



Seasonal Worker Programmes in Europe

Promising practices and ongoing challenges

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Executive Summary

While there are limited opportunities for low-skilled workers to migrate legally to the European Union, seasonal migration forms an important exception. EU Member States, like countries elsewhere in the world, often rely on workers from other countries to meet their seasonal labour needs in sectors such as agriculture, hospitality, and tourism. Some Member States (such as Germany) recruit seasonal labour from other parts of the European Union, while others primarily recruit from third countries with which they have historical, economic, or cultural ties.

In recent years, the European Commission has sought to harmonise seasonal worker programmes, some of which date back decades, to both make it easier to meet labour demand and to promote the potential development benefits of such migration for workers and their countries of origin. As part of this process, the Commission has aimed to create common standards for seasonal workers' admission, residence, and rights in countries across Europe and to address some of the longstanding issues with these schemes, such as the risk of worker exploitation, visa overstays, and hiring through the informal economy. The adoption of the Seasonal Workers Directive in 2014 marked a step forward, but with the

directive's implementation still ongoing, it remains to be seen how effective it will be in addressing these policy goals.

Beyond this legal framework, designing and operating seasonal worker programmes that can swiftly recruit workers with the right skills, prevent abuse and exploitation, deter visa overstays, and potentially promote broader development benefits is a challenging proposition. A review of programmes in Europe and elsewhere suggests a number of principles to guide future reforms, including prioritising more transparent and standardised recruitment procedures, greater monitoring and outreach to protect seasonal workers, and more broadly, strategies to help maximise the benefits of these programmes for workers and countries of origin alongside destination-country stakeholders.

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BOX 1 About the project

This policy brief is part of the research project ‘Legal Migration for Work and Training: Mobility options to Europe for those not in need of protection’, carried out by the Research Unit of the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration in cooperation with the Migration Policy Institute Europe, funded by Stiftung Mercator.

Given the scale of irregular migration to Europe, this project asks what legal alternatives exist or could exist for third-country nationals who are not in need of humanitarian protection and who seek to move for education, training, or work. The research is based on five country case studies—France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden—as well as analysis of the European Union’s external migration policy. It explores existing legal migration options and challenges in policy design and implementation and reflects on opportunities to develop effective legal migration policies and programmes.

The country case studies and final report from this project are available here: www.svr-migration.de/en/publications/mobility_options_to_europe/.

1 Introduction

Although low-skilled workers have limited opportunities to migrate legally to the European Union,¹ seasonal migration is an important exception.² Across Europe, employers in sectors such as agriculture and horticulture, construction, hospitality, retail, and tourism³ struggle at times to recruit local workers for seasonal roles that can be low paid, physically taxing, and (in the case of agriculture) located in remote areas.⁴ Faced with these recruitment challenges, many employers in these industries rely on foreign workers to meet their seasonal labour needs.

Some European countries (e.g., Germany and the United Kingdom) have a long history of seasonal labour migration from other European countries,⁵ while others primarily recruit seasonal workers from third countries through specially designed programmes.⁶ These recruitment practices tend to be rooted in a mixture of historical connections, cultural or economic ties, and geography, producing a diversity of migration patterns. For example, a large share of the first permits France and Spain issue for seasonal work go to Moroccan nationals, while

the vast majority of those from Sweden go to Thai nationals, and Poland issues many to Ukrainian nationals.⁷ The characteristics of seasonal workers vary too. In the case of agriculture, for example, many seasonal workers come from rural areas and have on-the-job experience (sometimes working with the same crops as those grown in destination countries); however, the Seasonal Workers Pilot launched by the United Kingdom in 2018 took another approach, with one of the two pilot operators opting to focus recruitment efforts on agricultural students from Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine.⁸ And while some seasonal workers form a relationship with one employer and may return year after year to work with that employer, some of the activities under the UK pilot initiative were framed more as one-off opportunities for participants to earn money, learn new agricultural skills, and practice English.⁹

Designing and operating seasonal worker programmes that can recruit workers with the right skills, ensure they are treated fairly, and that they return home when their permits expire is no easy feat. As with other labour migration programmes, it requires governments to balance the demand for swift, employer-led recruitment processes with

the obligation to provide adequate oversight.¹⁰ The short-term nature of seasonal programmes, and the fact that many workers recruited through them have limited host-country language skills and networks, can also create vulnerabilities unique to this group.¹¹ To effectively administer these programmes, governments must work closely with a variety of actors, including countries of origin, employers, and trade unions.

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With these challenges in mind, the European Union has taken steps to better regulate seasonal migration programmes across the bloc.¹² Adopted in 2014, the Seasonal Workers Directive established

common standards for seasonal work and working conditions, and rules to govern the admission and residence of third-country nationals as part of such programmes (see Box 2). However, deciding who and how many seasonal workers to admit remains a national responsibility, with Member States designing programmes that reflect both the needs of their employers and, often, their ties to particular third countries.¹³ Efforts to enforce the directive have also been delayed by slow implementation, with the last country (Belgium) introducing legislation to fully implement it in 2019.¹⁴

As European policymakers take stock of harmonisation efforts to date, this policy brief explores some of the challenges common to seasonal worker programmes. It draws on examples from programmes both within and outside the European Union, highlighting promising practices to help maximise the benefits of seasonal labour migration for migrants, employers, and countries of destination and origin alike.

BOX 2 Seasonal Workers Directive

The Seasonal Workers Directive, adopted in 2014, was the culmination of the European Commission's efforts to harmonise seasonal worker programmes in Europe. The rationale for creating the directive was threefold: (1) to help meet demand for seasonal labour while curbing illegal employment; (2) to protect the rights of workers; and (3) to provide development benefits for participating countries of origin.

The directive, for the first time, established a common set of rules for the admission, residence, and rights of non-EU seasonal workers. Among other things, it restricts migrants' stay in the European Union to between five and nine months per year, limits their options for family reunification, allows workers to switch employers, and permits employers to rehire workers who meet the conditions set by their residence and work permits. Still, Member States have the discretion to decide who and how many migrants to admit, the exact length of their admission (within the five-to-nine-month range), and whether and how to facilitate repeat hires. All Member States but Denmark and Ireland have adopted this directive, and all signatories have now transposed it into national law.

