The role of origin countries in immigrant integration has remained largely unexplored so far. To shed more light on this issue, this report devotes special attention to origin-country actors and processes.

A second goal of this report is assessing the potential role of the existing international frameworks for migration and development in the governance of immigrant integration. The report explores how international frameworks can enhance cooperation between origin and destination countries—particularly in the area of labour market integration and migrant workers' protection—and discusses the opportunities for establishing dedicated international fora for the coordination of multilevel governance of immigrant integration. To that end, the overview of actors in the first part of the report will help identify the most appropriate stakeholders to be convened to such international dialogues.

This broad mapping of actors and structures involved in the governance of immigrant integration focuses primarily on institutional actors in the INTERACT priority countries, a group which includes 14 EU Member States and 17 non-EU countries who are the principal origin countries of migrants to the European Union.<sup>14</sup> Although attention to the role of

9 With the communication, 'The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility', and subsequent Council conclusions, the European Commission and Council of the European Union have put forward a renewed strategy which aims at reinforcing the EU external migration policy through stronger coherence with other policy areas of EU strategic external action and increased thematic and geographical balance, as compared with the previous framework launched in 2005. See European Commission, 'The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility', 18 November 2011, COM(2011)743 final, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0743:FIN:EN:PDF>.

10 The EU Migration and Development strategy, which is one of the four pillars of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, is defined in European Commission, 'Maximising the Development Impact of Migration', 21 May 2013, COM(2013)292 final, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/immigration/general/docs/maximising\\_the\\_development\\_impact\\_of\\_migration.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/immigration/general/docs/maximising_the_development_impact_of_migration.pdf) and European Commission, 'Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: and Agenda for Change', 13 October 2011, COM(2011)637 final, [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/documents/agenda\\_for\\_change\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/documents/agenda_for_change_en.pdf).

11 The theme is 'Identifying concrete measures to strengthen coherence and cooperation at all levels, with a view of enhancing the benefits of international migration for migrants and countries alike and its important links to development, while reducing its negative implications.' United Nations General Assembly, 'International Migration and Development' (resolution adopted 21 December 2012), 67/219, [www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/219](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/219).

12 The report considers both the structural/functional and the sociocultural dimensions of integration. Structural integration includes areas that allow migrants to function in the receiving society, including employment, education, and to a certain extent, political participation. Sociocultural integration refers to a sense of belonging, loyalties, and identity—including social and cultural interactions, and religious affiliation and practice. See Erik Snel, Godfried Engbersen, and Arjen Leerkes, 'Transnational involvement and social integration', *Global Networks* 6, no. 3 (2007): 285-308; Marta Bivand Erdal, 'Migrant Transnationalism and Multi-Layered Integration: Norwegian-Pakistani Migrants' Own Reflections', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 39, no. 6 (2013): 983-99.

13 This report only discusses integration policy for third-country nationals, i.e. nationals of countries that are not members of the European Union. While intra-EU movers also have integration needs, EU institutions define these groups as mobile EU citizens rather than migrants.

14 INTERACT priority countries are the EU destination countries Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom; and the origin countries Algeria, Belarus, Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Syria, Senegal, Tunisia, Turkey, and Ukraine. The main criterion for the choice of priority countries of origin was the stock of nationals residing in the EU Member States. Other criteria were

nongovernmental stakeholders (for example, civil-society and migrant organisations, social partners, and academia) is critical for understanding integration policy and governance, the interactions among these actors and EU and country-specific institutions falls beyond the scope of this report, and will instead be addressed in a forthcoming INTERACT report. The present report intends to inform the final outputs of the INTERACT project by profiling the relevant institutional actors. These actors are ultimately the audience for the policy recommendations for enhancing multilevel and multistakeholder cooperation on integration that will emerge from later phases of the project.

The remainder of this report is divided into three main sections. Sections II and III summarise the institutional actors involved in the design and implementation of integration-related policies at various levels of governance, in destination and origin countries, respectively. A policy matrix in the Appendix complements the coverage of origin countries in Section III by offering further details on those institutional actors. Section IV explores the potential for enhanced cooperation between origin and destination countries in the governance of immigrant integration at the bilateral, multilateral, and regional levels. In this context, the analysis devotes special attention to a preliminary assessment of the role of international and supranational (EU) authorities in designing frameworks and providing incentives for improved multilevel and multistakeholder cooperation for immigrant integration.

Drawing from this comprehensive and original analysis, the conclusions present the challenges and opportunities for cooperation between EU Member States and third countries of origin in the governance of immigrant integration, and point to further research and possible policy initiatives—including at the EU level—that could help spur such cooperation.

## II. THE GOVERNANCE OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN EU MEMBER STATES

In a majority of EU Member States, the responsibility for framing and implementing integration policies is complex and stratified. The complexity stems from the fact that while most EU countries have dedicated national departments or ministries dealing with integration, in practice, the responsibility for designing and implementing specific measures is scattered across assorted ministerial departments and agencies in charge of generic policy areas such as employment, social affairs, and education.

The number of institutions dealing with immigrant integration at the national level mirrors the multifaceted nature of the integration process. In a number of EU Member States, this multiplicity also reflects a precise policy strategy of mainstreaming integration into other related policy areas.<sup>15</sup> This horizontal decoupling of responsibilities is amplified at the vertical level, as the governance of immigrant integration is generally shared—to a greater or lesser extent—between national, regional, and local authorities. An added layer of involvement is the supranational level, where EU institutions may also influence the integration frameworks of Member States through funding and “soft law” instruments.

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### A. The national level

Most EU Member States have a specific national office at the ministerial or subministerial level dedicated to immigrant integration. The dedicated offices most often reside within a general ministry, usually the ministries of interior,

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a country's participation in an EU neighbourhood initiative or the prominence of a specific migration corridor. For a more detailed discussion of the conceptual framework of the INTERACT project, see Anne Unterreiner and Agnieszka Weinar, *The Conceptual Framework of the INTERACT Project*, INTERACT Research Report 2014/01 (Florence: European University Institute), <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29566/INTERACT-2014%20-%2001.pdf?sequence=1>.

15 Mainstreaming refers to an effort to reach people with a migration background through social programming and policies that also target the general population. See Collett and Petrovic, *The future of immigrant integration in Europe: Mainstreaming approaches for inclusion*.

employment, or social affairs. Less frequently, the designated integration office is itself a stand-alone ministry or authority reporting directly to the Prime Minister—as is the case with the High Commission for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue (ACIDI) in Portugal.<sup>16</sup>

A notable exception is the United Kingdom, where immigrant integration has never been a formal policy area—apart from the integration of recognised refugees—and policies have traditionally focused on managing ethnic diversity through antidiscrimination and inclusion measures that target minorities rather than migrants.<sup>17</sup> Table 1 provides an overview of the national- or federal-level dedicated ministerial institutions for immigrant integration in the INTERACT EU priority countries.

**Table 1. Dedicated national immigrant integration institutions in INTERACT EU priority countries**

Country	Dedicated national office or ministry for immigrant integration	Ministerial affiliation (if applicable)
Austria	State Secretariat for Integration	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Belgium	State Secretary for Asylum, Migration, Social Integration, and Fight Against Poverty	Ministry of Justice
Denmark	Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration	Ministry of Social Affairs
France	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Department for Foreigner’s Reception and Support and for Nationality (DAAEN) in the General Directorate for Foreigners in France (DGEF)</li> <li>- French Office for Immigration and Integration</li> </ul>	Ministry of Interior
Germany	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Federal Office for Migration and Refugees</li> <li>- Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ministry of Interior</li> <li>- Chancellor’s Office</li> </ul>
Greece	Directorate-General of Migration Policy and Social Integration for legal migration policy issues	Ministry of Interior
Ireland	Irish Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration	Department of Justice and Equality
Italy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- General Directorate of Immigration and Integration Policies</li> <li>- Department of Civil Liberties and Immigration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ministry of Labour and Social Policies</li> <li>- Ministry of Interior</li> </ul>
Netherlands	Department for Integration and Society	Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
Poland	Department of Social Assistance and Integration	Ministry of Labour and Social Policy
Portugal	High Commission for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue	n/a
Spain	General Secretariat for Immigrant Integration (within the General Secretary for Immigration and Emigration)	Ministry of Employment and Social Security
Sweden	Minister for Integration	Ministry of Employment
United Kingdom	None	n/a

Source: Author’s compilation based on multiple sources.

16 In Germany, the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration also reports directly to the Chancellor’s Office.

17 Institutional responsibility for the United Kingdom’s national-level social inclusion policy (which applies to all residents, regardless of their origins) is attributed formally to the Department of Communities and Local Governments, although in practice it is shared across various government departments, including the Department of Education; the Department of Business, Innovation, and Skills; and the Department of Work and Pensions. The Home Office has the responsibility for overseeing immigration policy and the integration of refugees. This dispersion of responsibility on social cohesion policy is multiplied by the multiple layers of governance resulting from administrative devolution.

The connection of the national integration office or department with a general ministerial portfolio (i.e. interior, employment, social affairs, or justice) usually reflects the predominant governmental approach to integration at a point in time in the country in question. Typically, the institutional framing of national or federal integration policy may adjust over time for a variety of reasons: as a result of changes in the composition and integration needs of the immigrant community, due to differing positions on immigration and integration of subsequent elected governments, or because of efforts to improve policy efficiency. In Sweden, for example, the government's decision to transfer the overall responsibility for integration within the Ministry of Employment in 2010—abolishing the former Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality—stemmed from the government's acknowledgment of the central role of labour market participation in successful immigrant integration, and the pressing need to enhance this participation amidst an employment crisis.<sup>18</sup>

In the Netherlands, the shift of the integration portfolio from the Ministry of Interior (2010-11) to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment largely reflected the change in government composition and support after the 2012 elections.<sup>19</sup> More broadly, the Netherlands' national-level integration policy has shifted between a concentrated and a mainstreamed approach several times since the 1980s. There was a dedicated Minister for Migration and Integration within the Department of Justice between 2002 and 2006. More recently, a trend toward deconcentrating the governance of integration and consolidating it with other policy areas has meant that the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment shares its responsibilities for integration with the Ministries of Education, Culture, and Science; Foreign Affairs; Security and Justice; and Health, Welfare, and Sports.

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*In the past five years, EU Member States have tended to move away from their recently established stand-alone integration (and immigration) ministries.*

The establishment of a stand-alone ministry or authority devoted to immigrant integration may sometimes represent a communication strategy for governments wishing to promote immigrant integration and gather public support for integration efforts. The appointment of an Integration Minister in Italy in April 2013 is an example of such a strategy.<sup>20</sup> In other contexts, the creation of a separate integration authority aimed to strengthen coordination among different ministerial actors involved in the design of integration-related policy measures, thus acknowledging the cross-cutting nature of the issue.

Concentrating the responsibility for immigrant integration in a dedicated ministry, rather than attaching it to a more general ministerial portfolio, may bear the risk of narrowing the scope of integration governance; perhaps one explanation for why, in the past five years, EU Member States have tended to move away from their recently established stand-alone integration (and immigration) ministries—for example, in Denmark<sup>21</sup> and Ireland.<sup>22</sup>

Frequent changes in the institutional organisation of integration policy at the national or federal level reflect the increasing attention on immigrant integration among EU countries, and their commitment to fine tuning its management. However, recurrent reorganisations of national responsibilities can negatively affect coordination with local and regional actors involved in the governance of integration. Disruptions and changes in points of contact and the transfer

18 The transfer of responsibility for introduction courses and the integration of new arrivals from the municipalities to the Public Employment Service (brought on by the reform of the *Introduction Act* and implemented as of December 2010) also reflects Sweden's increased attention to labour market outcomes in its approach to immigrant integration. These reforms stem from the fact that Sweden has one of the highest gaps in Europe in employment outcomes between the migrant and the native population, largely due to the significant shares of refugees and family migrants with low or unrecognised skill sets who do not participate in the country's labour market. For a discussion of the labour market integration of immigrants in Sweden, see Peter Bievelander and Nahikari Irastorza, *Catching Up: The Labour Market Integration of New Immigrants in Sweden* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2014), <http://migrationpolicy.org/research/catching-labor-market-outcomes-new-immigrants-sweden>.

19 The September 2012 elections led to a shift in the government coalition, from a pure centre-right coalition (of the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy and the Christian Democratic Appeal), to a more balanced one (formed by the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy and Sweden's labour party, the Social Democratic Workers' Party).

20 In February 2014, an ongoing overhaul of the government in Italy aimed, among other things, to reduce the number of ministers. In this context, the recently established office of the Minister of Integration will dissolve. This should not involve a major competence shift, as the concrete integration governance portfolios had remained within the ministries of interior and labour and social policy.

21 In Denmark, a dedicated Ministry of Refugees, Immigrants, and Integration was established in 2001. The Ministry was abolished in 2011, when the overall portfolio for integration was taken over under the broader remit of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Children, and Integration.

22 Ireland's Minister of State for Integration was established in 2007. The downgrading of national responsibilities on integration in 2011 was one of the consequences of the recession. Republic of Ireland, Department of Justice and Equality, 'Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration', accessed 23 March 2014, [www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/WP11000239](http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/WP11000239).

of files are among the practical challenges in recalibrating national-local coordination. Furthermore, these changes may also hamper receiving countries' cooperation with the countries of origin by adding to the complexity of identifying the appropriate interlocutors.

The multidimensional policy relevance of integration means its governance can hardly be undertaken by a single, dedicated ministerial department within rigid boundaries. Thus, the institutional actors involved in the governance of immigrant integration at the national level extend well beyond the dedicated departments or ministries,<sup>23</sup> and the responsibility for integration policy is generally shared horizontally among a diverse set of departments. In addition to ministries such as interior, justice, or employment; the ministry of foreign affairs may occasionally be involved in predeparture integration measures by way of the rules for admission.<sup>24</sup> The dedicated national offices for integration thus do not have a monopoly at the central level; instead, they typically define immigrant integration efforts across government by setting the overall integration strategy (for example through the adoption of national integration plans), coordinating the design and implementation of integration-related policies among departments, and ensuring that the various parts of government adhere to the country's integration strategy.

In Denmark, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Employment participate in the design of integration measures—in the areas of second-language learning and labour market inclusion, respectively—while the Ministry of Social Affairs, Children, and Integration defines the overall integration strategy and the Ministry of Justice (Danish Immigration Service) is responsible for immigration governance. A Transversal Committee of Ministers on Integration was created in 2011 to facilitate whole-of-government coordination on the issue.

In France, the main responsibility for integration at the national level rests with the *Direction de l'Accueil de l'Accompagnement des Étrangers et de la Nationalité* (Department of Foreigners' Reception and Nationality Support; DAAEN) within the Ministry of the Interior; and the French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII), affiliated with the Ministry of the Interior. OFII is mainly in charge of the integration of new arrivals. The Ministries of Social Affairs and Health; Education, Sports, and Youth; Employment; and Equal Opportunities also participate in the national governance of immigrant integration in France. An Interministerial Committee on Integration, led by the general secretary of the Minister of Interior and composed of all the ministries and secretaries involved in the governance of immigrant integration under the authority of the prime minister, ensures horizontal coordination.

Similarly, in Greece, the Ministries of Education, Culture, and Sports; Labour and Social Insurance; and Health all participate in the governance of immigrant integration, which is overseen by a dedicated department in the Ministry of Interior.

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In Ireland, after the abolition of the dedicated Ministry of State for Integration in 2011, the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration took over the cross-departmental mandate to promote, develop, lead, and coordinate immigrant integration policy. The Office also administers funding from national and EU sources for the promotion of immigrant integration. The actual delivery of integration services, however, is the responsibility of mainstream government departments.<sup>25</sup>

In Italy, even when there was a dedicated Integration Minister directly attached to the Prime Minister's office (April 2013 to February 2014), the preexisting immigration and integration departments in the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs shared the integration portfolio—and still exercised much of the influence. Within the Ministry of Interior, the Department of Civil Liberties and Immigration is responsible for the governance of civic participation and citizenship, religious practice, and the integration of ethnic minorities. It also manages the language exam for permits for long-term stays. The General Directorate of Immigration and Integration Policies within the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs is responsible for labour market integration and social inclusion, and also manages predeparture programmes for labour migrants. And the Ministry of Education, Universities and Research also

23 Scholars have termed this phenomenon the deconcentrated (or mainstreamed) dimension of integration governance. Peter Scholten, 'The Multilevel Governance of Migrant Integration: A Multilevel Governance Perspective on Dutch Migrant Integration Policies', in *The Discourses and Policies of Migration in Europe*, eds. Umut Korkut, Gregg Bucken-Knapp, Aidan McGarry, Jonas Hinnfors, and Helen Drake (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013).

24 In the Netherlands, for example, under the system of civic integration (*inburgering*), Dutch embassies or consulates in the country of departure administer exams to those migrants who are required to take civic integration examinations.

25 Republic of Ireland, Department of Justice and Equality, 'Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration', accessed 23 March 2014, [www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/WP11000239](http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/WP11000239).

participates in the governance of immigrant integration, as part of its broader remit on children and youth.

The multiplicity of governmental actors involved in the design and implementation of immigrant integration-related policies is not an obstacle *per se* to working with countries of migrant origin. In international relations more broadly, intergovernmental cooperation in complex and multidimensional policy areas more frequently occurs at the level of the specific ministerial departments involved in a specific area, rather than between general national coordinating authorities. However, the deconcentrated nature of the institutional governance of immigrant integration in receiving countries ought to be explained to potential interlocutors in countries of origin, so that the complex and diffuse nature of integration activity does not hamper cooperation efforts. Furthermore, consistent directions from the national level and efficient horizontal coordination among all the different ministerial departments are crucial for cooperation on integration with countries of origin.

## B. The subnational level

While governing the acquisition of nationality and the exercise of civic and political rights are traditional prerogatives of the central government, other dimensions of immigrant integration policy, such as socioeconomic and cultural inclusion, are largely managed at the subnational level. In all EU Member States, regional and local authorities manage the implementation and delivery of a broad range of measures and services in the areas of employment, social welfare, education, health, culture, social inclusion, and residential policies—all important dimensions of immigrant integration.<sup>26</sup> In many countries, integration policy first developed at the local level, and was only later recognised as a national policy priority. The geographic concentration of immigrants in cities and their uneven distribution across regions have contributed to this pattern of institutional development.

Scholars and practitioners alike recognise a bottom-up approach as the most appropriate for the governance of immigrant integration, as day-to-day interactions between immigrants and receiving societies primarily happen at the local level—a fact highlighted in the European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals. In the Agenda, the European Commission points out that immigrant integration is first and foremost a local phenomenon, and that local authorities play a prominent role in it, also due to their higher capacity to reach out to the civil society than national administrative actors.<sup>27</sup> For these reasons, the Agenda encourages a greater involvement of local authorities in formulating integration policies.

### 1. Federal or highly decentralised states

In federal or highly decentralised countries, the extensive institutional responsibilities of subnational authorities is a matter of policy design, and extends to the governance of immigrant integration. Thus, in countries such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom,<sup>28</sup> federated states, regions, and/or municipalities have directive, regulatory, and executive competences—to varying degrees—over key policy areas including education, employment, social inclusion, and health. This decentralised set-up enables policies that are tailored to the distinct needs of each specific area or community, an asset which is particularly relevant to integration governance given the uneven territorial distribution of immigrants.

However, regional and local autonomy in the design of integration-related policies risks asymmetrical and conflict-

26 The degree of autonomy of regional and local authorities in integration-related areas varies in function of the different administrative organisation of each country as well as by policy area. For example, policies of residential integration are most commonly designed and implemented by local authorities.

27 The European Commission's communication, 'European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals' has stressed the importance of the active involvement of local authorities in the formulation and implementation of integration policies. The Agenda has also proposed that the focus of EU funding on integration be on local, targeted approach in support of consistent strategies specifically designed to promote integration at the local level. See European Commission, 'European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals'; Council of the European Union, 3135<sup>th</sup> Council Meeting; European Union Committee of the Regions, 'Draft Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the New European Agenda for Integration'.

28 In the United Kingdom, the devolution of administrative and political competences to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland results in a high degree of decentralisation in these three jurisdictions. On the other hand, in England, governance is extremely centralised. Government of the United Kingdom, 'Devolution of powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland', 18 February 2013, [www.gov.uk/devolution-of-powers-to-scotland-wales-and-northern-ireland](http://www.gov.uk/devolution-of-powers-to-scotland-wales-and-northern-ireland).

ing policies within a single country—a potential result of divergent political orientations among regional and local authorities, varying migration patterns, or differing financial resources available for integration. To offset this risk and ensure consistency of integration governance at different administrative levels, some federal countries have recently introduced coordinating institutions or mechanisms.

