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BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS TO RESPOND TO THE NEXT DECADE'S MIGRATION CHALLENGES

COUNCIL STATEMENT

By Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Kate Hooper

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MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE

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The 17th Plenary Meeting of the Transatlantic Council on Migration

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Executive Summary

Policymakers in countries around the world are looking for new strategies to better manage migration and, increasingly, turning to each other to collaboratively address shared challenges. Many governments have started to move away from exclusively unilateral approaches to migration management and toward greater responsibility-sharing with neighboring governments. This shift has been gradual and has not been embraced by some of the largest immigration countries, which still manage migration unilaterally as an expression of sovereign prerogative. Most English-speaking countries fall into this latter category, as do most East Asian high-income countries, Russia, and a number of others outside the European Union (EU). Such unilateralism often leads to unintended—if completely predictable—consequences. For example, "closing a border"[1] often diverts rather than stems flows, and policies based on this aim can push migrants to further indebt themselves to smugglers or to undertake more dangerous routes to avoid detection. This dynamic was readily apparent during the 2015–16 Mediterranean migration and refugee crisis, when national enforcement efforts often resulted in more deadly conditions for migrants without stopping the flow of arrivals.

With cooperation on migration quickly rising up the foreign policy agenda … it is important to take stock of past partnerships and identify what works and what doesn't.

As a result, destination-country governments have begun to think harder, and more creatively, about how to engage origin and transit countries to further migration management goals while mitigating some of the negative aspects of unilateralism. The United States and Mexico, for example, have a history that stretches back more than a decade of cooperatively managing their shared border, and more recently, they have coordinated strategies to disrupt unauthorized migration from Central America. The European Union and various Member States have also explored the potential of partnerships with countries to the south and east to stem illegal immigration and increase the volume and effectiveness of returns. The pace and scale of arrivals during the recent crisis has prompted European policymakers to pursue a much more ambitious policy agenda focused on strengthening cooperation with a few key countries of origin or transit for recent arrivals (including Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, Niger, and Turkey) and, crucially, actively exploring ways to expand livelihood opportunities for prospective migrants closer to home. To this end, the European Union and several Member States have entered into wide-ranging deals with such priority countries since late 2015, notably the EU-Turkey Statement, the European Union's Migration Partnership Framework, and, most recently, an agreement between Italy and Libya. These deals all rely to varying degrees on mobilizing additional migration management, humanitarian, development, and security resources, and they all aim to stem the onward movement of migrants and, particularly in the case of the EU Migration Partnership Framework, to address the drivers of migration and facilitate returns.

With cooperation on migration quickly rising up the foreign policy agenda, and much more money being put on the table, it is important to take stock of past partnerships and identify what works and what doesn't. While some arrangements have produced clear results, dramatically reducing unauthorized arrivals along certain migration corridors, others have little to show for their efforts. This mixed record demands a closer look.

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1 This is more a figure of speech than an attainable policy outcome, although it defines the approach taken by Israel, for instance, and the rhetoric of the current U.S. presidential administration.

The migration partnerships emerging in Europe and elsewhere are both broader in scope and larger in scale than previous cooperative efforts. But while one partnership may span a range of issues and types of collaboration, three areas encapsulate many of their aims:

- *Bringing borders under control to reduce both spontaneous arrivals and deaths en route.* This type of collaboration typically takes the form of investments in origin and transit countries' border infrastructure and surveillance capacity and of coordinated security operations (such as those involving Spain and Morocco or the United States and Mexico). Such partnerships have typically produced mixed results, due in part to some partner countries' limited capacity and/or divergent policy priorities. In addition to acknowledging capacity constraints and setting realistic expectations for the partnership, donor countries must take steps to ensure that stepped-up border enforcement doesn't come at the expense of denying persons with legitimate claims access to humanitarian protection or, in the absence of a regional strategy, simply "squeeze the balloon" by diverting flows elsewhere.