Sources: European Commission, 'Communication from the Commission – Policy Plan on Legal Migration' (COM [2005] 669 final, 21 December 2005); 'Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the Conditions of Entry and Stay of Third-Country Nationals for the Purpose of Employment as Seasonal Workers', *Official Journal of the European Union* L 94/375, 28 March 2014.

2 Recruiting the Right Foreign Workers at the Right Time

The success of seasonal worker programmes hinges first and foremost on finding the right candidates for the job. Some sectors, such as agriculture and hospitality, may rely heavily on foreign workers to meet seasonal needs, and recruitment failures can spell labour shortages.¹⁵ In 2018, for example, strawberry and asparagus growers in Germany reported major difficulties recruiting seasonal workers,¹⁶ while French companies reported the same concern in the hospitality and agriculture sectors.¹⁷ The same year, the United Kingdom launched its Seasonal Workers Pilot, partly in response to mounting concerns about the country's ability to attract seasonal agricultural workers after Brexit, though employers claimed that the programme's target of recruiting 2,500 people annually would only meet a fraction of their needs.¹⁸

In addition to being able to recruit enough workers, employers also need to be able to hire workers quickly enough to meet fluctuating seasonal needs. Swift recruitment procedures are especially important in sectors such as agriculture, where it can be difficult to predict the size or exact timing of harvests with much advance notice. Delays in the recruitment or visa approval process can have significant economic ramifications for employers, as was the case in the United States in 2015 when a glitch in the visa processing system stranded thousands of agricultural workers, leading to millions of dollars' worth of crop losses.¹⁹ One strategy for smoothing out this uncertainty is to facilitate recruitment from one year to the next. For example, the French government established a dedicated triennial work permit in 2007 that allows seasonal workers to come back to work in France for three years in a row, provided their main residence remains elsewhere and they have a work contract.²⁰ Some French compa-

nies—often bigger ones that hire large numbers of seasonal workers—have also negotiated simplified procedures with the local authorities to accelerate the administrative process.²¹

Another risk inherent to programmes that offer too few places to meet demand and/or that have slow or unpredictable immigration procedures is that employers may instead turn to the informal economy.²² Italy's poorly functioning legal migration system (with low quotas and time-consuming procedures) has led some employers to instead favour hiring foreign workers through the informal economy (e.g., those who may have overstayed a visa).²³ While quotas have been reduced for seasonal work over the past decade, reflecting the growing presence of EU nationals, asylum seekers, and refugees employed in these sectors, it is nonetheless notable that in 2015 more than half of all workers in the Italian agricultural sector (including both nationals and foreigners) were hired without a formal contract.²⁴ Some of the same dynamics are at play in France, where construction and hospitality companies often hire unauthorised migrants because it is faster and cheaper.²⁵

Delays in the recruitment or visa approval process can have significant economic ramifications for employers.

Creating a well-functioning system for selecting and admitting migrant workers is thus key. Foreign seasonal workers can be recruited informally (e.g., through the social networks of recently hired seasonal workers) or through more formalised processes involving recruitment or government agencies. For example, Sweden's berry-picking industry relies on seasonal labour from Thailand, a route that dates back to a Thai national living in Sweden in the 1980s who invited her relatives to join her and help her pick and sell berries.²⁶ Similarly, many French farmers largely use informal recruitment networks, asking

employees to recommend relatives or friends for the next season; as a result, many hire their workforce from the same regions in Morocco and Tunisia.²⁷ In this way, farmers and migrants drive the selection process, albeit with the involvement of the Tunisian and Moroccan employment agencies and the French Office of Immigration and Integration (OFII).²⁸ While this system has ensured that the needs of French employers are met in time, and that the workers selected have the right profile, research indicates that informal recruitment channels can be misused; for example, there are reports of some migrants monetising their connections to a French employer by making aspiring workers pay them for a formal introduction and a chance to be recruited.²⁹

In some EU countries, recruitment practices have become more formalised over time. Some have developed standardised recruitment criteria and/or involved specialised private or public agencies in the selection and vetting of candidates for employers. In the case of Sweden, for example, government authorities have increasingly taken steps to regulate the recruitment of Thai berry pickers amid concerns about poor working conditions and exploitation. These steps include new requirements for employers (including that they demonstrate their ability to pay wages, regardless of the season's yield) and the assignment of responsibility for berry pickers to a Swedish trade union, which drew up a collective agreement on wages and working conditions that Thai recruitment agencies must sign.³⁰

More formalised recruitment processes can be particularly helpful when employers cannot rely on existing networks in origin countries to attract workers. The recently launched UK Seasonal Workers Pilot, for example, relies on recruitment organisations to identify and sponsor workers and manage the programme (including organising workers' travel to the United Kingdom). Some EU Member State government agencies work directly with their counterparts in countries of origin to build their capacity

to identify and select labour migrants. For example, in 2018 France's employment agency tested a new scheme with the Moroccan National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Skills (ANAPEC) and OFII that set out selection criteria to help draw up a list of potential candidates in regions from which French farmers do not typically recruit.³¹ Spain has also been working closely with national employment agencies in origin countries, including ANAPEC and Colombia's National Office for Labour Migration, through bilateral agreements that have established common recruitment procedures for seasonal workers.³² This cooperation between public employment agencies can be a step towards a broader partnership on labour migration, as employment agencies on both sides learn to work together.³³

Regardless of how formal these recruitment procedures are, and whether they are primarily led by government or private-sector actors, the top priority is to respond quickly to employer needs. Alongside efforts to streamline recruitment procedures, governments can explore ways to speed up the process for employers and workers who abide by the rules. For example, France prioritises the rehiring of workers who register in their origin countries upon return—proof that they have left France within the timeframe stipulated by their seasonal permit.³⁴

3 Ensuring Workers Play by the Rules

From the perspective of destination countries, an ongoing concern about seasonal programmes is that workers may not return to their countries of origin at the end of the season. Host-country governments usually follow this aspect of seasonal worker programmes very closely, in part because they are already uneasy about the low return rate of other categories of migrants such as rejected asylum seekers.³⁵ The Seasonal Workers Directive sets out the option for Member States to require employers to cov-

er their seasonal workers' travel expenses, which can help workers avoid incurring debt that can cause them to overstay their visas until they can pay it off.³⁶ Outside of Europe, New Zealand has sought to hold employers accountable (and potentially encourage them to select workers more likely to comply with visa rules) by requiring them to cover the cost of removing any of their workers who overstays.³⁷

