
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMMIGRATION AND NATIVISM IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA

By Cas Mudde

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Executive Summary

Mass migration is thought to be a major factor behind the rise of the radical right.¹ But while there clearly is a relationship (particularly in Western Europe), the connection is not as straightforward as is often assumed. Higher levels of immigration in the three regions examined in this report — North America, Western Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe — do not automatically correlate to more votes for radical-right parties.

The success of radical-right parties has been uneven in Europe. Since 1980, only a handful has had moderate electoral success (that is, gained over 15 percent of the vote in two or more elections). Even parties with significant recent gains, such as the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), have yet to prove their longevity and thus do not confirm the long-held stereotype that the region is a hotbed of nationalism. There is also no strong evidence that the recent economic crisis has led to a clear rise in extremist politics; while some such as Jobbik have made striking gains in recent elections, others have lost support, such as Belgium's Flemish Interest and France's National Front.

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Immigration is also not the only salient issue for the radical right. In Central and Eastern Europe, where there is still relatively low immigration, radical-right parties tend to focus on indigenous minorities (notably the Roma). And in Western Europe, where immigration is central to political discourse, the ideology of radical-right groups is also linked to fears of crime and corruption. Immigration, however, does play a critical role, and is seen as a multifaceted threat on cultural, religious, security, economic, and political fronts. The discourse on immigration is similar in the United States, although Islam plays a less dominant role than in Western Europe.

Nativist groups have had a marginal effect on immigration policy in all three regions, mainly because they are rarely part of government. However, in the three Western European countries where nativist parties are part of government (Austria, Italy, and Switzerland), they have been instrumental in introducing more restrictive immigration policies. In Central and Eastern Europe, immigration is simply a nonissue; although the region has seen more radical-right government participation, the focus has been on national minorities rather than immigrants. In the United States, nativist actors have had indirect effects on policy at best, as the nativist voices within the Republican Party, for example, have not made it into prominent positions in government.

Outside the party political arena, several Eastern and Central European countries have strong nonparty groups, such as neo-Nazis and extreme-right skinhead gangs. Nonparty organizations are also relevant in the United States and Canada, neither of which have significant nativist political parties. While these groups may have a discernable effect at the local and community levels, they do not have a direct effect on policy, and often confront strong pro-immigration forces in political and public debates. And despite its high profile, extreme-right terrorism is rare (particularly compared to the 1990s), and usually not formally linked to radical-right parties. Consequently, the relationship between electoral success of radical-right parties and extreme-right violence seems nonstructural and weak.

The relationship between immigration and extremism is unclear and complex. Many assumptions are based upon feeble empirical evidence — suggesting the need for more cross-national data projects. Rising numbers of immigrants do not automatically translate into increasing extremism in a country; immigra-

¹ For purposes of this report, the radical right is defined as a broad grouping of political parties and nonparty organizations that share characteristics of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.



tion has to be *translated* into a political issue, which has not happened everywhere. Radical-right party success probably doesn't change many opinions. Rather, it mainstreams existing anti-immigrant attitudes. While nativist sentiments and organizations have played a role in the tightening of immigration laws — particularly those regarding asylum — they have lost the big battle, as both Western Europe and North America are increasingly multiethnic societies.

I. Introduction

Migration is as old as mankind itself, yet it has increased dramatically in scope and consequences in recent decades. Millions of people migrate or have migrated as transportation has become affordable, opportunity has expanded, and countries have become increasingly connected.² While the vast majority of migrants stay fairly close to their homeland, a growing group sets out for farther shores, most notably Western Europe and North America.

This report focuses primarily on the effects of migration on political extremism in three industrialized regions: North America, Western Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe. Although all three regions are internally diverse, they share some key features that are relevant: In North America, both Canada and the United States have long traditions as countries of immigration; Western Europe has seen mass immigration since the end of World War II (although some countries, France and the United Kingdom among them, experienced it much earlier than others, such as Ireland and Spain); and Central and Eastern Europe have only been confronted in recent decades with generally low levels of immigration and higher levels of emigration.

The focus of this report is on the political extremism of the host population, or the native born, not of the immigrants. While extremism among some immigrant groups, ranging from Turkish nationalist groups to Arab jihadists, has increased, this is only addressed indirectly, in the ways in which it has influenced the immigration debate in the host country. The report primarily focuses on the various nativist reactions to immigration. Nativism, a combination of nationalism and xenophobia, is “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the nation) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state.”³

The report's first section defines and introduces the main nativist actors by region, as well as highlights ways in which nativists mobilize in the different regions and their respective strengths and weaknesses. The second section examines the importance of migration to the identity and political relevance of the nativist actors, and analyzes how these actors frame migration and how central it is to their discourse and electoral success. The third section shifts the focus onto how nativist actors have affected migration policies in their country. The fourth section broadens the focus by looking into the public effects of nativist actors. The fifth section focuses on the various ways in which states and societies have tried to counter the nativist actors; while the sixth section touches briefly on the effects that the recent economic crisis has had on immigration and nativism in the three regions. The final section summarizes the main findings of the report and addresses state responses to anti-immigrant extremism.

2 The reasons for migration are diverse and are influenced by so-called push and pull factors. Push factors are those that push migrants away from their own country, which are mostly economic (e.g. poverty) or political (e.g. civil war). Pull factors are those that pull migrants toward their new country, which are also mostly economic (e.g. high standard of living) and political (e.g. safety and security); although much recent migration to Western Europe has been personal, such as family building and reunion.

3 Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007).



II. The Main Nativist Actors

The extremists discussed in this report go by many different, if often related, names. Academics and journalists use terms such as “xenophobes,” “nativists,” “racists,” “right-wing populists,” the “radical right,” “radical right-wing populists,” the “extreme right,” “(neo-)fascists,” and “neo-Nazis.”⁴ While the intrinsic details of the definitional debates are not discussed here, it is important to provide at least some broad clarifications of the main terms used. As mentioned previously, the overarching category examined is nativism.

The most important representatives of the radical right, at least throughout Europe, are political parties.

There are two fundamental distinctions that are relevant here: right-left and radical-extreme.⁵ However, these relative terms don’t help much in a broad interregional comparison. At the same time, the socio-economic distinction between a prostate left and a promarket right seems at best secondary to the main concern of this report. Therefore, for the purposes of this report, the distinction between left and right is in line with that of Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio, who differentiates on the grounds of the attitude toward (in)equality.⁶ In this interpretation, the left considers the key inequalities between people to be artificial and wants to overcome them by active state involvement, whereas the right believes the main inequalities between people to be natural and outside the purview of the state.⁷

The distinction between *extreme* and *radical* is not merely of academic importance but can have significant legal consequences. For example, in Germany, extremist organizations can be banned, whereas radical groups cannot.⁸ To keep things simple, this report defines extremism as antidemocratic, in the sense that the key aspects of democracy — majority rule and one person, one vote — are rejected. Radicalism, on the other hand, accepts the basic tenets of democracy but challenges some key aspects of liberal democracy, most notably minority protections. Hence, there is a fundamental difference between radical and extreme forces, which have significant consequences for the way (liberal) democracy can deal with them.

The main groups dealt with here are the radical right. This is not to argue that nativism is exclusive to the radical right, or even to the right per se (as some left-wing parties have at times voiced nativist arguments as well, particularly at the local level),⁹ but only that the radical right has nativism as a core ideological feature. Radical-right groups accept both inequalities and basic democracy but espouse an ideology that challenges minority protections. The most important representatives of the radical right, at least throughout Europe, are political parties; in Europe, parties dominate politics. These parties share an ideology that

4 Paul Hainsworth, *The Extreme Right in Western Europe* (London, UK: Routledge, 2008); Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties*; Frank Decker, *Der neue Rechtspopulismus* (Opladen, Germany: Leske & Budrich, 2004); Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick Hossay, eds., *Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe* (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Hans-Georg Betz, *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe* (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1994); Frank Elbers and Meindert Fennema, *Racistische partijen in West-Europa. Tussen nationale traditie en Europese samenwerking* (Leiden, Netherlands: Stichting Burgerschapskunde, 1993).

5 The distinction between left and right goes back to the French Revolution (1789-99), when supporters of the Revolution would be seated on the left side of the French parliament and opponents on the right. More generally, the term left has been associated with “progressive” forces, while the right is deemed “conservative.”

6 Norberto Bobbio, “Rechts und Links. Zum Sinn einer politischen Unterscheidung,” *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 39, no. 5 (1994): 543-49.

7 Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties*.

8 Uwe Backes, “Extremismus und politisch motivierte Gewalt” in *Demokratien des 21. Jahrhunderts im Vergleich: Historische Zugänge, Gegenwartsprobleme, Reformperspektiven*, eds. Eckhard Jesse and Roland Sturm (Opladen, Germany: Leske & Budrich, 2003).

9 Among the first local politicians to take an anti-immigrant position in France were communist mayors in the Paris area. See, for example, Martin Baldwin-Edwards, “Recent Changes in European Immigration Policies,” *Journal of European Social Policy* 2, no.1 (1992): 53-6.



includes core features such as nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.¹⁰ In addition, nonparty organizations, both of the radical and extreme right, are examined. The most important groups, at least in terms of physical threats to immigrants, are violent extreme-right groups such as neo-Nazi organizations and skinhead gangs.

A. Western Europe

Since the early 1980s, there has been a third wave of postwar radical-right parties with much more success in electoral terms than the previous two waves.¹¹ That stated, the development and success of radical-right parties in Western Europe has been quite uneven.

The *pater familias* of the contemporary radical right is the French National Front (FN), which was founded in 1972 as a collection of radical and extreme-right groups. Under the charismatic leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen, the party gained its electoral breakthrough in the mid-1980s and although its parliamentary representation would be mostly minimal because of the French electoral system, FN has become the leading example for most contemporary radical-right parties in Europe.¹² Many parties have adopted FN propaganda and slogans, and some have even copied its name and logo (for example, the Belgian National Front).

While most contemporary radical-right parties are relatively new, having been founded since the 1980s, some have much longer institutional legacies although often not as radical-right parties. The most influential of these, in terms of gaining electoral success and political power, are the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Swiss People's Party (SVP). The former developed from a small national(ist)-liberal party into one of the biggest radical-right parties after Jörg Haider took over the leadership in 1986. The latter originated as a farmers' party and changed into a mainstream conservative party in the 1970s; Zurich-based leader Christoph Blocher transform it into a full-fledged radical-right party by the early 2000s.

The development and success of radical-right parties in Western Europe has been quite uneven.

Radical-right parties have been electorally successful (winning over 15 percent of the vote in two or more elections since 1980) in only a few Western European countries (notably Austria and Switzerland). In about one-third of the countries (such as Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy), they have had moderate electoral success, receiving between 5 percent and 15 percent of the national vote. However, in most Western European countries, radical-right parties have never had serious electoral support and have polled below 5 percent (see Table 1).

In addition, many of the (once) successful radical-right parties passed their peak in the late 1990s. In fact, the prototype FN itself seemed to be close to a meltdown, until Marine Le Pen took over the party leadership from her father in January 2011. While Le Pen has been able to bring FN back into the center of the political debate in France, the next parliamentary and presidential elections, slated for 2012, will determine whether the party can survive its founder-leader. Even Belgium's Flemish Interest (VB) seems destined for a decline, having lost fairly substantially in all elections since 2006. Moreover, past years have been defined by internal struggles, which have led to the exit (sometimes forced) of many prominent members.

10 Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties*.

11 Klaus von Beyme, "Right-wing Extremism in Post-war Europe," *West European Politics* 11, no. 2 (1988): 1-18.

12 Jens Rydgren, "Meso-level Reasons for Racism and Xenophobia: Some Converging and Diverging Effects of Radical Right Populism in France and Sweden," *European Journal of Social Theory* 6, no. 1 (2003): 45-68.


Table 1. Support for Radical-Right Parties in Parliamentary Elections in Western Europe, 1980-2011

Country	Party	Highest Ever (Percent)	Most Recent (Percent)
Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria	10.7 (2008)	10.7 (2008)
	Austria Freedom Party (FPÖ)	26.9 (1999)	17.5 (2008)
Belgium	National Front (Belgian) (FNb)	2.3 (1995)	0.5 (2010)
	Flemish Interest (VB)	12 (2007)	7.8 (2010)
Britain	British National Party (BNP)	1.9 (2010)	1.9 (2010)
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DFP)	13.8 (2007)	12.3 (2011)
France	National Front (FN)	14.9 (1997)	4.3 (2007)
Germany	The Republicans (REP)	2.1 (1990)	0.4 (2009)
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)	5.6 (2009)	5.6 (2009)
Italy	Northern League (LN)	10.1 (1996)	8.3 (2009)
Netherlands	Centre Democrats (CD)	2.5 (1994)	---
	Party for Freedom (PVV)	15.5 (2010)	15.5 (2010)
Portugal	National Renovator Party (PNR)	0.3 (2011)	0.3 (2011)
Spain	New Force (FN)	0.5 (1982)	---
Sweden	Sweden Democrats (SD)	5.7 (2010)	5.7 (2010)
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party (SVP)	28.9 (2007)	26.6 (2011)

Source: Manuel Álvarez-Rivera, "Election Resources on the Internet: Western Europe," accessed March 4, 2012, <http://electionresources.org/western.europe.html>.

The only three real powerhouses are the Austrian FPÖ, which has rebounded from internal strife and electoral defeat; the Danish People's Party (DFP), which has provided essential support for the minority government for ten years; and the Swiss SVP, which, despite a recent split and conflicts between its party leader and other governmental party elites, is still operating as part in the Swiss government, and remains the most popular party in the country in terms of public support. In addition, Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom (PVV), founded in 2005, has fast become the third-largest party in the Dutch parliament and the support party of the current right-wing government. Although the party is not traditionally organized (it lacks party members), it seems quite stable and could survive for some time to come.