- *Returning migrants without legal permission to stay to their country of origin.* Perhaps the longest-standing priority for destination countries, returning a partner country's nationals who fail to establish legal grounds to stay is also one of the most politically sensitive. Countries of origin have typically been the arbiters of whether to accept returned nationals and can delay decisions indefinitely if they see returns as politically and financially costly. Yet as destination countries move to improve their return rates, they have increasingly linked their economic relationship to compliance. The cooperation destination countries increasingly expect takes many forms: readmission agreements that establish return procedures (such as the Joint Way Forward signed by Afghanistan and the European Union); informal arrangements to facilitate returns (typically across shared borders, such as the U.S.-Mexico border); and voluntary return programs that support reintegration. But for origin countries, agreeing to readmit returned migrants can result in a loss of remittances and political backlash within diaspora communities. The resulting reluctance to accept returns has led some policymakers to call for a "less-for-less" approach; that is, destination countries should respond to failure to cooperate on readmissions by reducing development assistance. Yet this approach risks worsening conditions in already fragile countries while poisoning the well for future cooperation. Destination-country policymakers may find it more productive to instead pair cooperation on returns with thoughtful collaboration on partner-country priorities, such as facilitating the flow and maximizing the impact of remittances, investing in training and job creation to support the reintegration of returnees, and some aspect of visa liberalization.

- *Tackling the underlying drivers of migration to reduce unregulated flows in the long run.* There is a growing recognition that responding to migration challenges requires a diverse toolkit—one that includes not only enforcement measures, but also longer-term investments in the ability of origin and transit countries to address the instability and lack of opportunity that drive people to move. Donor countries, international organizations, and the private sector have committed significant resources to this end. New funding instruments and initiatives to support refugees, migrants, and their host communities include the World Bank's Global Concessional Financing Facility, the EU Trust Funds for Africa and the Syrian Crisis, and the Alliance for Prosperity in Central America. However, these interventions can only shift the calculus behind decisions to migrate if they are made on a massive and sustained scale, address systemic issues that can limit impact (e.g., weak governance and trade barriers), and incorporate input from partner-country actors to ensure they complement rather than duplicate existing initiatives.

As destination countries redouble their efforts to initiate or expand cooperation with key countries of origin and transit, there is a growing appreciation of the fact that they will have to think outside of

the (enforcement) box. In looking beyond short-term responses to build more robust partnerships, policymakers should consider the following guiding principles:

- *Ensure that both parties derive real benefits from the deal.* Migration partnerships have a reputation for prioritizing the interests of destination countries, and offering incentives (or promising penalties, such as cuts to development aid) to coax origin and transit countries into compliance. Too often, migration becomes a "bargaining chip" used to raise the price destination countries pay for compliance, despite uncertain outcomes. Without taking the time to forge strong working relationships—in which the priorities and needs of both partners are attended to and all parties are willing to make compromises—partnerships are likely to produce little in the way of results.

- *Think creatively about how to cooperate on politically sensitive issues.* Finding the "sweet spot" that aligns the policy goals of destination and origin or transit countries, particularly when it comes to politically sensitive issues such as returns, is a key challenge for many partnerships. Policymakers should consider more informal avenues for cooperation (e.g., strengthening ties between national authorities and their partner-country counterparts) and embedding cooperation on sensitive issues within a broader set of shared initiatives that also address the partner's key concerns (e.g., investing in vocational training and maximizing remittances).

- *Invest in policies that can change people's migration calculus.* Taking the step to address the underlying drivers of migration requires policymakers to draw on the expertise and (where appropriate) resources of development, foreign policy, humanitarian, security, and trade ministries. Destination countries are also starting to incorporate private-sector actors in these efforts.[2] To equip partners to deal with the factors driving migration, policymakers must be prepared to make investments that yield few short-term results even as they gradually reshape longer-term migration dynamics.

- *Develop robust early-warning systems and take steps to preempt crises.* To preempt the adverse effects of the next crisis when (rather than if) it happens, governments must employ a more forward-looking approach to tracking shifting conditions in countries of origin and transit. One step is to invest in both early-warning and crisis-response capacity, making it possible to quickly mobilize and scale up resources. Another important step is to invest in opportunities to peer over the horizon by collecting, analyzing, and sharing data (in real time) on emerging migration routes and events that can trigger large-scale displacement.