European countries have employed various other strategies to prevent visa overstays as well, including in terms of how they work with origin countries. In the case of France, employers primarily recruit from third countries such as Morocco and Tunisia that, in addition to having historical, linguistic, and cultural connections with France, have demonstrated they are willing to take back their nationals if issued return orders.³⁸

Some employers and recruiting agencies also try and select migrants with particular profiles deemed more likely to return home. For instance, one of the two implementing agencies for the UK Seasonal Workers Pilot is working closely with local recruiters and universities in Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine to hire students who want to work in the United Kingdom for a few months but who have strong incentives to return home to complete their degrees.³⁹ And in 2005, Spain and Morocco adopted new selection criteria for seasonal workers in response to high rates of visa overstays, prioritising female workers with dependent children (who would stay in Morocco) because they were viewed as more likely to return at the end of their contract.⁴⁰ However, this type of profiling can come with tradeoffs. In the case of Spain, for example, concerns have been raised about the particular vulnerability of female seasonal workers to exploitation and the effects of separating parents from their dependent children for several months.⁴¹

Finally, several EU Member States have set up systems to track whether seasonal workers do in fact re-

turn. For example, France requires seasonal workers to register at the OFII's local office upon return, and Spain asks returning migrants to do so at its consulate in their country of origin. This is a condition for workers to be issued a visa again in the future.

4 Safeguarding the Rights of Seasonal Workers

Preventing the exploitation of workers is another common challenge for these programmes. Abuse of seasonal workers is regularly documented, including underpayment and substandard work and living conditions.⁴² While these abuses are not unique to seasonal workers, their temporary status and often limited ties to the host society mean they tend to be even more vulnerable to exploitation than other workers.

The protection of seasonal workers' rights was a priority in the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Seasonal Workers Directive. The directive calls for them to be treated as equal to nationals, though it restricts other rights (e.g., family reunification).⁴³ Importantly, the directive allows seasonal workers to switch employers during their stay. The rationale for this measure is that it would allow seasonal workers to escape poor working conditions without risking their ability to stay and work in the country. However, with limited host-country networks and such short stays, the extent to which seasonal workers make use of this provision is unclear. In addition, because EU Member States can choose which sectors to include in their seasonal worker programmes, some groups of seasonal workers may be excluded from these protections. Now that the directive has been fully transposed in all Member States, discussions on what steps national governments can take to further combat exploitation in their seasonal worker programmes are likely to gain momentum.

A review of existing practices in seasonal worker programmes suggests several promising strategies for reducing exploitation. One is to ensure that seasonal workers are informed of the terms of their employment, the working conditions they should expect, and their rights and options to seek legal remedies in instances of abuse (including their right to switch employers). Predeparture orientation on these and other topics, such as destination-country norms and basic language skills, are now fairly common in seasonal worker programmes, and some even make participation mandatory (see Box 3 for a discussion of how this support is provided).

In addition to predeparture orientation, governments can also explore ways to improve seasonal workers' access to services in destination countries. In Italy and Spain, for example, trade unions offer

services to foreign workers (regardless of their immigration status), including legal assistance.⁴⁴ In Italy, trade unions have supported migrant workers as they mobilise and even strike, which has led to some improvements in their salaries and working conditions.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, one of the implementing organisations for the Seasonal Workers Pilot runs an emergency hotline that workers can call any time if they face an issue.⁴⁶ And in Germany, trade unions deliver counselling and offer mediation services to migrant workers.⁴⁷ But the uptake and effectiveness of these mechanisms rely on outreach. Seasonal workers may not be aware that these services exist or may be unable to use them due to language barriers or limited means to contact or reach them (e.g., due to limited transport in remote areas). The ease of raising awareness about available services can also vary. For example,

BOX 3

Actors involved in predeparture support for seasonal workers

Predeparture support may be provided by destination- or origin-country governments directly. Bilateral agreements on labour migration may include some type of orientation in their terms; for example, Italy has signed several agreements that commit it to providing free Italian language tuition for workers in their origin countries. Some countries of origin, such as the Philippines and Thailand, require their nationals to attend predeparture orientation courses. For example, the Philippines requires all emigrants to attend a free seminar that includes modules on the destination country, health and safety, and their employment contracts, while Thailand requires nationals departing to work overseas to participate in predeparture training offered by the Thailand Overseas Employment Administration.

Alternatively, predeparture support may be offered by nongovernment actors, such as international organisations, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), or private-sector actors. For example, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has provided predeparture orientation on employment conditions to Ghanaian agricultural workers moving to Italy; specialised training to agricultural workers moving to Canada on topics such as dairy and poultry farming; and basic English language training and other orientation services to Haitian agricultural workers moving to the United States. By contrast, Swedish berry-picking companies such as Polarica work directly with Thai recruitment agencies to provide predeparture training on topics such as hygienic berry-picking practices.

Sources: Alin Chindea, *Headstart to Integration* (Geneva: IOM, 2015), 98, 126; IOM, 'IOM Brings Together US Employers and Haitian Agricultural Workers' (press release, 2 October 2015); Valio, 'Valio Supervises the Journey Taken by Berries from the Forests into Finished Products', updated 9 September 2013; Ana López-Sala et al., 'Seasonal Immigrant Workers and Programs in UK, France, Spain, and Italy' (working paper no. 1, TEMPER EU Project, 2016); Maruja M. B. Asis and Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, 'Strengthening Pre-Departure Orientation Programmes in Indonesia, Nepal, and the Philippines' (policy brief no. 5, IOM and MPI, Geneva and Washington, DC, September 2012); Charlotta Hedberg, Linn Axelsson, and Manolo Abella, *Thai Berry Pickers in Sweden – A Migration Corridor to a Low-Wage Sector* (Stockholm: Delmi, 2019).

outreach can be difficult in countries such as France, where small groups of seasonal agricultural workers are often spread across isolated farms, compared to Spain, where they are usually sent as part of a large group to the same farm.⁴⁸

Protecting the rights of seasonal workers remains a work in progress in the European Union, as elsewhere.