In Germany, the *Länder* are the key integration policy actors. Each of the sixteen *Länder* has its own regional government, fully responsible for the design and implementation of education, employment, and social cohesion policies. The federal government has supervising responsibility in these areas, as well as a financially supportive role. Only in 2005, the *Immigration Act* recognised immigrant integration as a federal policy area, assigning responsibility of the integration of new arrivals to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. While this office—along with the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration—formally has the general mandate over integration, in practice, the core responsibility rests with the commissioners for Migration, Refugees, and Integration of each *Land*. In addition, municipalities also have great discretion in the design and implementation of integration-related policy measures, even when commitment to integration is lacking at the *Länder* level<sup>29</sup>. The *Land* of North-Rhine Westphalia—with the largest immigrant population in absolute numbers—was the first one to adopt its own integration law in 2012. Building on the traditional focus on integration in the regional education policy, this law has provided for the reorganisation of the Regional Centres for the Development of Children and Youth with Immigrant Background (RAA)—some of which had existed for more than two decades—into Regional Integration Centres (KI), with the aim of mainstreaming support to youth with immigrant background. In North-Rhine Westphalia, the education systems of cities like Essen, Cologne, and Düsseldorf all have programmes to support cultural diversity—in some cases by offering Islamic religion classes.

The overlapping powers inherent in the multilevel governance of integration across several policy areas may sometimes reduce efficiency. This risk tends to be higher if the policy prerogatives at different levels are rigid. Thus, in Germany, for example, the fragmentation of responsibilities and funding in the field of school education among the *Länder* (which control the organisation and content of education) and the municipalities (which are the key school providers) has been reported to hamper the efficient and systematic implementation of integration initiatives. For instance, while municipalities can establish more all-day schools in order to encourage integration, they need the financial approval from the *Länder*, which bear the costs for teachers.<sup>30</sup>

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To tackle such issues of coordination and jurisdiction, the 2006 National Action Plan of Integration encourages institutionalised cooperation on immigrant integration between different governmental levels through conferences, committees, and networks. The Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration—which is attached to the Chancellor’s Office—annually convenes all the integration commissioners of the *Länder* and the municipalities for the Federal Conference of the Integration Commissioners, with the aim of determining common integration policy priorities, thus improving coordination. At the city level, the Local Quality Circles for Integration Policy—a network of big cities managed by the city of Stuttgart—meets five times a year to discuss integration topics. But despite increased federal efforts since 2006, vertical coordination among the actors involved in integration governance in Germany is still considered insufficient to capitalise on the potential synergy and efficiency of a multilevel approach.<sup>31</sup>

Like Germany, Austria’s immigrant integration policies were developed at the state level well before the introduction of federal responsibility. Following years of political abstinence at the federal level, integration policy governance was restructured in 2011, with the creation of the State Secretariat for Integration within the Federal Ministry of Interior. With the government renewal after the 2013 elections, the State Secretariat for Integration has been attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Among the main functions of the State Secretariat are ensuring that states’ policies conform with the National Action Plan on integration and facilitating information exchange among the federal, state, and community levels.<sup>32</sup>

29 Thus, for example, in the absence of a state integration policy in Bavaria, the city of Munich developed its own integration policy.

30 See Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR), *Integration in the Federal system: Federation, States and the role of communities, Annual expert opinion 2012*, Berlin, 2012.

31 Ibid.

32 The State Secretariat for Integration is assisted by the Advisory Committee on Integration. For more information see Expert Council for Integration (Austria), *Integration Report 2012* (Vienna: Expert Council for Integration, 2012).



In the United Kingdom, social cohesion is framed as a local issue. The Department for Communities and Local Government has the coordinating responsibility at the central level, but in practice the design and implementation of policies for social inclusion is devolved to the administrations of Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and England. The central government, however, maintains the financial support function as a key directive instrument.<sup>33</sup>

Italy, too, has highly decentralised immigrant integration governance, since regions and local authorities have considerable autonomy in the areas of education, health, employment, social inclusion, and housing. Going a step farther than reflecting the nature of state institutions and responding to local needs (as in the case of Austria), in Italy the local lead on integration also originated from the need to fill a governance gap at the national level. The National Coordination Body for Social Integration Policies at the Local Level, as well as the territorial offices of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, ensure coordination among regional and local stakeholders in the area of social inclusion. The National Fund for Social Policies provides for central funding. And the national agency of the Ministry of Economy and Finances, *Italia Lavoro*, oversees targeted initiatives designed at the local level in support of the labour market integration of immigrants. In addition, the Territorial Councils for Immigration bring together representatives of local government and civil-society organisations that represent workers and employers, and report to the Department of Civil Liberties and Immigration of the Ministry of Interior, in order to ensure coherence on integration policy implementation at the local level.

In Greece, the reform of local government structures which entered into force in January 2011 (generally known as the *Kallikratis* programme) has transferred a substantive part of the management and implementation of integration and migration policy to seven newly established Decentralised Administration Structures.<sup>34</sup> The local government reform programme also mandated the creation of Migrant Integration Councils (MICs) in the 325 municipalities of the country. MICs are entrusted with a consultative role on immigrant integration. They include elected municipal councillors, representatives of migrant communities, and representatives of relevant nongovernmental organisations. So far more than 200 MIC's have been set up.<sup>35</sup> However, the actual role of MICs in integration governance so far remains limited.

In some EU Member States, the substantial devolution of policy responsibility on integration to autonomous communities in the absence of coordination mechanisms has resulted in diverging local and/or regional approaches to integration. Among other problems, this outcome complicates potential cooperation with countries of origin. In Belgium, where the three linguistic communities have been autonomous in policy design and implementation<sup>36</sup> since the defederalisation of integration policy in the 1980s, identity conflicts between the Dutch and French communities inform their divergent approaches to integration.<sup>37</sup>

In Spain, the core responsibility for the management of immigrant integration falls under the competence of municipalities and regional governments. The provision of integration services across the country's 17 regions is uneven, in part due to the specific linguistic features of some regions. The various regional and municipal bodies' diverging approaches on the conditions required for the provision of Integration Efforts Reports and Social Insertion Reports—which migrants need in order to obtain or renew permits—are particularly concerning.<sup>38</sup> And one particular development in Spain has reverberations across the local level: since the national Fund for the Reception and Integration of Immigrants and Education Support was abolished in 2012 due to the economic crisis, one of the most important levers for coordination among regional and local authorities has been disrupted.<sup>39</sup>

33 At the same time, the United Kingdom has traditionally had a whole-of government antidiscrimination approach at the national level. Acquisition of citizenship has also been widely discussed at the national level as a key instrument of immigrant integration.

34 Decentralised Administration Structures are one level above the regions. Except for the decentralised administrations of Attica and Crete, the other decentralised administrations comprise two or three regions each.

35 European Website on Integration, 'Country Information Sheets (Greece)' updated 21 March 2014, [http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/info\\_sheet.cfm?ID\\_CSHEET=50](http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/info_sheet.cfm?ID_CSHEET=50).

36 Despite the designation of a State Secretary in charge of Asylum, Migration, and Social Integration in December 2011, the linguistic communities have remained the main actors of integration governance in Belgium. Nevertheless, the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism also retains some coordination and legal power on integration at the federal level.

37 François De Smet, 'Les politiques d'intégration: mise à l'épreuve de l'identité intérieure' (Policy Papers Prix Charles Ullens 2011-12, Fondation Roi Baudouin, Brussels), [www.kbs-frb.be/uploadedFiles/2012-KBS-FRB/05\\_Pictures\\_documents\\_and\\_external\\_sites/09\\_Publications/2012\\_PolicyPapers\\_PrixUllens\\_PolitiquesIntegration.pdf](http://www.kbs-frb.be/uploadedFiles/2012-KBS-FRB/05_Pictures_documents_and_external_sites/09_Publications/2012_PolicyPapers_PrixUllens_PolitiquesIntegration.pdf).

38 Maria Vincenza Desiderio, 'Country Notes: Recent Changes in Migration Movement and Policies – Spain', *International Migration Outlook 2012* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012), [www.oecd.org/els/mig/IMO%202012\\_Country%20note%20Spain.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/IMO%202012_Country%20note%20Spain.pdf).

39 The Spanish Fund for the Reception and Integration of Immigrants and Education Support Fund was created in 2005 to support the consistent development of integration policy across the country.

## 2. Centralised states

In centralised states, policy design in integration-related areas remains largely a prerogative of the central government. But local authorities—frequently at the municipal level—play a considerable role in implementing immigrant integration measures, although with varying degrees of independence across countries. In all INTERACT EU priority countries, cities have discretion to develop local initiatives to address the particular needs of communities within their territories.

Denmark is a relatively centralised state in which regions have little policymaking autonomy. Nevertheless, managing and implementing integration and inclusion policies is the full responsibility of cities, with a high degree of independence. The two cities with the highest concentration of migrants—Copenhagen and Aarhus—both have municipal integration policies and have adapted their general policies in education and employment to better serve integration goals. A nationwide integration network fosters vertical cooperation between Danish municipalities and the national-level Ministry of Social Affairs, Children, and Integration.

In Sweden, the shift in the responsibility for coordinating the introduction of new arrivals to the Public Employment Service following the implementation of the new *Swedish Introduction Act* (December 2010) has reduced the integration competences of the municipalities. However, municipalities still maintain some specific responsibilities such as arranging Swedish courses for immigrants, offering civic orientation, and providing access to school and housing.

France is the most centralised state among the INTERACT EU priority countries. The responsibility for integration and social cohesion policy formulation, funding, and management remains with the central government. Furthermore, central government representatives are also involved in implementing policy measures at the local level. The local programmes for integration (PRIPI) are established by state services (DAAEN), in cooperation with the French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII), the National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunities (l'Acisé), specialised NGOs, and local authorities—notably, the Regional Directions of Youth, Sports, and Social Cohesion (DRJSCS) and the social departments of the local offices of health and social affairs (DRASS). Funding is also a key instrument through which the central government influences the delivery of policies affecting immigrant integration at the local level. The government uses a bilateral contractual framework for coordination between national and the local authorities, which is based on the Urban Contracts for Social Cohesion (CUCs) that the government concludes with interested cities. The government then allocates funding to the municipality according to the defined priorities, and the local administration is required to address these items. L'Acisé participates with local authorities in the design and implementation of local initiatives through the CUCs.

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*Territorial pacts and other overarching mechanisms fostering coordination...are key instruments for ensuring consistent integration policy.*

As the above country examples illustrate, the multidimensional structure of integration governance at the central level is replicated at the regional and local level, where several departments or territorial offices are generally in charge of managing and delivering integration-related services. Thus, the involvement of multiple institutional actors at various levels of governance amplifies the administrative complexity of integration policy-making in the EU receiving countries. In this context, territorial pacts and other overarching mechanisms fostering coordination at both the horizontal and the vertical level are key instruments for ensuring consistent integration policy development and implementation in each country.

International migration is simultaneously a global and local phenomenon. The presence of family or community members in a destination, migration policy regulations, colonial and linguistic ties, geographic proximity, skill development measures, and the specific appeal of certain urban or regional areas for particular migrant groups all tend to favour a concentration of migrants from the same origin and with similar characteristics (such as education or skill level), settling in the same destinations as each other, at least in the initial period after migration.<sup>40</sup> The regional or local concentration of migrants varies greatly depending on the country of origin.<sup>41</sup> Against this background, it is easy to see how a

40 For a discussion of the determinants of chain migration, see Thomas Bauer, Gil Epstein, and Ira N. Gang, 'Herd Effects or Migration Networks? The Location Choice of Mexican Immigrants in the US' (IZA Discussion Paper No.551, August 2002), <http://ftp.iza.org/dp551.pdf>. For a discussion of regional migration patterns and regional concentration of migrants see OECD, 'Regional Aspects of Migration', *Trends in International Migration*, SOPEMI 2003 Edition (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2004), [www.oecd.org/els/mig/37965266.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/37965266.pdf).

41 In Canada for example, Asian immigrants showed a greater level of geographic concentration as compared to immigrants born in Northern and Western Europe and in the United States. Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), *Vers une répartition géogra-*

multilevel administrative structure for the governance of immigrant integration can offer opportunities for integration management tailored to ‘the diverse diversities’ in receiving countries.

## C. *The role of the European Union*

Although the European Union cannot determine the integration strategies of Member States, it does provide a framework for coordination, monitoring, benchmarking, and information exchange in integration policymaking. By supporting cooperation on common integration challenges, EU institutions can improve fragmented integration governance structures at the national level by bringing together relevant actors across multiple levels of administration. This ‘soft power’ is enhanced by financial instruments, notably the European Integration Fund and the European Social Fund.

### 1. Offering guidelines for immigrant integration

The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009, provides an explicit legal basis for EU initiatives in support of Member States’ policy-making in the area of immigrant integration. Article 79.4 of the amended Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states that:

*‘The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may establish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of Member States with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.’<sup>42</sup>*

The Lisbon Treaty officially recognised a strategy that EU institutions had already deployed since 1999 to facilitate the development of a common framework for integration,<sup>43</sup> while preventing the Union from advancing binding legislation (in the form of directives or regulations) in this area.<sup>44</sup>

Member States had called for more dynamic integration policies at the European Council of Tampere in 1999,<sup>45</sup> creating the impetus for a number of key supporting instruments and initiatives which today frame the EU role in the governance of immigrant integration. The first instrument, the network of National Contact Points on Integration,<sup>46</sup> is still the key coordination mechanism for integration policy. The network brings together government officials from the central integration department or ministry in each Member State. These officials meet several times a year, participating in a regular exchange of information and good practices in integration management. Beginning in 2004, the European Commission published and regularly updated a *Handbook on Integration for policy-makers and practitioners*, in cooperation with the National Contact Points on Integration.<sup>47</sup>

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*phique mieux équilibrée des immigrants*, Études spéciales (Ottawa: CIC Research, 2001), <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/Ci51-109-2002F.pdf>.

42 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), consolidated version, art 79.4, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:ccccda77-8ac2-4a25-8e66-a5827ecd3459.0010.02/DOC\\_1&format=PDF](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:ccccda77-8ac2-4a25-8e66-a5827ecd3459.0010.02/DOC_1&format=PDF).

43 Earlier, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) for the first time had allowed the EU institutions to shape policy decisions in this area, granting the Commission the right of initiative (i.e. adoption of communications, common principles and agendas). However, in derogation to the supranational approach, decisions on legal migration and integration are still subject to the unanimous consensus of all the Member States (until a common framework in this area is adopted; see Article 67 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). The European Commission cannot initiate binding legislation in this area, but instead depends on voluntary cooperation among Member States for the realisation of its proposals. Nevertheless, after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), the European Commission has increasingly contributed to the development of a common framework for integration among the Member States through nonbinding “soft law” initiatives.

44 Besides its limited competences in the specific domains of immigrant integration and legal migration management, the Commission has put forward legislation in key related areas, including the respect of the principles of equality and nondiscrimination, and secured juridical status for legally resident third-country nationals.

45 European Parliament, ‘Tampere European Council 15-16 October 1999: Presidency Conclusions’, accessed 23 March 2014, [www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm).

46 The National Contact Points of Integration were established at the request of the Justice and Home Affairs Council in 2002.

47 Handbooks on Integration aimed at driving information exchange and pointing out prominent trends and challenges in the governance of integration policy across the Member States. The second edition of the handbook had a focus on the multilevel governance of immigrant integration. Jan Niessen and Yongmi Schibel, *Handbook on Integration for policy-makers and practitioners*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition

The adoption of the Common Basic Principles (CBPs) and the Common Agenda on Integration in 2004-05 represented intensifying cooperation on integration issues at the EU level. The Common Basic Principles were intended to “underpin a coherent European framework on integration of third-country nationals.”<sup>48</sup> The Common Agenda planned for a series of mechanisms for implementing this framework, including the European Website on Integration<sup>49</sup> and the European Integration Forum, both aimed at connecting with civil-society organisations and enhancing information exchange among stakeholders involved in the governance of immigrant integration. Since 2009, the European Commission has convened the European Integration Forum twice a year, in cooperation with the European Economic and Social Committee for consultation on specific thematic issues. The forum brings together about 100 civil society representatives from all EU Member States.<sup>50</sup> The European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, adopted in 2011,<sup>51</sup> has gone a step further in the area of knowledge exchange by establishing the European Integration Modules, which are flexible reference frameworks in thematic areas of integration policymaking that are formulated based on the existing evidence of what works across the Member States.<sup>52</sup>

## 2. Funding for immigrant integration

Funding is another key instrument through which the European Union can shape integration policy developments in Member States. The most targeted financing instrument is the European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals (EIF), established in 2007. The EIF, which is managed by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Home Affairs (DG HOME), supports Member States’ efforts for the social, civic, and cultural integration of third-country nationals, with a focus on newly arrived immigrants.<sup>53</sup> EIF-funded measures belong to three broad categories depending on who they target: third-country nationals, the host society as a whole, or the policymakers and staff of organisations dealing with immigrant integration in Member States. Funded measures that benefit third-country nationals directly include predeparture measures in the country of origin, along with instruments and initiatives for their reception and participation in the receiving society (such as language classes, civic orientation, social and legal guidance, and preliminary actions for facilitating labour market insertion, among others).

Most of the EIF funding is channelled through national governments, who disperse the money to a large number of public and private actors at the local, regional, and national level. At the Commission initiative, 7 per cent of the available funding may be used to finance transnational actions, or actions that interest the European Union. For example, the Integrating Cities Process, aimed at promoting the implementation of the Common Basic Principles on Integration at the local level, as well as the EUROCITIES Charter of Integrating Cities, have been implemented with the support

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(Brussels: European Communities, 2007), [www.migpolgroup.com/public/docs/17.IntegrationHandbookII\\_EN\\_05.07.pdf](http://www.migpolgroup.com/public/docs/17.IntegrationHandbookII_EN_05.07.pdf). The third edition was published in 2009. Jan Niessen and Thomas Huddleston, *Handbook on Integration for policy-makers and practitioners*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (Brussels: European Communities, 2009), [http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/doc1\\_12892\\_168517401.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/doc1_12892_168517401.pdf).

48 European Commission, ‘A Common Agenda for Integration: Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union’.

49 The European Website on Integration was established in 2009. See European Website on Integration, home page, <http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/>. It contains detailed information on integration governance structures and integration practices at the national/federal and local levels in EU Member States.

50 In its sixth meeting in November 2011 the European Integration Forum was convened to start a debate on the involvement of countries of origin, civil-society organisations, and diaspora networks in immigrant integration. Issues addressed included cooperation with origin-country actors on the design and the implementation of predeparture measures, recognition of qualifications and skills, the role of local and regional authorities and social partners in such cooperation, the positive contribution of transnationalism to immigrant integration and reintegration, and the feasibility and benefits of circular migration. See European Integration Forum, ‘Summary Report – Sixth meeting of the European Integration Forum: The involvement of countries of origin in the integration process’ (Brussels, 9-10 November 2011), [http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/static\\_38\\_196892198.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/static_38_196892198.pdf).

51 European Commission, ‘European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals’.

52 The European Commission has prepared draft European Integration Modules in consultation with EU Member States and civil-society organisation representatives in three areas: introductory courses and language classes, commitment by the receiving society, and active participation of migrants in all aspects of collective life. For more information on the Draft European Integration Modules, see European Commission, Directorate-General of Home Affairs, *Draft European Modules on Migrant Integration* (Brussels: European Commission, 2011), [http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/doc1\\_25494\\_793453556.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/doc1_25494_793453556.pdf).

53 The European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals (EIF) was established with a Council of the European Union decision of 25 June 2007 as a part of the General Programme, ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’. See Council of the European Union, ‘Council decision establishing the European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the General programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’, 25 June 2007, 2007/435/EC, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:168:0018:0036:EN:PDF>. Denmark does not participate in the EIF. The other three funds established within the programme, and managed by the Directorate-General for Home Affairs are the External Borders Fund, the European Refugee Fund, and the European Return Fund. The EIF budget for 2007-13 was 825 million euros.

of EIF funding.<sup>54</sup>

The Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows framework is a financial initiative that establishes funds that aim to advance various migration-related goals, including the European Integration Fund and the European Refugee Fund (ERF). The ERF can finance, among other measures, actions related to the integration of asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection.<sup>55</sup>

With a much greater budget available, the European Social Fund (ESF) complements the EIF in the area of supporting the social inclusion of immigrants through labour market insertion efforts in their receiving countries.<sup>56</sup> The ESF is administered by the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs, and Inclusion (DG EMPL). As the EU structural fund aimed at promoting active inclusion of all EU residents into the labour market, the ESF does not target immigrants as its focus category. However, among its priority areas is supporting the labour market insertion of people from disadvantaged groups—explicitly including migrants and people with migrant background (second and later generations).<sup>57</sup> Member States have increasingly used the ESF to improve migrants’ labour market participation.<sup>58</sup> As the economic crisis has tightened national budgets for integration-related measures across EU Member States, the availability of ESF assistance may enhance the European Union’s capacity to influence and coordinate decisionmaking and policy implementation in integration-related areas at the national and local levels.