- *Be prepared to control illegal migration both at external borders and at home.* To reduce unwanted migration, destination countries must demonstrate that illegal migration will not be tolerated. This includes fully implementing border and interior controls, quickly adjudicating asylum claims, and removing migrants without legal grounds to stay. Making crystal clear that the rule of law applies to all can help reassure anxious destination-country publics that the government remains in control of who is admitted and on what terms, while also illustrating to partner countries that they are willing to follow through on politically difficult policies.

Developing effective partnerships between destination and origin or transit countries requires considerable time and resources. Those that are most successful are rooted in jointly set priorities and shared ownership of initiatives. Finally, destination countries and donors must be realistic about their

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2   Examples include the G20 Africa Partnership launched by the German Presidency to support private-sector investment in Africa and the European Fund for Sustainable Development, which will provide guarantees and blending mechanisms to private-sector actors investing in African countries and their neighbors as part of its remit to address the drivers of migration in these regions.

partners' capacity to deliver on migration management goals over the short to medium term and be prepared to make—and sustain—the massive investments needed to address the whole migration cycle, from its underlying drivers to carefully planned enforcement.

I.   Introduction

The events over the past few years have illustrated the limits of any one country's ability (and to a certain degree, even that of a group of countries) to manage unwanted migration on their own. They have also reinforced the emerging recognition that acting unilaterally on migration often has unintended, if completely predictable, consequences. For example, border enforcement by itself and without the cooperation of neighboring countries often diverts rather than deters arrivals, as migrants opt for new (and often more dangerous) routes. The U.S. experience managing its border with Mexico is a textbook example of this simple truth. And in Europe, the pace and scale of the 2015–16 Mediterranean crisis exacerbated this dynamic: closing one border quickly resulted in chaotic scenes elsewhere, and cracking down on smuggling operations led to ever more dangerous journeys in ever more unseaworthy vessels and to a spiraling death toll.

Border enforcement by itself and without the cooperation of neighboring countries often diverts rather than deters arrivals.

One outcome of recent crises has been a renewed focus on cooperation with countries of origin or transit as a vehicle for managing migration more effectively. European destination countries and the European Union have both sought cooperation on migration with new partner countries (such as Mali and Niger) and stepped up collaboration with long-term partners (such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey). These recent efforts are distinguished by their scope, both in terms of the partners involved and the range of issues addressed, and by the resources destination countries are investing in them.

But as destination countries in Europe and elsewhere deepen their engagement with key origin and transit countries, questions remain about the role that cooperation has played or could play in successful migration management. This Council Statement examines how countries along different migration corridors are cooperating on migration management—whether managing borders, returning people without legal grounds to remain, or taking steps to deter prospective migrants from leaving their origin country in the first place—and why the results of these efforts are mixed.[3] It also explores what steps policymakers must take to build deeper, more forward-looking partnerships that can respond effectively to current and future migration challenges.

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3   For a full discussion of these issues, see Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Kate Hooper, "Reconsidering the Partnership Approach in International Migration Cooperation," in *Global Migration Movements*, eds. Christoph Beier, Dirk Messner, and Hans-Joachim Preuß (Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer VS, forthcoming).

II.   Rethinking the Role of Partnerships across the Migration Cycle

Cooperation with countries of origin or transit has long been a key component of destination countries' migration management toolbox. The partnerships that have emerged recently, however, are distinguished by their scale and scope, involving new partners and placing far more resources on the table.

In Europe, destination countries have launched an array of ambitious new agreements and funding pledges in response to the 2015–16 crisis. Notable examples include the EU-Turkey Statement on curbing irregular maritime migration from Turkey to Greece, the EU Migration Partnership Framework with several African countries of origin and transit (Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal), and Italy's recent agreements with Chad, Libya, Niger, and Tunisia to cooperate on managing migration and tackling human trafficking. These agreements have been accompanied by funding increases to address the root causes of migration, drawing on migration management, humanitarian, development, and security resources. The EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (or Madad Fund), for example, launched in December 2014 with 1 billion euros in financing, and the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was set up in November 2015 with 2.5 billion euros in funds. At a Member State level, Germany announced its "Marshall Plan with Africa" in March 2017, which would increase development funding by 20 percent for countries willing to undertake reforms that promote good governance, human rights protections, and economic development.[4]

There has been a move away from the narrow labor recruitment and exchange programs of the 1950s and 1960s … toward more open-ended agreements.