Alongside outreach to seasonal workers themselves, governments can take steps to inform employers about their responsibilities, monitor companies to make sure they comply with labour standards, and take action against those that do not. Carrying out workplace inspections is one strategy to enforce standards, although resources are often too limited to do this systematically across all relevant sectors and workplaces.⁴⁹ In the wake of reported abuses, some EU Member States have invested additional resources in inspections. Following reports of abuse of Moroccan seasonal workers in Spain, government agencies from both countries visited the Spanish province of Huelva to investigate work conditions and subsequently arranged a joint commission to visit strawberry farms employing Moroccan workers.⁵⁰ Another strategy to improve employer compliance is to introduce a licensing system for employers, as was done in the UK Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (which ran until 2013) and continues in the United Kingdom's current pilot programme.⁵¹ This approach requires actors in certain sectors who recruit or employ foreign labour to apply to the UK Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority (GLAA)⁵² for a license to participate in the pilot programme, to meet minimum standards, and to be monitored by the GLAA.⁵³

Despite these recent changes, protecting the rights of seasonal workers remains a work in progress in the European Union, as elsewhere. While prede-

parture orientations to inform workers about their rights are now quite common, outreach to workers to connect them with services, support organisations, and resources after arrival in a destination country is still rare. Effective enforcement of labour standards also hinges on employers perceiving that there is a realistic chance of being caught and sanctioned should they engage in unscrupulous practices. For governments, this means committing adequate resources to carry out workplace inspections and imposing sanctions on employers who do not comply with the rules. While the Seasonal Workers Directive calls for EU Member States to implement effective sanctions against noncompliant employers, this ultimately remains a question of priorities for Member States, and previous efforts by the European Commission to increase sanctions against companies that hire foreign workers illegally have yielded limited results.⁵⁴

5 Maximising the Benefits for Seasonal Workers and Sending Countries

Seasonal migration can be an important source of income for migrants, their families, and even their local communities, and over the years, policymakers and researchers alike have explored ways to tap the potential development benefits of this type of mobility.⁵⁵ A large body of research shows that circular migration more broadly can benefit migrants and countries of origin and destination by meeting labour needs while providing migrants with opportunities to earn higher wages,⁵⁶ develop new skills, and gain professional experience. Ensuring that all three groups of stakeholders benefit from migration—sometimes referred to as a ‘triple win’—requires careful policy design that integrates both labour market and development aims.⁵⁷ While many destination countries still frame their seasonal worker schemes primarily in terms of meeting labour

market needs,⁵⁸ some (such as Australia and New Zealand; see Box 4) have taken a more proactive approach to maximising the development impact of these programmes.⁵⁹

One strategy for bolstering the development benefits of seasonal worker programmes is to facilitate circular migration by allowing employers to hire workers for multiple seasons,⁶⁰ as is allowed under the Seasonal Workers Directive. This type of circular migration already exists in some European programmes, with Tunisian and Moroccan workers often returning to work on the same French farms for multiple seasons; similar dynamics also exist in Spain, the United Kingdom (under its previous programme), and in Sweden.⁶¹ This type of repeat migration mainly offers benefits in the form of sustained higher wages and remittances and expanded opportunities to accrue professional experience. A 2010 study of Bulgarian seasonal workers, for example, showed that circular migration contributed to poverty reduction and more investments in small businesses.⁶² Similarly, a 2018 evaluation of the Australian Seasonal Worker Programme documented its positive development effects for workers, their households, and their broader communities.⁶³ At the same time, programmes that permit repeat migration can also benefit employers, who do not need to identify and train new workers each season and who may gradually develop a more productive and specialised workforce.⁶⁴ However, some observers have raised concerns that recruiting the same workers for several seasons may fuel inequality between programme participants and other members of their communities who are not afforded the opportunity to participate.⁶⁵

Another policy option is to support migrants in sending remittances and, potentially, to encourage their investment in countries of origin. With their stay in destination countries limited to a short period of time, many seasonal workers are motivated to save their earnings and send remittances.⁶⁶ The

positive effects of remittances on development have been widely documented, including their impacts on education, health, poverty reduction, and sustainable economic growth.⁶⁷ Over the years, countries of destination and origin, international organisations, civil society, and the private sector have explored ways both to facilitate remittances (most notably, through efforts to reduce fees and make it easier for recipients to access remittances) and to encourage the investment of this money.⁶⁸ Examples of the latter include financial advice and outreach to encourage overseas nationals to use financial institutions and efforts to improve the offerings of such institutions (e.g., through new saving products or options for remittance-backed loans).⁶⁹

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A third option is to explore ways to offer migrant workers opportunities for skills development during seasonal programmes. Although skill-building opportunities tend to take the form of on-the-job learning rather than dedicated training in many such programmes, some seasonal workers have reported acquiring new skills during their time abroad.⁷⁰ For example, the 2018 evaluation of Australia's Seasonal Worker Programme found that 91 per cent of participating seasonal workers thought the skills they had acquired in Australia would increase their employment prospects back home (see Box 4).⁷¹ But while seasonal workers can benefit from on-the-job training, there are few incentives for employers to cover the costs of more resource-intensive language or vocational training due to the short-term and often low-skilled nature of seasonal employment,

coupled with tight profit margins, in sectors such as agriculture. To an extent, this calculus may shift if employers have the opportunity to rehire the same workers for successive years,⁷² as this would allow them to see more of the benefits of workers' improved skills.⁷³

Simply offering skill-building opportunities, however, does not guarantee a positive impact when seasonal workers return home. In the case of agriculture, for example, the applicability of skills gained abroad hinges on factors such as whether seasonal migrants continue to work in agriculture or horticulture upon their return; whether the same crops are cultivated in the destination and origin countries;⁷⁴ and whether they have access to the same technologies at home as those they learned to use abroad. Studies of seasonal worker programmes in Canada and New Zealand have found the transfer of skills was stymied by factors such as a lack of access to land (in the case of Mexican seasonal workers returning from Canada) and the different crops grown locally (in the case of Pacific Islander seasonal workers returning from New Zealand).⁷⁵ By comparison, language skills and soft skills developed abroad (e.g., time management or experience working in a team) may be more widely applicable upon return.⁷⁶ Farmers and seasonal workers in Australia, for instance, have reported the development of soft skills as one of the key benefits of their programme.⁷⁷

In some cases, destination-country governments have invested in skill-building measures for seasonal workers explicitly as a development initiative. For example, in 2006 the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) Colombia and the Farmers Union of Catalonia (Pagesos Union) launched a two-year project to boost the development benefits of seasonal work for Colombians in Spain. Using EU funds, the programme recruited workers from poor municipal-

ities near Bogotá and helped participants develop a business plan to implement in their communities when they returned home. While participants were able to successfully fund their business plans using earnings saved while working abroad, the onset of the economic crisis in 2008 meant that the project was not extended beyond this first two-year period.⁷⁸ Outside the European Union, Australia and New Zealand's seasonal worker programmes have also offered an array of vocational, language, and soft skills training opportunities for participants, primarily funded by the countries' development agencies (see Box 4).