While EU initiatives and funding are key instruments of (nonbinding) coordination of the Member States’ national and local integration policies, responsibility for integration-related policy areas at the European level is actually distributed across various Directorates-General of the European Commission. This distribution of responsibilities reflects and replicates the deconcentration of administrative structures dealing with integration-related issues at the national and local levels. DG HOME oversees the integration of first generation migrants from third countries, as part of the EU efforts to create a common immigration policy. Meanwhile, DG EMPL covers the integration-related issues of resident migrants and EU mobile citizens within its broader focus on social inclusion.<sup>59</sup> The Directorate-General for Education and Culture (DG EAC) also deals with integration-related issues, notably with respect to the integration of immigrant children and youth through schooling and education. Finally, while the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO) has no competence in the area of immigrant integration in the EU countries, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility<sup>60</sup> has created new opportunities for building synergies between DG DEVCO and the other DGs working in the area of integration.<sup>61</sup> In particular, stepping-up cross-departmental cooperation in pre-departure measures and diaspora engagement could be a key element of a strategy to support the three-way approach to immigrant integration.<sup>62</sup>

Other EU institutions participating in the governance of immigrant integration at the EU level are the Council of the European Union, namely in its configuration as JHA Council the Standing Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Standing Committee for Employment and Social Affairs of the European Parliament; the Commission for Citizenship, Governance, Institutional Affairs, and External Relations (CIVEX) of the Committee of Regions; and the Social Affairs Section of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC).

54 The funding was delivered through the DIVE and MIXITIES PROJECTS. See Integrating Cities, home page, accessed 23 March 2014, [www.integratingcities.eu](http://www.integratingcities.eu).

55 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, ‘Decision establishing the European Refugee Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 as a part of the General Programme “Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows” and repealing Council Decision 2004/904 EC’, 23 May 2007, 573/2007/EC, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:144:0001:0021:EN:PDF>. The European Refugee Fund’s budget for the period 2008-13 is 628 million euros.

56 The European Social Fund (ESF) has an overall annual budget of 10 billion euro. European Social Fund, home page, accessed 23 May 2014, <http://ec.europa.eu/esf/home.jsp>.

57 Migrants are explicitly mentioned in recital 6 and articles 3 and 10.

58 Approximately 1.5 per cent of the total ESF budget until the end of 2008.

59 Thus, for example, the European Agenda for New Skills and New Jobs identifies the successful labour market inclusion of immigrants as a key step for meeting the employment target under the Europe 2020 strategy to foster EU growth and competitiveness. European Commission, ‘An Agenda for new skills and jobs: A European contribution towards full employment’, 23 November 2010, COM(2010) 682 final, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0682:FIN:en:PDF>.

60 European Commission, ‘The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’. This communication has strengthened the external dimension of the European Union’s migration policy. The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) constitutes the overarching framework of the EU external migration policy. Mobility Partnerships and Migration Dialogues are the key drivers of the GAMM.

61 For the position of the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO) on migration related areas, see the European Commission, ‘Maximising the Development Impact of Migration’.

62 In this context it is important to mention that DG DEVCO is the main funder of the Africa-Europe Platform of diaspora organisations. Africa Europe Platform, home page, accessed 23 March 2014, [www.ae-platform.org](http://www.ae-platform.org).

### III. ORIGIN-COUNTRY INVOLVEMENT IN THE GOVERNANCE OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION: A MAPPING OF ACTORS

#### A. *Changing approaches toward diaspora engagement and integration among origin countries*

How traditional countries of migrant origin engage with their diasporas has transformed over the past 15 years. A number of countries with large emigrant communities abroad have moved from trying to exert tight control over the diaspora, to a markedly more open attitude, aimed at engaging their overseas populations and maintaining a richer relationship. Along with this shift, many governments have begun to actively support the economic integration of their nationals in receiving countries, and to a lesser extent, have also turned their attention to civic and political participation.<sup>63</sup> An increased awareness of the multiple positive contributions that migrants can bring to the development of their home countries underpins these trends. These contributions include remittances, knowledge transfers, direct investments, and entrepreneurship, as well as the ability to 'market' their origin countries abroad—and thus attract tourists and foreign investors, stimulate trade, or even channel broader geopolitical benefits.<sup>64</sup> Countries of origin have started to acknowledge that successfully integrated diaspora members are more likely to contribute to development back home.

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*Countries with large emigrant communities abroad have moved from trying to exert tight control over the diaspora, to a markedly more open attitude.*

The durability of transnational links implies that integration in the receiving country does not automatically diminish migrants' commitment to their country of origin, and that migrants can accommodate transnational identities and dual loyalties.<sup>65</sup> Furthermore, new technology and lower travel and communication costs have enhanced the transnational activities of emigrants, making governments in countries of origin more conscious of the importance of gaining the trust of increasingly influential populations living abroad. Thus, governments in many of the major immigrant-origin countries have progressively moved away from rhetoric that equates integration at the destination to betrayal of the homeland, and have also been waiving policy regulations and actions that hampered the full integration of their nationals in their host countries.<sup>66</sup> Some of those countries are also increasingly working to empower the members of their diaspora in receiving societies.

63 Since origin countries offer support to the integration of their emigrants in destination countries as a way to empower and engage the diaspora for development, support policies mainly target the insertion of emigrants in labour markets and, to a lesser extent, social, civic, and political representation systems of receiving countries. Support for sociocultural integration tends to be more tepid, since countries of origin may perceive this activity as a challenge to its nationals' sense of belonging, and thus the sovereignty of the origin country over its nationals (and their descendants).

64 Kathleen Newland and her collaborators argue that an engaged diaspora can act as a counterweight to the emigration of skilled nationals, contributing to job creation, business development, and economic growth—all without the need for migrants to relocate permanently back to their countries of origin. In fact, their position outside the country facilitates skills and capital transfers. See Kathleen Newland, ed. *Diasporas: New Partners in Global Development Policy* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2010); Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias and Kathleen Newland, *Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners in Home and Host Countries* (Washington, DC and Geneva: Migration Policy Institute and International Organisation for Migration, 2012), [www.migrationpolicy.org/research/developing-road-map-engaging-diasporas-development-handbook-policymakers-and-practitioners](http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/developing-road-map-engaging-diasporas-development-handbook-policymakers-and-practitioners). See also Kathleen Newland and Sonia Plaza, *What We Know About Diasporas and Economic Development* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2013), <http://migrationpolicy.org/research/what-we-know-about-diasporas-and-economic-development>.

65 For a discussion of the mechanisms through which transnational links and integration in the destination country can coexist based on the experience of Pakistani migrants in Norway see Erdal, 'Migrant Transnationalism and Multi-Layered Integration'.

66 For an analysis of shifting state approaches to emigrants, respectively in Morocco and China, see Hein De Haas, 'Between courting and controlling: the Moroccan state and "its" emigrants' (working paper no.54, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society [COMPAS], University of Oxford, 2007), [www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/between-courting-and-controlling-the-moroccan-state-and-its-emigrants](http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/between-courting-and-controlling-the-moroccan-state-and-its-emigrants); Pál Nyiri, 'Expatriating is patriotic? The discourse on "new migrants" in the People's Republic of China and identity construction among recent migrants from the PRC', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27 no. 4 (2001): 635-53.

Turkey and Morocco, two major countries of origin of among Europe's immigrants, illustrate the recent trend among countries of origin toward a more open and supportive approach to the integration of their emigrants.<sup>67</sup> Although Morocco has traditionally maintained strong ties with Moroccans living abroad, the nature of this relationship has changed significantly over time. Until the early 1990s, the government's policies actively discouraged emigrants' integration and political participation in European countries, due to fears that Moroccan dissidents would politically organise abroad and cause unrest in their homeland.<sup>68</sup> The government also assumed that migrants' integration in destination countries would hamper their contributions to Morocco, which were expected to stem from emigrants eventually returning to Morocco. Control policies were enforced in Europe through the network of Moroccan embassies and consulates, mosques, and government-controlled migrant associations such as the *Amicales*, established in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France.<sup>69</sup> Especially during the 1970s and the 1980s, the Moroccan government perceived the political and civic organisation of Moroccan migrants in Europe as a threat, and actively deterred migrants from joining trade unions and political parties, and from voting in destination countries' local elections. As a result, the government also did not seek protection for Moroccan workers' rights abroad.<sup>70</sup>

*Over the past 20 years, Morocco has built a diaspora engagement strategy based on a new understanding of the compatibility between Moroccans' integration in their receiving countries and their loyalty to Morocco.*

In the 1990s, however, a series of converging events prompted a shift in the focus of Morocco's policies toward its emigrants. The government tried to build trust among the diaspora community in order to grasp its development contributions.<sup>71</sup> As a more liberal political regime rose to power in Morocco, its ruling elite came to acknowledge the counterproductive effects of tight control policies on emigrants' attachment to Morocco and their development contributions in their sending regions. During this time, a growing number of Moroccans were settling permanently in Europe after the end of the guest-worker era. Moroccans Residents Abroad, as they were now called in government communications, were seen as a powerful part of Moroccan society, whose most significant contributions to the socioeconomic development of the homeland would stem from successful economic—and, to a lesser extent, social and cultural—integration in their destination countries.

Over the past 20 years, Morocco has built a diaspora engagement strategy based on a new understanding of the

**Box 1. How the conditions of emigration shape origin countries' approaches to integration in receiving countries**

Morocco illustrates that the predominant reason for migration, as well as the profile of the diaspora community, shape origin countries' approaches to the social and political integration of their emigrants. Diaspora engagement and support for emigrant integration in receiving countries is generally more straightforward when the country of origin is not experiencing political or civil unrest, does not have a despotic regime that engages in broad violations of civil liberties, and when the emigrant population is mainly comprised of economic migrants. Conversely, when emigration is driven by domestic conflicts and the diaspora consists mainly of refugees and dissidents, the origin-country government may attempt to control the diaspora and repress its integration abroad, notably discouraging political participation. This scenario has recently played out in Russia, as well as among the North African and the Middle Eastern countries that have experienced opposition movements and civil unrest commonly referred to as the Arab Spring, notably Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria.

Since political regimes in many developing countries tend to vary over time, fluctuations between repressive and supportive approaches to the integration of emigrants can be expected, having varied effects on the integration patterns of different generations of migrants.

*Source:* Author's analysis based on the available body of literature.

67 European University Institute (EUI) estimates based on Eurostat and National Statistical Institutes data indicate that in 2010, the stock of EU residents born in Turkey was 2,604,772. The corresponding figure for the Moroccan born was 2,366,388. As these figures only include first-generation migrants, they only refer to one part of the broader diaspora for each country.

68 Since independence, the Moroccan government has actively encouraged emigration. In the 1960s, the government also shaped emigration patterns, prioritising emigration from regions where dissidence and political turbulence could menace the development of the new independent state (notably the Eastern part of the Rif area, the Southwestern Sous region, and the oases located Southeast of the High Atlas). Migration was used as a safety valve to relieve internal tensions, and recruiters from Western European countries were directed to these regions. Meanwhile, the government issued passports selectively. This trend led to the seemingly paradoxical situation where emigration was encouraged but harshly controlled, along with an effort to reduce the risk of dissident migrants organising themselves in countries of destination. De Haas, 'Between courting and controlling'.

69 The *Amicales des Marocaines* were migrant organisations established and controlled by the Moroccan government in the main European receiving countries of Moroccan emigrants. They were established in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands in 1973. Officially aimed at helping Moroccans abroad develop social and cultural activities to preserve their cultural heritage, they also acted as a control apparatus of the Moroccan government.

70 De Haas, 'Between courting and controlling'; Fatima Ait Madani, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report—Morocco* (Florence: EUI, 2014 forthcoming).

71 De Haas, 'Between courting and controlling'.

compatibility between Moroccans' integration in their receiving countries and their loyalty to Morocco. Under this strategy, the Moroccan government supports economic integration and the civic and political participation of Moroccan residents abroad, with the hope of drawing high returns for the country's development.<sup>72</sup> The coexisting objectives of supporting the functional integration of emigrants while preserving and strengthening the attachment to Morocco imply that the government has not completely given up on controlling the diaspora abroad, but has rather softened its approach. Thus, while part of the control apparatus was dismantled, Morocco continues to send imams and teachers of Moroccan culture and the Arabic language abroad—although this policy aims primarily at preventing the spread of Islamic radicalism<sup>73</sup> rather than an effort to impede cultural integration in receiving countries.<sup>74</sup> Similarly, while the Moroccan state now favours the naturalisation of Moroccans abroad as a way of rooting Moroccan communities in Europe and simultaneously allowing the circulation of Moroccans between their home and host countries,<sup>75</sup> Moroccan citizenship remains constitutionally inalienable, which means that Moroccan descendants who are citizens of European countries are still subject—to a certain extent—to the king's sovereignty.

In Turkey too, there has been a positive shift in the government's approach toward the integration of emigrants in European destination countries. In the 1980s, the inception of economic liberalisation and growth along with Turkish emigrants' transition from temporary to permanent settlement abroad prompted an initial change in the government's attitude toward the diaspora. During this decade, the government became more tolerant of dual citizenship, allowing Turkish expatriates to acquire the nationality of their destination countries while still maintaining their Turkish nationality.<sup>76</sup> A more remarkable evolution occurred in the 1990s, when the government started to perceive Turks living in Europe as a lobbying tool for advancing Turkey's broad geopolitical interests, notably its accession to the European Union.<sup>77</sup> The financial contribution of the Turkish diaspora to Turkey's economic development—which was already not a major force in the country's economy<sup>78</sup>—became even less relevant in the face of the potential political contribution of the 'Euro-Turks' in marketing Turkey as a European nation by virtue of their successful integration in their EU destinations. Therefore the Turkish government actively encouraged civic and political participation among migrants and their descendants in EU receiving countries, and supported the acquisition of the receiving-country language and culture as a way of promoting Turkey's claims to EU accession.<sup>79</sup>

- 72 The Moroccan diaspora engagement policy has proven successful in attracting remittance transfers. The government has encouraged these since 1995 through new regulations on the opening of foreign bank accounts for expatriates, and by establishing overseas branches of Moroccan banks. The steep increase in remittances in the 2001-06 period is also linked to the constant increase in the number of Moroccans returning during summer holidays.
- 73 The government considers the radical Islamist movement, both within Morocco and in the diaspora, as the main threat to the established political order in Morocco. In this sense, security objectives of EU Member States and Morocco coincide.
- 74 The Moroccan case demonstrates that origin-country support to the functional integration of its diaspora in receiving countries is less controversial than efforts toward cultural and political integration.
- 75 In the mid-1990s Morocco launched an initiative to facilitate and promote emigrants' annual summer vacation trip to Morocco. This initiative, known as *Opération Transit*, was prompted by the realisation that the prior 'control' approach to managing emigration, ongoing until the 1980s, had created mistrust and discouraged expatriates from visiting Morocco. Through this strategy, the Moroccan government also marketed the country as a safe tourist destination for Europeans. *Opération Transit* is currently managed by the Mohammed V Foundation for Solidarity.
- 76 The Turkish government's increased tolerance of dual citizenship was partly a result of the pressure exerted by various expatriate Turkish organisations, whose lobbying power had been strengthening as a consequence of the growing proportion of citizens living abroad. Economic considerations and the evolution of the official national self-understanding of Turkish identity coincided with the changes in citizenship rules, which began in 1981 with the introduction of an amendment to the citizenship law allowing dual citizenship. Further reforms in 1995 introduced the pink card (renamed blue card since 2009), which allows members of the Turkish diaspora who renounced their Turkish nationality to take the nationality of their country of settlement while still enjoying similar rights as Turkish citizens, save for voting. For a discussion of the evolution of Turkey's approach to the citizenship of Turkish descendants living in Europe, see Zeynep Kadirbeyogly, 'National Transnationalism: Dual Citizenship in Turkey' in *Dual Citizenship in Europe: From Nationhood to Societal Integration*, ed. Thomas Faist (Hampshire, United Kingdom: Ashgate, 2007); and Ahmet İcduygu and F. Keyman, 'Globalization, Migration and Citizenship: The Case of Turkey' in *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, eds. Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs (London: Continuum, 2003), 193-206. See also Deniz Karci Korfali, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report – Turkey* (Florence: EUI, 2014 forthcoming).
- 77 Ozge Bilgili and Melissa Siegel, 'Understanding the Changing Role of the Turkish Diaspora', (UNU-MERIT Working Paper No. 39/2011, United Nations University and Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht, Netherlands, 2011), [www.merit.unu.edu/publications/wppdf/2011/wp2011-039.pdf](http://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/wppdf/2011/wp2011-039.pdf).
- 78 While remittances have always helped pay for imports to Turkey, they have also always remained a small part of the country's gross domestic product. Also, due to corruption and mismanagement, measures for engaging the diaspora in economic activities and economic development in Turkey have failed. And according to the World Bank (2009), the flow of remittances to Turkey has declined drastically in the past ten years, partly attributed to the government's decreased prioritisation of securing remittance flows to Turkey. Ahmet İcduygu, *International Migrant Remittances in Turkey*, CARIM Research Report no.7 (Florence: EUI, 2006), [www.carim.org/publications/CARIM-AS06\\_07-Icduygu.pdf](http://www.carim.org/publications/CARIM-AS06_07-Icduygu.pdf).
- 79 Kemal Kirişci, 'Three Way Approach' to Meeting the Challenges of Migrant Incorporation in the European Union: Reflections from a Turkish Perspective, CARIM Research Reports, no. 03/2008 (Florence: European University Institute, 2008), <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/8291>. After the interruption of negotiations for Turkey's accession to the European Union, and in light of the increas-



## Box 2. Case study: The Philippines' labour market integration strategies in support of the diaspora

The Philippines has pioneered labour market integration strategies for overseas citizens. The country trains and protects its mostly low-skilled workforce abroad through the institutionalised national contract migration programme, which began in the mid-1970s. Support for the labour market integration of redundant workers abroad is an essential component of the government's workforce and economic development strategies. Moreover, the state's commitment to protecting overseas workers' welfare and employment conditions has been strengthened over time through legislative action such as the passage of the *Migrant Workers Act of 1995* (Republic Act [RA] 8042), amended in 2007 and 2010. The Act lays down the principles governing diaspora policy and the responsibilities of the multiple governmental bodies involved in diaspora policy design and implementation. RA 8042 encourages the deployment of Filipino workers overseas by local recruitment agencies, and states that overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) 'are to be deployed only in countries where the rights of Filipino migrant workers are protected'.

In line with these principles, the Philippines government has been active in negotiating bilateral labour agreements, conventions on the recognition of qualifications, and social security arrangements with the main receiving countries of OFWs. According to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, to date there have been 44 labour migration agreements—either Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs, which are nonbinding) or Memoranda of Agreement (MoAs, which are binding). These exist with 20 countries, including an agreement on labour migration management cooperation with Spain, and agreements concerning recruitment and the health sector workforce with the United Kingdom. Conventions on the recognition of Philippine seafarers' certificates have been concluded with 34 countries; including Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, and Sweden. And agreements on the portability of social security rights exist with Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, as well as a few non-EU countries.

The Philippine government also provides pre- and postdeparture assistance to migrants. The Commission on Filipinos Overseas organises compulsory predeparture orientation and peer counselling seminars, and the optional pre-employment orientation seminar. The government also offers a post-arrival orientation seminar and a vast array of assistance services and labour and social integration programmes in destination countries, through the network of Philippine embassies and consulates, as well as the Migrant Workers and Other Overseas Filipinos Resource Centres and the Philippine Overseas Labour Offices. These centres and offices are established in several countries with large Filipino-origin communities.

The Philippines' state diaspora policy stands out for covering all the phases of the labour migration process, and for the government's active and longstanding engagement in bilateral, regional, and multilateral initiatives and partnerships for improving the labour market integration and social protection of Filipinos abroad. This kind of engagement on behalf of labour emigrants is a rising trend among many other countries of origin.

*Source:* Maria Theresa Sindico-Guillaume, INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report— Philippines (Florence: European University Institute, 2014 forthcoming); Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), 'Bilateral Labor Agreements', accessed 25 April 2014, [www.poea.gov.ph/lmi\\_kiosk/labor\\_agreements.htm](http://www.poea.gov.ph/lmi_kiosk/labor_agreements.htm); POEA, 'Bilateral Labor Agreements for Filipino Seafarers', accessed 25 April 2014, [www.poea.gov.ph/blas/BLA\\_Seafarers.pdf](http://www.poea.gov.ph/blas/BLA_Seafarers.pdf); Center for Migrant Advocacy, Bilateral Labor Agreements and Social Security Agreements (Quezon City, Philippines: Center for Migrant Advocacy, 2012), <http://centerformigrantadvocacy.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/bilateral-labor-agreements-and-social-security-agreements1.pdf>.

The fact that prominent origin countries such as Morocco and Turkey have recently themselves become countries of destination for significant numbers of immigrants—and are thus confronted with the need to integrate immigrant populations in their own societies—might also partly explain the shift toward a more positive approach to the integration of their emigrants abroad.

## B. How origin countries can participate in immigrant integration: An overview

Changing views on the potential contributions of a diaspora to an origin country's development and geostrategic objectives has led to an expansion of policy activities to empower and engage emigrant communities. Correspondingly, origin countries' institutional structures for dealing with their diasporas have become more complex. Alan Gamlen has pointed out that developing a set of state institutions for reaching out to and 'governing' the diaspora is the first step in constructing a diaspora engagement policy.<sup>80</sup>

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ingly repressive course of Erdogan's government, which continues to generate increasing dissent among Turkish civil society as well as among the diaspora in Europe, it is likely that a further evolution of Turkey's approach to the integration and political participation of the Turkish diaspora in Europe may be underway. Although it is too early to relate here if the current political turbulence has given the way for a repressive turn in Turkey's approach to its diaspora in Europe, the INTERACT project will continue to monitor developments.