There are a few Western European parties that could be counted as radical-right, but at least for the purposes of this report are borderline cases. Most notably, the Norwegian Progress Party (FRP) has been ideologically eclectic and chaotic, at times supporting a strong anti-immigrant agenda. It is one of the largest parties in Norway, but has had its image damaged by the gruesome terrorist attack in July 2011; the shooter, Anders Behring Breivik, was a former party member. Another party sometimes considered radical right is the Finnish True Finns (PS) party, which became a major player in Finnish politics after gaining a surprising 19.1 percent of the vote in the 2011 elections. Like FRP in Norway, PS has been responsible for putting immigration on the national political agenda, but its nativism is more episodic than structural and doesn't define the core ideology of the party.¹³

In addition to these political parties, there are various extreme and radical-right nonparty organizations in Western Europe, many of which are sectarian and cater to a few hundred people (at best) in their country.¹⁴ Some of the most notable organizations have developed only recently, focusing their agendas almost exclusively on Muslim immigrants. Examples include the English Defence League (EDL) and Stop the Islamification of Europe (SIOE). SIOE seems mainly to exist as an online organization and its "success" a consequence of its tight connection to politicians from radical-right parties (including DFP and

13 David Arter, "The Breakthrough of Another West European Populist Radical Right Party? The Case of the True Finns," *Government & Opposition* 45, no. 4 (2010): 484-504.

14 Examples include the various neo-Nazi *Kameradschaften* in Germany or small radical student groups such as the Union Defense Group in France. A few groups work in Europe or even worldwide; for example, the infamous neo-Nazi skinhead organization Blood & Honour, which has (small and often barely active) branches in all three regions, or the esoteric International Third Position.



VB) as well as to prominent conservatives in the United States. Moreover, like various other “counter-Jihadist” groups in Western Europe, SIOE has chosen to adopt a less-prominent profile (even dismantling its website) in light of the fallout from the terrorist attack in Norway; the terrorist quoted SIOE and other counter-Jihadist groups regularly and approvingly in his 1,500-page manifesto.

EDL is probably the most active and prominent nativist nonparty organization in Western Europe today, organizing demonstrations throughout the United Kingdom (predominantly within England), at times mobilizing thousands of mostly young white men. Its loose “membership” is more diverse than traditional radical-right parties like BNP, but it seems that much of its core is quite similar. However, unlike the traditional radical right in Britain, EDL has reached out to non-Muslim minorities (particularly Jews and Sikhs as well as gays and lesbians) and to like-minded people and organizations abroad. So far, their success has been limited; minorities are only sparsely represented within the organization and its activities. EDL activities abroad (e.g. in Canada and the Netherlands) attract few people.

B. Central and Eastern Europe

Although the parties and party systems of Central and Eastern Europe are not yet as institutionalized as in the western part of the continent, political parties are also the main actors in the former communist part of Europe. While received wisdom holds that Central and Eastern Europe is a hotbed for nationalist extremists, radical-right parties are hardly more successful in Central and Eastern Europe than in “Old Europe”¹⁵ (see Table 2).

Table 2. Radical-Right Parties in Eastern Europe with the Largest Share of Support in Parliamentary Elections, 1990-2012

Country	Party	Highest Ever (Percent)	Most Recent (Percent)
Bulgaria	National Union Attack (NSA)	9.4 (2009)	9.4 (2009)
Croatia	Croatian Party of Rights (HSP)	5.0 (1995)	3.0 (2011)
Czech Republic	Assembly of the Republic - Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ)	8.0 (1996)	---
	Sovereignty - Jana Bobošíková Bloc	3.7 (2010)	3.7 (2010)
Hungary	Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP)	5.5 (1998)	0.0 (2010)
	Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)	16.7 (2010)	16.7 (2010)
Latvia	Popular Movement for Latvia-Zigerista Party (TKL-ZP)	15 (1995)	---
	National Alliance (NA)	13.9 (2011)	13.9 (2011)
Poland	League of Polish Families (LPR)	8.0 (2005)	---
Romania	Greater Romania Party (PRM)	19.5 (2000)	3.2 (2008)
Russia	Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)	22.9 (1993)	11.7 (2011)
Serbia	Serbian Radical Party (SRS)	29.5 (2008)	29.5 (2008)
Slovakia	Slovak National Party (SNS)	11.7 (2006)	4.6 (2012)

Source: Manuel Álvarez-Rivera, “Election Resources on the Internet: Western Europe,” accessed March 4, 2012, <http://electionresources.org/western.europe.html>; Wikipedia.

Only in four countries have radical-right parties ever gained over 15 percent of the vote; however, in two of them, the respective parties have since lost most of their support (the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, or LDPR, and Greater Romania Party, or PRM), while in the third, the party has recently split (the Serbian Radical Party, or SRS). The newest star on the radical-right front is the Hungarian Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), which started with a bang but still has to prove its longevity. The Latvian National Alliance (NA) is a coalition of the national-conservative For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK party, one of the oldest parties in the country but with decreasing support, and the radical right All for Latvia!, which

15 Cas Mudde, “Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe,” *East European Politics and Societies* 19, no. 2 (2005): 161-84.



started as a youth movement in 2000. While it has been able to jump from 7.7 percent support in 2010 to 13.9 percent in 2011, and joined the government, NA remains an untested quantity.

In only four countries was the most recent score also the highest support score for parliamentary elections since 1990; in two other countries, the parties no longer have independent parliamentary representation (Croatia and Poland). In other words, as in the western part of the continent, radical-right parties are without significant electoral support in a majority of Central and Eastern European countries and without governmental participation as of September 2011.

Central and Eastern Europe does seem to have a stronger nonparty radical right, which includes old mainstream nationalist organizations such as Slovak Motherland (Matica Slovenská) in Slovakia, revisionist organizations such as the Marshal Antonescu League in Romania, or orthodox-religious organizations such as Radio Maria in Poland.¹⁶ However, in most cases, their political relevance has been closely related to the electoral strength of the domestic radical-right party or to their relationships with idiosyncratic postcommunist parties, such as the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) or the Socialist Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR), both of which have lost most of their power since the 1990s. The only exception is Radio Maria, which remains closely allied with the national-conservative Law and Justice (PiS), the second-biggest party in Poland.

Finally, several Central and Eastern European countries have significant neo-Nazi groups and extreme-right skinhead gangs; most notably Russia and Serbia.¹⁷ Unlike in much of the West, these groups were until recently seldom confronted with strong state or antiracist resistance. In countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia, both state and local security agencies now take the extreme right seriously, while antiracist initiatives have successfully generated media and public attention. In Russia, which had seen a massive growth of these movements, the state has reacted late, but particularly vigilantly; it has passed draconic new laws, which have been criticized by domestic and foreign human-rights organization, to ban organizations and imprison activists.

C. North America

The United States and Canada have very different political systems, and it is therefore unsurprising that the structure of their nativist movements also differs significantly. They do share two main features though: (1) there are no significant nativist political parties; (2) nativists confront strong pro-immigration forces in the political and public debates.

I. Canada

Canada has no nativist political parties. The Nationalist Party of Canada is a tiny white supremacist organization that is not registered to contest elections, although some members have run in local elections (with very marginal returns). Some people consider Canada Action a nativist party because of its push to halve the level of immigration to Canada. However, this would bring it down to US levels, which are among the highest in the world; therefore, this is hardly a nativist position. Similarly, while immigration and multiculturalism have become more openly debated in recent years, few important voices have really criticized the fundamentals of Canada's official policies, which are extremely liberal in a global perspective.

In recent years, there has been a toughening of the discourse on immigration in elections in Quebec, under pressure from the Democratic Action of Quebec (ADQ), but the effects seem marginal in terms of policy and short-lived and regional in terms of discourse.¹⁸ Moreover, ADQ's call for "reasonable accommodation" might be radical within the pro-multicultural context of Canada but is far removed from the policies supported by nativist parties in Europe.

16 See Cas Mudde, ed., *Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe* (London: Routledge, 2005); and Sabrina P. Ramet, ed., *The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).

17 Hilary Pilkington, Al'bina Garifzianova, and Elena Omel'chenko, *Russia's Skinheads* (London, UK: Routledge, 2010); Anti-Defamation League (ADL), *The Skinhead International: A Worldwide Survey of Neo-Nazi Skinheads* (New York: ADL, 1995).

18 Will Kymlicka, *The Current State of Multiculturalism in Canada and Research Themes on Canadian Multiculturalism 2008-2010* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2010), 16.



Some groups try to lobby mainstream parties and the public to support a drastic decrease in migration. Arguably the most prominent is Immigration Watch Canada, and even its party members do not want to do away with immigration entirely. Instead, the group wants to bring immigration levels back to 50,000 a year; according to the organization, this would constitute “about 20 percent of the current annual 260,000 intake.”¹⁹ In addition, there are some small neo-Nazi and white supremacist groups, often Canadian branches of US-based groups.²⁰

2. United States

Although the United States boasted some of the first nativist parties in the world, notably the Know-Nothing Party or American Party in the mid-19th century,²¹ they have been nonexistent or irrelevant throughout the 20th century. The only recent example of a notable nativist party was the Reform Party under Patrick J. Buchanan in 2000. Since then, the Reform Party has supported non-nativist politicians for the US presidency. Today, only minor parties with at best regional appeal promote an openly nativist agenda. Probably the most significant is the long-standing American Constitution Party, which recently created some waves in the Colorado governor elections. Its surprise candidate was former Republican Congressman Tom Tancredo, one of the most prominent nativist US politicians of the past decades, who came in second with a staggering 36 percent of the vote, more than three times as much as the Republican candidate.²²

The United States does count a broad variety of nativist nonparty organizations, however, most of which are politically marginal at the federal level. This includes virtually all white supremacist groups, including the various incarnations of the formerly powerful Ku Klux Klan, and neo-Nazi and skinhead gangs. It should be noted, though, that while these groups have no relevance in the political arena, their local presence does at times adversely influence the life of immigrants in the area.

The most prominent organization of anti-immigration politicians is arguably the House Immigration Reform Caucus (IRC), founded by Tancredo, which touts itself as “an organization dedicated towards identifying legislative solutions to address the issue of illegal immigration.”²³ Although the caucus was created, among other reasons, “to create a much-needed forum in Congress to address both the positive and negative consequences of immigration,” it almost exclusively focuses on the negative aspects, and all the supported legislation is aimed at restricting illegal immigration.²⁴

Since 2007, Representative Brian Bilbray (R-CA) has run the caucus, which has seen its membership fall during his tenure, from 112 members in the summer of 2008 to 91 in early 2012 (virtually all Republicans).²⁵ Despite its clear anti-immigration stance, IRC is careful in its wording and does not use an openly nativist discourse. In May 2011, newly elected Representative Lou Barletta (R-PA), who gained notoriety as mayor of Hazleton, PA, for his fight against illegal immigration, announced the formation of a new Congressional Immigration Reform Caucus, to be chaired by himself.²⁶

The most important anti-immigration actors in the United States are single-issue groups that are able

19 Immigration Watch Canada, “Who are we? Why have we organized?” www.immigrationwatchcanada.org/

20 One of the few significant groups still active is the National Alliance in Ontario, now that the Heritage Front (1997-2005) and the Aryan Guard (2006-09) have been dissolved.

21 See for example, John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1955).

22 An outspoken anti-immigration politician, Tom Tancredo also sought the Republican presidential nomination in 2008 on an immigration-control platform. See *USA Today*, “For Tancredo, it’s all immigration,” accessed January 4, 2012, www.usatoday.com/news/politics/election2008/tom-tancredo.htm.

23 House Immigration Reform Caucus (IRC), “Home: Immigration Reform Caucus,” accessed March 4, 2012, www.house.gov/bilbray/irc.

24 Building Democracy Initiative, *Nativism in the House: A Report on the House Immigration Reform Caucus* (Chicago: Center for New Community, 2007), http://buildingdemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1083&Itemid=10009.

25 IRC, “Membership,” accessed March 4, 2012, <http://irc.bilbray.house.gov/membership/>. In February 2012, 91 members were listed on the website. However, the website doesn’t seem to be updated often, perhaps a reflection of the inactivity of the caucus; at the time of this report’s publication, the latest news update on the site was dated February 17, 2011.

26 W. James Antle III, “Barletta Forming Immigration Reform Caucus, Cracking Down on Sanctuary Cities,” *The American Spectator*, May 4, 2011, <http://spectator.org/blog/2011/05/04/barletta-forming-immigration-r>.



to connect to mainstream media and politicians. This includes the various organizations linked to John Tanton, a retired Michigan ophthalmologist who has been instrumental in creating a number of anti-immigration organizations.²⁷ Among the most active and influential Tanton organizations are the grassroots group NumbersUSA and the lobby group Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). In certain regions, notably in the South, openly racist groups such as the Council of Conservative Citizens, and various neo-Confederate groups such as the Heritage Preservation Association also are active in the immigration arena and have connections to some mainstream politicians.²⁸

The most important anti-immigration actors in the United States are single-issue groups.

III. Immigration and the Radical Right

The rise of radical-right parties is considered to be closely linked to the phenomenon of mass migration, particularly in Western Europe. Indeed, the German political scientist Klaus von Beyme defined the “third wave” of “right-wing extremism” as a response to mass immigration and the consequent development of multicultural societies in Western Europe.²⁹ But while there clearly is a relationship, it is not as straightforward as is often assumed. Moreover, immigration plays much less of a role in elections in North America and, particularly, in Central and Eastern Europe.

A. Western Europe

Much of the literature on the Western European radical right considers the phenomenon to be first and foremost a majority response to the perceived threat of mass immigration. In fact, some authors go even a step further and consider radical-right parties by and large as single-issue parties, referring to them as “anti-immigrant parties.”³⁰ However, the single-issue thesis is inaccurate on at least two counts: first, radical-right parties have a broader ideology and stress multiple issues, and second, people vote for radical-right parties on the basis of different issues.³¹

Radical-right parties share a core ideology of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.³² The three core ideological features are closely linked to three major political issues: immigration, crime, and corruption. Hence, radical-right parties are clearly not single-issue parties. Despite this, immigration features prominently in both the internally and externally oriented literature of these parties.³³ In line with their nativism, migration and migrants are seen as multifaceted threats. At least four frames (cultural, religious,

27 Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), *The Nativist Lobby: Three Faces of Intolerance* (Montgomery, AL: SPLC, 2009).