The challenges set out above mean that opportunities for skills development, at least on a formal basis, are likely to remain limited in many of these programmes. While development-focused investments in seasonal worker programmes have been fairly unusual to date, European policymakers could draw inspiration from the approaches trialled in Australia and New Zealand. If development actors were to play a more active role, they could consider supporting local development projects in regions of origin so that investing resources gained abroad is more attractive to returning seasonal workers (e.g., better local governance, regulations of the private sector, and infrastructure). Development agencies could also support private actors and employment agencies in efforts to diversify the recruitment of seasonal workers to target people from regions that have not had the chance to benefit from such programmes. Finally, development agencies could support skills development opportunities for seasonal workers, albeit with an eye to what is realistic, given their short-term stay and employers' often tight profit margins and to what is most likely to benefit migrants once they return to their origin countries.

BOX 4**Skills development opportunities in Australia and New Zealand's seasonal worker programmes**

The programmes run by Australia and New Zealand recruit seasonal labour from the Pacific Islands, and unlike many such programmes, they have an explicit development mandate alongside the goal of meeting employers' seasonal labour needs. For example, New Zealand's Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme has run pilot projects to help migrant workers develop different types of skills. One project funded by New Zealand Agency for International Development offered training in topics including financial literacy, health, and remittances, as well as workers' rights and responsibilities. Another Department of Labour-funded project offered a 12-week horticulture course through which participants could earn New Zealand qualifications. Other trainings have been offered by charities or employers themselves; for example, some employers have provided training in literacy, numeracy, and even driving, while one course offered by a local charity also covered personal and community development and other life skills.

Australia's aid agency has also funded 'Add-On Skills Training' in topics such as literacy, numeracy, first aid, and IT skills. But an evaluation conducted in 2018 found that only 42 per cent of workers in the country's seasonal worker programme took part in the training, with others lacking time to participate, illustrating the challenges of coordinating skills development opportunities with the often rigorous demands of seasonal work.

Sources: Australian Government, Department of Jobs and Small Business, '[Seasonal Worker Programme](#)', updated 2 April 2019; Sankar Ramasamy, Vasantha Krishnan, Richard Bedford, and Charlotte Bedford, 'The Recognised Seasonal Employer Policy: Seeking the Elusive Triple Wins for Development through International Migration', *Pacific Economic Bulletin* 23, no. 3 (2008); Charlotte Bedford, '[Picking Winners? New Zealand's Recognised Seasonal Employer \(RSE\) Policy and Its Impacts on Employers, Pacific Workers, and Their Island-Based Communities](#)' (PhD dissertation, University of Adelaide, Department of Geography, Environment, and Population, Adelaide, March 2013); World Bank Group, *Maximizing the Development Impacts from Temporary Migration: Recommendations for Australia's Seasonal Worker Programme* (Washington DC: World Bank Group, 2018).

6 Conclusion

In much of Europe, employers continue to rely on a seasonal workforce that is comprised at least in part of foreign nationals, whether from other EU Member States or third countries. Though seasonal employment-based migration programmes have a long history in the region, important questions remain about how to most effectively design and operate such schemes, even as the European Union has taken steps to harmonise them. Employers continue to call for greater flexibility and predictability in recruiting seasonal workers, especially in times of economic uncertainty, while governments must weigh the benefits of a light-touch approach against their obligations to monitor employers to make sure they play by the rules and that seasonal workers' rights are protected. And while some destination-coun-

try governments are working to ensure that their programmes better meet labour market needs and curb informal employment, including by working more closely with origin countries on recruitment, investments in capacity building and other projects to support economic and social development in sending countries remain limited, restricting these programmes' benefits for workers and countries of origin.

Existing programmes in Europe and further afield offer policymakers a number of lessons on how some of these challenges might be addressed, including:

- ▶ **Moving towards more transparent and standardised recruitment procedures.** In countries such as France, recruitment channels for seasonal workers are often informal—something that has helped to build

solid relationships between employers and workers, but that also comes with risks as this informal approach makes it harder for governments to monitor and sanction unscrupulous hiring practices. A gradual shift towards more formalised procedures, which do not disrupt existing recruitment networks but build on these relationships, can help make the selection process more transparent and accountable. It may require companies, employment agencies, and host countries to invest further in the development of local networks and understanding of regional labour dynamics, including what may motivate workers to participate in a seasonal work programme and how to best work with origin-country partners. Laying this type of groundwork was, for example, the focus of the French Office of Immigration and Integration in Morocco when it began a pilot initiative in 2018 to recruit workers from new regions within the country.⁷⁹

► **Investing in monitoring and outreach to guarantee better worker protections.**

Seasonal workers are especially vulnerable to abuse, in part because of their short-term status and the nature of their work. The Seasonal Workers Directive has established some standards to promote better protections for these workers (e.g., the ability to switch employers), but it is too early in the implementation phase to assess the directive's effects in this regard. A broader and ongoing challenge is that most governments do not invest sufficient resources in monitoring mechanisms to detect instances where employers break the rules and exploit workers. Dedicating additional resources for inspections, coupled with greater sanctions for noncompliant employers, are thus sorely needed. Taking additional steps to support seasonal workers directly, such as investing

in predeparture orientation to ensure they are aware of their rights and the services available to them in the destination country, would also help improve the situation. Finally, host countries could map and design initiatives to address issues facing specific groups of workers, such as women and those employed in rural settings. This could involve dedicated monitoring, outreach, and support mechanisms for such workers.