80 Alan Gamlen, 'Why Engage Diasporas?' (working paper No. 08/63, COMPAS, University of Oxford, 2008), [www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/Publications/working\\_papers/WP\\_2008/WP0863%20A%20Gamlen.pdf](http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/Publications/working_papers/WP_2008/WP0863%20A%20Gamlen.pdf); Alan Gamlen, 'Diaspora Engagement

Since 2001, major migrant-origin countries have established dedicated administrative structures for the design and the implementation of diaspora policies at an increased pace. Generally these institutions operate at the national or federal level, although in a few countries—such as China and India—branches of central diaspora offices exist at the subnational level as well. These diaspora institutions aim to leverage the development contributions of emigrants, and in pursuing this goal, many diaspora engagement policies affect immigrant integration at the destination. However, not all diaspora engagement institutions have the same level of involvement in integration-related activities, and some diaspora-centred activities do not focus on integration at all. For example, in Moldova, the well-developed institutional framework for diaspora engagement is mainly geared to stimulating the return (and investments) of Moldovans living abroad.<sup>81</sup>

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*Origin countries' institutional structures for dealing with their diasporas have become more complex.*

Embassies and consulates have maintained their pivotal roles in keeping track of the diaspora and implementing diaspora engagement policies in destination countries. But the new diaspora engagement structures tend to go beyond embassies and consulates, and generally consist of dedicated overarching ministries, agencies, or ministerial departments with a coordination role over the various—and multiplying—institutions dealing with emigrants, in both origin and receiving countries.<sup>82</sup> When embedded in general ministries, diaspora institutions are often in the ministries of labour, social, or foreign affairs.

In the area of labour market integration, the central diaspora institution generally formulates and oversees policies aimed at the protection of the rights and welfare of migrant workers in destination countries, in cooperation with labour and social affairs departments. These policies may be eventually implemented through bilateral agreements that the ministry of foreign affairs negotiates with receiving countries.

Cultural, education, and religious institutions of countries of origin may also be involved—more or less explicitly and to varying degrees—in activities that shape the functional and sociocultural integration of emigrants in their receiving societies. Generally, the broad objectives of these actions are defined in coordination with the overarching diaspora institution and are implemented in countries of destination through quasigovernmental institutions or civil-society organisations that are linked to the origin country's government.

### *C. Mapping the field: A survey of origin-country integration efforts*

This section offers a systematic overview of the institutions in INTERACT priority countries of origin that facilitate immigrants' socioeconomic, civic, and political integration at destination. Furthermore, the appendix of the report contains a detailed, comprehensive taxonomy of institutions in the main origin countries of migrants residing in the European Union, involved in the governance of immigrant integration.

The section offers a guide for policymakers in EU countries as they identify their interlocutors in origin-country governments in order to cooperate on integration goals. While a large body of literature on the governance of immigrant integration in receiving countries—as well as sources for identifying the actors involved in integration policies in EU Member States—are broadly accessible, the role of origin countries has remained largely unexplored so far, and fewer sources are available for ascertaining how these countries design and implement policies that have an impact on the integration of their emigrants in their host societies.<sup>83</sup> As a consequence, this section's descriptions of origin coun-

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Policies: What are they, and what kinds of states use them?' (working paper No. 32, COMPAS, University of Oxford, 2006), [www.ssrc.org/worksapace/images/crm/new\\_publication\\_3/%7B0a6ab151-8050-de11-afac-001cc477ec70%7D.pdf](http://www.ssrc.org/worksapace/images/crm/new_publication_3/%7B0a6ab151-8050-de11-afac-001cc477ec70%7D.pdf).

81 Valeriu Mosneaga, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report—Moldova* (Florence: EUI, 2014 forthcoming).

82 The Philippines is the exception among INTERACT priority countries, because its diaspora institutions are scattered at the sub-ministry level, across various agencies within general ministries, notably the Department of Labour and the Department of Foreign Affairs. This fragmentation of the state's institutional agency on emigration may result in inefficiencies due to lack of coordination. Maria Theresa Sindico-Guillaume, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report—The Philippines* (Florence: EUI, 2014 forthcoming).

83 The INTERACT project has commissioned country reports, named Policy and Institutional Framework reports, aimed at collecting information on the institutional actors involved in the governance of immigrant integration in INTERACT origin and destination

tries' institutions are a first attempt to define the relevant players in the main origin countries for emigrants in the EU, rather than an exhaustive overview<sup>84</sup>. Such an exercise is the starting point for exploring the potential for cooperation between origin and destination countries in the governance of immigrant integration, because the scope of cooperation depends on knowledge about the characteristics and goals of the institutional actors on both sides.

Most of the INTERACT priority countries of origin have overarching national-level ministerial offices dedicated to the design and coordination of relations with the diaspora (see Table 2). These offices would be the principal points of contact for EU policymakers interested in joint integration-related efforts with countries of origin. The overarching nature of these institutions is important, because it signals a unified location and decisionmaking structure for integration cooperation efforts.

Many of these institutions were either created or reorganised within the past decade. A number of them consist of stand-alone ministries that report directly to the office of the head of government, such as the Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad and the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. Similarly, in China, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office acts as an administrative office under the State Council, which is the country's highest executive body (and includes the Premier and the Ministries). In Moldova, the Bureau on Relations with Diaspora established in late 2012 to coordinate the implementation of the state diaspora policy is part of the State Chancellery.<sup>85</sup> Many other overarching diaspora institutions at the ministerial level are aggregated with other portfolios, typically foreign affairs, labour and/or social affairs. This is the case in several countries, including Algeria, Brazil, Ecuador, Pakistan, Senegal, Syria, and Tunisia. In Senegal, the overarching institution for the diaspora is the Ministry of Senegalese Living Abroad, Arts and Crafts, and Tourism. (The government sees the 'arts and crafts' and 'tourism' components of this ministry's portfolio as development contributions of the Senegalese diaspora). For more details on all countries, see Table 2, and the Appendix.

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*Multiple ministries...have a stake in the definition of the state's diaspora policies.*

A notable exception is the Philippines, where the institutional responsibility over diaspora affairs is scattered across several institutions. The Philippine Overseas and Employment Administration, an agency attached to the Department of Labour and Employment (DOLE), manages workers from the predeparture stage—including offering information and training to emigrants, and regulating the private sector's participation in the recruitment and placement of workers abroad—to the arrival stage, where it monitors and promotes the welfare of overseas Filipino workers. The Overseas Workers and Welfare Administration, also attached to the DOLE, formulates and implements welfare programmes for Filipino workers and their families, both abroad and in the Philippines. The Office of the Undersecretary for Migrant Workers' Affairs within the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) is responsible for the overall coordination of legal assistance services to Filipino migrant workers in distress. Also attached to the DFA, the Commission on Filipinos Overseas is a dedicated agency to promote and uphold the interests of Filipino emigrants abroad and to preserve and strengthen the state's ties with overseas Filipino communities.<sup>86</sup> Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine also have a diffuse ap-

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countries (forthcoming in 2014 at <http://interact-project.eu/>). In addition to an original review of literature, this section draws on the INTERACT reports on the countries of origin.

- 84 For a first effort on a taxonomy of diaspora engagement institutions see Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, ed., *Closing the Distance: How Governments Strengthen Ties with Their Diasporas* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2009). The taxonomy is available online. See Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, 'Taxonomy of the Diaspora-Engaging Institutions in 30 Developing Countries', 2010, <http://migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/taxonomy.pdf>.
- 85 See Valeriu Mosneaga, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report – Moldova* (Florence: European University Institute, 2014 forthcoming).
- 86 Sindico-Guillaume, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report – The Philippines*; Ambassador Jesus I. Yabes, 'Harnessing Diaspora in Times of Crisis: Philippine Experience' (speech by the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs to the International Organisation for Migration Diaspora Ministerial Conference, Geneva, 18-19 June 2013), [www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-Do/idm/workshops/IDM-2013-Diaspora-Ministerial-Conference/Diaspora-Ministerial-Conference-Statement-Jesus-Yabes.pdf](http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-Do/idm/workshops/IDM-2013-Diaspora-Ministerial-Conference/Diaspora-Ministerial-Conference-Statement-Jesus-Yabes.pdf). See also Republic of the Philippines Professional Regulation Commission, *Philippine Laws and Regulations Affecting Filipinos Overseas*, accessed 24 March 2014, [www.cfo.gov.ph/pdf/handbook/Philippine\\_Laws\\_and\\_Regulations\\_Affecting\\_Filipinos\\_Overseas-chapter-I-II.pdf](http://www.cfo.gov.ph/pdf/handbook/Philippine_Laws_and_Regulations_Affecting_Filipinos_Overseas-chapter-I-II.pdf). The *Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act* (Republic Act No. 8042, as amended in 2007 and 2010) has established an interagency committee, the Shared Government Information System for Migration, to implement a shared government information system for migration and facilitate intergovernmental communication on migration issues. The committee is set to be composed of the Department of Foreign Affairs and its attached agency, the Commission on Filipinos Overseas; the Department of Labour and Employment and its agencies; the Department of Tourism; the Department of Justice; the Bureau of Immigration; the National Bureau of Investigation; the Department of the Interior and the Local Government; the National Telecommunications Commission; the Commission on Information and Communications Technology; the National Computer Center; the National Statistical and Coordination Board (NSCB); the National Statistics Office (NSO) and other government agencies concerned with overseas employment. The committee had not yet been activated at the time of writing. The *Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act* also established a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee, composed of five senators and five representatives, aimed at monitoring and ensuring

proach to diaspora policies (see Appendix).

In all the main emigration countries, despite the recent trend for establishing overarching institutions that address diaspora issues, other national institutions continue to be involved in formulating diaspora engagement and other policies that directly affect the integration of emigrants at their destination. Multiple ministries—including typically the ministries for labour, social affairs, education, culture and foreign affairs—have a stake in the definition of the state’s diaspora policies. This is similar to the distribution of integration governance responsibilities at the national level in the receiving countries of the European Union.

**Table 2. National-level diaspora policy institutions among select INTERACT priority countries of origin**

Country	Overarching institution for diaspora relations	Ministerial affiliation
Turkey	Prime Minister Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities	Dedicated office attached to the Prime Ministry
Morocco	Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad	Stand-alone ministry
Algeria	None. The Ministry of Algerian Community Abroad was abolished in 2013.	
India	Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs	Stand-alone ministry
Ukraine	None. Responsibility is scattered across various general ministerial portfolios.	
Russia	None. Responsibility is scattered across various general ministerial portfolios.	
China	Overseas Chinese Affairs Office	Dedicated office under the State Council.
Pakistan	Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development	Dedicated Ministry (hybrid setting)
Ecuador	Vice Ministry of Human Mobility	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility (hybrid setting)
Tunisia	Office of Tunisians Abroad	Ministry of Social Affairs
Philippines	None. Responsibility is scattered across different dedicated bodies.	
Moldova	Bureau on Relations with Diaspora	Dedicated office within the State Chancellery
Belarus	None	
Lebanon	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants	Dedicated Ministry (hybrid setting)
Syria	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates	Dedicated Ministry (hybrid setting)
Brazil	Undersecretary General for Brazilian Communities Abroad	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Senegal	Ministry of Senegalese Living Abroad, the Arts and Crafts, and Tourism	Dedicated Ministry (hybrid setting)

*Notes:* ‘Hybrid setting’ refers to a situation in which diaspora governance is a primary role of the overarching ministry, but not the only role. For more detail on origin-country diaspora institutions, see the Appendix.

*Source:* Ali Mebroukine, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report–Algeria* (Florence: European University Institute, 2014 forthcoming); Consuelo Sanchez, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report–Ecuador* (Florence: European University Institute, 2014 forthcoming); Valeriu Mosneaga, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report–Moldova* (Florence: European University Institute, 2014 forthcoming); Nasra Shah, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report–Pakistan* (Florence: European University Institute, 2014 forthcoming); Sorana Toma, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report–Senegal* (Florence: European University Institute, 2014 forthcoming).

Furthermore, integration-related measures are, for the most part, implemented through various offices and bodies that the countries of origin establish in emigrants’ receiving countries. In the major countries of destination, these bodies

adequate implementation of all programmes and activities foreseen under the Act. See *Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995* (Republic Act No. 8042), section 37-B, [www.poea.gov.ph/rules/ra8042.html](http://www.poea.gov.ph/rules/ra8042.html).

extend well beyond the embassies and consular networks. A detailed list of origin-country institutions involved in the integration of emigrants abroad, as well as a list of related offices and actors in destination countries, is provided in the Appendix to this report.

## D. A deeper look: Diaspora engagement and integration in Turkey, Morocco, and India

The first step in facilitating cooperation among origin and receiving countries is a survey of the key actors involved in immigrant integration on both sides. Next, a detailed understanding of the structure of integration efforts in various national contexts is important. This section covers these efforts in Turkey, Morocco, and India—singled out because all are major countries of origin of immigrants to EU Member States, and all have well-developed diaspora engagement efforts.

### 1. Turkey

In Turkey, the Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities was created in 2010 as the umbrella organisation in charge of coordinating Turkey's complex structure of institutional bodies dealing with the diaspora. The organisation, a related institution of the Prime Ministry, aims to reduce the fragmentation of authority for migration at the ministerial level.<sup>87</sup> The Presidency has seven thematic departments, including the Citizens Abroad Department (responsible for defining the government's diaspora engagement strategies and obligations) and the Public Relations and Communications Department (tasked with supporting the nongovernmental organisations established by Turkish citizens and their descendants living abroad).<sup>88</sup>

The Advisory Committee and the High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad,<sup>89</sup> both established in 1998 and attached to the Ministry of State, monitor the Turkish diaspora's obstacles to integration and report on this to the parliament and the council of ministers. One-third of the Advisory Committee's members are Turkish citizens living abroad, and each represents a Turkish community in a different country. The other members are deputies from the political parties in the Turkish Parliament, and undersecretaries from various ministries—including Interior, Foreign Affairs, Education, Labour and Social Security, and Culture and Tourism; as well as commissioners from the Department of Religious Affairs.

In the areas of employment and social affairs, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities cooperates with the Foreign Relations and Abroad Worker Services General Directorate within the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. The General Directorate, established in 1967 with a special focus on Europe, coordinates the implementation of Turkey's social security agreements with other governments and provides assistance to Turkish workers in their countries of residence—including legal assistance, support for labour market insertion, and vocational training. These activities are implemented by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security's network of foreign counsellors and attachés across 17 destination countries and in 40 cities.<sup>90</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also influences the integration trajectories of Turkish emigrants and their descendants, helping them in overcoming obstacles to political participation, education, employment, and culture.

Any overview of Turkey's institutional actors that have a stake in the integration of Turks in their receiving societies could not be complete without a discussion of the role of the *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*, the Directorate of Religious Affairs attached to the Prime Ministry. Founded in 1924 as the representative of official Islam in Turkey, the *Diyanet*

87 Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, home page, accessed 24 March 2014, [www.ytb.gov.tr/](http://www.ytb.gov.tr/).

88 The other departments are Cultural and Social Relations (with a geographic focus on the Middle East and Asia), Foreign Students, Strategy Planning, Legal Advisor, and Human Resources and Support. The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities considers nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) established by the Turkish diaspora at destination as the 'fourth power' in Turkey's international relations. The department directs its activities not only to individual Turkish citizens and their descendants abroad, but also to professional bodies, migrant organisations, and other NGOs in receiving countries. See Bilgili and Siegel, 'Understanding the Changing Role of the Turkish Diaspora'.

89 Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad and High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad, home page, accessed 24 March 2014, [www.ytb.gov.tr/index.php/yurtdisi-vatandaslar-danisma-kurulu.html](http://www.ytb.gov.tr/index.php/yurtdisi-vatandaslar-danisma-kurulu.html).

90 Bilgili and Siegel, 'Understanding the Changing Role of the Turkish Diaspora'.

has extended its responsibilities abroad since the 1980s, alongside the broader shift in the government's approach to the diaspora. Today, the Department of Religious Affairs and its offices in destination countries—the *Diyanet* Foundations<sup>91</sup>—are among the most influential bodies affecting the integration of Turkish citizens and their descendants. Their activities extend beyond the religious sphere into the sociocultural dimensions of immigrant integration. In addition to sending imams, operating Sunni mosques, and lobbying for Islamic religious education as a part of school curricula in European countries, the *Diyanet* implements broader social and cultural initiatives aimed at helping the diaspora maintain a sense of belonging to the homeland.<sup>92</sup>

## 2. Morocco

Morocco has a complex and multilayered system of governance of diaspora policies that also includes quasi-governmental and public-private bodies. The Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad, re-established in 2007,<sup>93</sup> oversees the government's diaspora engagement policy and works to preserve the Moroccan national identity among the diaspora. The Ministry promotes and organises social, cultural, and recreational initiatives such as the National Day of Moroccans Abroad and Moroccan cultural weeks in destination countries. It also establishes cultural centres in cities with a strong concentration of Moroccan migrants, including Brussels, Barcelona, Paris, Montreal, and Tripoli.<sup>94</sup>

The Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad is also responsible for protecting the rights and welfare of Moroccans abroad, and works with the Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training and the Directorate of Consular and Social Affairs within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation in order to negotiate, implement, and monitor international labour migration and social protection agreements.

The Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training is responsible for exploring job opportunities abroad and placing Moroccan workers internationally.<sup>95</sup> Since 2000, the National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Competences (ANAPEC) has worked under the Ministry's authority to facilitate employment matching for Moroccan workers, both internally and internationally. The Agency cooperates with public bodies and NGOs in Morocco and abroad on predeparture orientation and migration assistance. ANAPEC has four branches devoted to the international placement of Moroccan workers—in Rabat, Tangier, Fez, and Marrakech—and runs a website for this purpose, with a specific focus on European labour markets.<sup>96</sup> The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of *Habous* and Islamic Affairs also participate in the integration of Moroccan migrants abroad, coordinating linguistic and religious instruction in destination countries.

Since the 1990s, the Moroccan government has been very active in promoting initiatives to harness the development contributions of the diaspora, including through knowledge transfers. More recently, in 2006, the International Forum of Moroccan Competences Abroad was established to take advantage of Moroccan expertise abroad for the country's economic development. In addition, early this year, the Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad launched Maghrib.com, an Internet platform to help forge collaborations between the research and business communities in Morocco and among Moroccans abroad.<sup>97</sup>

Countries of emigration frequently partner with semipublic institutions or NGOs to engage with their diaspora, allow-

91 *Diyanet* foundations are to be found in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, as well as in a number of non-EU countries. Korfali, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report – Turkey*; Gamze Avci, 'Religion, transnationalism and Turks in Europe', *Turkish Studies* 6, no. 2 (2005): 205-13.

92 The *Yunus Emre* Institutes—established in the 2000s in the main countries of destination of Turkish emigrants to teach the Turkish language and culture—are also key actors influencing the cultural integration of Turkish emigrants and their descendants abroad. *Yunus Emre* Institutes, home page, accessed 24 March 2014, <http://yee.org.tr/turkiye/en/homepage>.

93 The Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad was originally founded in 1993 and went through several institutional changes. In the meantime other institutions (public-private partnerships, foundations, etc.) were established. The Ministry was also closed for some years before reopening in 2007 with a stronger coordination role. See Madani, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report –Morocco*.

94 Ozge Bilgili and Silja Weyel, 'Diaspora Engagement in Morocco. Understanding the Implications of a Changing Perspective on Capacity and Practices' (Migration Policy Brief No. 10, Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht, Netherlands, 2012), <http://mgsog.merit.unu.edu/ISacademie/docs/PB10.pdf>.

95 As part of its responsibility of governing the Moroccan labour market, the Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training also manages the immigration of foreign workers to Morocco.

96 National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Skills (ANAPEC), home page, accessed 24 March 2014, [www.anapecinternational.com/](http://www.anapecinternational.com/).

97 MAGHRIBCOM, home page, accessed 24 March 2014, [www.maghribcom.gov.ma/](http://www.maghribcom.gov.ma/).

ing the government to maintain a low profile in the exercise of sovereignty over the diaspora, and reducing the risk of diplomatic frictions with receiving-country governments. Morocco's recourse to public-private partnerships in emigration policy might also be read, to a certain extent, as part of the government's strategy to overcome the distrust engendered by past policies, which were more controlling than the current approach. Examples of semi-public institutions that help define and implement diaspora policies are the Council of Moroccan Community Abroad and the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad.<sup>98</sup> These institutions—which work with the Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad, receive government funding, but maintain financial and administrative autonomy—stand at the intersection of governmental and nongovernmental bodies.

The Council of Moroccan Community Abroad was funded in 2008 as an advisory institution, and analyses the common problems among Moroccan emigrants in order to inform the government's strategy towards the diaspora. It has working groups organised around specific topics, including citizenship and political participation, culture, education and identity, religious education, and women's rights. The Council also encourages the participation of Moroccans abroad in the political, economic, and cultural development of their ancestral homeland.

The Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad, established in 1990, works in the areas of education, cultural exchange, sports and youth, legal assistance, social assistance, economic development, cooperation and partnership, and communication. Educational activities focus on the descendants of Moroccan migrants, and include constructing and organising schools and sociocultural centres in destination countries. The Foundation also manages the programme for Arabic Language and Moroccan Culture Teaching.<sup>99</sup> Like other Moroccan state actors involved in the governance of diaspora policies, the Hassan II Foundation has been increasingly providing services to the Moroccan community residing abroad via the internet, including in the areas of education and Arabic language instruction.

### 3. India

India has among the world's most comprehensive state-level diaspora engagement policies. The Indian government's diaspora-related activities revolve around persons of Indian origin (up to the fourth generation) and nonresident Indians (meaning Indian citizens residing abroad) who are economically, socially, and culturally successful—and thus more able to contribute knowledge, capital, or lobbying efforts to India's development.<sup>100</sup> The government is also very active in protecting low-skilled Indian workers abroad, and its efforts to promote integration focus mainly on functional areas such as labour market integration, social protection, and civic and political participation.

The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) was established in 2004 as the overarching institution for diaspora policies. It coordinates all diaspora-related government activities across three main policy areas: engaging the diaspora, protecting migrant's rights abroad, and facilitating trade and investment. MOIA also establishes public-private institutions to intervene in policy formulation and implementation in these areas. For example, the Indian Development Foundation of Overseas Indians (a trust under MOIA) and the Global Indian Network of Knowledge (a partnership between MOIA and Tata Consultancy Group) both play a key role in diaspora engagement.

MOIA's Emigration Policy Division, created in 2006, protects migrant workers abroad. It focuses on the low-skilled population and employs an approach similar to that of the Philippine government (see Box 2). Since 2008, the Indian Centre for Migration informs MOIA's policymaking by providing studies and analysis.<sup>101</sup> The Centre functions as an independent think tank, promoting overseas employment and better working and welfare conditions for Indian workers abroad.<sup>102</sup>

98 The Mohammed V Foundation for Solidarity is the third prominent, quasi-governmental actor of Morocco's diaspora engagement strategy.

99 Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Resident Abroad, 'L'Enseignement de la Langue Arabe et de la Culture Marocaine (ELACM)', accessed 24 March 2014, [www.fh2mre.ma/promotion-culturelle/enseignement/presentation.html](http://www.fh2mre.ma/promotion-culturelle/enseignement/presentation.html).

100 Simona Vezzoli and Thomas Lacroix, 'Building bonds for migration and development: Diaspora engagement policies of Ghana, India and Serbia' (discussion paper, GTZ Migration and Development and International Migration Institute, Eschborn, Germany, 2010), [www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/building-bonds-for-migration-and-development](http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/building-bonds-for-migration-and-development). The annual *Pravasi Bhartiya Divas* celebration with the attribution of the *Pravasi Bhartiya Samman* (Overseas Indian Award), established in 2003, are among the expressions of such a focus.

101 Formerly the Indian Council for Overseas Employment. The secretary of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs'; the secretaries of the Department of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Labour and Employment; and the secretaries of three state governments by rotation all sit in the governing body of the Indian Centre for Migration (ICM), together with four external nominees. See Meenakshi Thapan, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report – India* (Florence: EUI, 2014 forthcoming).

102 For a comprehensive review of the public and semipublic institutions involved in the state diaspora engagement policies in India across the three main areas of activity see Katie Kuschminder and Metka Hercog, 'The power of a strong state: A comparative analysis

The government runs on-site welfare services for emigrants—available in 42 countries—and offers remote assistance through the Overseas Workers Resource Centre (worldwide) in order to implement some of its worker protection goals. In major destination countries for Indians, MOIA has established field offices called Overseas Indian Centres to provide services to the diaspora that are more targeted to specific needs than those at consular and embassy services.<sup>103</sup>

Emigration—like integration—has a marked local dimension. Emigration flows typically originate from specific regions in each country (often less-developed regions, and areas affected by natural disasters, civil wars, or ethnic and political tensions). Thus, some countries have official bodies dedicated to emigration policy at the subnational level, whether they are territorial branches of central institutions or separate local institutions that are established by the subnational authorities. In India, the government of Kerala—an Indian state with a large diaspora—has a Department of Non-Resident Keralites Affairs, established in 1996.<sup>104</sup> The Department designs and implements a vast array of services for the labour market integration of Keralite emigrants, including predeparture training and orientation, legal assistance for overseas workers, insurance schemes for domestic workers abroad, and reintegration for returnees.<sup>105</sup> Other Indian states with large shares of emigrants—including Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh—have also initiated programmes to facilitate the socioeconomic integration of their diasporas, and boost these migrants development contribution in their sending regions.

### *E. The role of local-level institutions and civil society*

India's local-level involvement in the design of diaspora engagement policy is not the norm. In most origin countries, emigration and diaspora policy design remains highly centralised and local authorities have implementing responsibilities at best. China, for example, has one of the largest networks of local diaspora offices, with branches of the central Overseas Chinese Affairs Office in 30 provinces and a number of cities across the country. In contrast to India, however, these local offices only implement policies that are designed by the central government office. In Brazil too, although some provinces with high rates of emigration have developed targeted training and assistance programmes in partnership with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, public banks, international organisations and NGOs; in most cases diaspora policy and programmes are not decentralised.<sup>106</sup>

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*In most origin countries, emigration and diaspora policy design remains highly centralised.*

Cooperation on integration governance between subnational authorities in countries of origin and destination could bear more potential than broad schemes defined at the national level, because local authorities must respond to the peculiar integration issues of specific groups of migrants.<sup>107</sup>

Since, in most cases, civil-society organisations participate in the implementation and—to a lesser extent—the design of integration-related policies and initiatives at the territorial level, a dedicated INTERACT conceptual report will discuss the involvement of NGOs. This companion report will also discuss the role of civil-society organisations of both origin and destination countries in the governance of immigrant integration.

Nongovernmental actors and civil-society actors also play an important role in the governance of immigrant integration, working at the local level to support the day-to-day integration of immigrant communities and individuals. Among all the actors involved in the governance of immigrant integration, they are the ones with the closest and most

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of the diaspora engagement strategies in India and Ethiopia' (UNU-MERIT working paper no. 44/2011, United Nations University and Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht, Netherlands, 2011), <http://migration.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/the-power-of-the-strong-state-a-comparative-analysis-of-the-diaspora-engagement-strategies-of-india-and-ethiopia.html>.

103 So far, Overseas Indian Centres have been established in Washington, DC; Abu Dhabi; and Kuala Lumpur.

104 Government of Kerala, 'Department of Non-Resident Keralites Affairs', accessed 24 March 2014, [www.kerala.gov.in/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=85&Itemid=315](http://www.kerala.gov.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=85&Itemid=315).

105 Other major emigration states within the Indian Federation (including Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh) have established programmes for diaspora engagement. Thapan, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report – India*.

106 Carolina Moulin Aguiar, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report – Brazil* (Florence: EUI, 2014 forthcoming).

107 To shed more light on the involvement of regional and local authorities in both origin and destination countries in integration governance, a forthcoming INTERACT conceptual paper will be devoted to the role of regional and local level actors in the governance of immigrant integration.



direct contact with migrants.

Local ethnic churches, ethnic professional associations, national organisations for migrants, or regional and hometown associations are among the most common civil-society actors. Support for integration also often comes from mainstream and multiethnic organisations rather than migrant-specific ones, especially in receiving countries where migrant communities are small or not organised.

Within countries of origin themselves, there are fewer civil-society actors that can influence integration outcomes abroad, since such organisations usually do not have the resources or clout to reach out internationally. Twinned associations are the best example of such civil-society actors. They include a wide range of organisations, such as friendship associations (for example, the *Association d'Amitié Franco-Marocaine*),<sup>108</sup> churches, and private educational outlets. However, some civil-society organisations (in particular international NGOs, such as Caritas) are involved in helping to implement state-funded predeparture measures. These international NGOs are unique, because they can work with migrants in both origin and destination countries.

Overall, origin countries' governments increasingly recognise the important role of nongovernmental actors abroad in shaping relations between the diaspora and the origin country, as well as with receiving-country institutions.

## IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION

Although migration issues have always played a role in foreign affairs and international cooperation, the question of how countries of origin can influence the integration of their nationals abroad through international channels is a less-developed aspect of the field.<sup>109</sup> This section investigates the challenges and opportunities for enhancing cooperation between origin and destination countries in the management of migrant integration. The analysis evaluates the compatibility of the design and objectives of integration-related activities in origin and destination countries, and explores thematic areas where there is notable potential for strengthening cooperation. The section highlights the mutual gains from cooperation—for origin and destination countries as well as for migrants themselves.

The nature of the institutions that address integration policy can shape (positively or negatively) the opportunities for cooperation between origin and destination countries. Drawing on the overview of integration-focused actors offered in the previous sections, the report now explores the institutional barriers that hamper efficient cooperation and suggests ways to overcome them.

The section also assesses the potential of supranational frameworks and instruments for enhancing cooperation in the governance of immigrant integration, particularly on the EU level. The broader scenario of international diplomatic and economic relations is indispensable for understanding prospects for cooperation, since agreements on migration management often result from more comprehensive negotiations that involve the broad geopolitical interests of participating countries.<sup>110</sup>

### A. *Explaining the challenges and incentives for cooperation*

Historically, origin and destination countries were viewed as having diverging interests in the areas of migration and migrant integration. Observers debated the extent to which emigrants can contribute to the development of their countries of origin in the long run. Meanwhile, the successful integration of immigrants who are closely linked to their countries of origin was viewed with suspicion because of a suggested disruptive influence of origin-country ties on social cohesion in receiving countries.<sup>111</sup>

<sup>108</sup> *Association d'Amitié Franco-Marocaine*, home page, 24 March 2014, [www.amitiefrancemaroc.fr/](http://www.amitiefrancemaroc.fr/).

<sup>109</sup> An exception to this are historic retaliation measures in which a country withdraws the rights of noncitizens who are nationals of another country, in retaliation for the mistreatment of its own nationals in that country.

<sup>110</sup> Similarly, depending on the particular case, past colonial relations between origin and destination countries may either facilitate or impede cooperation in the field of integration governance.

<sup>111</sup> Christian Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University

However, a growing consensus within origin countries posits that diasporas can contribute substantially to development. And as the previous section describes, origin countries have increasingly supported the successful integration of their diasporas—in line with receiving-country efforts to promote integration and social cohesion. This shift can be explained by important changes on all three levels of international policymaking: bilateral cooperation, regional multilateral frameworks, and international multilateral frameworks. As with other areas of migration-related international cooperation, these three levels tend to intertwine in what has been called a ‘three-level game’.<sup>112</sup> The first level reflects domestic politics and interests that steer international relations agendas. The second level refers to the existence of a regional framework for cooperation (which is increasingly the case across all continents and especially in Europe). The third level is international cooperation led by global institutions and shaped by global frameworks.

## 1. The bilateral level

The main reasons for the shift in origin countries’ approach to integration are the opportunities for development through the successful integration of their diasporas, the need to support populations abroad that are increasingly influential on the domestic scene, and meeting the expectations of nonmigrant nationals who nevertheless have close contacts with members of growing expatriated communities.<sup>113</sup>

Additionally, some traditional migrant-origin countries have increasingly become destination countries as well, and have thus started to deal with integration issues at home. Mexico, Turkey, and Morocco are good examples of this trend. In Morocco, following a 2013 National Council on Human Rights report—endorsed by the king—advocating a policy protecting the rights of Morocco’s immigrants,<sup>114</sup> the government has begun work on a global migration policy that focuses on immigrants’ rights protection and integration. Morocco is seeking EU cooperation with this task,<sup>115</sup> and has indicated immigrant integration as a priority in the framework of the EU-Morocco Mobility Partnership.<sup>116</sup>

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*Some traditional migrant-origin countries have increasingly become destination countries as well.*

Labour market integration is an area in which the involvement of origin countries in integration governance is the most advanced and promising, as compared with other integration policy domains.

Providing predeparture services, offering training and support measures at destination, and negotiating bilateral labour migration agreements that protect the social and labour rights of migrant workers are among the range of ways that origin countries extend rights to their diaspora.<sup>117</sup> Agreements that exempt emigrants from double income taxation are another widespread measure for migrant workers’ protection. Many of these strategies have been pioneered by the

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Press, 1999).

112 Magdalena Frennhoff Larsén, ‘Trade Negotiations between the EU and South Africa: A Three-Level Game’, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45, no. 4 (2007): 857–81; Rafael Leal-Arcas, ‘The European Union and New Leading Powers: Towards Partnership in Strategic Trade Policy Areas’, *Fordham International Law Journal* 32 (2008): 345–416; Weinar, Agnieszka, ‘Mobility Partnerships - a Way Forward?’ in *The Revised European Neighbourhood Policy – Continuity and Change in EU Foreign Policy*, eds. Tobias Schumacher and Dimitris Bouris (Palgrave, 2014 forthcoming).

113 Jean-Pierre Cassarino and Sandra Lavenex, ‘EU-Migration Governance in the Mediterranean Region: The Promise of (a Balanced) Partnership?’ in *Mediterranean Yearbook 2012* (Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2012), 284–88, [www.iemed.org/observatori-en/arees-danalisi/arxiu-adjunts/anuari/med.2012/cassarino%20Lavenex\\_en.pdf](http://www.iemed.org/observatori-en/arees-danalisi/arxiu-adjunts/anuari/med.2012/cassarino%20Lavenex_en.pdf); Alexandra Délano, ‘From Limited to Active Engagement: Mexico’s Emigration Policies from a Foreign Policy Perspective (2000–2006)’, *International Migration Review* 43, no. 4 (2009): 764–814.

114 National Council on Human Rights (Morocco; CNDH), *Thematic Report on Situation of Migrants and Refugees in Morocco - Foreigners and Human Rights in Morocco: for a Radically New Asylum and Migration Policy. Conclusions and Recommendations* (CNDH, 2013), [http://cndh.ma/IMG/pdf/CNDH\\_report\\_-\\_migration\\_in\\_Morocco.pdf](http://cndh.ma/IMG/pdf/CNDH_report_-_migration_in_Morocco.pdf).

115 The report states, ‘The CNDH further urges the international organisations of the United Nations system, partner countries of Morocco, including European countries and the European Union, to work actively for the success of such operation by mobilising human and financial resources for the implementation of a genuine policy of inclusion of regularised migrants’. See *ibid.*; The Associated Press, ‘Morocco seeking help from Europe on migration’, 11 September 2013, <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/africa/2013/09/11/Morocco-seeking-help-from-Europe-on-migration.html>.

116 See Council of the European Union, ‘Joint Declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between the Kingdom of Morocco and the European Union and its Member States’, 3 June 2013, 6139/13, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2013/docs/20130607\\_declaration\\_conjointe-maroc\\_eu\\_version\\_3\\_6\\_13\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2013/docs/20130607_declaration_conjointe-maroc_eu_version_3_6_13_en.pdf).

117 Gamlen, ‘Why Engage Diasporas?’; Gamlen, ‘Diaspora Engagement Policies: What are they, and what kinds of states use them?’

Philippines government, which pursues a variety of strategies to prepare future emigrants for migration and protect their rights once they are living and working abroad (see Box 2).

Over the past decade the Indian government has also increased its efforts in support of the labour market integration and social protection of its emigrants. The government has pursued bilateral social security agreements, particularly with EU countries. Sixteen such agreements have been signed so far, though only nine of them have been implemented to date (in the European Union, these are with Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, and Luxembourg).<sup>118</sup> And the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, the country's overarching institution dealing with the diaspora, cooperates with the International Organisation for Migration to establish skills training and vocational qualifications programmes that help workers secure employment abroad.

The Colombian government has recently established vocational training centres in Spain and the United States to support the labour market integration of their emigrants. And Turkey and Mexico also operate similar programmes.<sup>119</sup>

In Pakistan, the Draft Emigration Policy submitted to the Parliament in 2009 (after the 2008 general elections, and still pending implementation) has a renewed focus on labour migration. Two major objectives are increasing the number of overseas workers, and ensuring protective mechanisms for those workers. Pakistan maintains bilateral agreements on labour migration and vocational training with Asian and Gulf countries, and is currently negotiating a similar agreement with Italy.<sup>120</sup>

Many of the traditional origin countries of immigrants in the European Union concluded their first bilateral recruitment and labour migration agreements with receiving countries during the guestworker era of the 1950s to the 1970s. Over the past decade, some of those countries have entered into a new generation of labour migration agreements, such as those signed by Morocco with France (2001), Italy (2001), and Spain (2005) based on the principle of circular migration.<sup>121</sup>

Furthermore, the national employment agencies of traditional origin countries cooperate closely with their counterparts in European Union countries on the job placement of their migrants. For example, the Tunisian National Employment and Independent Work Agency partners with the French National Agency for Employment to help match Tunisian workers to vacancies in the French labour market.<sup>122</sup>

Traditional migrant-origin countries have also developed a network of bilateral social security agreements with many EU countries. These agreements provide migrants with significant welfare coverage, like social security and health benefits. For instance, Turkey's agreements with Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom allow for the portability of health benefits upon retirement, and are also applicable for dual citizens.<sup>123</sup>

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*The national employment agencies of traditional origin countries cooperate closely with their counterparts in European Union countries on the job placement of their migrants.*

Destination countries also seem more open to bilateral cooperation on integration with countries of origin. The growing internationalisation of migrant communities, evident problems with their integration, and thus a pressing need to look for policy solutions beyond the domestically available instruments are some of the factors that account for this trend.

One challenge for bilateral cooperation is a concern over sovereignty. While not allowing countries of origin to exert control within their borders, receiving countries can increasingly acknowledge the limited role that foreign institutions and civil society can play in immigrant integration, and even welcome the opportunity to cooperate in the administration and activities of these institutions within their borders.

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118 The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, 'Bilateral Agreements,' accessed 24 March 2014, <http://moia.gov.in/services.aspx?ID1=81&id=m4&idp=81&mainid=73>.

119 Metin Nebiler, Alessandra Venturini, and Ivan Martin, *The Role of Sending Countries in the Labor Market Assimilation of Immigrants in Host Countries*, INTERACT Research Report 2013/6 (Florence: EUI, 2013), <http://interact-project.eu/docs/publications/Research%20Report/INTERACT-RR-2013-06.pdf>.

120 Nasra Shah, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report – Pakistan* (Florence: EUI, 2014 forthcoming).

121 Madani, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report – Morocco*.

122 Stéphanie Pouessel, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report – Tunisia* (Florence: EUI, 2014 forthcoming).

123 Korfali, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report – Turkey*.

## 2. The regional level

On the regional level, due to increased international dialogue and communication, the origin-country objectives develop through interaction with other states, with a socialising effect. The regionalisation of international relations has helped to build communities of practice that tend to exchange and cooperate on more issues at a time, and have more intense contacts across administrations (and not only through diplomatic missions). This deliberative and broad process may open up avenues for dialogue on migration-related issues as it allows treating migration as one issue among others, and not necessarily as a difficult issue blocking cooperation on every other topic. Additionally, the broader pool of national actors involved in regional cooperation has built trust and resulted in deeper mutual understandings of other countries' objectives and modus operandi. These factors, when coupled with growing interdependence in other areas (mainly trade and other economic relations) have opened the door to more symmetric relationships.

The ability to trust prospects for cooperation and problem solving in difficult areas such as trade gives more confidence to origin countries when negotiating on behalf of their nationals in the partner country. The interdependency in many policy fields and trust building among administrations also explains why some destination countries are more prone to international cooperation in the narrow field of integration—traditionally considered a domestic issue. Migration is no longer a unilateral matter and claims made by the partners (countries of origin) are not seen as random attacks on sovereign policy to be punished through economic or diplomatic instruments. Interdependency requires flexibility and disallows extreme reactions or retaliation.

Regional cooperation can encourage migration discussions. For example, U.S.-Mexico dialogue on migration benefited from broader regional cooperation, with the Mexican government becoming more assertive in suggesting and implementing initiatives that supported the integration of its nationals in the United States, for example language and vocational training centres.<sup>124</sup> In the case of the European Union, origin countries within the block support the integration of their nationals in the destination countries by negotiating measures on social security coordination, working rights, health insurance, and the recognition of qualifications. While intra-EU cooperation in these areas is one model, one should not overlook the fact that the strong level of cooperation among EU Member States on the socioeconomic integration of mobile EU citizens stems from a unique and much broader regional cooperation framework.

## 3. The multilateral level

On the multilateral level, the recent international focus on the migration and development agenda ushered in two main developments related to integration governance: increased policy dialogue between countries of origin and destination at multilateral forums, and increased access to funding that empowered international organisations and also stirred interest among national actors in origin and destination countries.

The migration and development agenda introduced countries of origin as important actors of migration policy insofar as they are able to manage diaspora relations to ensure the involvement of emigrants in their national development strategies. One of the most important consequences of the new agenda was the creation of dedicated forums to facilitate discussions and diplomatic relations between countries of origin and destination. The most prominent is the United Nations High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development<sup>125</sup> and its working-level institution, the Global Forum on Migration and Development.<sup>126</sup> The latter gathers governments and civil-society organisations active in the field of diaspora relations.