28 See Heidi Beirich and Bob Moser, “Politicians’ Links to the Council of Conservative Citizens,” SPLC *Intelligence Report* 115 (Montgomery, AL: SPLC, 2004), www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2004/fall/communing-with-the-council; SPLC, “Neo-Confederates,” *Intelligence Report*, no.99 (Montgomery, AL: SPLC, 2000), www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2000/summer/the-neo-confederates.

29 Klaus von Beyme, “Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe.”

30 Wouter Van der Brug, Mendert Fennema, and Jean Tillie, “Why Some Anti-immigrant Parties Fail and Others Succeed: A Two-Step Model of Aggregate Electoral Support,” *Comparative Political Studies* 38, no. 5 (2005): 537-73; Rachel Gibson, *The Growth of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe* (Ceredigian, UK: Edwin Mellen, 2002); Meindert Fennema, “Some Conceptual Issues and Problems in the Comparison of Anti-immigrant Parties in Western Europe,” *Party Politics* 3, no. 4 (1997): 473-92.

31 Cas Mudde, “The Single-Issue Party Thesis: Extreme Right Parties and the Immigration Issue,” *West European Politics* 22, no.3 (1999): 182-97. http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=cas_mudde.

32 Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties*.

33 See Cas Mudde, *The Ideology of the Extreme Right* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); Hainsworth, *The Extreme Right in Western Europe*: 70-7.



security, and economic) are used in the propaganda of Western European nativist movements.

The predominant frame is **cultural**, in which migration is seen as a threat to the cultural homogeneity of the home nation. Depending on how strictly the nativist ideology is interpreted, migrants are considered to be either unable or unwilling to assimilate in the host culture. And as the nation is flooded by a “tsunami” of migrants,³⁴ the core of its culture is threatened. Some parties even go so far as to speak of a “bloodless genocide.”³⁵

At least since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a **religious** frame has accompanied the cultural one. Increasingly the immigrant is seen as a Muslim, not a Turk or Moroccan. While Muslims have been migrating to Western Europe since the 1960s, their numbers and visibility have increased significantly since the 1980s, in part as a consequence of family reunification and growth in asylum seekers. Today, by conservative estimates, approximately 13 million Muslims live within the European Union (an estimated 2.5 percent of the EU population). The vast majority of Muslims live in Western Europe, most notably in France (3.5 million), Germany (3.4 million), and the United Kingdom (1.6 million). Countries with the relative largest Muslim populations include the Netherlands (6 percent) and France (5 percent).³⁶ In many Western European countries, the Muslim population is relatively young and growing much faster than the non-Muslim population; for example, in both Austria and Switzerland, the Muslim population quadrupled between 1980 and 2000.³⁷

While much of Islamophobia is in fact cultural xenophobia, the religious angle adds important aspects to the debate.

With the realization that the “guest workers” invited during the 1950s and 1960s were not all going to return to their countries of origin, and with legal economic migration severely limited as a consequence of the 1970s oil crisis, the integration of already present “immigrants” became an important part of the immigration debate. In fact, since the early 1990s, when most West European countries further tightened immigration and political asylum laws, the immigration debate has become predominantly an integration debate.³⁸ This debate has become more prominent and more focused on religion in general, and Islam in particular, since 9/11. In various countries, intellectuals and politicians have started to debate the question of the compatibility of Islam with democracy, leading to calls for a growing range of restrictions. While many debates start at the local level, mostly in large multicultural cities, they often end with legal proposals at the national level. For example, in Belgium the so-called burqa ban, which outlaws the public wearing of face veils, was first debated and implemented in Antwerp. Today it is national law, just as in France, while the Dutch government was preparing a burqa ban of its own at this writing.³⁹

While much of Islamophobia is in fact cultural xenophobia, the religious angle adds important aspects to the debate. Most importantly, nativists consider Islam a fundamentalist religion; Dutch PVV leader Geert Wilders, for example, has called Islam “an intolerant and fascist ideology.”⁴⁰ Nativist politicians such as VB

34 Dutch PVV leader Geert Wilders often refers to a “tsunami of islamization.”

35 BBC News, “BNP Leader Defends Policy on Race,” April 23, 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/politics/8011878.stm>.

36 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, *Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia* (Vienna: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2006), http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/Manifestations_EN.pdf.

37 Martin Dolezal, Marc Helbling, and Swen Hutter, “Debating Islam in Austria, Germany and Switzerland: Ethnic Citizenship, Church-State Relations and Right-Wing Populism,” *West European Politics* 33, no. 2 (2010): 171-90.

38 Anthony W. Messina, *The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Martin Schain, *The Politics of Immigration in France, Britain and the United States: A Comparative Study* (New York: Palgrave, 2008).

39 Mike Corder, “Dutch Burqa Ban Legislation Planned,” Huffington Post, January 27, 2012, www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/27/dutch-burqa-ban-n_1236625.html.

40 Dolf Hendriks, “Ondertekenaars oproep zijn onnozel,” *Algemeen Dagblad*, January 2, 2008.



leader Filip Dewinter flat out deny the possibility of a moderate Islam.⁴¹ Others, Wilders included, officially distinguish between Muslims and Islam, claiming their problem is with the latter and not the former, but even their propaganda paints the average Muslim immigrant as an at least potential Islamic extremist. They argue that Muslims threaten key aspects of Western democracies, such as the separation of state and church, the equal position of women, and growing support for gay rights (although many radical-right parties are too homophobic to take up this point).

The third most important theme is *security*, in which immigration and crime (often low level) are linked. Some parties argue, in line with ethnopluralist ideology, that immigrants become criminals because they have been uprooted from their natural environment. Radical-right magazines are full of short news articles about criminal offenses, such as murder and rape, committed by “aliens.” They argue that immigrants are much more likely to commit criminal acts than the host population, but that the real level of crime is being kept from the public by politically correct politicians. Moreover, they decry the allegedly soft way in which the state deals with these criminals and want them to be either expelled or punished more severely. As in the case of the religious frame, the security frame is used not just by the radical right. Particularly after 9/11, the immigration debate in Europe and North America has become “securitized,” with immigration policy increasingly made in light of national security.⁴²

In recent years, the security frame has come to include the link between migration and terrorism. With the migrant increasingly defined in religious terms, and Muslim adherent-perpetrated terrorist attacks such as 9/11 in New York and Washington, 11-M in Madrid, and 7/7 in London on the public radar, nativists create a dark picture in which Muslim immigrants are considered the “fifth column” of the Muslim empire. The ultimate goal, they warn, is “Eurabia,” a Euro-Arab axis that is connected by Islam and will be fiercely anti-American and anti-Zionist.⁴³

Oddly enough, the “Eurabia” thesis is still more popular in the United States than in Europe. It is widely disseminated within mainstream conservative circles in the United States and popularized in the books of authors such as American writer and expatriate Bruce Bawer and *The Weekly Standard’s* senior editor Christopher Caldwell, with telling titles that include *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within* and *Surrender: Appeasing Islam, Sacrificing Freedom*, published by highly respectable publishing houses (Random House and Doubleday, respectively).⁴⁴ They are even reviewed positively in liberal publications like the *New York Times*,⁴⁵ and *While Europe Slept* was nominated for the 2006 National Book Critics Circle award (which did raise some critique).⁴⁶

Until recently, the “Eurabia” thesis was limited to the margins of the radical right in Europe. Only in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom was the thesis expressed by mainstream actors, such as Melanie Phillips, columnist for the popular British tabloid *Daily Mail*; Ayaan Hirsi Ali, former Dutch parliamentarian (now with the conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC); and Afshin Ellian, columnist for the broadsheet *NRC Handelsblad*. The relatively obscure “Eurabia conspiracy” became world news with the publication of excerpts of the 1,500-page manifesto “2083 – A European Declaration of Independence” written by Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian right-wing extremist who massacred 77 people (mostly teenagers) in July 2011.

41 *Metro*, “Multicultureel betekent multicromineel,” June 15, 2005.

42 See Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia and Simon Reich, eds., *Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008); Christopher Rudolph, *National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United States and Western Europe since 1945* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).

43 Bat Ya’Or, *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis* (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005). For a popular account of the thesis, its problems and protagonists, see *The Economist*, “Tales from Eurabia,” June 22, 2006. www.economist.com/node/7086222.

44 Bruce Bawer, *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within* (New York: Random House, 2006); Bruce Bawer, *Surrender: Appeasing Islam, Sacrificing Freedom* (New York: Anchor Books, 2009).

45 Stephen Pollard, “The Appeasers,” *The New York Times*, July 24, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/books/review/Pollard-t.html.

46 Patricia Cohen, “In Books, A Clash of Europe and Islam,” *The New York Times*, February 8, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/02/08/books/08circ.html.



The fourth frame employed in nativist discourse is *economic*. Here immigrants are depicted as a financial burden to the host society, taking jobs away from the natives and/or draining social benefits. Slogans popular among radical-right parties note the number of unemployed natives, juxtaposed with the larger number of immigrants. This is often combined with a welfare-chauvinist agenda, in which welfare programs are supported, but only for the natives. The argument is that if immigrants are sent back to their countries of origin, there will be enough money to provide decent services to natives.

The fifth and final frame is *political*, in which immigrants are seen as mere tools of sinister political forces. With varying degrees of conspiracy theories — some more anti-Semitic, others more anticapitalist — mass immigration is presented as a willing plot of (inter)national politicians, business leaders, and trade union leaders to strengthen their own position at the expense of the average citizen. Moreover, in line with their populism, the elite (seen as a homogenous corrupt entity) are accused of covering up the real costs of immigration and of muffling the people through antidiscrimination laws and political correctness.

Many studies have looked into the relationship between the number of immigrants and the number of votes for radical-right parties in Western Europe. So far, the results have been highly contradictory, which is in part the result of the use of different datasets, indicators, and units of analysis. For example, some authors have found a clear, positive correlation between the number of foreign-born citizens and the electoral success of a radical-right party in a country⁴⁷ while others have not.⁴⁸ Similarly, some studies show a significant positive correlation with the number of new immigrants⁴⁹ or asylum seekers⁵⁰ at the national level, but others find a negative (cor)relation or none at all.⁵¹

To become a salient political issue, immigration has to be (made) visible to a significant section of the population.

Still, immigration and immigrants do play an important role in the electoral success of radical-right parties. But the relationship is not as simple as is often assumed: that the more immigrants in a country, the higher the electoral success of a radical-right party. Immigration is not inherently a political issue; in fact, while mass immigration started in most Western European countries in the 1960s and 1970s, it only became a salient political issue in the 1980s and 1990s. To become a salient political issue, immigration has to be (made) visible to a significant section of the population. Once this has happened, different narratives will emerge and there will be a political struggle over the right narrative.

In many countries, notably the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the hegemonic narrative was for a long time a positive one, which saw multiculturalism as an enrichment of national culture.⁵² Only since

47 See Matt Golder, "Explaining Variations in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 36, no. 4 (2003): 432-66.

48 Messina, *The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration*; Christopher Wendt, "Toward a Majoritarian Model for Western Europe" (paper presented at the 99th annual American Political Science Association meeting, Philadelphia, August 28-31, 2003); and Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony McGann, *The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

49 Duane Swank and Hans-Georg Betz, "Globalization, the Welfare State and Right-wing Populism in Western Europe," *Socio-Economic Review* 1, no. 2 (2003): 215-45, <http://ser.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/2/215.full.pdf+html>; Marcel Lubbers, "Exclusionistic Electorates: Extreme Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe" (PhD dissertation, Radboud University Nijmegen, 2001); Pia Knigge, "The Electoral Correlates of Right-wing Extremism in Western Europe," *European Journal of Political Research* 34, no. 2 (1998): 249-79.

50 Wendt, "Toward a Majoritarian Model;" Lubbers, "Exclusionistic Electorates."

51 Hermann Dülmer and Markus Klein, "Extreme Right-wing Voting in Germany in a Multilevel Perspective: A Rejoinder to Lubbers and Scheepers," *European Journal of Political Research* 44, no. 2 (2005): 243-63; David Jesuit and Vincent Mahler, "Immigration, Economic Well-being and Support for Extreme Right Parties in Western European Regions" (paper presented at the conference "Immigration in a Cross-National Context: What are the Implications for Europe?" Bourlingster, Luxembourg, June 20-22, 2004); Kitschelt and McGann, *The Radical Right*; Hanspeter Kriesi, "Bewegungen auf der Linken, Bewegungen auf der Rechten: Die Mobilisierung von zwei neuen Typen von sozialen Bewegungen in ihrem politischen Kontext," *Swiss Political Science Review* 1, no. 1 (1995): 9-52.

52 Messina, *The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration*.



the late 1980s has this started to change, with more leading political and societal actors subscribing to various interpretations of the multiculturalism-as-problem/threat narrative.

B. Central and Eastern Europe

In Central and Eastern Europe, immigration levels are relatively low. According to a recent Eurostat report, virtually all Central and Eastern European countries had fewer non-European Union (EU) immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants than the EU average in 2010.⁵³ In addition, in most Central and Eastern European countries the main immigrant community is from a neighboring state, often with significant cultural similarities to (parts of) the native population: Russians in Latvia, Belarusians in Lithuania, Romanians in Hungary, Moldovans in Romania, and Bosnians in Slovenia.⁵⁴

Moreover, while immigration into Central and Eastern Europe is low by comparison to other EU states, emigration from Central and Eastern Europe, particularly into western EU countries, has been rather high since 2004, when most of the countries joined the European Union. For example, in 2010, more than 2 million Romanian and more than 1.5 million Polish migrants lived in other EU countries.⁵⁵ In fact, Poles are the largest foreign population in countries such as Ireland and Norway, while in Italy and Spain it is Romanians.⁵⁶

Consequently, few political actors, radical right or otherwise, have made immigration an important issue in their propaganda. Although the number of immigrants has been rising slowly but steadily in recent years, and immigrants have become more visible in many of the larger cities in the region, including Budapest and Prague, radical-right parties tend to focus on indigenous minorities (notably the Roma) rather than immigrants. And while anti-immigrant attitudes are at least as widespread in the East as the West of the continent,⁵⁷ so far few Central and Eastern European voters have considered immigration a key concern.