A similar uptick in collaboration can also be seen in the Americas. The sharp increase in the number of Central American families and unaccompanied children crossing the U.S.-Mexico border in 2014 prompted the United States to seek out greater cooperation with not only Mexico, but also top countries of origin El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.[5] This included much deeper cooperation between the United States and Mexico on enforcement issues—including reinforcing Mexico's southern border to reduce crossings and transit through the country—as well as funding for the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle, an ambitious regional development program that takes aim at some of the factors driving children and youth to migrate.

In addition to the emergence of new efforts to manage migration, existing bilateral relationships have also changed significantly over the decades. There has been a move away from the narrow labor recruitment and exchange programs of the 1950s and 1960s (such as the guest worker programs offered by the six

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4   Government of Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), *Africa and Europe: A New Partnership for Development, Peace and a Better Future. Cornerstones of a Marshall Plan with Africa* (Berlin: BMZ, 2017), www.bmz.de/en/publications/type_of_publication/information_flyer/information_brochures/Materialie270_africa_marshallplan.pdf.

5   In fiscal year (FY) 2014, the number of unaccompanied children from these Central American countries to be apprehended at the U.S. southern border nearly doubled, from 38,000 in FY 2013 to 67,000 in FY 2014, while apprehensions of family units rose from 15,000 in FY 2013 to 68,000 in FY 2014. See Marc R. Rosenblum, *Unaccompanied Child Migration to the United States: The Tension between Protection and Prevention* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2015), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/unaccompanied-child-migration-united-states-tension-between-protection-and-prevention; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector," updated September 11, 2017, www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/usbp-sw-border-apprehensions.

original members of the European Community) toward more open-ended agreements. While these deals offer fewer concrete promises on labor mobility, they offer a wider range of pledges to jointly address issues such as visa liberalization, readmissions, and voluntary return.[6]

This evolution of bilateral relationships has been accompanied by a growing focus on migration at the multilateral level. In Europe, policymakers in the early 2000s began to recognize cooperation as a valuable tool for furthering their migration management goals. The European Union launched the Global Approach to Migration (GAM) in 2005, calling for EU cooperation with non-EU countries on legal and illegal migration and on migration and development. This was followed by the creation of "mobility partnerships"—flexible arrangements within which the European Union could work with non-EU countries on a range of migration issues.[7] The Migration Partnership Framework that the European Union introduced in 2016 builds on these efforts, expanding to cover a fuller menu of migration-management issues, including border security, returns, counter-smuggling operations, and the drivers of migration.[8] More important yet is the fact that migration has now become a key foreign policy issue—and not just in the European Union. In 2016, the United Nations General Assembly held its first Summit for Refugees and Migrants, and a year later, at the 2017 G20 Summit, managing migration and addressing its root causes were among the top priorities for discussion.

This heightened attention has produced some successes, notably the dramatic reduction in maritime crossings after the entry into force of the EU-Turkey Statement (in conjunction with the closure of the West Balkans route) and after the 2017 Italy-Libya agreements.[9] But the overall record for migration partnerships remains mixed: many new initiatives have done little to improve migration management in countries of origin or transit, even as the sense of urgency among destination countries has pushed funding upward.[10] As policymakers eye further cooperation on migration, it is important to take stock of the role that partnerships currently play and could take on in responding to migration challenges, including the goals and intended outcomes of these initiatives and how national and multilateral efforts fit together.

A.   *Managing Borders*

The goals of reducing high death tolls along migration routes, avoiding chaos at borders, and enabling asylum determination and integration systems to expand their capacity and reduce backlogs have underscored many destination-country efforts to cooperate more closely with origin and transit countries. Collaborative management of borders has, for example, been at the center of recent EU agreements,

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6   Sandra Lavenex and Marion Panizzon, "Bilateral Agreements: The Way Forward for International Migration Governance?" (discussion paper tabled at the sixth plenary meeting of the Transatlantic Council on Migration, Migration Policy Institute, Lisbon, June 2011).