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*Such nonbinding international instruments have proven useful in bringing together representatives from origin and destination countries.*

One example of a multilateral initiative that came out of this forum is the 16 million euro European Commission-United Nations Joint Migration and Development Initiative (EC-UN JMIDI).<sup>127</sup> The Initiative provided a forum to discuss

<sup>124</sup> See Délano, 'From Limited to Active Engagement: Mexico's Emigration Policies from a Foreign Policy Perspective (2000–2006)'.

<sup>125</sup> United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 'High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development', accessed 24 March 2014, [www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/HLD2013/mainhld2013.html](http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/HLD2013/mainhld2013.html).

<sup>126</sup> Global Forum on Migration and Development, home page, accessed 24 March 2014, [www.gfmd.org/](http://www.gfmd.org/).

<sup>127</sup> European Commission-United Nations Joint Migration and Development Initiative (EC-UN JMIDI), 'Migration for Development'.

a variety of migration issues, and led to a few projects related to integration. For example, the Migrants Initiatives for Development in the Country of Origin<sup>128</sup> supports the recognition and tutorship of immigrants' entrepreneurial initiatives between Italy and several countries of origin: Ghana, Poland, and Albania. As another example, the Temporary and Circular Labour Migration project<sup>129</sup> established between Colombia and Spain supports agricultural workers from Colombia in their migration to and from Spain, especially by providing predeparture training and post-arrival support (however, this type of project is usually for temporary migrant workers rather than long-term immigrants).

Such nonbinding international instruments have proven useful in bringing together representatives from origin and destination countries, improving reciprocal understanding, and facilitating the coordination of objectives. They can thus be a solution to one of the challenges of cooperation in the area of immigrant integration: identifying and convening all the relevant actors from origin and destination countries.

Overall, the conditions for cooperation between origin and destination countries in the governance of immigrant integration are much improved compared to three decades ago. However, many challenges still exist. The most important challenge is that immigrant integration policies usually fall under the competence of actors that do not engage in foreign policy. For example, while local authorities are key actors in the design and implementation of integration policy measures, only national-level actors can sign bilateral agreements or enter into multilateral frameworks of cooperation. This is why, for example, Dutch municipalities—which are quite active in the area of integration and international cooperation—have developed an array of instruments to lobby and influence the national government. Thus, the city of Rotterdam, home to many Cape Verdeans, was crucial in persuading the Dutch government to sign the Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde.<sup>130</sup> Similarly, the multiplicity of actors in both origin and destination countries who are responsible for integration policies is another challenge for matching institutional actors across borders. The complex institutional environment is also difficult to navigate by the countries of origin and this is where extended cooperation on the regional and international level can help, by bringing together all relevant actors and facilitating cooperation also at the domestic level.

## *B. Potential areas of enhanced cooperation on sociocultural integration*

The functional dimension of integration—particularly labour market integration, encompassing the areas of training, employment, and social and fiscal rights—is less controversial than issues of cultural integration and social cohesion.<sup>131</sup>

Cooperation between origin and destination countries on the sociocultural dimension of integration is less straightforward as compared to the functional dimension for several reasons. First, it is often difficult to determine if a cultural action is intended as a tool for integration or for cultural diplomacy. For example, do French schools abroad primarily serve the French diaspora abroad, or do they serve to promote French culture? There is no clear-cut answer to this. Moreover, the level of bilateral cooperation in this case is not very deep, since although France establishes the schools based on the agreement of the receiving country, the schools enjoy diplomatic status and receiving countries do not have significant input.

Bilateral cultural agreements usually aim to encourage 'people-to-people' contact, and are enacted by institutional actors who do not primarily deal with migration policy, such as ministries of culture and education. As a consequence, such agreements are not intended to be migration policy tools. Agreements on cultural cooperation between countries can cover various areas of activities (from language teaching to film festivals), but have limited direct links to integra-

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accessed 24 March 2014, [www.migration4development.org/](http://www.migration4development.org/).

128 EC-UN JMDI, 'The case of Ghanacoop : from a bilateral agreement to a social contract between migrants communities and the country of origin', accessed 24 March 2014, [www.migration4development.org/content/case-ghanacoop-bilateral-agreement-social-contract-between-migrants-communities-and-country-0](http://www.migration4development.org/content/case-ghanacoop-bilateral-agreement-social-contract-between-migrants-communities-and-country-0).

129 EC-UN JMDI, 'Temporary and circular labour migration (TCLM) between Colombia and Spain: a model for consolidation and replication', accessed 24 March 2014, [www.migration4development.org/content/temporary-and-circular-labour-migration-tclm-between-colombia-and-spain-model-consolidation-](http://www.migration4development.org/content/temporary-and-circular-labour-migration-tclm-between-colombia-and-spain-model-consolidation-).

130 Agnieszka Weinar, 'EU Cooperation Challenges in External Migration Policy' (Florence: EUI, 2011), <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/17756>.

131 A detailed analysis for each area is presented in the INTERACT position papers, which offer a state of the art of the research in nine dimensions of integration, with a focus on the role of countries and communities of origin in the integration processes in receiving countries. See INTERACT, 'Publications', accessed 24 March 2014, <http://interact-project.eu/publications/>.

tion efforts. When the country of destination is very active in the field of culture in the country of origin, the link to integration is more obvious. It is less clear the other way round. For instance, Morocco and France cooperate on the implementation of the Moroccan ELCO programme (Programme for Teaching the Arabic Language and Moroccan Culture; *programme pour l'enseignement de la langue arabe et de la culture marocaine*). Through the program, Moroccan teachers are detailed to French public schools to teach Arabic as an optional part of the French school curriculum.<sup>132</sup> However, the programme is not aimed at integration, and its effects on the integration of Moroccan immigrants and their children in France have not been explored.<sup>133</sup>

The administration of religion is another potential area of exploration for sociocultural integration efforts, but without clear-cut links to integration governance thus far. Religion is an especially important element of integration in Europe, with much attention given so far to shaping relations with imams to facilitate the integration of Muslim migrants. However, it is widely recognised among practitioners that it is easier to establish dialogue on religious issues with migrant communities themselves rather than with their countries of origin.<sup>134</sup> The example of imams can be instructive here: some imams sent from the countries of origin may have little in common with the lifestyle of migrant communities, lack language skills, and are more conservative than their congregations<sup>135</sup>—some reasons why the governments of receiving countries may prefer to cooperate directly with immigrant communities on training and preparing imams from among existing residents. The countries of origin can also help imams become better suited to being leaders of a diaspora community by establishing preparatory institutions abroad—as the Turkish government is doing (but in this case, without input or support from destination countries).<sup>136</sup>

Another area of possible cooperation on integration between origin and destination countries could be the governance of nationality. This is a controversial area of cooperation, since issues of citizenship and naturalisation are traditionally a mainstay of state sovereignty, hardly subject to international cooperation. Still, guidelines issued by international bodies may be helpful in refining policies (e.g. the Council of Europe's guidance on dual citizenship or United Nations conventions on statelessness). Overall, however, bilateral cooperation on citizenship is rare, and when it happens, concerns dual citizenship. Bilateral agreements can lay down the rules that apply to specific nationalities, allowing for dual nationality or banning it. Examples of the former are the bilateral agreements between Spain and several Latin American countries of the 1960s allowing dual nationality.<sup>137</sup> Examples of the latter were the conventions on avoidance of dual citizenship among the communist states,<sup>138</sup> stating the automatic loss of previous citizenship if the nationals of a signatory country acquire the nationality of another party to the convention. These agreements have been mostly discontinued.

Other areas of sociocultural integration—for example political participation—have even fewer examples of cooperation. Bilateral cooperation on political participation is rare and usually limited to reciprocal rules allowing immigrants to participate in local or national elections.<sup>139</sup> And cooperation on issues such as housing, social interactions, or civic participation has potential, but has not been identified so far.

### C. Existing frameworks and practices of cooperation: The socioeconomic dimension

132 For a detailed discussion of the ELCO programme see Madani, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework report – Morocco*; Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Resident Abroad, 'L'Enseignement de la Langue Arabe et de la Culture Marocaine (ELACM)'.

133 See Alexandra Filhon, *Linguistic Practices in Migration Models of Integration, Language Policies and Establishment of Social Hierarchy of Languages*, INTERACT Research Report 2013/02 (Florence: EUI, 2013), <http://interact-project.eu/docs/publications/Research%20Report/INTERACT-RR-2013-02.pdf>.

134 Jocelyne Cesari, *Religion and Diasporas: Challenges of the Emigration countries*, INTERACT Research Report 2013/01 (Florence: EUI, 2013), <http://interact-project.eu/docs/publications/Research%20Report/INTERACT-RR-2013-01.pdf>.

135 Ibid.

136 Ibid.

137 See Martin Peter Vink, *Immigrant Integration and Access to Citizenship in the European Union: The Role of Origin Countries*, INTERACT Research Report 2013/05 (Florence: EUI, 2013), <http://interact-project.eu/docs/publications/Research%20Report/INTERACT-RR-2013-05.pdf>.

138 Maria Albinia and Alicja Czajkowska, *Przepisy o obywatelstwie polskim: 1919-1995* (Toruń, Poland: Dom Organizatora, 1996).

139 See Ricard Zapata-Barrero, Lorenzo Gabrielli, Elena Sánchez-Montijano, and Thibaut Jaulin, *The political participation of immigrants in host countries: An interpretative framework from the perspective of origin countries and societies*, INTERACT Research Report 2013/07 (Florence: EUI, 2013), <http://interact-project.eu/docs/publications/Research%20Report/INTERACT-RR-2013-07.pdf>.

Examples of efficient cooperation in the governance of labour market integration are easier to find than examples in other areas, notably in the areas of predeparture orientation and training, and the protection of the rights and welfare of migrant workers. In particular, cooperation between origin and destination countries already exists in three areas that have direct impact on the integration outcomes of migrants: protection of workers' rights; provision of welfare and social rights (including their portability); and training, including predeparture and post-arrival information, and the accreditation of foreign qualifications and skills.

It is worth noting that intra-EU mobility policy is a prime example of what countries of origin can do to influence rights, welfare, and equal access to the labour market in destination countries through diplomatic channels in a regional framework.<sup>140</sup> However, this experience—which is unique in that it is embedded in a much broader framework of regional cooperation—so far has had a limited effect on EU external migration policies or cooperation with third countries in multilateral settings.

## 1. Protection of migrant workers' rights

The protection of workers' rights is a broad area that has been covered not only at the bilateral level (for the Philippines example, see Box 2), but also at the multilateral level of cooperation. In fact, cooperation on integration at the UN level has so far evolved almost exclusively around migrant workers' rights. This is understandable considering that this area of cooperation is quite advanced at the bilateral level, which facilitates consensus on broader, multilateral agreements. Cooperation on migrant workers' protection has taken the form of binding legal frameworks and nonbinding initiatives.

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is the main international forum for discussions and negotiation on migrant workers' protection for both countries of origin and destination. The ILO has been advancing its framework for protecting migrant workers since 1949. To date, ILO Member States have agreed on two binding legal instruments in the area of migration: the Migration for Employment Convention (which advocates the equal treatment of migrant and native workers in a variety of areas, including recruitment, collective bargaining, social security, taxation, and legal proceedings) and the Migrant Workers Convention (which complements the Migration for Employment Convention by offering provisions on migrant workers who find themselves in irregular employment or abusive conditions).<sup>141</sup> Only a handful of EU Member States have ratified each of these conventions.<sup>142</sup>

Furthermore, ILO's Domestic Workers Convention, adopted in June 2011 and entered into force in 2013, also indirectly focuses on the protection of migrant workers, since a large share of domestic workers are migrant women. So far it has been ratified by only 13 countries, including Germany and Italy—an encouraging sign only three years after adoption.<sup>143</sup> The convention provides a catalogue of domestic workers' rights and origin and destination countries' obligations for their protection. Its effects are likely to materialise in a few years, once it is in force in several countries and so applied in legal proceedings.

## 2. Welfare rights and portability of social security<sup>144</sup>

Another dimension of social protection is the portability of social security rights, meaning how easily mobile work-

<sup>140</sup> This has been true from the very beginning of the European Community, with Italy pushing to rapidly realise the labour mobility component of the single market at the founding negotiation table. Similar attitudes and developments are evident in the context of the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007.

<sup>141</sup> International Labour Organisation (ILO), 'C097 Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97)', accessed 24 March 2014, [www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100\\_ILO\\_CODE:C097](http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_ILO_CODE:C097); ILO, 'C143 Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No.143)', accessed 24 March 2014, [www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100\\_ILO\\_CODE:C143](http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C143).

<sup>142</sup> EU Member States who have ratified the Migration for Employment Convention are Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. EU Member States who have ratified the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention are Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, and Sweden.

<sup>143</sup> The countries (as of April 2014) are Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Germany, Guyana, Italy, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, and Uruguay.

<sup>144</sup> For an in-depth review of these agreements see Maria Vincenza Desiderio, *Supporting the labour market integration of immigrants in Europe: The role of origin countries* (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2014, forthcoming).

### Box 3. International cooperation on the recognition of foreign qualifications

The EU legal framework for the automatic recognition of professional qualifications in the seven ‘sectoral’ professions (architects, dentists, doctors, midwives, nurses, pharmacists, and veterinary surgeons) is a prime example of robust international cooperation in the recognition of foreign qualifications, in the form of a binding regional framework. Recognition of qualifications for these professions can be included in the European Union’s international agreements with third countries (for example, the proposed EU-Canada and EU-Mexico agreements on the recognition of architects’ qualifications). For other occupations, national regulatory bodies engage in a case-by-case assessment. However, a recent MPI analysis has shown that within the European Union, automatic recognition of professional qualifications is a common practice even beyond the sectoral professions.

At the bilateral level, two high-profile examples of cooperation are the framework for the automatic recognition of all professional qualifications between Australia and New Zealand; and the complex set of Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) between France and Québec (signed in 2008) that allow migrant professionals in these countries to enter each others’ labour markets more easily.

However, bilateral agreements for the recognition of qualifications between EU Member States and third countries are extremely rare. When they exist, they are often the legacy of colonial or historical ties, as in the case of the mutual recognition agreements that Spain maintains with its former colonies in Latin America, which allow the automatic recognition of academic qualifications. The main obstacles for cooperation between EU Member States and third countries of origin on the recognition of academic and professional qualifications are the often profound differences in educational and occupational systems.

Additional barriers are the complexities due to the involvement of regional authorities in decentralised countries, as well as the fact that many professional bodies (rather than governments) often control decisionmaking on the conditions for admitting new members of a profession. The mutual recognition of professional qualifications across borders can also be facilitated through direct cooperation among professional regulatory bodies, such as the MRAs operated by the US accountancy profession with Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Mexico and New Zealand. Such agreements do not offer automatic licensing but simplify the burden for obtaining full accreditation.

Mutual understanding between origin and destination countries of migrants on the recognition of qualifications between professional bodies can also be initiated in other fora. For example the European Training Foundation (ETF) is an EU agency active in this field, with a specific focus on the neighbouring countries of the EU. ETF cannot as such negotiate agreements, but it can build bridges between third countries and the EU Member States, as it has been the case for its flagship project in the Republic of Moldova, under the umbrella of the Mobility Partnership. In this context ETF facilitated the exchange of information between Moldovan, Italian and Swedish authorities and professional bodies on their respective qualification systems and helped in building capacities of Moldovan partners to negotiate agreements in this area.

Source: Madeleine Sumption, Demetrios G. Papademetriou, and Sarah Flamm, *Skilled Immigrants in the Global Economy: Prospects for International Cooperation on Recognition of Foreign Qualifications* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2013), [www.migrationpolicy.org/research/international-cooperation-recognition-foreign-qualifications](http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/international-cooperation-recognition-foreign-qualifications).

ers can transfer the rights and entitlements they acquired while working abroad. A complex legal area, the portability of rights is likely best achieved either in a regional setting between actors with similar systems, or through bilateral instruments. Bilateral agreements have been predominant in this area. In these, not only do returnees have their social rights recognised at home, but emigrating workers are also able to have their vested rights recognised in the receiving country. The main problem with this approach is the variance among national welfare systems that in practice excludes any possibility of agreeing on binding multilateral legal frameworks in this area.

International organisations have introduced nonbinding frameworks and guidelines, however. The ILO has issued a number of recommendations regarding workers’ rights and portability of social security (for example, the 2005 Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration).<sup>145</sup> The main guiding principles are equal treatment and nondiscrimination between nationals and non-nationals; maintenance of acquired rights; maintenance of rights in the course of acquisition; and payment of benefits to beneficiaries residing abroad.

Another important multilateral initiative in the area of welfare and social rights is the United Nations’ 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which finally entered into force in 2003 when a sufficient number of countries ratified it. All the ratifying countries, as well as signatories, are primarily countries of origin.<sup>146</sup> This convention is a prime example of diplomatic deadlock between

<sup>145</sup> ILO, *ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration: Non-binding principles and guidelines for a rights-based approach to labour migration* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2006), [www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms\\_146243.pdf](http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_146243.pdf).

<sup>146</sup> Currently 47 states have ratified the Convention: Albania, Argentina, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, East Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Guinea, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda and Uruguay. The signatories awaiting ratification are: Benin, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Montenegro, Palau, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Venezuela.



countries of origin and destination, with the former proposing policies that are unacceptable to a majority of the latter, even as a starting point for negotiation. The main countries of destination have also not informally adhered to the Convention.<sup>147</sup> Still, it may be a useful instrument because it obliges the signatory countries of origin to provide protection for their nationals abroad. This may ultimately encourage their efforts to seek agreements on the bilateral level.<sup>148</sup>

The European Union has tried to expand its regional approach to social rights to its neighbours through Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) and the Association Agreements, including steps to include partner countries in its internal social security coordination mechanism. For the moment, the proposal concerns Albania, Montenegro, San Marino, and Turkey (revised 1975 PCA agreement), all countries with social systems that can translate relatively easily across national contexts.<sup>149</sup> This is the first attempt to extend the area of social protection from the EU-level to non-EU countries, with the view of better integration outcomes for migrants and equal treatment of all contributing workers.

In negotiations with the EU Member States, portability of rights is an area where a dynamic third country can achieve a lot. For example, on the bilateral level, Moldova has been particularly active in negotiating and signing such agreements with numerous EU Member States.<sup>150</sup> The fact that Moldova and the European Union have signed a Mobility Partnership, however, has not had much of an effect on this result, since Moldova has signed such agreements on social rights with Member States that are outside the Partnership as well. It remains to be seen if the number of social security agreements will facilitate the future extension of the EU social security coordination mechanism to Moldova, or lead to an EU-wide social security agreement with this country.

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*In negotiations with the EU Member States, portability of rights is an area where a dynamic third country can achieve a lot.*

### 3. Predeparture and post-arrival support for labour market insertion

Predeparture and post-arrival support measures are best implemented through bilateral cooperation, as migrants can directly benefit from coordinated actions in the origin and destination countries.

Regional agreements, though less frequent, can also help prepare migrant workers for labour markets abroad. The most advanced case is the European Union. The principle of open labour markets for EU nationals was agreed in the regional framework. The mobility of workers has been accompanied by a legal framework to facilitate labour-market insertion.<sup>151</sup> Notably, this framework covers the area of rights and the recognition of professional qualifications in the European Union. At first, the professional qualifications were recognised through the European rules on mutual recognition of qualification, with the rules codified and harmonised in a dedicated directive in 2005.<sup>152</sup> Also the EU-wide

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147 EU receiving countries question the rationale of this instrument, noting that it covers irregular immigrants, thus binding the signatories to offering these migrants the same access to welfare and social protection as legally employed workers receive. (The latter are included in national systems of contributions). Receiving countries also note that under EU law, legally employed migrant workers already have a higher level of protection than the one proposed by the Convention. Finally, they note that in the European Union, undocumented workers do have access to basic services, as stipulated by the Convention. For other reasons for nonratification by EU Member States see Antoine Pécoud and Paul de Guchteneire, 'Migration, Human Rights and the United Nations: an investigation into the low ratification record of the UN Migrant Workers Convention', *Global Migration Perspectives*, no. 3 (Geneva: Global Commission on International Migration, 2004), [www.refworld.org/pdfid/42ce46a74.pdf](http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/42ce46a74.pdf).

148 Ryszard Cholewinski, 'International Standards and Processes for the Protection of Migrant Rights', *The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration*, 4 February 2013; Ryszard Cholewinski, 'Human Rights of Migrants: The Dawn of a New Era', *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal* 24 (2010): 585-615.

149 European Commission, 'The External Dimension of EU Social Security Coordination', 30 March 2012, COM(2012) 153 final, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0153:FIN:EN:PDF>. For details of the proposals, see European Commission, 'Communication on the External Dimension of EU Social Security Coordination and four proposals for Council Decisions' (press release, 30 March 2012), [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-12-234\\_en.htm?locale=en](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-234_en.htm?locale=en).

150 Agnieszka Weinar, 'Mobility Partnerships - a Way Forward?'

151 For details on all legislative acts see European Commission, Employment Social Affairs, and Inclusion, 'Legislation', accessed 24 March 2014, <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=474&langId=en>.