One of the few exceptions is Slovenia, where the radical right responded to the influx of Bosnian and Serbian refugees from the Yugoslav civil war in the early 1990s.⁵⁸ However, even here the impact was relatively modest and only short-lived despite continuously high levels of former-Yugoslav immigrants. In later years, the Slovenian National Party (SNS) moderated its ideology and shifted its primary focus to Croatians and Roma.⁵⁹ The most recent exception is Russia, where the single-issue party Russian Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) was founded in 2002. While electorally irrelevant, its emergence does signify the rising salience of the immigration issue in Russia. Most interesting is the striking similarity between its anti-immigration positions and those of the radical right in Western Europe. The group links migrants to societal problems and even shares the Islamophobia. For example, DPNI states that “migrants from the Caucasus states and from Central and South-Eastern Asia are the first part of the foreign expansion.”⁶⁰ The party was banned in 2011 for pursuing “extremist goals and objectives,” under draconian new antiextremism legislation. DPNI has since appealed the ruling, which has not yet been enforced.⁶¹

53 The only two exceptions are Estonia and Latvia with 15.1 percent and 17.0 percent citizens of non-EU countries, respectively, but here it refers to Russian speakers who “immigrated” one or two generations ago within the then existing Soviet Union. Katya Vasileva, “6.5% of the EU population are foreigners and 9.4% are born abroad,” Eurostat, no. 34 (2011), 2. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-11-034/EN/KS-SF-11-034-EN.PDF

54 Ibid., 4.

55 Ibid., 3.

56 Ibid., 4.

57 Mudde, “Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe.”

58 Tonci A. Kuzmanic, *Hate-Speech in Slovenia: Slovenian Racism, Sexism and Chauvinism* (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Open Society Institute, 1999).

59 Tomaz Trplan, “Slovenia,” in *Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Cas Mudde (London: Routledge, 2005).

60 Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties*, 71.

61 Tom Washington, “Ultra-nationalist group banned by Kremlin,” *The Moscow News*, February 18, 2011, <http://themoscownews.com/society/20110218/188431564.html>.



C. North America

North America has a much longer history of mass immigration. Unlike the European countries, Canada and the United States are officially immigration countries. This means that they not only accept relatively large groups of immigrants annually but they also (try to) regulate the influx of immigrants. Consequently, the annual number of new (legal) immigrants is fairly constant, which makes it less explosive as a political issue. For various reasons, neither Canada nor the United States has a relevant radical-right party, such as exist in many European countries. Still, with more than 10.8 million unauthorized immigrants in the United States as of January 2010⁶² particularly from Latin America, illegal immigration will at times explode onto local and national public agendas in the United States, not in the least through the advocacy of anti-immigration organizations and politicians.

In the United States the positions on immigration do not so much distinguish the two major parties as divide them. Both parties have significant anti- and pro-immigration voices. Consequently, it is not surprising that immigration is a hot-button issue in the Republican primaries. At one of the major Republican presidential primary debates, organized by CNN and the Tea Party Express, Texas Governor Rick Perry was attacked by almost all other candidates for his alleged pro-immigration position. Perry's defense of legislation permitting the children of unauthorized immigrants to attend universities at in-state tuition rates was loudly criticized by candidates and audience alike. Republican candidates such as Representative Michele Bachman, a member of the Congressional Immigration Reform Caucus, and former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney have kept immigration on the attack agenda to politically harm Perry and Newt Gingrich (who has favored a path to legalization for immigrants). Attacks on candidates as being soft on immigration are bolstered by powerful anti-immigration organizations such as FAIR or nativist lobbies such as Team America PAC, that of former Republican Tancredo.⁶³ At the same time, many people inside and outside of the GOP argue that the party has to moderate its position on immigration to court the growing Latino vote.⁶⁴

The discourse on immigration in the United States is quite similar to that in Western Europe. In fact, there is contact among nativists from both regions. For example, British National Party (BNP) leader Nick Griffin spoke at the annual meeting of American Renaissance in Virginia in 2006 while former presidential candidate and political commentator Pat Buchanan met with VB leader Filip Dewinter and Frank Vanhecke in Washington, DC, in 2007.⁶⁵ Self-proclaimed hater of Islam Geert Wilders is probably the most well-connected European nativist in the United States, regularly gracing the opinion pages of *The Wall Street Journal* as well as prime time on Fox News, being very close to "counterjihadists" such as Pamela Geller and Robert Spencer, and even being invited to Congress by Representative Jon Kyl (R-AZ) for a screening of Wilders' anti-Islam film "Fitna" (which Congressman Keith Ellison (D-MN) opposed and compared to showing the racist film "Birth of a Nation" at the White House).⁶⁶ As in Western Europe, cultural, religious, security, economic, and political themes are prevalent. There are some subtle differences, however.

62 US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Immigration Statistics, *Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2010* (Washington, DC: DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, 2011), www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2010.pdf.

63 Tom Tancredo, "Rick Perry not a real conservative," *Politico*, August 11, 2011, www.politico.com/news/stories/0811/61076.html.

64 See, among many more, Roland Martin, "Republicans blow off Latino concerns in debate," CNN, September 19, 2011, www.cnn.com/2011/09/17/opinion/martin-gop-latinos/index.html; Albert R. Hunt, "Republican Anti-Immigrant Stance Bodes 2012 Risk," *Bloomberg Businessweek*, January 16, 2011, www.businessweek.com/news/2011-01-16/republican-anti-immigration-stance-bodes-2012-risk-albert-hunt.html.

65 Anti-Defamation League (ADL), *Patrick Buchanan: Unrepentant Bigot* (New York: ADL, 2009), www.adl.org/special_reports/Patrick_Buchanan2/extremists.asp.

66 Anahad O'Connor, "Mr. Wilders Goes to Washington," *New York Times*, February 26, 2009, <http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/26/mr-wilders-goes-to-washington/>. In 2011, Wilders had op-ed pieces in *The Wall Street Journal* on (at least) February 22 and July 24 as well as highly supportive articles and op-eds by both prominent Dutch (e.g. author Leon De Winter) and American writers (e.g. *Wall Street Journal* columnist Bret Stephens).



First of all, in many cases, the cultural theme is more racial in the United States. This is in part a linguistic matter; apart from in the United Kingdom and United States, the term “race” is no longer widely used in European languages. Whereas Americans might be taught that all races are equal, Europeans are taught that there is only one race, the human race. Consequently, much of the racial nativism in the United States is very similar to the cultural nativism in Europe. Moreover, most of the recent nativist debates are about ethnic outsiders, notably Hispanics and Muslims, rather than the traditional racial outsider, African Americans.

Much of the racial nativism in the United States is very similar to the cultural nativism in Europe.

Second, with regard to security, Islam plays a less-dominant role among US nativists. Oddly enough, it seems to be most present among neoconservatives and paleoconservatives, who see the threat predominantly as a European issue. As mentioned previously, a good example is *While Europe Slept*. Neoconservatives see the “Muslim threat” also in the Middle East (endangering the existence of the Jewish state of Israel). While Islam was initially seen almost exclusively as an issue in foreign policy, it is slowly but steadily emerging on the domestic agenda. Now, these conservatives are increasingly rallying against perceived Muslim terrorist threats within the United States.⁶⁷

Most paleoconservatives are not sympathetic to Israel, or America’s activities within the Middle East, and see the main danger within the United States still the “Mexican threat.” The most prominent and prolific writer on “alien invasions” of the United States is Pat Buchanan, whose nativist books can be found in all major bookstores. In *State of Emergency*, he argues that Mexico is slowly but steadily taking back the American Southwest.⁶⁸ This is the key threat according to American nativists. They refer to it as the “Aztlán Plot” for “*la reconquista*,” to recapture lands lost by Mexico in the Texas War of Independence and the Mexican-American War. While these ideas are far removed from those of mainstream political actors in the United States, most notably the two main political parties, they were expressed in Lou Dobbs’ program on CNN (until November 2009) and by various right-wing talk-radio hosts. Moreover, Buchanan himself was until recently a well-known pundit on the national cable TV network MSNBC.

IV. Effects of Political Extremism

While public attitudes and, particularly, political violence are important aspects of politics, the true test of power is in whether or not nativist actors have influenced policies. It is worth distinguishing two different types of influence: direct and indirect.

Direct influence means that nativist groups directly influence immigration policy, either by implementing it themselves or by (directly) making other actors implement it. Indirect influence works more slowly and unclearly; nativist actors influence non-nativist actors, who would then implement anti-immigrant policies — obviously, establishing “influence” here is problematic.

67 For example, Pamela Geller, *Stop the Islamization of America: A Practical Guide to the Resistance* (Washington, DC: WND Books, 2011). For a study of particularly the conservative Islamophobic movement, see Wajahat Ali, Eli Clifton, Matthew Duss, Lee Fang, Scott Keyes, and Faiz Shakir, *Fear, Inc. The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America* (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2011), www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/08/islamophobia.html.

68 Patrick J. Buchanan, *State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America* (New York: Thomas Dunne, 2006).

A. Direct Effects

Overall, there are very few documented cases of nativist actors directly affecting immigration policy in all three regions. The reason is simple: only in a few cases have nativist actors been part of government (see Table 3). Moreover, most of these cases were in Eastern Europe, where immigration has so far not been a major issue, not even for nativist parties. Where nativist parties have been represented in the parliament but not in the government, their law initiatives have mostly been boycotted by the governmental (and even most other oppositional) parties. In other words, nativist parties have had relatively few direct effects on politics, even on immigration politics.

In Western Europe, only five nativist parties have made it into government so far: the Northern League (LN) in Italy (1994, 2000-05, 2008-11), FPÖ and the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) in Austria (2000-06), and SVP in Switzerland (2000-08, 2008-), and the Popular Orthodox Rally in Greece (2011-12). However, the few academic studies of radical-right parties in office all agree on one thing: they have been instrumental in introducing more restrictive immigration policies.⁶⁹

Table 3. Nativist Parties in European National Governments since 1980

Country	Party	Period(s)	Coalition Partners (party ideology)
Austria	FPÖ BZÖ	2000-02 2002-05 2005-07	ÖVP (Christian democratic) ÖVP ÖVP
Croatia	HDZ	1990-20001	
Estonia	ERSP	1992-95	Isamaa (conservative)
Greece	LAOS	2011-12	PASOK (social-democratic) and ND (conservative)
Italy	LN	1994 2001-05 2008-11	FI (neoliberal populist) and AN (conservative) FI and AN and MDC (Christian democratic) PdL (right-wing)
Latvia	NA	2011-	ZRP (center-right) and Unity (conservative)
Poland	LPR	2006-08	PiS (conservative) and Samoobrona (social populist)
Romania	PUNR PRM	1994-96 1995	PDSR (diffuse) and PSM (social populist)
Serbia	SRS	1998-2000	SPS (social populist) and JUL (communist)
Slovakia	SNS	1994-98 2006-10	HZDS (diffuse) and ZRS (communist) Smer (social populist) and HZDS
Switzerland	SVP	2000-08, 2008-	SPS (social democratic) and FDP (liberal) and CVP (Christian democratic)

Notes: HDZ changed into a conservative party after 2000. SVP only became a full-fledged radical-right party in/around 2000.

Source: Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties*.

Austria and Switzerland tightened their asylum laws at the initiative of the radical right in 2003 and 2006, respectively. Interestingly, the Austrian radical-right governments did not introduce stricter general immigration laws; previous mainstream governments had already done so.⁷⁰ The most notable examples in the Italian case are the Bossi-Fini Law, which came into force in August 2002 and was named after the LN and AN leaders who proposed the bill. The bill aimed to curb immigration, except for highly skilled workers,

69 Franz Fallend, "Are Right-Wing Populism and Government Participation Incompatible? The Case of the Freedom Party in Austria," *Representation* 40, no. 2 (2004): 115-30; Andrej Zaslove, "Closing the Door? The Ideology and Impact of Radical Right Populism on Immigration Policy in Austria and Italy," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 9, no. 1 (2004): 99-118; Reinhard Heinisch, "Success in Opposition - Failure in Government: Explaining the Performance of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Public Office," *West European Politics* 26, no. 3 (2003): 91-130; Michael Minkenberg, "The West European Radical Right as a Collective Actor: Modeling the Impact of Cultural and Structural Variables on Party Formation and Movement Mobilization," *Comparative European Politics* 1, no. 2 (2003): 149-70.

70 August Gachter, "Migrationspolitik in Österreich seit 1945" (working paper No. 12, Migration und soziale Mobilität, 2008).



although it also included a limited amnesty for some unauthorized immigrants.⁷¹ A more recent law, adopted in August 2009, goes much further by, among other things, making illegal presence a criminal offense.⁷²

Although most countries will allow nongovernmental parties to submit proposals for legislation, in very few cases does this lead to actual laws. This is even more apparent with proposals from the radical right, which tends to be shunned by the other parties in the parliament (such as the VB in Belgium). There are three important exceptions, however: DFP in Denmark, PVV in the Netherlands, and SVP in Switzerland. Although DFP has never been an official part of the Danish government, it was the major support party of the right-wing minority governments between 2001 and 2011. As a consequence, the party played a crucial role in drafting the immigration law of 2002 for the government, which, among other things, limited grounds for political asylum and stipulated financial requirements for marrying a foreigner.⁷³ This law is described as “one of Europe’s strictest immigration laws” by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).⁷⁴ In 2011 the party was instrumental in tightening border controls, despite the fact that Denmark is in the “borderless” Schengen zone, to fight organized crime and illegal immigration.⁷⁵ A similar role is currently played by PVV, which has been supporting the Dutch right-wing government since 2010. The Swiss situation is even more complex; while the nativist SVP is part of the broad four-party coalition government, as a consequence of the particular Swiss constitution, it fights many of its political battles through Switzerland’s strong system of direct democracy, which includes referendums initiated by the public. A recent example of this, which gained much attention and condemnation around the world, was the referendum that banned the construction of minarets, which was passed by 57 percent of the voters and in 22 of the 26 Swiss cantons in November 2009.⁷⁶

While Central and Eastern Europe has seen more radical-right government participation, only a small minority of post-communist Central and Eastern European governments have included the radical right. Furthermore, this has not had an effect on immigration policies. As previously noted, immigration is simply a nonissue in the region, even for the radical right, which, instead, focuses primarily on indigenous minorities such as Hungarians, Russians, and “Gypsies” or Roma. In fact, most pressure to implement tougher border regimes came from the European Union, which was worried that Central and Eastern European states did not exert sufficient control of their borders, which were soon to become and now are EU borders.⁷⁷

The situation in North America is more complex. Canada has no nativist party with parliamentary, let alone governmental, representation. But while the United States does not currently have any successful nativist parties, unlike in the 19th century (the Know-Nothing Party), there are some powerful nativist voices within the main parties, most notably the Republican Party. None have made it into prominent positions within Republican administrations, however. Hence, nativist actors have had at best only indirect effects.