7   Agnieszka Weinar, "EU Mobility Partnerships: A Model for International Cooperation on Migration?" in *Improving the Governance of International Migration,* eds. Bertelsmann Stiftung and Migration Policy Institute (Berlin and Washington, DC: Bertelsmann Stiftung and Migration Policy Institute, 2012).

8   Elizabeth Collett and Aliyyah Ahad, *EU Migration Partnerships: A Work in Progress* (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2017), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/eu-migration-partnerships-work-progress.

9   Arrivals in Greece fell from 57,066 in February 2016 to 3,650 in April 2016. They have remained at about 1,500 per month since then. The EU-Turkey Statement was announced on March 18, 2016. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "Mediterranean Situation: Greece," accessed May 16, 2017, http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179; European Council, "EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016" (press release, Brussels, March 18, 2016), www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/.

10   For example, shortly after the EU-Turkey deal was announced, Niger estimated it would now need 1 billion euros (or roughly one-seventh of its total GDP) to stem irregular migration through its territory. Niger's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2015 was USD 7.143 billion (or about 6.6 billion euros). See World Bank, "GDP (Current US$) – Niger," updated August 2, 2017, http://data.worldbank.org/country/niger; Reuters, "Niger Tells Europe It Needs 1 billion Euros to Fight Illegal Migration," Reuters, May 3, 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-idUSKCN0XU1P9.

including the EU-Turkey deal and the EU Migration Partnership Framework, and Italy's deals with Libya and Tunisia were conceived explicitly to deter irregular migration and reduce deaths in the Mediterranean Sea.[11]

These agreements often build on a longer history of cooperation. Italy has worked with Tunisia and Libya on migration management since the early 1990s and early 2000s, respectively, and such EU Member States as Germany have cooperated with Turkey on the migration of its nationals for decades. But successful cooperation on migration requires policymakers to strike a fine balance between often contradictory policy priorities and to prepare for unintended consequences. For example, Mediterranean search and rescue patrols undoubtedly save lives, but when patrols bring rescued migrants to European ports they help complete the migrants' journey, setting up a dangerous precedent by validating smugglers' strategy of deliberately putting migrants in harm's way.

Successful cooperation on migration requires policymakers to strike a fine balance between often contradictory policy priorities.

Cooperation on border management can take several forms and focus on different stages of the migration journey, including:

- predeparture capacity-building initiatives, such as prescreening programs, trainings and expert briefings, and investments in surveillance systems—both human and technological;

- interdiction through coordinated operations, with activities ranging from intelligence and data sharing to joint patrols (including antismuggling missions);

- cooperation at points of entry in the form of joint infrastructure and border investments between neighboring countries; and

- facilitation of the return of migrants who do not qualify for protection or are otherwise in a country illegally (see Section II.B.).

But while opportunities for cooperation abound, outcomes remain mixed. One recurring issue is the choice of partners. Origin and transit countries may lack the governance or institutional capacity to effectively enforce their borders. For example, Mali and Niger—both priority countries in the EU Migration Partnership Framework—are two of the poorest in the world, with limited government control over their territories (including their borders).[12] Both countries are members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) free movement scheme that allows citizens of all Member States to travel freely to other countries in the bloc, further complicating enforcement efforts at Member State borders. Another example is Libya, which is the largest departure point for migrants in North Africa seeking to reach Europe and thus a key partner for destination countries such as Italy. Italy and Libya first signed a formal agreement on managing migration in 2000, and under the Gaddafi regime, their cooperation (both formal and informal) encompassed returns, financial and technical support for border surveillance, police

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11   European Commission, "Commission Announces New Migration Partnership Framework: Reinforced Cooperation with Third Countries to Better Manage Migration" (press release, Strasbourg, June 7, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2072_en.htm.