152 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 'Directive on the recognition of professional qualifications', 7 September 2005, 2005/36/EC, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:255:0022:0142:en:PDF>.

#### Box 4. Immigrant integration in the EU Mobility Partnerships

EU Mobility Partnerships (MPs) are the most developed examples of country-by-country cooperation on migration and mobility. The joint declarations of these partnerships often address migrant integration, however, the most meaningful negotiations on integration actions continue to be carried out at the bilateral level, between the EU Member States and third countries.

Joint Declarations on Mobility Partnerships foresee cooperation on integration measures either through in-country policy solutions in the European Union, or through predeparture measures. The first are very rare, and for the moment include only cooperation on exchanges of researchers and students (for example, between Germany and Morocco) that do not directly support long-term integration. Another type of measure to facilitate the integration of migrants from partner countries into the European Union is support for the recognition of professional qualifications, offered systematically by European Training Foundation in all the Mobility Partnerships. Here, a major barrier to implementation is the willingness of the EU Member States to embark on such bilateral exercise, which is quite cumbersome and resource-intensive. In the case of Moldova, for example, only Italy and Sweden out of the 15 participating EU Member States agreed to take part in the recognition exercise. The second category, predeparture measures, could be a simple distribution of information about integration help that is available in the destination country, to language and civic training (for example, Italy's initiative in Morocco), to more complex language and vocational education training.

Cooperation on integration under the umbrella of Mobility Partnerships has three features: it is limited to government institutions, the depth of cooperation varies from country to country, and countries of origin are not typically involved in implementing the predeparture measures on their territories.

Cooperation is limited to government institutions. Only in the case of Morocco is the role of the migrant associations in integration acknowledged in the Declaration. For the moment however it is still unclear what Member State will engage in an initiative that would involve these associations. A possible outcome is that Morocco will take initiative in this regard without partnering with any EU Member State.

Actions vary according to the interest of the country of origin. In fact, one of the main innovations within the Mobility Partnership framework is that the partner country can state its priorities and preferences within the partnership at an early stage in the negotiation, and these shape the priorities of the Partnership. The Mobility Partnership with Morocco puts the greatest emphasis on integration, following the policy objectives of the Moroccan government, which has prioritised the issue of integration and antidiscrimination of its migrant communities. However, the actual practical impact of these declarative statements has been unclear, as EU-Morocco relations have not actively focused on the integration of Moroccans in the EU so far. Integration is of less concern for Eastern European countries, as they are more interested in the return and reintegration of their nationals. Thus, for example, the Moldovan government emphasised the return of nationals rather than their integration in its Mobility Partnership.

The country of origin is not involved in implementation. The country of destination or the European Union fund predeparture initiatives, and their content is not agreed upon with the origin country's government. In fact, the implementation of predeparture measures is often subcontracted to an international body, which cooperates with the local civil society and companies to deliver the service (for example, the CAMPO project in Cape Verde or the Swedish Public Employment Service project in Moldova).

Source: *Centro de Apoio ao Migrante no País de Origem* (Migrant Support Centre in Origin Country; CAMPO), home page, accessed 24 March 2014, [www.campo.com.cv/](http://www.campo.com.cv/); European Union, 'Consolidation of migration management capacities in the Republic of Moldova', accessed 24 March 2014, [www.legal-in.eu](http://www.legal-in.eu).

promotion of multilingualism<sup>153</sup> indirectly supports the mobility of workers within the Union. The EU actively supports the learning and teaching of its 23 main languages across the continent.<sup>154</sup> Language skills are perceived as a part of European identity but also as a necessary tool for making the internal market work.

Another notable regional arrangement is the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The main areas of cooperation concern Russian language instruction in the main CIS countries of migrant origin (mostly in Central Asia), and educational institutions that indirectly familiarise potential migrants with Russian culture, society, and work standards.<sup>155</sup>

Predeparture training and post-arrival support is not embedded in multilateral cooperation at the multilateral level. However international organisations have been actively promoting best practices on the bilateral level.<sup>156</sup>

153 European Commission, 'A New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism', 22 November 2005, COM(2005) 596 final, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0596:FIN:en:PDF>.

154 See European Commission, 'Languages', accessed 24 March 2014, [http://ec.europa.eu/languages/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/languages/index_en.htm).

155 See Olga Tkach, *INTERACT Policy and Institutional Framework Report– Russian Federation* (Florence: EUI, 2014 forthcoming).

156 IOM, 'Best Practices: IOM's Migrant Training / Pre-departure Orientation Programs', accessed 24 March 2014, [www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/facilitating/Best-Practices-Migrant-Training.pdf](http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/facilitating/Best-Practices-Migrant-Training.pdf); EC-UN JMDI, 'Migration for Development: A Bottom-Up Approach' (Brussels: EC-UN JMDI, 2011), [www.migration4development.org/sites/m4d.emakina-eu.net/files/jmdi\\_august\\_2011\\_handbook\\_migration\\_for\\_development\\_0.pdf](http://www.migration4development.org/sites/m4d.emakina-eu.net/files/jmdi_august_2011_handbook_migration_for_development_0.pdf).

## D. EU regional dialogues on socioeconomic integration

The European Union brings all three thematic areas of cooperation on the socioeconomic integration of immigrants together in a number of new regional initiatives that go beyond the traditional approaches described in the above sections. The Union has been reaching out to its neighbours for discussions on migrant workers' rights, particularly in the context of the EU Neighbourhood Policy. Examples of this include the Migration, Mobility, and Employment process (MME)<sup>157</sup>, the Rabat Process,<sup>158</sup> and the Eastern Partnership (EaP).<sup>159</sup> Each of these initiatives has created a forum in which the issues of decent work, social rights of workers, and recognition of qualifications are discussed, albeit on different levels of governance and cooperation.

MME is a dialogue between the EU Member States and African countries on the issues facilitating better legal labour migration and mobility, and involving several capacity-building mechanisms, such as the Decent Work Initiative<sup>160</sup> and support for the recognition of qualifications. In this way MME goes beyond sole migration issues, aiming to build comparable social realities among which migration of workers can take place (for example, on the issues of workers' rights and protection). The Rabat Process focuses on migration from West Africa and thus is more of a usual migration dialogue, where issues of worker's rights, social welfare, and recognition of qualifications are strictly focusing on migrants. Finally, EaP is a platform for dialogue on all policy areas that traditionally cover Eastern Neighbourhood. Issues of labour market integration, workers' rights, and social welfare, as well as education and qualifications cooperation are included in EaP Platforms 2 (on labour market and economy) and 4 (on culture and education).

In all these cases the management of migration flows is carefully separated from cooperation on these three thematic areas of socioeconomic integration. Most importantly, the cooperation on the three thematic areas relevant to labour market integration is among actors that are rarely involved in entry and immigration policy, such as ministries of education or labour. In fact, the capacity-building and cooperation activities focus on general policy frameworks as developed by the non-EU partners and have only indirect effects on migrant workers. For example, the Decent Work initiative contains social policies covering the whole population. Experiencing the benefits of these policies depends on the actions of the countries of origin, and their ability to implement the acquired knowledge for domestic adjustment, and their efforts to open new channels for cooperation for more targeted collaboration with the EU Member States. In fact, decision-making in all three thematic areas is still under the national responsibility and thus policy-making and politics still take place on the bilateral level and on a country-by-country basis.

## V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This report has demonstrated that integration is a multidimensional phenomenon characterised by multilayered governance in migrant origin and destination countries. In origin countries, governance institutions for the diaspora generally develop policies influencing the integration of emigrants, but multiple institutions are often involved in the process. The multiplicity of actors with a stake in the design and implementation of policies affecting immigrant integration in both origin and destination countries presents multiple challenges and opportunities for enhancing international cooperation at the institutional level. The paper focuses in particular on socioeconomic integration, including labour market insertion, workers' rights, welfare and social benefits, and predeparture measures.

A main barrier to cooperation is the challenge of identifying the right interlocutors for cooperation in each of the thematic areas that compose the mosaic of integration policy. In receiving countries in the European Union, the institutional agency over integration governance is scattered across multiple ministerial departments, and is often shared among various administrative levels. Likewise, in origin countries, despite the recent trend toward the creation of dedicated overarching diaspora ministries or departments, the governance of diaspora and emigrant integration policies involves multiple institutions—though mostly at the national or federal level.

157 International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 'The Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility & Employment', accessed 24 March 2014, [www.icmpd.org/MME.1559.0.html](http://www.icmpd.org/MME.1559.0.html).

158 Rabat Process: Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development, 'Support Project activities', accessed 24 March 2014, <http://processusderabat.net/web/>.

159 European Union External Action Service, 'Eastern Partnership', accessed 24 March 2014, [http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm).

160 ILO, 'Measuring decent work', accessed 24 March 2014, [www.ilo.org/integration/themes/mdw/lang-en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/integration/themes/mdw/lang-en/index.htm).

This report mapped this broad range of institutional actors—both dedicated and general offices and ministries—in order to provide policymakers and other stakeholders with a starting point for identifying interlocutors for future cooperation on immigrant integration. This innovative exercise is one of the first of its kind, and further research is needed for generating state-of-the-art information on ‘who does what’ in this area. For this reason, a comprehensive and frequently updated international database of institutional actors participating in the design and implementation of integration-related policies would be a useful tool to facilitate reciprocal knowledge and dialogue among interested parties.

In particular, the subnational dimension of integration and diaspora engagement governance requires more research. The key role of municipal and regional actors in receiving countries has been extensively recognised in the literature and in the public discourse. Much less is known about the involvement of subnational institutions in diaspora engagement initiatives in origin countries, and about the experiences of cooperation between such institutions and the local and regional authorities in charge of immigrant integration programmes in destination countries. Migrants originating from the same localities and with similar educational and socioeconomic characteristics tend to concentrate in the same cities and regions in their countries of destination, at least in the first years after arrival—indicating that integration management ought to be tailored to these patterns of diversity. A forthcoming INTERACT paper on the local level governance of integration will be a first attempt to cover the research gaps in this area. This paper will also explore new methods of international cooperation that take the local nature of migration and integration processes into account.

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*A main barrier to cooperation is the challenge of identifying the right interlocutors for cooperation in each of the thematic areas that compose the mosaic of integration policy.*

A second, procedural, challenge related to the multilayered, multilevel governance of immigrant integration is that institutional actors at different levels of governance (local, national) and in charge of different portfolios (like labour, social affairs, interior, or education) have limited opportunities (and incentives) to sit around the same table. Difficulties of convening all the institutional stakeholders involved with integration already abound within each country or group of countries. Within the European Union, for example, the relatively narrow mandate of the Directorate-General for Home Affairs on integration policy and the absence of a cross-cutting approach to migration and integration in the European Council’s Justice and Home Affairs multiannual programmes so far, have not tapped into the potential of the EU institutional framework for facilitating dialogue and stimulating large consensus among the Member States on integration policy directions. A post-Stockholm multiannual programme, which would simultaneously be more targeted to migration and integration and more open to encompassing the cross-cutting dimensions of these phenomena, could better serve integration objectives. Against this background, it is not surprising that bringing together the right actors among both origin and destination countries is even more complex of an exercise.

The establishment of dedicated international fora for knowledge exchange and cooperation in the area of immigrant integration could help bringing together interested parties in origin and destination countries across the various policy portfolios and administrative levels of government, while also facilitating internal coordination and policy coherence on integration-related issues in each country. Transnational sectoral cooperation in each thematic area of integration—such as labour market integration and workers’ rights—would also benefit from the creation and regular convening of working groups. While the potential for enhancing cooperation on migrant integration among origin and destination actors varies greatly depending on the thematic area, these fora and technical meetings could, at minimum, help build trust and relationships between origin- and destination-country actors. Building on its experience in supporting coordination among integration actors across Member States, the European Union could contribute greatly to the establishment of international fora and modules for cooperation. The expansion of the National Contact Points on Integration to the representatives of the major origin countries of immigrants to the European Union, and the increased participation of these representatives in the European Integration Forum, could be cost-effective initiatives in this respect.

Even in those integration-related areas where the interests of origin and destination countries are broadly converging—such as labour market integration—stepping up cooperation remains a delicate exercise. Moreover, the outcomes of cooperation efforts are often uncertain, especially in the context of multilateral frameworks. For this reason, an incremental, modest, and flexible approach to cooperation is more likely to bear concrete fruit in a reasonable time-frame, than broadly comprehensive and overly ambitious negotiations. Limited-scope agreements between a small group of countries having similar characteristics or common geopolitical interests seem to be a good starting point for initiating cooperation, and ultimately expanding it (either in scope or participants) in the medium to long term. In this case, it is important that the reviewing and implementing mechanisms, as well as membership rules of the agreements, are supple. At the same time, global international frameworks of cooperation, such as the United Nations initiatives, should be designed broadly enough to accommodate more targeted and advanced bilateral and regional-level initia-

tives among some of their members.

Some of the major origin countries of Europe's immigrants have entered a migration transition, characterised by the coexistence of emigration and immigration flows, and so face their own socioeconomic, cultural, and political integration issues at home. This moment might offer good opportunities for EU Member States to enhance cooperation in integration governance with origin countries. Europe's supportive stance toward the emerging immigration countries as they address their own immigrant integration challenges could help create further opportunities for cooperation.

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*The establishment of dedicated international fora for knowledge exchange and cooperation in the area of immigrant integration could help bringing together interested parties in origin and destination countries.*

At a time when significant emigration flows are again originating from the Southern EU Member States and Ireland, the migration transition of some of the European Union's traditional migrant-origin countries is blurring the categorical distinction between origin and destination. A broad and participative reflection on the significance of these categories in the context of highly globalised, interconnected, and multifaceted national economies and societies will help establish a fair playing field for international cooperation in integration management.

## APPENDIX: DIASPORA-RELATED ORGANISATIONS

Table A-1 categorises and explains the origin-country actors and initiatives that may play a role in immigrant integration. The information is based mainly on the INTERACT Policy and Institutional Frameworks reports, and complemented with additional literature. While the effort to assemble this information has been extensive, gaps may persist due to the availability and accessibility of source material. Rather than a definitive compilation, it is an attempt to provide a comprehensive comparative overview of diaspora engagement policies. The countries are ordered by their stock of migrants in the European Union. The term ‘n/a’ refers to information that is not available.

**Table A-1. Diaspora-related organisations among INTERACT priority countries of origin**

		Turkey
National level	Diaspora ministry	The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, a dedicated office attached to the Prime Ministry, was established in 2010.
	Diaspora ministry's functional areas	The Presidency for Turks Abroad oversees and coordinates Turkey's diaspora policy. It is organised in seven departments: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Citizens Abroad (defines government diaspora engagement strategy and the government's obligations towards diaspora)</li> <li>• Cultural and Social Relations (has a geographic focus on the Balkans, Middle East, and Asia)</li> <li>• Public Relations and Communications (supports activities of NGOs established by Turks abroad)</li> <li>• International Students (foreigners in Turkey)</li> <li>• Strategy Planning</li> <li>• Legal Advisor</li> <li>• Human Resources and Support.</li> </ul>
	Dedicated diaspora department within a general ministry	General Directorate for Foreign Relations and Abroad Worker Services within the Ministry of Labour and Social Security.  The General Directorate was established in 1967, with a focus on Europe. It coordinates implementation of social security agreements and assists Turkish workers abroad with legal matters, training, and labour market insertion.
	Other governmental institutions	Directorate of Religious Affairs ( <i>Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi</i> ) Founded in 1924, this directorate is attached to the Prime Ministry. It has had responsibilities abroad since 1980. In addition to representing official Islam in Turkey, the directorate works on many other aspects of sociocultural integration. The directorate sends religion ministers, operates Sunni mosques, and lobbies for the establishment of official Islamic education in European countries. It also implements broader social and cultural initiatives as part of an effort to help the Turkish diaspora maintain a sense of belonging to the homeland.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs Helps Turks abroad in overcoming integration obstacles in the areas of political participation, education, employment, and culture.  Advisory Committee and High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad Committees contribute to shaping the Turkish government's diaspora engagement policy, monitor integration obstacles faced by the diaspora, and report on this to the parliament and the council of ministers.
	Quasi-governmental institutions	Consultancy Board for Citizens Living Abroad (attached to the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities)  This board creates policies for the socioeconomic integration of Turkish citizens abroad, reports on the needs of Turkish citizens abroad, and evaluates policies.
Overseas offices	Branches/ centres of diaspora institutions	The Network of Foreign Counsellors and Attachés of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security has been established in 40 cities in 17 destination countries. These offices implement activities that are designed by the General Directorate for Foreign Relations and Abroad Worker Services.  <i>Diyanet</i> Foundations have been established in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark France, Germany, the Netherlands, as well as in non-EU countries.
	Consular offices and embassies	Yes
	Other	<i>Yunus Emre</i> Institutes promote the diffusion of Turkish language, history, and culture in the world; and offer Turkish language courses to young Turks who are the children of immigrants.
Local level	Regional or state diaspora institutions	No
	Branches of national diaspora institutions	No
	Other	n/a

**Table A-1. Diaspora-related organisations among INTERACT priority countries of origin**

		Morocco
National level	<b>Diaspora ministry</b>	<p>The Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad</p> <p>Founded in 1993, the Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad went through several institutional changes, through which it was integrated into other ministries. It was reestablished as an independent ministry in 2007, with a coordination role over other state institutions dealing with diaspora.</p>
	<b>Diaspora ministry's functional areas</b>	<p>The Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad oversees diaspora engagement policy and is charged with preserving the Moroccan national identity among diaspora members. It promotes and organises social, cultural, and recreational activities, such as the National Day of Moroccans Abroad, and Moroccan cultural weeks in destination countries. It also maintains cultural centres in cities with a strong concentration of Moroccan migrants, and promotes initiatives aimed at leveraging the contributions of the diaspora for development in Morocco.</p> <p>The ministry is also responsible for protecting the rights and welfare of Moroccans abroad, and it coordinates the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation in this area.</p>
	<b>Dedicated diaspora department within a general ministry</b>	No
	<b>Other governmental institutions</b>	<p>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (Directorate of Consular and Social Affairs) negotiates and monitors international labour migration and social protection agreements that apply to Moroccans living abroad.</p> <p>Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training</p> <p>National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Skills (ANAPEC) within the Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training facilitates employment matching and the international placement of Moroccan workers.</p> <p>Moroccan Council of Ulemas for Europe under the Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs provides spiritual support and guides youth against religious extremism.</p> <p>Ministry of Education manages 'ELCO,' a programme for teaching the Arabic language and Moroccan culture abroad.</p>
	<b>Quasi-governmental institutions</b>	<p>Hassan II Foundation</p> <p>The foundation works in the areas of language provision to Moroccans abroad, cultural exchange, sports and youth, legal assistance, social assistance, economic development, cooperation, and partnership and communication with the diaspora.</p> <p>Council of Moroccan Community Abroad (advisory institution)</p> <p>The council informs the government's strategy towards the diaspora through analysing problems encountered by Moroccans abroad; maintains working groups on citizenship and political participation, culture, education and identity, religious education, and women's rights; and encourages the diaspora's participation in Morocco's political, economic, and cultural development.</p> <p>Mohamed V Foundation for Solidarity</p> <p>Cooperates with governments and NGOs specialising in migration issues in Morocco and abroad, and manages 'opération transit'.</p>
Overseas offices	<b>Branches/ centres of diaspora institutions</b>	Cultural centres established by the Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad in major destination cities (including Barcelona, Brussels, Montreal, Paris, and Tripoli).
	<b>Consular offices and embassies</b>	Yes
	<b>Other</b>	No
Local level	<b>Regional or state diaspora institutions</b>	No
	<b>Branches of national diaspora institutions</b>	n/a
	<b>Other</b>	ANAPEC has four territorial agencies devoted to the international placement of Moroccan workers in Rabat, Tangier, Fez, and Marrakech.