► **Expanding opportunities for seasonal work as a way to support development in origin countries.** While seasonal worker programmes offer some opportunities for skills development, these tend to be focused on equipping migrants for the work at hand, with less thought given to how workers might use these skills upon their return. However, in countries such as Australia and New Zealand, national development agencies have invested in offering additional skills development opportunities for seasonal workers, with add-on training modules focused on helping migrants develop skills that can be put to use when they return home. In Europe, more could be done to develop such trainings and link circular migration with origin-country development, through bilateral or European development projects for example. Expanding professional development opportunities would require a careful examination of workers' skill levels at the beginning of a programme and tracking their growth—a complicated and time-intensive endeavour, but one that could be divided among host- and origin-country actors. Member States recruiting workers from similar origin-country regions for similar activities (e.g., horticulture) could also coordinate to develop common projects and encourage skills development of new recruits and, potentially, other workers who

may participate in seasonal programmes in the future. Beyond skills development, support for local development plans, particularly for rural areas, would help maximise the development impact of such programmes. Regions of origin already benefit from remittances, and development actors and government authorities may wish to complement these with investments in infrastructure and services.

As the Commission takes stock of the implementation of the Seasonal Workers Directive to date, this

is an important opportunity for policymakers to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their seasonal migration programmes and to tackle some of the common issues described in this brief. And with European countries pursuing deeper partnerships with third countries, this is also a good moment for policymakers to think more broadly about how to maximise the benefits of these programmes for all stakeholders—employers, migrant workers, and countries of origin and destination—and how to align seasonal worker programmes with their broader legal migration and development policy agendas.

As the Commission takes stock of the implementation of the Seasonal Workers Directive to date, this is an important opportunity for policymakers to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their seasonal migration programmes.

Endnotes

- 1 Expert Council of German Foundations (SVR) Research Unit and Migration Policy Institute (MPI) Europe, *Legal Migration for Work and Training: Mobility Options to Europe for Those Not in Need of Protection* (Berlin: SVR, 2019).
- 2 See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Le recrutement des travailleurs immigrés: France 2017* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017).
- 3 For instance, data from 2004–12 for France indicates that more than 90 per cent of seasonal workers in the country were employed in the agriculture sector. See Ana López-Sala et al., 'Seasonal Immigrant Workers and Programs in UK, France, Spain, and Italy' (working paper no. 1, TEMPER EU Project, 2016), 41–42. However, industry-level data on seasonal workers are not always available. For 2018, less than half of EU Member States provided a breakdown of the authorisations (residence permits) they issued for seasonal work by economic sector. See Eurostat, 'Authorisations Issued for the Purpose of Seasonal Work by Economic Sector, Sex and Citizenship [migr_ressw2]', updated 6 August 2019.
- 4 For example, farmers in the United Kingdom have long recruited seasonal workers from eastern Europe, but as unemployment levels in origin countries fall and uncertainty around post-Brexit EU-UK migration policies continues, some have reported challenges recruiting and even having crops spoil due to a lack of labour to harvest them. See, for example, Leila Abboud, 'UK Farmers Struggle to Hire Overseas Workers for Harvest', *Financial Times*, 25 August 2019; Gian Volpicelli, 'From Rotting Crops to Migrant Worker Shortages, Times Are Hard down on the Farm that Brexit Built', *Wired*, 3 April 2018.
- 5 In Germany, most seasonal workers come from eastern and southeastern Europe (mainly Poland and Romania) and, as EU citizens, benefit from intra-EU mobility rights. See Jan Schneider and Malte Götte's Germany case study in *Are agri-food workers only exploited in Southern Europe? Case studies on migrant labour in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden*, eds. Alessandra Corrado and Letizia Palumbo (Brussels: Open Society European Policy Institute, forthcoming).
- 6 At the EU level, data about seasonal workers are patchy; 2018 is the first year for which Eurostat has nearly complete data, and some discrepancies remain, likely linked to how Member States define and report seasonal workers. Author interview with European Commission official, 23 October 2019.
- 7 This is based on analysis of first permits issued to seasonal workers. In 2017, France and Spain issued 51 per cent and 85 per cent, respectively, of their first permits for seasonal work to Moroccan nationals; 99.9 per cent of Sweden's first permits issued for seasonal work went to Thai nationals; and 94 per cent of Poland's first permits issued for seasonal work went to Ukrainian nationals. See Eurostat, 'First Permits Issued for Remunerated Activities by Reason, Length of Validity and Citizenship [migr_resoccl]', updated 17 January 2020.
- 8 Author interview with Chief Executive, Concordia, 14 May 2019.
- 9 Author interview with Chief Executive, Concordia, 14 May 2019.
- 10 SVR Research Unit and MPI Europe, *Legal Migration for Work and Training*.
- 11 See, for example, Pascale Mueller and Stefania Prandi, 'Zahlreiche Erntehelferinnen werden in Spanien missbraucht – und die EU zahlte Millionen-Subventionen', *Buzzfeed News*, 27 July 2018; Lorenzo Tondo and Annie Kelly, 'Raped, Beaten, Exploited: The 21st-Century Slavery Propping up Sicilian Farming', *The Guardian*, 12 March 2017.
- 12 European Commission, 'Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Conditions of Entry and Residence of Third-Country Nationals for the Purposes of Seasonal Employment' (COM [2010] 379 final, 13 July 2010); Margarite Helena Zoetewij-Turhan, 'The Seasonal Workers Directive: "...but Some Are More Equal than Others"', *European Labour Law Journal* 8, no. 1 (2017): 28–44.
- 13 The impact assessment conducted by the European Commission in 2010, recapped in a recent fitness check of EU legal migration policies, showed that before the directive was introduced, Member States' legislation on seasonal workers had different definitions of seasonal work (e.g., if it was linked to particular sectors and a particular timeframe, or more broadly understood as temporary work); of the length of permits, admission procedures, and rights for seasonal worker permits; and different requirements for their accommodation. See ICF Consulting Services Limited, *Annex to 'Legal Migration Fitness Check Final Evaluation Report – Supporting Study'* (Brussels: European Union, 2018), 31.
- 14 Fragomen, 'Single Permit and EU Directive Implementation Update', updated 2 September 2019; Oscar Schneider, 'EU Withdraws Appeal against Belgium Concerning Seasonal Workers', *The Brussels Times*, 31 October 2019.
- 15 In the case of the United Kingdom, for example, a 2017 survey by the National Farmers Union estimated that 99 per cent of agency-sourced seasonal labour in horticulture were EU nationals. UK grower associations have claimed there are not enough local workers to carry out these roles, with implications for their ability to grow, harvest, or pack crops. See UK Parliament, 'Chapter 3: Adapting the UK Labour Market', accessed 11 November 2019; UK Office for National Statistics, 'Labour in the Agriculture Industry, UK: February 2018', accessed 11 November 2019.
- 16 Data from the Verband Süddeutscher Spargel- und Erdbeeranbauer e.V. (VSSE), cited in Welt, 'Erntehelfer aus Osteuropa schwerer zu finden', *Welt*, 26 May 2018.
- 17 Pauline Chateau, 'La France confrontée à une pénurie de saisonniers', *Le Figaro*, 12 August 2018.