The situation is different at the local and regional levels, where nativist groups have advanced their agenda through assistance and collaboration on immigration legislation. For instance, various US communities have tried to limit or decrease illegal immigration by pushing through a broad variety of legislation. Much of this legislation seeks to punish businesses that use or cater to unauthorized immigrants or to exclude unauthorized immigrants from local community services (ranging from schools to hospitals). While in many cases these changes were pushed through by mainstream actors, groups such as FAIR have

71 Asher Colombo and Giuseppe Sciortino, “The Bossi-Fini Law: Explicit Fanaticism, Implicit Moderation, and Poisoned Fruits” in *Italian Politics: The Second Berlusconi Government*, eds. Jean Blondel and Paolo Segatti (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003).

72 Aidan Lewis, “Italian Migration Policy Draws Fire,” BBC News, March 7, 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7880215.stm>.

73 CNN, “Denmark Passes Tough Migrant Laws,” May 31, 2002, <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/05/31/denmark.immigration>.

74 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Freedom in the World 2009 – Denmark,” www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,...DNK.4562d8b62.4a6452bfc.0.html.

75 Lars Eriksen, “Denmark’s populist border controls reintroduced but many remain skeptical,” *The Guardian*, May 12, 2011, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/12/denmark-border-controls-reintroduced-populist.

76 BBC News, “Swiss Voters Back Ban on Minarets,” November 29, 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8385069.stm>.

77 See Sandra Lavenex, *Safe Third Countries: Extending EU Asylum and Immigration Policies to Central and Eastern Europe* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999).



provided technical assistance to several state legislators in passing bills that curtail immigrant rights (e.g. requiring proof of citizenship to get a driver's license, mandating employer verification, restricting immigrant access to public benefits). Similarly, groups such as FAIR and California's Save Our State (SOS) have been instrumental in pushing for versions of the so-called *Illegal Immigration Relief Act*, which aims to exclude unauthorized immigrants from housing, in a number of communities. Moreover, there are other prominent state actors who can foster anti-immigrant sentiment in an area.⁷⁸ A key example here is Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio from Arizona, who was the subject of a US Department of Justice civil-rights investigation into allegations that he discriminated against Latinos while enforcing federal immigration law.⁷⁹

One US state with polarizing debates about such measures is California, which despite its progressive image and Democratic legislative majorities, has seen significant nativist campaigns and anti-immigration legislative successes (particularly through referendums).⁸⁰ The most notable of these was the 1994 Proposition 187, listed on the ballots as the "Save our State Initiative," which called for strict and punitive measures against unauthorized immigrants. The initiative was cosponsored by the nativist California Coalition for Immigration Reform (CCIR) and was passed by an overwhelming 59 percent of the vote, though later ruled unconstitutional by a federal court and never implemented.⁸¹

Probably the biggest subnational success of the nativist lobby has been Arizona's 2010 immigration law, SB 1070, which observers called at that time "the nation's toughest bill on illegal immigration."⁸² Among the main authors of SB 1070 was immigration-control activist Kris Kobach, who is Kansas Secretary of State.⁸³ Criticized nationwide by prominent leaders such as President Barack Obama and Cardinal Roger M. Mahony of Los Angeles, but widely popular among the public,⁸⁴ the law has become a blueprint for similar legislative proposals enacted in a number of states, including Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. While the laws are publicly popular, they have also generated protest from both the left and the right, with lawmakers even reconsidering the measures' effects both on business and the states' image.⁸⁵

However, while there are many examples of successful anti-immigration measures at the subnational level, with or without pressure from nativist actors, there are also countless examples of successful pro-immigration mobilization, particularly at the local level.⁸⁶ For example, since the 1980s, a growing group of cities has banned city employees and police officers from asking people about their immigration status. Although the number of cities involved is not impressive (ca. 30), it does include practically all *major* cities in the United States (e.g. Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Francisco, Washington DC).⁸⁷

78 Justin Massa and Cecelia Abundis, "The New Battleground: Anti-Immigrant Ordinances Attack Housing Rights," *Building Democracy Monthly*, February 2007, http://buildingdemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=957&Itemid=10002.

79 See Randy James, "Sheriff Joe Arpaio," *Time*, October 13, 2009, www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1929920,00.html. The Justice Department, in December 2011, issued a report finding that the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office had engaged in unconstitutional policing. See US Department of Justice, "Investigation of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office," accessed February 29, 2012, www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/mcso.php.

80 See Dan HoSang, *Racial Propositions: Genteel Apartheid in Postwar California* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010).

81 Building Democracy Initiative, *Nativism in the House*, 2.

82 Randal C. Archibold, "Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration," *New York Times*, April 23, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html.

83 *New York Times*, "Romney's Hard Line," editorial, January 11, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/01/12/opinion/romneys-hard-line-on-immigration.html?_r=1.

84 Sean Alfano, "Arizona Immigration Law SB 1070 Has Support of 55% of Americans, New Poll Shows," *Daily News*, July 28, 2010, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-07-28/news/27071095_1_immigration-law-immigration-status-arrests-of-illegal-immigrants.

85 Fox News Latino, "Alabama Immigration Law May Get Second Look After Big Business Backlash," December 8, 2011, <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2011/12/08/alabama-immigration-law-may-get-second-look-after-big-business-backlash/>.

86 See Lisa M. Hanley, Blair A. Ruble, and Allison M. Garland, eds., *Immigration and Integration in Urban Communities: Renegotiating the City* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).

87 Jennifer Ridgley, "Cities of Refuge: Immigration Enforcement, Police, and the Insurgent Genealogies of Citizenship in U.S. Sanctuary Cities," *Urban Geography* 29, no.1 (2008): 53-77.



B. Indirect Effects

Obviously, governments don't make policies in total isolation. They are influenced by public opinion, the media, lobby groups, international organizations, and by other competing political parties. Both opponents and supporters of the radical right have argued that mainstream parties have implemented anti-immigration legislation under pressure from radical-right electoral success. In a few cases, the respective governments have acknowledged this. In some of these cases, governments have been criticized for offering what sounded like a convenient excuse rather than a credible explanation. For example, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and former Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar all called for stricter immigration laws to prevent the rise of the radical right, despite the fact that their countries have marginal radical-right parties.⁸⁸

While there are many national and regional differences, one can detect some general shifts in the debate on immigration in Western Europe. First and foremost, there is a debate on immigration. Up until the 1980s, the established parties in most Western European countries were engaged in a "conspiracy of silence,"⁸⁹ or an explicit or implicit agreement to keep immigration outside of the public debate. Mainly due to public pressure, often expressed loudly by the tabloid media, the mainstream parties reluctantly started to address immigration as a political issue while nativist parties further heightened its salience.

Second, the consensus in the debate has shifted in most countries from a (implicit or explicit) pro-immigration to an *anti-immigration* standpoint. Nowadays, virtually all but a few radical left and green parties consider immigration a fundamental challenge to their society at best and a threat at worst.⁹⁰ Hence, where mainstream parties in the Netherlands or the United Kingdom tended to sing the praises of the many enrichments of multiculturalism in the 1970s and 1980s, they now ponder the ways in which "Dutchness" and "Britishness" can be protected against outside influences.⁹¹ Overall, right-wing parties have co-opted radical-right positions more often and more radically than left-wing parties; the best examples include the British Conservative Party, the Dutch People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, and the French Union for a Popular Movement. That stated, there are many examples of social democratic, and even communist, parties that have adopted anti-immigration positions, from the Dutch Labor Party to the French Communist Party.⁹² In fact, in many cases immigration laws were tightened by governments that included social democratic parties; sometimes under (perceived) electoral pressure from radical right-right parties (e.g. Austria and Germany in the early 1990s), sometimes without (e.g. the United Kingdom in the 1990s).⁹³

Third, the debate has shifted from immigration to *integration*, as in most countries no significant party calls for more immigration. As Western European countries do not typically present themselves as immigration countries, and mainstream politicians do not want to encourage immigration, they still have few integration policies in place despite several decades of immigration. Hence, from Belgium to Norway and from Spain to Denmark, countries are debating what the rights and duties of the host population and immigrants are, with an increasing emphasis on the duties of the immigrants. It is important to stress that in many countries the vast majority of the "immigrants" being debated about are, in fact, not immigrants as most people think of the word: many are European citizens, born and raised in (Western) Europe, who have only "ethnic" connections to their parents' countries of origin.

Fourth, the immigration debate has shifted from the cultural to the *religious*; for example, traditionally the typical Dutch or German immigrant was seen as "a Turk," but after 9/11, she or he had become "a Muslim." This has had significant influence on the debate, most notably on the anti-immigrant position.

88 John Hooper, Giles Tremlett, and Jon Henley, "Immigration the key as left faces loss of power," *The Guardian*, May 16, 2002, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/may/16/thefarright.politics1.

89 Messina, *The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration*, 86.

90 Zaslove, "Closing the Door?"; Heinisch, "Success in Opposition;" Michael Minkenberg, "The Radical Right in Public Office: Agenda-Setting and Policy Effects," *West European Politics* 24, no. 4 (2001): 1-21.

91 See also Kymlicka, *The Current State of Multiculturalism in Canada*, 11-3.

92 Sonia Alonso and Saro Claro da Fonseca, "Immigration, Left and Right," *Party Politics*, forthcoming.

93 Messina, *The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration*; Dietrich Thränhardt, "The Political Uses of Xenophobia in England, France and Germany," *Party Politics* 1, no. 3 (1995): 323-45.

Initially, immigration could only be opposed on the basis of economic and cultural grounds. In most countries, cultural opposition was outside of the realm of the respectable, as it linked to (ethnic) nationalism. The struggle against Islamist terrorism has shaped the post-9/11 debate about immigration, linking it to religion and security, and widening the scope for anti-immigration positions. Nowadays, parties will oppose immigration on the basis of mainstream liberal democratic arguments, rather than marginal nationalist positions.⁹⁴ A good example was the infamous Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn, who framed his attacks on Muslim immigrants in terms of his defense for gay rights, equality of men and women, and the separation of state and church.⁹⁵ Similar arguments have been made by former right-wing Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi as well as left-wing Scandinavian feminists.⁹⁶

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The relationship between the strength of radical-right parties and the adoption of anti-immigrant positions by mainstream parties is not always clear, however. For example, while countries such as Denmark and France exemplify the received wisdom that strong radical-right parties have pushed mainstream parties “to the right,” other countries do not. The best counter-example is Belgium,⁹⁷ where most mainstream parties are among the most pro-immigrant in Europe, precisely *because* of the strong VB. And then there are many mainstream parties, from the British Labour Party to the German Christian Social Union, which have adopted relatively strong anti-immigration positions despite the lack of a successful radical-right party in their country. For example, in the past two years British Prime Minister David Cameron, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have all, in one way or another, declared that multiculturalism has failed.⁹⁸ Of these, only France has a somewhat successful radical-right party.

A similar point can be made about immigration *policies* in Western Europe. As far as cross-national comparative studies of immigration laws are available, they show that European immigration policies are increasingly converging, not least because of cooperation within the European Union.⁹⁹ Recent developments indicate that this will only increase in the future. From the European Commission:¹⁰⁰

During the last decade, the need for a common, comprehensive immigration policy has been increasingly recognised and encouraged by the European Commission and the EU’s Member States. The Commission is therefore now proposing concrete principles and measures – accompanied by a new strategy on immigration governance

94 See for an elaboration of that argument, Cas Mudde, “The Intolerance of the Tolerant,” *Open Democracy*, October 20, 2010, www.opendemocracy.net/cas-mudde/intolerance-of-tolerant.

95 Tjitske Akkerman, “Anti-Immigration Parties and the Defense of Liberal Values: The Exceptional Case of the List Pim Fortuyn,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 10, no. 3 (2005): 337-54.

96 Tjitske Akkerman and Anniken Hagelund, “‘Women and Children First!’ Anti-Immigration Parties and Gender in Norway and the Netherlands,” *Patterns of Prejudice* 41, no. 2 (2007): 197-214.

97 See Pascal De Decker, Christian Kesteloot, Filip De Maesschalck, and Jan Vranken, “Revitalizing the City in an Anti-Urban Context: Extreme Right and the Rise of Urban Policies in Flanders, Belgium,” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29, no. 1 (2005): 152-71.

98 *The Daily Mail*, “Nicolas Sarkozy joins David Cameron and Angela Merkel view that multiculturalism has failed,” February 11, 2011, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1355961/Nicolas-Sarkozy-joins-David-Cameron-Angela-Merkel-view-multiculturalism-failed.html.

99 Messina, *The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration*; Terri Givens and Adam Luedtke, “The Politics of European Union Immigration Policy: Institutions, Salience, and Harmonization,” *The Policy Studies Journal* 32, no. 1 (2004): 145-65; Terri Givens and Adam Luedtke, “European Immigration Policies in Comparative Perspective: Issue Salience, Partisanship and Immigrant Rights,” *Comparative European Politics* 3, no. 1 (2005): 1-22.

100 An overview of EU-wide immigration initiatives can be found on the European Commission Web site. See European Commission, “Towards a common European Union migration policy,” January 11, 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/immigration/fsj_immigration_intro_en.htm.