**Table A-1. Diaspora-related organisations among INTERACT priority countries of origin**

		Algeria	Ukraine
National level	Diaspora ministry	No  The Ministry for Algerian Community Abroad was abolished in 2013, following a 2009 presidential decree. The Advisory Council for the Algerian Community Abroad is to be established in 2014 under the president's office.	No
	Diaspora ministry's functional areas	---	n/a
	Dedicated diaspora department within a general ministry	Directorate for Algerian Community Abroad in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.	No
	Other governmental institutions	Ministry of Employment  National Employment Agency  Ministry for Industrial Development and Investment Promotion	Ministry of Labour and Social Policy  Ministry of Foreign Affairs  State Migration Service  Ministry of Education  Ministry of Culture  Ministry of Youth and Sports
	Quasi-governmental institutions	n/a	No
Overseas offices	Branches/ centres of diaspora institutions	n/a	No
	Consular offices and embassies	Yes	Yes
	Other	n/a	No
Local level	Regional or state diaspora institutions	No	No
	Branches of national diaspora institutions	n/a	No
	Other	n/a	n/a

**Table A-1. Diaspora-related organisations among INTERACT priority countries of origin**

		Russian Federation
National level	Diaspora ministry	No
	Diaspora ministry's functional areas	---
	Dedicated diaspora department within a general ministry	<p>Rossotrudnichestvo (Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation; located within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)) Established in 2008, Rossotrudnichestvo focuses on the diffusion of Russian culture and language abroad and has main responsibility for implementing 'The Russian Language' programme. It also implements a programme on the resettlement of Russians living abroad.</p> <p>Department for Relations with the Compatriots Abroad within MFA Established in 2005, this department develops cooperation with diaspora; it covers legal, social, cultural, educational, and economic issues.</p> <p>Governmental Commission for the Affairs of Compatriots Abroad This intergovernmental organisation is composed of representatives of various ministries, the administration of the president of Russia, the Duma, the MFA, Moscow and St. Petersburg governments, the Administration of the Republic of Tatarstan and NGOs. The Commission has a working group responsible for coordinating different actors in charge of diaspora issues through regular exchange of information. It also prepares recommendations for public authorities, maintains and develops relationships with diaspora organisations, engages Russians abroad in goals like preserving ethnic and cultural identity, and supervises the use of budget funds for the support of compatriots abroad.</p> <p>Department for Organisation of Work with Compatriots within the Federal Migration Service.</p>
	Other governmental institutions	Ministry of Finance Ministry of Education and Science Ministry of Mass Communications
	Quasi-governmental institutions	<p>Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad—created by a presidential decree with the strong involvement of MFA and other government officials, and active as of 2012, this foundation works for the protection of ethnic and cultural rights of Russians, with a special focus on strengthening the position of the Russian language in foreign countries.</p> <p>Russkiy Mir Foundation—created by presidential decree in 2007. The MFA and the Ministry of Education and Science were involved in its creation. The foundation has programmes for cultural outreach, mostly on teaching the Russian language abroad.</p>
Overseas offices	Branches/ centres of diaspora institutions	Rossotrudnichestvo has branches in over 100 countries, with a focus on members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
	Consular offices and embassies	Yes
	Other	The Russkiy Mir Foundation has centres in 42 countries (including 19 EU Member States) offering language courses.
Local level	Regional or state diaspora institutions	n/a
	Branches of national diaspora institutions	n/a
	Other	Moscow, the Moscow region, St. Petersburg, and Tatarstan have programmes for Russians abroad that are partly independent from national-level programmes.

**Table A-I. Diaspora-related organisations among INTERACT priority countries of origin**

		China
National level	<b>Diaspora ministry</b>	The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, a dedicated administrative office under the State Council, was established in 1978.
	<b>Diaspora ministry's functional areas</b>	The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office works to enhance cohesion and potential among diaspora in support of China's development, promotes Chinese culture, protects the rights and interests of overseas Chinese, helps diaspora members integrate in receiving countries, markets Chinese culture abroad to promote Chinese economic development, expands public diplomacy, and encourages the return of talented students from abroad.
	<b>Dedicated diaspora department within a general ministry</b>	Bureau of Emigration and Entry Administration in the Ministry of Public Security.
	<b>Other governmental institutions</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security Chinese Ministry of Education
	<b>Quasi-governmental institutions</b>	n/a
Overseas offices	<b>Branches/ centres of diaspora institutions</b>	n/a
	<b>Consular offices and embassies</b>	Yes
	<b>Other</b>	Confucius Institutes (These institutes promote Chinese language and culture).
Local level	<b>Regional or state diaspora institutions</b>	n/a
	<b>Branches of national diaspora institutions</b>	The Central Overseas Chinese Affairs Office is replicated in 30 provinces and in many cities across the country.
	<b>Other</b>	n/a

**Table A-1. Diaspora-related organisations among INTERACT priority countries of origin**

		India
National level	<b>Diaspora ministry</b>	The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) was established 2004.
	<b>Diaspora ministry's functional areas</b>	<p>MOIA oversees and coordinates all diaspora-related government activities across three main areas: diaspora engagement, protection of migrants' rights abroad, and the facilitation of trade and investment.</p> <p>MOIA's Emigration Policy Division (established in 2006) is responsible for the protection of migrant workers' rights, with a focus on low-skilled workers. It maintains on-site welfare services in countries of destination.</p> <p>The Ministry's Emigration Services Division (formerly the Emigration Division of the Ministry of Labour and Employment) includes the Protectorate General of Emigrants (PGE), the authority responsible for protecting the interests of Indian workers abroad.</p>
	<b>Dedicated diaspora department within a general ministry</b>	Diaspora Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	<b>Other governmental institutions</b>	<p>Ministry of Human Resource Development</p> <p>Ministry of External Affairs</p> <p>Ministry of Labour</p> <p>Ministry of Commerce and Industry</p> <p>Ministry of Finance</p> <p>Ministry of Information and Broadcasting</p>
	<b>Quasi-governmental institutions</b>	India Development Foundation of Overseas Indians (a trust under the MOIA that focuses on diaspora engagement); Global Indian Network of Knowledge (a cooperative effort between MOIA and Tata Consultancy that focuses on diaspora engagement); and the Indian Centre for Migration (formerly the Indian Council of Overseas Employment; focuses on supporting migrant workers abroad and providing analysis).
Overseas offices	<b>Branches/ centres of diaspora institutions</b>	The MOIA provides on-site welfare services for emigrants in 42 countries. The MOIA's Overseas Workers Resource Centres are located in India but provide information and support services to overseas Indians through a toll free helpline.
	<b>Consular offices and embassies</b>	Overseas Indian Centres in the embassies in Washington, Abu Dhabi, and Kuala Lumpur provide legal assistance and field information.
	<b>Other</b>	The Global Indian Foundation maintains schools abroad that teach India's national curriculum. In addition, Kendriya Vidyalaya are central government schools in Nepal and Russia, administered under the Ministry of Human Resource Development.
Local level	<b>Regional or state diaspora institutions</b>	The state Government of Kerala maintains the Department of Non-Resident Keralites Affairs. There are state programmes for diaspora engagement in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Kerala, Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh.
	<b>Branches of national diaspora institutions</b>	PGE has field offices in Chandigarh, Chennai, Cochin, Delhi, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai and Thiruvananthapuram.
	<b>Other</b>	n/a

**Table A-1. Diaspora-related organisations among INTERACT priority countries of origin**

		<b>Pakistan</b>
<b>National level</b>	<b>Diaspora ministry</b>	<p>The Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development</p> <p>The Federal Ministry of Labour, Manpower, and Overseas Pakistanis was established in the early 1980s and was responsible for emigration policy until 2010, when the responsibilities of the Ministry of Labour were devolved to the four provinces of Pakistan and the federal Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis was established. In 2013, the ministry was reorganised into its current name and form.</p>
	<b>Diaspora ministry's functional areas</b>	<p>The Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development formulates emigration and diaspora policy, ensures overseas workers' welfare, strengthens labour relations, and coordinates with provincial governments and other international agencies.</p> <p>The Bureau of Emigration &amp; Overseas Employment, the Overseas Employment Corporation, and the quasigovernmental Overseas Pakistanis Foundation work under the administrative control of the ministry. The priorities of Pakistani emigration and diaspora policy are increasing the volume of labour emigration and protecting overseas workers' rights.</p>
	<b>Dedicated diaspora department within a general ministry</b>	No
	<b>Other governmental institutions</b>	<p>Higher Education Commission Leverages the contributions of highly qualified Pakistanis abroad for development in Pakistan.</p> <p>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</p> <p>Federal Education Board within the Ministry of Education</p> <p>Ministry of Interior</p> <p>Ministry of Information and Broadcasting</p>
	<b>Quasi-governmental institutions</b>	The Overseas Pakistanis Foundation protects the welfare of migrant workers abroad and their families in Pakistan, facilitates remittances transfers, and educates children of overseas Pakistanis.
<b>Overseas offices</b>	<b>Branches/ centres of diaspora institutions</b>	No
	<b>Consular offices and embassies</b>	Fifteen among embassies and consulates (mostly in the Gulf countries, as well as in Norway and the United Kingdom, ) have community welfare attaches for protecting and promoting the welfare of Pakistani workers abroad, and helping to increase the number of overseas Pakistani workers.
	<b>Other</b>	n/a
<b>Local level</b>	<b>Regional or state diaspora institutions</b>	No
	<b>Branches of national diaspora institutions</b>	The Bureau of Emigration & Overseas Employment has seven regional offices (called protectorates) that ensure the legal and orderly emigration of Pakistani workers and provide predeparture information to Pakistani labour emigrants.
	<b>Other</b>	n/a

**Table A-1. Diaspora-related organisations among INTERACT priority countries of origin**

		<b>Ecuador</b>	<b>Tunisia</b>
<b>National level</b>	<b>Diaspora ministry</b>	<p>The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility. (Located within this ministry, the Vice-Ministry of Human Mobility is specifically in charge of emigration and diaspora issues. Thus, the ministry reflects a hybrid setting, meaning that diaspora governance is one of its major roles, but not the only role).</p> <p>A stand-alone National Secretariat for Migrants was created in 2007 and abolished in 2013. A general overhaul of diaspora institutions is ongoing.</p>	<p>No</p> <p>The Secretary of State for Migrations and Tunisians Living Abroad dissolved in January 2014. It had been established as the overarching ministry in charge of emigrants, migrant communities abroad, and returnees in December 2012. Its responsibilities have been downgraded to the Office for Tunisians Abroad, which has been within the Ministry of Social Affairs since 1988.</p>
	<b>Diaspora ministry's functional areas</b>	The Vice-Ministry of Human Mobility works for the protection of migrant communities through a variety of activities, including orientation, legal advice, and psychosocial assistance to migrant families.	---
	<b>Dedicated diaspora department within a general ministry</b>	The Vice Ministry of Human Mobility, located within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility.	<p>Office for Tunisians Abroad within the Ministry of Social Affairs</p> <p>The office coordinates all migration-related issues, supports integration in destination states, facilitates the return of Tunisian citizens abroad, strengthens the Tunisian diaspora's feelings of belonging to the homeland, defends the rights of the diaspora, and produces research and analysis.</p>
	<b>Other governmental institutions</b>	n/a	Ministries of: Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, Employment and Professional Training, Culture, Education, Youth and Sports, Religious Affairs, and Economy and Finance.
	<b>Quasi-governmental institutions</b>	n/a	National Observatory on Migration. The draft decree on its creation was approved by cabinet in 2014, with functions to be clarified.
<b>Overseas offices</b>	<b>Branches/ centres of diaspora institutions</b>	n/a	No
	<b>Consular offices and embassies</b>	Yes	Yes
	<b>Other</b>	Homes for Migrants Abroad	n/a
<b>Local level</b>	<b>Regional or state diaspora institutions</b>	n/a	No
	<b>Branches of national diaspora institutions</b>	n/a	No
	<b>Other</b>	n/a	n/a

**Table A-1. Diaspora-related organisations among INTERACT priority countries of origin**

		Philippines
National level	Diaspora ministry	No
	Diaspora ministry's functional areas	---
	Dedicated diaspora department within a general ministry	<p>Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) within the Department of Labour and Employment (DOLE)—manages the overseas employment of Filipinos starting from the predeparture stage, and monitors and promotes the welfare of overseas Filipino workers.</p> <p>Overseas Workers' Welfare Administration within DOLE—formulates and implements welfare programmes for Filipino workers and their families abroad and in the Philippines.</p> <p>Office of the Undersecretary for Migrant Workers' Affairs within the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)—coordinates legal assistance to Filipino migrant workers in distress.</p> <p>Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) within DFA—dedicated agency for diaspora affairs that promotes and upholds the interests of Filipino emigrants abroad and preserves the state's ties with overseas Filipino communities.</p>
	Other governmental institutions	<p>Shared Government Information System for Migration (composed of DFA; CFO; DOLE and its attached agencies; local governments; and the departments of Tourism, Justice, and Interior).</p> <p>Department of Education</p> <p>Interagency Committee on Philippine Schools Overseas (consisting of the Department of Education, DFA, DOLE, and CFO).</p> <p>Bureau of Immigration</p> <p>National Bureau of Investigation</p> <p>Commission on Communications and Information Technology</p> <p>National Telecommunications Commission</p>
	Quasi-governmental institutions	n/a
Overseas offices	Branches/ centres of diaspora institutions	Philippine Overseas Labour Offices in major destinations
	Consular offices and embassies	Embassies in major destinations maintain Migrant Workers and Other Overseas Filipinos Resource Centres.
	Other	n/a
Local level	Regional or state diaspora institutions	<p>Overseas Filipino Workers' Desk, Provincial Government of Pangasian.</p> <p>Provincial Overseas Filipino Workers' Centre in Province of Batangas.</p> <p>Maribkojoc Diaspora Organisation, Bohol Employment and Placement Office, in Province of Bohol Maribojc.</p>
	Branches of national diaspora institutions	Local Government Units disseminate information on overseas employment at the local government level, in partnership with the POEA.
	Other	n/a

**Table A-1. Diaspora-related organisations among INTERACT priority countries of origin**

		<b>Moldova</b>
<b>National level</b>	<b>Diaspora ministry</b>	The Bureau on Relations with Diaspora (within the State Chancellery) was established in 2012 and has been fully operational since 2013. The creation of the bureau resulted in an ongoing reorganisation of competences among various governmental actors in the area of diaspora policy.
	<b>Diaspora ministry's functional areas</b>	The Bureau on Relations with the Diaspora coordinates the implementation of the state's diaspora-relations policy; contributes to the preservation and confirmation of the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic identity of Moldovans living abroad; and works to develop the diaspora's human and material capital.
	<b>Dedicated diaspora department within a general ministry</b>	Bureau of Migration and Asylum in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (develops conceptual and strategic approaches and policies on migration and diaspora).
	<b>Other governmental institutions</b>	<p>Coordinating Council on Diaspora Chaired by the Prime Minister, since 2011 the council includes elected representatives of the Moldovan diaspora. It works for the preservation of Moldovan national identity.</p> <p>National Bureau of Interethnic Relations The bureau facilitates cultural cooperation with the Moldovan Diaspora and communities abroad.</p> <p>Ministry of Economy The ministry develops policies on the employment of Moldovan citizens abroad and oversees economic relations with the diaspora (for example, investments).</p> <p>Ministry of Labour, Social Protection, and Family The ministry negotiates labour and social protection agreements with foreign countries for Moldovan workers.</p> <p>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration The ministry supports the Moldovan communities abroad and provides consular and diplomatic protection for Moldovan citizens.</p> <p>Ministry of Culture</p> <p>Ministry of Health</p>
	<b>Quasi-governmental institutions</b>	n/a
<b>Overseas offices</b>	<b>Branches/ centres of diaspora institutions</b>	n/a
	<b>Consular offices and embassies</b>	Yes
	<b>Other</b>	No
<b>Local level</b>	<b>Regional or state diaspora institutions</b>	No
	<b>Branches of national diaspora institutions</b>	No (but the Bureau on Relations with Diaspora aims at developing a diaspora policy at the regional and local level).
	<b>Other</b>	n/a



**Table A-1. Diaspora-related organisations among INTERACT priority countries of origin**

		<b>Belarus</b>	<b>Lebanon</b>
<b>National level</b>	<b>Diaspora ministry</b>	No	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants (Diaspora governance is a major role of this ministry, but not the only role).  In 1946, responsibility for migrants was first incorporated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A stand-alone Ministry of Migrants was established in 1994, but it was incorporated again into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2000.
	<b>Diaspora ministry's functional areas</b>	---	The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants works to strengthen government links with diaspora, encourages harmonious relations among Lebanese groups residing abroad, encourages Lebanese abroad to establish trade unions and associations, and tries to leverage diaspora contributions for development.
	<b>Dedicated department within a general ministry</b>	No	No
	<b>Other governmental institutions</b>	Office of Commissioner for Religious and National Affairs (develops diaspora policy).  Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Culture (has Consultative Council of Belarusians Abroad).  Department of Citizenship and Migration in the Ministry of Interior (migration planning).  Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (workers' protection).  State Border Committee (controls migration).  Ministry of Education  Ministry of Internal Affairs	Ministry of Labour  Ministry of Education  Ministry of Foreign Affairs  Ministry of Interior and Municipalities
	<b>Quasi-governmental institutions</b>	No	n/a
<b>Overseas offices</b>	<b>Branches/ centres of diaspora institutions</b>	No	n/a
	<b>Consular offices and embassies</b>	Yes	Yes
	<b>Other</b>	No	n/a
<b>Local level</b>	<b>Regional or state diaspora institutions</b>	No	n/a
	<b>Branches of national diaspora institutions</b>	No	n/a
	<b>Other</b>	n/a	n/a

**Table A-1. Diaspora-related organisations among INTERACT priority countries of origin**

		Syria	Brazil
National level	Diaspora ministry	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates  This Ministry has a hybrid setting, meaning that diaspora governance is a major role, but not the only one. The ministry was established in 2009, after the abolition of a stand-alone Ministry of Expatriates, which had been created in 2002.	No
	Diaspora ministry's functional areas	The authors are uncertain of the ministry's functional areas, due to the Syrian civil war.	---
	Dedicated diaspora department within a general ministry	n/a	The Undersecretary General for Brazilian Communities Abroad in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was created 2006. This office assists the largest and the most vulnerable Brazilian communities abroad, develops ties between Brazil and the diaspora, improves consular assistance, forms strategies for reaching out to Brazilian emigrants, and updates services and technologies (such as web portals) for emigrants.
	Other governmental institutions	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs	Ministry of Labour and Employment Ministry of Interior Ministry of Social Welfare Ministry of Economy and Finances Ministry of Education
	Quasi-governmental institutions	n/a	Council of Representatives of Brazilians Abroad (This organisation informs and proposes policies).
Overseas offices	Branches/ centres of diaspora institutions	n/a	The dedicated diaspora department is located in the MFA.
	Consular offices and embassies	n/a	Yes
	Other	n/a	The Ministry of Labour and Employment set up Home of Workers in 2012 in Japan to support Brazilian workers in Japan.
Local level	Regional or state diaspora institutions	n/a	No
	Branches of national diaspora institutions	n/a	No
	Other	n/a	Governador Valadares and Goiânia, as well as the provincial government of Goiás, have developed projects and programmes (in cooperation with MFA) to support emigrants and returnees.

**Table A-1. Diaspora-related organisations among INTERACT priority countries of origin**

		<b>Senegal</b>
<b>National level</b>	<b>Diaspora ministry</b>	<p>Ministry of Senegalese Living Abroad, the Arts and Crafts, and Tourism</p> <p>The Ministry has a hybrid setting, meaning that diaspora governance is a major role of this ministry, but not the only role. The ministry was created in 2003 as the Ministry of Senegalese from Abroad. Ministerial-level institutions in charge of the diaspora have existed in Senegal since the early 1980s.</p>
	<b>Diaspora ministry's functional areas</b>	The ministry develops the policy for engaging diaspora for development, and implements a system for efficiently managing and monitoring the Senegalese population living abroad.
	<b>Dedicated diaspora department within a general ministry</b>	<p>National Committee for the Management and Monitoring of Employment Offers</p> <p>This interministerial committee, established in 2008, brings together the ministries of Youth and Youth Employment, Internal Affairs, External Affairs, Senegalese Living Abroad, Employment; as well as the committee of Coordination 'Defence-General Studies'.</p> <p>The committee centralises and circulates job offers, verifies the protection of migrant workers' rights, manages the preselection of job candidates, creates an inventory of worker profiles, raises awareness of rights-related and other important issues among migrant workers, provides predeparture information and training, ensures the good proceedings of job contracts and of the return of workers at the end of their contract; implements measures for preventing brain drain; and coordinates the work of different ministries in legal migration-related areas.</p>
	<b>Other governmental institutions</b>	<p>Ministry of Internal Affairs (in charge of concluding bilateral agreements on migration management).</p> <p>Ministry of External Affairs (participates in negotiating and implementing bilateral agreements and partnerships on migration management).</p> <p>Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Collectivities (serves as the local-level entry point for national and international actors, notably diaspora organisations that wish to invest in Senegal).</p> <p>Ministry of Public Function, Work and Professional Organisation (involved in negotiating the terms of legal migration and the protection of migrant workers' rights).</p> <p>Ministry of Economy and Finances</p> <p>Ministry of Youth and Youth Employment</p> <p>Ministry of Justice</p> <p>Ministry of Armed Forces</p>
	<b>Quasi-governmental institutions</b>	n/a
<b>Overseas offices</b>	<b>Branches/ centres of diaspora institutions</b>	n/a
	<b>Consular offices and embassies</b>	Yes
	<b>Other</b>	n/a
<b>Local level</b>	<b>Regional or state diaspora institutions</b>	n/a
	<b>Branches of national diaspora institutions</b>	n/a
	<b>Other</b>	n/a

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**Migration Policy Institute Europe**, established in Brussels in 2011, is a non-profit, independent research institute that aims to provide a better understanding of migration in Europe and thus promote effective policymaking. Building upon the experience and resources of the Migration Policy Institute, which operates internationally, MPI Europe provides authoritative research and practical policy design to governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders who seek more effective management of immigration, immigrant integration, and asylum systems as well as successful outcomes for newcomers, families of immigrant background, and receiving communities throughout Europe. MPI Europe also provides a forum for the exchange of information on migration and immigrant integration practices within the European Union and Europe more generally.

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