- 18 Farmer associations have expressed concerns that the pilot programme would not meet seasonal labour needs, citing estimates that British summer fruit and vegetable growers hire about 60,000 seasonal workers, most of whom were recruited from eastern Europe. See Lisa O'Carroll, 'Brexit: Farmers Criticise Temporary Agricultural Worker Visa Scheme', *The Guardian*, 6 September 2018; UK Home Office and Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs, 'Seasonal Workers Pilot Request for Information', updated 11 April 2019.
- 19 Miriam Jordan, 'Visa Glitch Stalls Workers, Straining U.S. Farms', *The Wall Street Journal*, 15 June 2015.
- 20 OECD, *Le recrutement des travailleurs immigrés*.
- 21 The OECD reports, for instance, that the tourism company Club Med has an agreement with the local authorities in Rhône to facilitate the process every year. See OECD, *Le recrutement des travailleurs immigrés*.
- 22 Alessandra Corrado, *Migrant Crop Pickers in Italy and Spain* (Berlin: Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2017). For a discussion of the effects of well-regulated seasonal worker programmes in Australia and New Zealand on recruitment practices (and particularly the recruitment of unauthorised migrants), see Richard Curtain, Matthew Dornan, Stephen Howes, and Henry Sherrell, 'Pacific Seasonal Workers: Learning from the Contrasting Temporary Migration Outcomes in Australian and New Zealand Horticulture', *Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies* 5, no. 3 (2018): 462–480.
- 23 Roberta Perna, 'Legal Migration for Work and Training: Mobility Options to Europe for Those Not in Need of Protection. Italy Case Study' (working paper, FIERI, Turin, Italy, July 2019).
- 24 Anna Corrado, 'Is Italian Agriculture a "Pull Factor" for Irregular Migration – And If So, Why?' (policy brief, Open Society European Policy Institute and European Policy Institute, Brussels and Florence, December 2018); Roberta Perna, 'Legal Migration for Work and Training: Mobility Options to Europe for Those Not in Need of Protection. Italy Case Study' (working paper, FIERI, Turin, Italy, July 2019).
- 25 For information on the sectors that recruit unauthorised migrants, see OECD, *Le recrutement des travailleurs immigrés*. On working conditions for unauthorised migrants, see Bahar Makooi, 'Plus d'une centaine de travailleurs sans-papiers en grève pour réclamer leur régularisation', *InfoMigrants*, 2 October 2019.
- 26 Bernd Parusel, *Legal Migration for Work and Training: Mobility Options to Europe for Those Not in Need of Protection. Case Study Sweden* (Stockholm: DELMI, forthcoming).
- 27 Author interview with a representative of the French Office of Immigration and Integration (OFII), 25 April 2019; OECD, *Le recrutement des travailleurs immigrés*. The same is true for Germany, where researchers found that migrants from Poland often came from the same villages and worked in the same German farms, sometimes for several years in a row. See Schneider and Götte's Germany case study in *Are agri-food workers only exploited in Southern Europe?*
- 28 This circular and informal system is not, however, without tensions within communities of origin that experience increased competition for these positions and sometimes complain about favouritism. See Giulia Breda, 'Les migrations saisonnières au regard du discours sur le codéveloppement', *Faire Savoirs*, 13 December 2019.
- 29 Breda, 'Les migrations saisonnières au regard du discours sur le codéveloppement'.
- 30 Parusel, *Legal Migration for Work and Training. Case Study Sweden*.
- 31 Carmen González Enríquez and Miquel Reynés Ramon, *Spain and Morocco: Something More Than Agricultural Work?* (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2011); author interview with French government official, 10 May 2019.
- 32 Corrado, *Migrant Crop Pickers in Italy and Spain*.
- 33 Under the pilot projects launched by the European Commission, EU Member States have shown an inclination to work with Morocco and Tunisia, reflecting their established relationships with the countries' national employment agencies. See Kate Hooper, *Exploring New Legal Migration Pathways: Lessons from Pilot Projects* (Washington, DC: MPI, 2019).
- 34 OECD, *Le recrutement des travailleurs immigrés*.
- 35 Jonathan Slagter, 'An "Informal" Turn in the European Union's Migrant Returns Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa', *Migration Information Source*, 10 January 2019.
- 36 A review of New Zealand's Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme identified travel-related debts as an incentive for seasonal workers to overstay their permits. See John Gibson and David McKenzie, 'Development through Seasonal Worker Programs: The Case of New Zealand's RSE Program' (policy research working paper no. 6762, World Bank Group, Washington, DC, January 2014).
- 37 Gibson and McKenzie, 'Development through Seasonal Worker Programs'.
- 38 Recruitment in Morocco and Tunisia is based on bilateral agreements signed with Morocco and Tunisia in 1963.
- 39 Author interview with Chief Executive, Concordia, 14 May 2019.
- 40 While Morocco's National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Competencies (ANAPEC) was already selecting female workers for seasonal roles in Spain, many of those selected did not come from rural areas and/or lacked agricultural work experience, and so were unable to perform their duties. See González Enríquez and Reynés Ramon, *Spain and Morocco: Something More Than Agricultural Work?*
- 41 For example, see Letizia Palumbo and Alessandra Sciarba, *The Vulnerability to Exploitation of Women Migrant Workers in Agriculture in the EU: The Need for a Human Rights and Gender Based Approach* (Brussels: European Parliament, 2018).
- 42 Corrado, *Migrant Crop Pickers in Italy and Spain*.
- 43 Zoetewijj-Turhan, 'The Seasonal Workers Directive'.
- 44 Kate Hooper, *Spain's Labour Migration Policies in the Aftermath of Economic Crisis* (Brussels: MPI Europe, 2019); Corrado, 'Is Italian Agriculture a "Pull Factor"?'.
- 45 Corrado, 'Is Italian Agriculture a "Pull Factor"?'.