– on which to base the further development of the common immigration policy over the coming years.¹⁰¹

Still, at this moment, the level of convergence remains rather limited. And while there are some important changes that might facilitate further convergence, such as the Stockholm Programme 2010-2015 (which is the European Council framework for policies to be developed in the area of Justice and Home Affairs) and the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting under the Lisbon Treaty, progress is glacial and the European Commission might be an unreliable barometer of such progress.¹⁰² Most importantly, given their marginal role in the European Parliament and in the European Council, radical-right parties will most likely not play an important role in these initiatives.

A significant success supported by the immigration-restrictionist movement in the United States was in 2007, when a major bipartisan immigration reform package proposed by Senators Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and John McCain (R-AZ), and backed by President George W. Bush, was defeated. While various factors played a role, not least the internal divisions within major progressive forces such as the trade unions, defeat of the bill was assisted from the anti-immigration mobilization efforts undertaken by groups such as Numbers USA; reportedly, the phone system of the US Congress collapsed under the weight of more than 400,000 calls opposing the legislation.¹⁰³ Moreover, in recent years, representatives of nativist and anti-immigration organizations have become mainstream in the media — appearing most notably on CNN’s Lou Dobbs Tonight¹⁰⁴ and repeatedly testifying as experts to Congress. FAIR, for instance, claims it has testified to Congress “more than any other organization in America.”¹⁰⁵

While the “nativist lobby” has access to the mainstream media and policymakers, its influence should not be exaggerated. Even the defeat of the “amnesty” bill in 2007 was a defensive victory. With regard to implementing new legislation, nativists and anti-immigration advocates more broadly have been much less successful, at least at the federal level. While they have been able to profit from the securitization of the immigration debate post-9/11, most notably with the construction of the border fence, they have also faced a powerful pro-immigration lobby that includes big business, immigrant groups, and libertarians.¹⁰⁶ This is in sharp contrast to the situation in Western Europe, where pro-immigration forces have been almost invisible in the debate.

V. Public Effects of Nativism

Influence on policies and other political parties are arguably the most important possible effects of nativist actors, but certainly not the only ones. Nativist actors can also affect the public directly. In 1955, the famed American sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset argued that “radical-right agitation has facilitated the growth of practices which threaten to undermine the social fabric of democratic politics.”¹⁰⁷ Over the years, this belief has become received wisdom, uttered at strategic times in political debates and repeated in the mainstream media. With regard to immigrants, two alleged phenomena have received most attention: an increase in anti-immigrant violence and an increase in anti-immigrant public sentiment.

101 European Commission, “A Common Immigration Policy for Europe,” (press release, June 17, 2008), <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/402>.

102 For an overview, see Thomas Faist and Andreas Ette, eds., *The Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration: Between Autonomy and the European Union* (New York: Palgrave, 2007).

103 SPLC, *The Nativist Lobby*.

104 In return, Dobbs was awarded the 2004 Eugene Katz Award for Excellence in the Coverage of Immigration by the immigration-restrictionist Center for Immigration Studies (CIS). In November 2009, Dobbs left CNN after a campaign by immigrant-rights advocates to get him removed and allegedly because of growing unease over his right-wing views. Dobbs continues his radio work, which includes *Lou Dobbs Radio* and *Lou Dobbs Financial Report*, and in 2011 was hired to anchor a Fox Business Network TV program.

105 SPLC, *The Nativist Lobby*, 9.

106 Dan Tichenor, *Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

107 Seymour Martin Lipset, “The Radical Right: A Problem for American Democracy,” *British Journal of Sociology* 6, no. 2 (1955): 176-209.



So far, these assertions have not been supported by academic research, although this is to a large extent thanks to a lack of reliable cross-national data. This might change in the near future, as several organizations have started to collect reliable cross-national data, most notably the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), formerly the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), in Vienna, Austria.

A. Racist Violence

There are two strains of thought regarding the relationship between radical-right parties and anti-immigrant violence. The majority view holds that the xenophobic rhetoric of radical-right parties is often spills over into violence.¹⁰⁸ One of the few studies that has provided empirical evidence for this thesis was a pilot study in Switzerland in the 1984-93 period.¹⁰⁹ In addition, some other studies have found a minor correlation between the electoral success of radical-right parties and the level of anti-immigrant violence.¹¹⁰

There is a minority that holds the opposite view that successful radical-right parties actually channel the frustrations of would-be perpetrators away from anti-immigrant violence.¹¹¹ The first cross-national study on the topic, by Ruud Koopmans, concludes that “(i)n general, strong extreme right parties serve to limit the potential for extreme right and racist violence.”¹¹² This conclusion was confirmed in a more recent study based on European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) data.¹¹³

The problem with all these studies is the lack of reliable cross-national data on anti-immigrant violence. Most countries do not have a central agency responsible for collecting these data. Sometimes the information is only registered at the local level, and local police officers by and large determine whether a crime is logged as racist or not. But even if countries do use a centralized and standardized way to register anti-immigrant violence, different countries use different definitions of anti-immigrant violence.¹¹⁴ For example, in some countries, such as Hungary, a crime becomes registered as “racist” only after the police or a judge has ruled such action a racist crime, whereas in other states, such as the United Kingdom, the victim can declare whether the crime is racist or not. Obviously, the huge differences in implementation will lead to substantial differences in levels of “racist violence.”

This notwithstanding, almost all serious studies show a rise of nativist violence over the past decade or more. For example, based on FRA data, ten of the 12 EU Member States that publish sufficient criminal justice data on racist crime to be able to undertake a trend analysis experienced an increase in recorded crime of that nature in the period 2000-08. Looking only at the most recent year for which data are available (2007-08), nine of these 12 countries experienced an upward trend in recorded racist crime. However, this includes both countries with strong (or rising) radical-right parties, and those without. The data on anti-Semitic crimes, which are available for only six EU Member States, show a rise in five countries in the 2001-08 period. However, it is known that significant proportions of anti-Semitic crimes are committed by non-right-wing extremists (in particular Muslim immigrant youth). Finally, only four EU Member States collect sufficiently robust criminal justice data on crimes with an extreme-right motive. Of these four, three saw a rise in both the short term and long term.¹¹⁵

108 Jonathan Marcus, “Exorcising Europe’s Demons: A Far-Right Resurgence?” *The Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 4 (2000): 31-40.

109 Urs Altermatt and Hanspeter Kriesi, *Rechtsextremismus in der Schweiz. Organisationen und Radikalisierung in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren* (Zurich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1995).

110 Mudde, “Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe;” Roger Eatwell, “The Extreme Right and British Exceptionalism: The Primacy of Politics,” in *The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream*, ed. Paul Hainsworth (London: Pinter, 2000); Tore Björge and Rob Witte, “Introduction” in *Racist Violence in Europe*, eds. Tore Björge and Rob Witte (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993).

111 Minkenberg, “The West European Radical Right;” Harold L. Wilensky, “Migration and Politics: Explaining Variation among Rich Democracies in Recent Nativist Protest” (working paper no. 87, University of California, Berkeley, Institute of Industrial Relations, 1998).

112 Ruud Koopmans, “Explaining the Rise of Racist and Extreme Right Violence in Western Europe: Grievances or Opportunities,” *European Journal of Political Research* 30, no. 2 (1996): 185-216.

113 Uwe Backes, “Extremismus und politisch motivierte Gewalt.”

114 Robin Oakley, *Policing Racist Crime and Violence: A Comparative Analysis*, (Vienna: EUMC, 2005).

115 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), *Annual Report 2010 Conference Edition* (Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2010), http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/AR_2010-conf-edition_en.pdf.



The Norway killing spree by Anders Behring Breivik has put the spotlight on extreme-right terrorism. Although the killer was clearly influenced by a broad variety of sources, nativist arguments were central in his motivations. Convinced of the “Eurabia” conspiracy theory,¹¹⁶ he wanted to shock “native Europeans” into action to prevent the continent from succumbing to Islam. Directly after the attacks, a contentious debate broke out in Europe on whether the killings were a logical consequence of the European immigration debates. In addition, various critics alleged the attack could have been prevented if European states had been less obsessed with Islamist threats and instead devoted more attention to extreme-right terrorists.

Breivik’s influence from the radical right, as well as by “counterjihadists,” is not in itself proof for the more general argument that nativist rhetoric leads to extreme-right terrorism. After all, millions of people are exposed to this type of rhetoric. The claim that extreme-right terrorism is a significant threat to European and North American states but is ignored by their intelligence services seems also largely baseless. For example, Europol reports published before the Norwegian tragedy warn that “(g)rowing immigration flows will impact on terrorism and extremism” and that “(t)he insular nature of some immigration and the lack of integration into societies could lead to an increase in right-wing extremism in the EU.”¹¹⁷ Its annual report always include a section on “right-wing extremism” and its 2011 report states, among other things, that while there had been no right-wing terrorists attacks in Europe the previous year, and “the overall threat from right-wing extremism appears to be on the wane and the numbers of right-wing extremist criminal offences are relatively low, the professionalism in their propaganda and organisation shows that **right-wing extremist groups have the will to enlarge and spread their ideology** and still pose **a threat** in EU Member States [bolded in report].”¹¹⁸

Although many European states have disproportionately shifted attention and resources to preventing Islamic terrorism since the 9/11 attacks and Madrid bombings, most security services still closely monitor the extreme-right scene.¹¹⁹ In addition to Europol, most national security services that publish annual reports (such as Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands) include a chapter on the extreme right. Regarding the particular threat of a European-wide right-wing terrorist network, Ernst Uhrlau, president of the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND), an agency particularly vigilant toward the extreme right, said: “Right-wing extremism is nationally defined. We have no information that a cross-border militant movement or even an international right-wing terrorism network is developing.”¹²⁰

Two of the most infamous European right-wing terrorists are the Austrian mail bomber Franz Fuchs, who killed four and injured 15 between 1993 and 1997, and British neo-Nazi David Copeland, known as “the Soho bomber” or the “London nail bomber,” responsible for killing three and injuring 129 in a 13-day bombing spree in London in April 1999; both were sentenced to extended prison terms (though Fuchs committed suicide in prison in 2000). The 1990s saw also significant extreme-right terrorism and violence in Germany and Scandinavia, as well as in several post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, but in the first decade of the 21st century attacks decreased. Vigilance by state security might be one reason; a total of 44 suspects were arrested for right-wing terrorism in Austria, the Netherlands, and Portugal in 2007 alone. In addition, UK authorities reported a total of seven right-wing extremists arrested for a range of explosives-related offenses in 2007.¹²¹ A 2011 Home Office report stated: “There are 17 people serving prison sentences in this country for terrorism-related offences who are known

116 BBC News, “Norway massacre: Breivik declared insane,” November 29, 2011, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-15936276.

117 Europol, “Counter Terrorism Working Group Conclusions,” 2011, www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/epcc-counterterrorismconclusions.pdf.

118 Europol, TE-SAT 2011: *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2011* (The Hague: European Police Office, 2011): 20, www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/te-sat2011.pdf.

119 There certainly will be some exceptions. For example, a Danish terrorism expert claimed that all attention in the country has been devoted to Islamist terrorism since 2001 and no serious attention was paid to the potential threat of extreme-right terrorism. See Information.dk, “Terrorforskere: Vi ved intet om det højreradikale miljø,” August 12, 2011, www.information.dk/275806.

120 *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, “Die Union entdeckt die Gefahr von Rechts neu,” July 29, 2011, www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/debatte-nach-norwegen-anschlaegen-die-union-entdeckt-die-gefahr-von-rechts-neu-1.1125781.

121 Of these, 31 were arrested in Portugal as part of the operation against the Portuguese section of the Hammerskins, probably better labeled a violent than a terrorist organization. Europol, *TE-SAT 2008: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2008* (The Hague: European Police Office 2008): 38-9, www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/tesat2008_0.pdf.



to be associated with extreme right-wing groups, though none of these groups are themselves terrorist organisations.”¹²²

European governments are admittedly aware of the continuing threat of extreme-right terrorism and violence; they not only monitor potentially violent actors and groups, but also arrest them preventively and invest in deradicalization and disengagement programs. Various European countries have developed so-called “exit programs,” which encourage and assist people to leave extremist organizations. Pioneered in Scandinavia, most of these programs target in particular right-wing extremist youths.¹²³

European governments are admittedly aware of the continuing threat of extreme-right terrorism and violence.

Conversely, the United States also faces a serious threat from extreme-right terrorists, but ones much less motivated by nativist arguments. The most deadly extreme-right terrorist attack to date has been the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, which killed 168 and injured more than 680 people. The attack was the work of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, both part of the broad but fairly amorphous anti-federal government militia movement. While nativist elements figure within this movement, often referred to as the sovereign citizen movement, they are not central elements. Consequently, most targets of these terrorists are state officials, not immigrants or minorities.

According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), at least 201 deaths can be attributed to domestic terrorists in the decade since the attacks of 9/11. The overwhelming majority of these deaths were the work of right-wing extremists (84 percent), although their prime motivations include both antigovernment sentiments and nativism.¹²⁴ Some of the most striking nativist-inspired terrorist attacks include the murder of two West African immigrants and the rape and attempted murder of a third by a white supremacist in Massachusetts in January 2009, the killing of a Latino man and his nine-year-old daughter by members of a vigilante border group in Arizona in May 2009, and the shooting at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum by an anti-Semitic lone wolf in Washington, DC in June 2009.¹²⁵

Recently, several watchdog organizations have accused the US government of ignoring the threat from the extreme right, under political pressure from the mainstream right wing.¹²⁶ In April 2009 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) produced the report *Right-Wing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fuelling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment*, which warned about a rising threat of right-wing extremist terrorists, particularly ex-military (such as Timothy McVeigh), in light of the economic crisis and the election of the nation’s first black president.¹²⁷ The report was vilified by Republican politicians and right-wing media, who accused the new Democratic administration of “political profiling”

122 UK Home Office, *Prevent Strategy* (London: Home Office, 2011): 15, www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/prevent/prevent-strategy/prevent-strategy-review?view=Binary.

123 Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration, and Integration Affairs, *The Challenge of Extremism: Examples of Deradicalisation and Disengagement Programmes in the EU* (Copenhagen: Ministry of Refugee, Immigration, and Integration Affairs, October 2010), www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/20FBDF6E-43C2-43F1-A770-D908D67AC16C/0/the_challenge_of_extremisme_final.pdf

124 ADL, “Homegrown Extremism after 9/11: The Toll of Extremism,” August 26, 2011, www.adl.org/main_Extremism/911_homegrown_extremism.htm?Multi_page_sections=sHeading_3.

125 ADL, “A Wave of Hate: Ideologically Motivated Violence Against Jews and Others in America,” June 11, 2009, www.adl.org/main_Extremism/A_Wave_of_Hate.htm. See also the list compiled by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), www.splcenter.org/get-informed/publications/terror-from-the-right.

126 SPLC, “SPLC Urges DHS to Reassess Resources after Key Analyst Reveals Unit on Domestic Terror was Scaled Back in Wake of Right-Wing Criticism,” June 7, 2011, www.splcenter.org/get-informed/news/splc-urges-dhs-to-reassess-resources-after-key-analyst-reveals-unit-on-domestic-terror-was-scaled-back.

127 The report, which is not available on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) website, can be found elsewhere online. See Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf.



and of a “hit job on conservatives.”¹²⁸ According to the report’s lead researcher, DHS had already shifted most of its resources to Islamic terrorism, but “following the controversy, DHS dismantled the intelligence team that studied the threat from right-wing extremists and the department no longer produces its own analytical reports on that subject.”¹²⁹ While other insiders confirmed the claim,¹³⁰ DHS officially denied this. A senior DHS counterterrorism official even claimed: “As it stands today, we have been much more focused than at any time in the last 10 years on threats posed by homegrown terrorism.”¹³¹

In conclusion, extreme-right terrorism and violence are serious concerns in both Europe and North America. Most nativist violence is committed by young men, under the influence of alcohol, who have no clear ties to extreme-right organizations.¹³² Extreme-right terrorism is rare, particularly compared to the 1990s, and seems fairly well policed. The few deadly terrorists in the past few decades did have individual ties to radical-right parties, mostly in the form of (previous) memberships, but did not play leading roles within them. Consequently, the relationship between electoral success of radical-right parties and extreme-right violence seems nonstructural and weak; a more definitive answer will only be possible when more reliable comparative data become available.

B. Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

Another argument is that the electoral success of radical-right parties has “infected” the public discourse with anti-immigrant sentiments, which has led to a “tolerance for intolerance.”¹³³ Because of a lack of reliable cross-time and cross-national data, there is little empirical evidence for this thesis.¹³⁴ A comparative study of seven Western European countries found that electoral success of radical-right parties does correlate with ethnic prejudice within countries but has a fairly limited impact on other authoritarian values.¹³⁵ Yet, other studies found that “the representation of RRP [[radical-right wing populist]] parties in parliament, in fact, has no discernible effect on individual levels of intolerance” or even an increase in tolerance toward immigrants in countries with strong radical-right parties.¹³⁶

Again, a simple causal relationship should hardly be expected. First of all, radical-right parties reflect existing prejudices as much as they create or unleash new ones. While data are sketchy for the pre-1990s period, various authors have noted long-standing anti-immigrant sentiments in Western Europe and

128 FOXNews.com, “Chorus of Protest Grows over Report Warning of Right Wing Radicalization,” April 15, 2009, www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/04/15/chorus-protest-grows-report-warning-right-wing-radicalization; Michelle Malkin, “Confirmed: The Obama DHS Hit Job on Conservatives is Real,” April 14, 2009, <http://michellemalkin.com/2009/04/14/confirm-the-obama-dhs-hit-job-on-conservatives-is-real>.

129 SPLC, “SPLC Urges DHS to Reassess Resources after Key Analyst Reveals Unit on Domestic Terror was Scaled Back in Wake of Right-Wing Criticism.”

130 See R. Jeffrey Smith, “Homeland Security Department Curtails Home-Grown Terror Analysis,” *Washington Post*, June 7, 2011, www.washingtonpost.com/politics/homeland-security-department-curtails-home-grown-terror-analysis/2011/06/02/AGQEaDLH_story.html.

131 Marcus Baram, “Threat of Right-Wing Extremism in U.S. Debated By Feds, Analysts,” *Huffington Post*, July 28, 2011, www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/28/right-wing-extremism-united-states_n_911102.html.

132 See Tore Bjørge, *Racist Violence in Europe* (Basingstoke, UK: St. Martin’s, 1994); Helmut Willems, “Right-wing Extremism, Racism or Youth Violence? Explaining Violence against Foreigners in Germany,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 21, no.4 (1995): 501-23; Koopmans, “Explaining the Rise of Racist and Extreme Right Violence in Western Europe.”

133 Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick Hossay, “The Development of Radical Right Parties in Western Europe” in Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick Hossay, eds., *Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe* (New York: Palgrave, 2002).

134 An exception is Charles Westin, “Racism and the Political Right: European Perspectives,” in Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg, eds., *Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Frank Cass, 2003).

135 Robert Andersen and Jocelyn A.J. Evans, “Social-Political Context and Authoritarian Attitudes: Evidence from Seven European Countries” (working paper no. 104, CREST, Glasgow, 2004).

136 See, respectively, Kris P. Dunn and Shane P. Singh, “The Surprising Non-Impact of Radical Right-Wing Populist Party Representation on Public Tolerance for Minorities,” *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties* 21, no. 3 (2011): 313-31; Tor Bjørklund and Jørgen Goul Andersen, “Anti-immigration parties in Denmark and Norway: The Progress Parties and the Danish People’s Party” in *Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe*, eds. Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick Hossay (New York: Palgrave, 2002).



North America, virtually unrelated to the number of immigrants in the country.¹³⁷ Moreover, while the success of radical-right parties might heighten the visibility of anti-immigrant discourse, it has often also given way to popular and state anti-nativist initiatives (see below).

It is crucial to note that there are many more people with anti-immigrant sentiments than there are anti-immigrant voters, as anti-immigration sentiments were already widespread before the late 1980s rise of radical-right parties.¹³⁸ Even in countries with highly successful radical-right parties, such as Austria or Switzerland, the majority of people with anti-immigration sentiments vote for non-nativist parties across the political spectrum.¹³⁹

In summary, the success of radical-right parties probably doesn't change many opinions. Rather, it brings existing anti-immigrant attitudes to the fore. Undoubtedly this process is helped by the behavior of mainstream parties, which legitimize the radical-right discourse by adopting a tempered version to their rhetoric. Simply stated, radical-right parties do not make people nativist; they make people aware of their nativist sentiments and of the importance of these sentiments.

Also, while most Western European countries had fairly strong social and legal pressures against expressing nativist sentiment at least until the late 1990s, the success of radical-right parties helped undermine the strength and effectiveness of this "political correctness." Still, radical-right parties were, at best, one of several factors that undermined the pro-immigration consensus. Among some of the other important factors are the sometimes disputed crises with asylum seekers, immigrant crime (framed in nativist terms by tabloid media), and, of course, 9/11 and European terrorist attacks by immigrants living within those countries.

VI. Anti-Nativist Reactions

Nativist actors have been able to influence political parties, policies, and publics in order to advance their own position. This is only one side of the coin, however. The rise of nativism also has provoked anti-nativist reactions, both at the societal and the state level.

A. Societal Responses

The success of radical-right parties might heighten the visibility of anti-immigrant discourses, but it has also given way to popular antiracism movements, which put forward pro-immigration discourses. The most famous examples are the British Anti-Nazi League, founded in reaction to the (moderate) electoral successes of the National Front in the 1970s, and the French SOS Racism, a direct reaction to the breakthrough of Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front in Dreux in 1983.¹⁴⁰ Additionally, in many countries, governments at all levels started to sponsor antiracist and pro-multicultural activities in direct response to radical-right electoral victories. As most important media in Europe were state-controlled or close to mainstream political parties until at least the late 1980s, when ties loosened and private television took off, this meant that the dominant discourse remained anti-nativist or often changed from implicit anti-racist to explicit antiracist. Even where certain tabloid media would advance nativist arguments, as in the case of the British *Sun* newspaper or the German *Bild Zeitung*, they would equally strongly come out against nativist actors, ranging from political parties such as BNP and NPD to neo-Nazi groups and violent racist youths.¹⁴¹

137 Messina, *The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration*; Schain, *The Politics of Immigration in France, Britain and the United States*.

138 Ibid.

139 Cas Mudde, "The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy," *West European Politics* 33, no. 6 (2010): 1,167-186.

140 Cathie Lloyd, "Antiracist Mobilization in France and Britain in the 1970s and 1980s," in *Scapegoats and Social Actors: The Exclusion and Integration of Minorities in Western and Eastern Europe*, ed. Daniele Joly (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1998).

141 Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties*.



Hence, some authors have argued that the successes of radical-right parties provoke a backlash among those with liberal attitudes.¹⁴² This seems an overstatement, however. While the antiracist backlash might have mobilized large groups of people at certain times, it is most likely that it rallied people who were already antiracist and pro-multicultural. Similarly, it is doubtful that antiracist mass mobilization has played a big role in the hindering of electoral success of radical-right parties.¹⁴³ Their success seems mostly limited to preventing already weak parties from gaining initial success or building upon existing moderate successes. A good example was the Hope Not Hate campaign in England, which targeted districts where BNP expected electoral success. One of the most visible local campaigns was in the district of Barking in East London, where prominent local resident, musician, and left-wing activist Billy Bragg physically confronted Richard Barnbrook, a BNP member of the Barking and Dagenham Council.¹⁴⁴ While antifascists have long challenged the English radical right on the ground, the limited electoral success of parties like BNP and National Front (NF) seems at least as much the consequence of internal incompetence and infighting.

There is one area in which antiracist groups have played an important role: law. Throughout Europe, a broad coalition of nongovernmental organizations has pushed for stricter antidiscrimination laws, and stronger enforcement of these laws. In the United States, groups such as the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) went even further, taking nativist groups to civil court and at times even bankrupting them.¹⁴⁵ The most famous case is *Berhanu vs. Metzger*, which led to the bankruptcy of Tom Metzger's White Aryan Resistance.

The situation in the United States is markedly different from that in Europe. In the United States, the so-called populist backlash against mass immigration has often been met by a powerful pro-immigration movement, which unites a broad variety of actors, ranging from some of the richest businessmen in the country (such as former Republican presidential candidate Steve Forbes) to Latino advocates from the poor inner cities.¹⁴⁶ Some of the largest demonstrations in the United States in recent years have been those in favor of comprehensive immigration reform, i.e. with a clear pro-immigration message. For example, in March 2006, some 500,000 people demonstrated in favor of immigrant rights in Los Angeles, while smaller groups demonstrated all over the country.¹⁴⁷ And in March 2010, tens of thousands of people participated in the "March for America" in Washington, DC, urging President Obama to make good on his promise for immigration reform.¹⁴⁸

B. State Responses

Most countries have treated radical-right parties negatively, at least initially. A broad variety of state responses to nativist actors have been implemented, from the ideological to the legal. As previously indicated, many local and national governments have spent millions of dollars on antinativism/pro-multicultural initiatives in direct reaction to the rise of nativist actors. At various occasions, local and national authorities have hindered nativist groups from freely demonstrating and organizing.¹⁴⁹ In some cases, police were merely enforcing existing laws that prohibited certain organizations from demonstrating and organizing, but in other cases, the legal basis was at best shaky. For example, from 1980-2000 many radical-right demonstrations in the Netherlands were forbidden because of the alleged threat of a confrontation with antifascists, who had announced a counterdemonstration (rather than simply keeping the

142 Andersen and Evans, "Social-Political Context and Authoritarian Attitudes;" Kitschelt and McGann, *The Radical Right in Western Europe*.

143 Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties*, 247.

144 Matthew Taylor, "Billy Bragg Clashes with BNP's Richard Barnbrook," *The Guardian*, April 19, 2010, www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/apr/19/billy-bragg-clash-richard-barnbrook.

145 George Michael, *Confronting Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the USA* (London: Routledge, 2003).

146 See Gary P. Freeman, "Client Politics or Populism? Immigration Reform in the United States" in Virginie Guiraudon and Christian Joppke, eds., *Controlling a New Migration World* (London: Routledge, 2001).

147 Associated Press. "Immigration Issue Draws Thousands Into the Streets," March 26, 2006, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11442705/ns/politics/t/immigration-issue-draws-thousands-streets/.

148 Julia Preston, "At Rally, Call for Urgency on Immigration Reform," *New York Times*, March 22, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/03/22/us/politics/22immig.html.

149 Jaap Van Donselaar, *De staat paraat? De bestrijding van extreme-rechts in West-Europa* (Amsterdam: Babylon-De Geus, 2005).



two groups apart or banning the counterdemonstration).