- 46 Author interview with Chief Executive, Concordia, 14 May 2019.
- 47 See Schneider and Götte's Germany case study in *Are agri-food workers only exploited in Southern Europe?*
- 48 Author interview with French government official, 10 May 2019.
- 49 For example, in 2007 Spain had only 1,600 inspectors to monitor labour market conditions and the informal economy throughout the country. Author interview with Complutense University of Madrid official, Madrid, 4 October 2018, cited in Hooper, *Spain's Labor Migration Policies in the Aftermath of Economic Crisis*, 12.
- 50 Ahlam Ben Saga, 'Morocco Establishes Commission to Protect Seasonal Workers in Spain', Morocco World News, 5 February 2019.
- 51 A similar mechanism exists in New Zealand, where employers have to qualify as 'recognised seasonal employers', which requires meeting a range of financial, wage, accommodation, and other criteria. See Gibson and McKenzie, 'Development through Seasonal Worker Programs'.
- 52 UK Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, 'Applying for a GLAA License', accessed 11 November 2019.
- 53 This system reportedly helped to improve conditions for seasonal workers, although it was partially encumbered by limited resources. See Palumbo and Sciarba, *The Vulnerability to Exploitation of Women Migrant Workers*.
- 54 Zoetewij-Turhan, 'The Seasonal Workers Directive'.
- 55 Even though Gibson and McKenzie note that 'there is strikingly little evidence on the impacts of participating in these programs for the migrants, their families, and their home countries', the New Zealand programme did include a research and evaluation component. See Gibson and McKenzie, 'Development through Seasonal Worker Programs'.
- 56 In Sweden, research has shown that Thai berry pickers earned about three times what they would earn in Thailand during the season. See Charlotta Hedberg, Linn Axelsson, and Manolo Abella, *Thai Berry Pickers in Sweden – A Migration Corridor to a Low-Wage Sector* (Stockholm: Delmi, 2019). In New Zealand, research indicates that over two year, households participating in the seasonal worker scheme earned 35 per cent more income on average. See Gibson and McKenzie, 'Development through Seasonal Worker Programs'. In Australia, a World Bank evaluation found that for workers participating in the Seasonal Worker Programme in the Pacific region, their incomes were on average 4.3 times higher than potential earning at home. See World Bank Group, *Maximizing the Development Impacts from Temporary Migration: Recommendations for Australia's Seasonal Worker Programme* (Washington DC: World Bank Group, 2018).
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- 59 Brickenstein, 'The Development Impact of Seasonal Worker Schemes'.
- 60 This is also the case for the New Zealand programme. See Gibson and McKenzie, 'Development through Seasonal Worker Programs'.
- 61 OECD, *Le recrutement des travailleurs immigrés*. Under the previous UK seasonal worker programme, 50 per cent of workers came back the following year. See also Migration Advisory Committee, *The Impact on the Horticulture and Food Processing Sectors of Closing the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme and the Sectors Based Scheme* (London: Migration Advisory Committee, 2013); González Enríquez and Reynés Ramon, *Spain and Morocco*; Hedberg, Axelsson, and Abella, *Thai Berry Pickers in Sweden*.
- 62 Eugenia Markova, 'Effects of Migration on Sending Countries: Lessons from Bulgaria' (GreeSE paper no. 35, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, May 2010).
- 63 World Bank Group, *Maximizing the Development Impacts from Temporary Migration*.
- 64 Brickenstein, 'The Development Impact of Seasonal Worker Schemes'.
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- 67 Dilp Ratha, *The Impact of Remittances on Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction* (Washington, DC: MPI, 2013). For a related discussion in the Moroccan context, see Jamal Bouoiyour and Amal Miftah, 'The Impact of Migrant Workers' Remittances on the Living Standards of Families in Morocco: A Propensity Score Matching Approach', *Migration Letters* 12, no. 1 (January 2015).
- 68 This includes efforts to improve channels for sending remittances, sharing information about remittance options (and facilitating competition among providers), streamlining regulatory requirements, and technological innovations.
- 69 For a more in-depth discussion, see Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias and Kathleen Newland, *Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners in Home and Host Communities* (Washington, DC: International Organisation for Migration and MPI, 2012).
- 70 For instance, an evaluation of the Australian Seasonal Worker Programme found that 42 per cent of the workers took part in the formal Add-on Skills Training, while most learned new skills on the job. See World Bank Group, *Maximizing the Development Impacts from Temporary Migration*.
- 71 World Bank Group, *Maximizing the Development Impacts from Temporary Migration*.

- 72 In turn, opportunities to build skills may offer a competitive advantage when recruiting workers. The UK Seasonal Workers Pilot, for example, is recruiting agricultural students in Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine, with one of the programme operators highlighting the experience students can gain in cultivating crops, using different technologies, and building their English language skills. Author interview with Chief Executive, Concordia, 14 May 2019.
- 73 For example, some seasonal workers who have repeatedly participated in programmes run by Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have developed specialist skills in horticulture or viticulture tasks and become valuable employees. However, there are limited pathways for these workers to stay on a longer-term basis. See Richard Bedford, Charlotte Bedford, Janet Wall, and Margaret Young, 'Managed Temporary Labour Migration of Pacific Islanders to Australia and New Zealand in the Early Twenty-First Century', *Australian Geographer* 24 (January 2017): 13–14.
- 74 For instance, seasonal workers in Australia may learn about crops such as almonds and apples that do not grow in the Pacific Islands where they are from. See Brickenstein, 'The Development Impact of Seasonal Worker Schemes'.
- 75 Charlotte Bedford, 'Picking Winners? New Zealand's Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) Policy and Its Impacts on Employers, Pacific Workers, and Their Island-Based Communities' (PhD dissertation, University of Adelaide, Department of Geography, Environment, and Population, Adelaide, March 2013), 213.
- 76 For example, participants in New Zealand's Recognised Seasonal Employer programme reported the benefits of developing English and other skills such as time management, financial management, and an improved work ethic. See Bedford, 'Picking Winners?'
- 77 Brickenstein, 'The Development Impact of Seasonal Worker Schemes'.
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