The focus here will be on the most important *legal* state responses to nativist actors. All regions have fairly strong antidiscrimination laws in place, even though the implementation differs significantly between countries and even regions. In particular, Northwestern Europe and Canada have developed very elaborate antidiscrimination laws, in part directly targeting nativist actors, which are strictly enforced. The United States has a more permissive legal framework although the introduction of the concept of “hate crimes” and the easier procedures in civil laws provide state and nonstate actors with significant avenues for legal action. Central and Eastern Europe, as well as much of Southern Europe, have similar legal frameworks to the rest of the European Union, yet many countries fail to enforce antidiscrimination legislation.¹⁵⁰

Antidiscrimination legislation has increasingly been used against nativist actors, ranging from individuals to organizations. The most famous case was in Belgium in 2004, when the VB was effectively convicted for incitement to racial hatred. While this didn’t directly lead to a ban of the party, it did make it practically impossible for the party to continue to function as a regular political entity. At the same time, the successor party, Flemish Interest, is almost an exact copy of its predecessor.¹⁵¹

Other countries have banned or withheld registration of political parties on the basis of a variety of laws, including antidiscrimination and explicitly anti-extremist legislation. Some of the most notable cases include the National Democratic Party in Austria, the National Socialist Block in the Czech Republic, and the Centre Party ’86 in the Netherlands. Another example is the recent legal case brought against BNP by the Equality and Human Rights Commission in the United Kingdom, which forced the party to amend its constitution and accept nonwhites as members.¹⁵²

In recent years various states seem to have become more reluctant to prosecute and convict radical-right parties and politicians on the basis of antidiscrimination legislation. For example, BNP leader Nick Griffin was convicted in Britain for historical revisionism in 1998, but acquitted for Islamophobia in 2006.¹⁵³ And despite the long Dutch tradition of convicting radical-right politicians for inciting racial hatred, Geert Wilders, Europe’s most famous Islamophobic politician, was acquitted in 2011. This surprising ruling seemed more the result of political and public pressure than strict interpretation of the broad antidiscrimination legislation in the Netherlands. Wilders was in many ways much more extreme than people like the late leader of the radical-right Centre Democrats (CD), Hans Janmaat. But unlike Janmaat, who led a marginal party, Wilders is the leader of the third-biggest parliamentary party in the Netherlands, which functions as the support party of the Dutch government.¹⁵⁴

In most countries, political parties enjoy special legal protections, and they are therefore more difficult to ban. A good example of this is Germany, which has the most suppressive legal system regarding “nondemocratic” actors and yet failed to ban the radical-right National Democratic Party of Germany. At the same time, the German Interior Minister has banned more than 50 “extreme-right” groups over the past two decades. Similarly, in several Central and Eastern European countries, nonparty organizations have faced much more legal pressure than radical-right parties.¹⁵⁵

Finally, nativist individuals have been taken to court by both state and nonstate actors. These individuals have included radical-right politicians, who would go on to lose their political rights. For example, in France, various leading members of the National Front have been convicted on the basis of antidiscrimination and historical revisionism legislation (including Bruno Gollnisch, Bruno Mégret, and even Jean-Marie Le Pen). In other countries, radical-right politicians have also been convicted for inciting racial hatred,

150 Mudde, *Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe*.

151 Jan Erk, “From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: Belgian Far-Right Renames Itself,” *West European Politics* 28, no. 3 (2005): 493-502.

152 Fiona Hamilton, “British National Party Forced to Admit Non-Whites,” *The Times*, September 3, 2009.

153 Martin Wainwright, “Retrial Ordered after Griffin Walks Free,” *The Guardian*, February 2, 2006.
www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/feb/03/uk.race.

154 Cas Mudde, “Geert Wilders and Dutch Democracy,” *Open Democracy*, June 24, 2011,
www.opendemocracy.net/cas-mudde/geert-wilders-and-dutch-democracy.

155 Mudde, *Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe*.



but they have kept their political rights; for example, FPÖ parliamentarian Susanne Winter in Austria and Centre Democrats leader Hans Janmaat in the Netherlands.

The effects of state actions against nativist groups or individuals go much further than the relatively few convictions, however. First of all, these actions have an impact on the public discourse. Second, they affect the organizational capabilities of nativist groups. In countries with governments that work to curtail nativist activities, which also often have more social stigmatization, nativist groups can have a hard time attracting qualified members and leaders.¹⁵⁶ Third, it leads to debates about how far liberal democracies can go in their struggle against their enemies without undermining their own values.

VII. The Economic Crisis, Immigration, and Nativism

The association between crisis and extremism has a lengthy history. In 1919, the famous German scholar Max Weber argued that charismatic leaders benefit from crisis situations.¹⁵⁷ But it was particularly the rise of Adolf Hitler and his National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) amid Germany's depression, in the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 1929 that has linked economic crisis and the rise of political extremism. In fact, most contemporary studies of the radical right link its emergence to some form of crisis, though not always (exclusively) economic, connected to some type of modernization process.¹⁵⁸

Despite the strength of this received wisdom, the empirical evidence is thin. For example, while the Great Depression led to the rise of German extremist parties, it did not in many other European countries (e.g., the Netherlands and United Kingdom) or in the United States. Similarly, neither the oil crisis of the 1970s nor the democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, which involved massive economic hardship for large portions of the people, led to the clear rise of extremist politics.

The recent economic crisis seems so far to follow this pattern. If one looks at the national elections in European countries, which have been conducted since the global recession began in mid-2008, there is no clear trend toward the rise of "extremist" parties, i.e. radical-right parties. While some radical-right parties have gained traction in recent elections, most notably the Hungarian Jobbik in 2010 and the Latvian National Alliance in 2011, others have lost (slightly), e.g., the DFP in Denmark or the VB in Belgium. And even though various radical-right parties have done well in national and local elections, such as the Austrian FPÖ and the French FN, they are nowhere near their peaks of the 1990s.

The lack of a clear trend toward radical-right electoral success can also be seen in the results of the elections for the European Parliament in June 2009. Against the striking victory of Jobbik (gaining 14.8 percent in its first European election) stands the complete implosion of the League of Polish Families (LPR) in Poland (which had gained 15.2 percent in 2004 but didn't even contest in 2009). Similarly, while much attention in Western Europe went to the gains of the British National Party (+1.4 percent) and the Dutch PVV (+17 percent), few noted the clear losses of the Belgian VB (-3.4 percent) and French FN (-3.5 percent).¹⁵⁹ Moreover, in most European countries, radical-right parties did not contest the European elections or they didn't make it into the European Parliament (e.g. Czech Republic, Germany, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden).

156 See David Art, *Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

157 Max Weber, *Politik als Beruf* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1987, 8th edition).

158 See Mabel Berezin, *Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times: Cultures, Security, and Populism in a New Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Kitschelt and McGann, *The Radical Right in Western Europe*; Betz, *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*.

159 See, among many others, Bruno Waterfield, Henry Samuel, and Nick Squires, "European Elections 2009: Far-Right and Fringe Parties Make Gains across Europe Amid Low Turnout," *Daily Telegraph*, June 8, 2009, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/5471893/European-elections-2009-far-Right-and-fringe-parties-make-gains-across-Europe-amid-low-turnout.html.

Table 4. Performance of Nativist Parties in European Election in 2009 and Comparison with 2004 Election

Country	Party	European Election 2009 (%)	Difference 2004-09 (%)
Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria	4.6	+4.6
	Austria Freedom Party (FPÖ)	12.7	+6.4
Belgium	National Front (Belgian) (FNb)	1.3	-1.5
	Flemish Interest (VB)	9.9	-3.4
Britain	British National Party (BNP)	6.2	+1.4
Bulgaria*	National Union Attack (NSA)	9.4	-2.8
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DFP)	13.9	+7.1
France	National Front (FN)	6.3	-3.5
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)	7.2	+3.1
Hungary	Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)	14.8	+14.8
Italy	Northern League (LN)	10.2	+5.2
Netherlands	Party for Freedom (PVV)	17.0	+17.0
Poland	League of Polish Families (LPR)	---	-15.9
Romania*	Greater Romania Party (PRM)	8.7	+4.5
Slovakia	Slovak National Party (SNS)	5.6	+3.6

* For Bulgarian and Romania the difference is between the 2009 and 2007 European elections, as they only joined the European Union in 2007.

Source: All data are from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD), "European Election Database," www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database.

Although it is too early to discern clear trends, data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) show that immigration to Europe and North America has actually decreased since the beginning of the economic crisis.¹⁶⁰ Some anecdotal evidence even indicates that return migration from the United States has increased in recent years.¹⁶¹ At the same time, immigration has become a less salient issue for Europeans. Whereas 15 percent of Europeans considered immigration to be one of the two most important issues facing their country in September 2007, this had dropped to 9 percent by August 2008.¹⁶² This has stabilized since; in October/November 2009, again 9 percent was the EU average, though with some striking national variations.¹⁶³ Most importantly, in the United Kingdom, the figure was 29 percent, which served as a reflection and a reason for the sharply increased salience of immigration in the campaign preceding the May 2010 parliamentary elections.

The situation in the United Kingdom seems to be exceptional, however. In most European countries, the debate is fully focused on the dire economic situation and the worrying increase in unemployment, but immigration plays little role. In the United States, the political debate in 2010 was dominated by health care and the country's financial system and rising debt load. Although President Obama promised to propose comprehensive immigration reform, the ongoing economic crisis, and the fear of a "double-dip" recession have so far kept him primarily focused on economic issues. While still too early to tell how significant a role immigration will play in the 2012 general elections, it has surfaced at times during the Republican presidential primaries.

160 Angelique Chrisafis, "World Financial Crisis Has Led to Sharp Cut in Migration, Says OECD," *The Guardian*, July 12, 2011, www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/jul/12/financial-crisis-migration-cut-oecd?CMP=twf_fd; Patrick Barta and Paul Hannon, "Economic Crisis Curbs Migration of Workers," *Wall Street Journal*, July 1, 2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124636924020073241.html>.

161 Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Aaron Terrazas, *Immigrants and the Current Economic Crisis: Research Evidence, Policy Challenges, and Implications* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2009), www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/lmi_recessionjan09.pdf.

162 European Commission, "Standard Eurobarometer, no. 70," August 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb70/eb70_part4_en.pdf.

163 European Commission, "Standard Eurobarometer, no. 72," February 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb72/eb72_en.htm.



VIII. Conclusion

As has been demonstrated, many of the assumptions about the relationship between immigration and nativism are based upon feeble empirical evidence. In many cases, academic research is inconclusive, not in the least because of a lack of reliable cross-national data. Hence, it is absolutely vital that more cross-national data projects be created and supported over longer periods of time. Recent developments such as the creation and activities of EUMC/FRA and the European Social Survey (ESS) are important steps forward. Nevertheless, it is critical that policymakers base their assumptions about policy and law on what is known. Policy-relevant findings from the literature include:

- ***The most extreme reactions to immigration and migrants are fomented by the radical or extreme right, not the left, but their popularity is highly circumscribed across North America, Western Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe.*** The most significant extremist reaction to immigration comes from radical-right parties in Western Europe. However, radical-right parties are successful only in a minority of European countries and not at all in North America. In the United States, the most important nativist actors are nonparty organizations, which are at times well-connected to mainstream media and politicians. In addition, extreme-right violence against immigrants is a significant problem in some countries, including Germany and Russia. Research shows that this violence is not directly related to radical-right parties; as far as the perpetrators are active within political organizations, it is in small neo-Nazi groups and skin-head gangs.
- ***Migration patterns do not drive radical-right voting although immigration as a political issue has contributed to their electoral success.*** There is no straightforward relationship between immigration patterns and radical-right voting. Immigration has to be *translated* into a political issue, which involves many different steps. And while immigration is certainly not the single issue of the radical right, it clearly plays an important role in their propaganda and their electoral success.
- ***There is no clear relationship — either way — between rising numbers of immigrants and extremist incidents.*** Logically, with the growth of the immigrant population, anti-immigrant crimes have increased, too. However, no clear relationship exists between the electoral strength of a radical-right party in a country and the level of anti-immigrant violence. As EUMC/FRA started to collect reliable cross-national data several years ago, future research might find more conclusive evidence on the exact relationship between the two factors.
- ***Both the process of globalization and the (related) public attitudes toward immigrants influence the support for radical-right parties in a much more complex manner than is often assumed.*** Mass attitudes toward immigration and immigrants have always been relatively negative, in the sense that at the very least a somewhat sizeable minority in every country will hold nativist attitudes. While radical-right groups have clearly profited from this, they tap into only a minority of the nativist population. While globalization is also influencing the support for radical-right parties, the relationship is highly complex and seriously underdeveloped theoretically. Clearly, with globalization affecting most highly industrialized countries in roughly similar ways, and with the electoral successes of radical-right parties diverging significantly, there is no linear relationship between globalization and radical-right electoral success.
- ***The radical right frames the immigration debate consistently across countries on the basis of two main themes: a cultural threat (recently amalgamated as a cultural-religious threat) and a security threat (recently amalgamated as a criminal-terrorist threat). Secondary themes include economic competition and an anti-elite/anti-politics narrative.*** Although individual political parties will emphasize specific points more than others in their discourse, all share a roughly similar set of themes. The key theme is cultural, in which immigrants are considered a threat to the cultural homogeneity of the nation because of an inability or unwillingness to assimilate. In recent years, particularly in Western Europe, the cultural has



been accompanied by a religious theme, in which (radical) Islam is seen as a threat to liberal democratic values. Parties in all countries also share a strong security theme, in which immigration is linked to crime and, increasingly, terrorism. Two secondary themes are the economic, in which immigration is seen as a threat to the wealth of welfare of the nation, and the political, in which corrupt elites are accused of using immigration for financial and political gains. Of all these themes, the security, religious, and economic frames have been most adopted by mainstream actors, though often in watered-down versions.

- ***States have tightened immigration policies, but the radical right is only one causal factor; furthermore, counterforces, particularly state-sponsored antidiscrimination laws, have blunted the rise of more extremist parties.*** European countries have tightened their immigration policies in recent decades. However, the electoral pressure of radical-right parties has been only one of many important factors. In many cases the most significant policies were implemented well before the radical right became successful. Moreover, European integration complicates the distinction between domestic and international factors. There is an increasing pressure on developing an EU-wide migration policy; while this is yet to be implemented, national policies have already started to converge significantly. But not everything has gone the radical right's way. In various countries, antiracist and pro-immigrant groups have sprung up in direct reaction to radical-right success, pushing through an alternative, pro-immigration discourse. These initiatives have often been subsidized and expanded by local and national governments. Finally, many states have used antidiscrimination legislation to hinder the development of the radical right, including the banning of political parties.
- ***There is a complex relationship between immigration and extremism in which some parties have profited, especially in Western Europe, though many countries do not have a relevant party — and not at all in Central and Eastern Europe.***

In conclusion, the relationship between immigration and extremism is unclear and complex. Increased levels of immigration have given rise to nativist reactions in Europe and North America but not yet in Central and Eastern Europe. While immigration has helped some radical-right parties obtain moderate electoral success, most European and North American countries do not have a politically influential nativist movement. And while nativist sentiments and organizations have played a role in the tightening of immigration laws, particularly those regarding asylum, they have lost the big battle as both Western Europe and North America are increasingly multiethnic societies.



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