12   In 2016, Mali ranked 175 and Niger ranked 187 (of 188 countries) on the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Index. See UNDP, *Human Development Report 2016* (New York: UNDP, 2016), 198–201, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf.

cooperation and joint patrols, and information sharing.[13] But the ongoing civil war and the dire security situation that has led to well-documented abuses of migrants has until very recently precluded any serious cooperation.[14] Moreover, government actors may not always be the most effective partners on the ground, particularly where there is weak rule of law or where the government has a poor human rights record, raising a host of legal and ethical issues.

> *Migration can become a "bargaining chip," with origin or transit countries seeking additional financial support in return for their continued commitment to cooperation.*

Implementing the terms of migration agreements may also simply not be a political priority for some partner countries. While destination countries typically view these partnerships as key vehicles for achieving border management goals, origin and transit countries may not assign them the same importance. This is especially the case where emigration serve as an important political and economic "safety valve," offering much needed opportunities to unemployed young people, and where remittances represent a key source of revenue for governments.[15] Partner countries may be offered incentives to enter into an agreement—such as promises of (additional) development aid, private investment, or favorable travel and trade arrangements—but these may not be adequate compensation for the potential loss of remittances or for resulting tensions in a government's relationship with its diaspora, an increasingly influential constituency. For example, in 2009, the prospect of losing French development assistance did not alter Mali's refusal to pursue a readmission agreement with France following a double backlash—at home and from its diaspora.[16] In fact, offering incentives ultimately risks creating a purely transactional arrangement between donors and recipient countries, in which the price to be paid for compliance grows and grows.[17] In this scenario, migration can become a "bargaining chip," with origin or transit countries seeking additional financial support in return for their continued commitment to cooperation and donor countries resorting to coercing their partners by making aid conditional on cooperation or by utilizing other diplomatic channels (e.g., restrictions on visa issuance).[18]

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13   Emanuela Paoletti, "Power Relations and International Migration: The Case of Italy and Libya," *Political Studies* 59, no. 2 (2011): 269–89.

14   In February 2017, Italy signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the UN-backed Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) on combatting irregular migration, trafficking and smuggling, and development. However, this was blocked by a Tripoli court on the grounds that the GNA lacked legal standing to make this deal. And while in March 2017 the European Council pledged support to Libya to help tackle irregular migration at its Malta meeting (including endorsing the Italy-GNA deal and pledging additional funding), an internal report by EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Libya documented the significant security and governance barriers to cooperation. See European External Action Service (EEAS), "EUBAM Libya Initial Mapping Report Executive Summary" (working document, European Council, Brussels, January 25, 2017), http://statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-eeas-libya-assessment-5616-17.pdf; Libya Herald, "Tripoli Court Blocks Serraj's Migrant Deal with Italy: Effect Unclear," Libya Herald, March 22, 2017, www.libyaherald.com/2017/03/22/tripoli-court-blocks-serrajs-migrant-deal-with-italy-effect-unclear/.

15   For example, remittance inflows (through formal channels) in 2016 made up notable shares of the annual GDP of Tunisia (4 percent), Nigeria (5 percent), Mali (6 percent), and Senegal (14 percent). See World Bank, "Migrant Remittance Inflows (US$ million)," updated April 27, 2017, www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data; World Bank, "GDP (Current US$)," updated August 2, 2017, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2016.

16   Florian Trauner and Stephanie Deimel, "The Impact of EU Migration Policies on African Countries: The Case of Mali," *International Migration* 51, no. 4 (2013): 20–32.

17   See Luca Lixi, *Beyond Transactional Deals: Building Lasting Migration Partnerships in the Mediterranean* (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2017), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/beyond-transactional-deals-building-lasting-migration-partnerships-mediterranean.

18   Examples of other diplomatic channels being used include declaring states as safe countries of origin or safe countries of transit, the denial of visas, and various other forms of diplomatic pressure.

More broadly, a focus on quelling flows at the border can backfire if it merely pushes the problem elsewhere. For example, the introduction in the mid-1990s of a U.S. program targeting resources to certain "hotspots" of illegal migration (and drugs) traffic along the U.S.-Mexico border led migrants to cross via other, more remote and much more dangerous routes, including through the Arizona desert.[19] And Spanish-Moroccan cooperation on bringing maritime departures from Morocco under control ultimately redirected flows to other North African countries, such as Tunisia and Libya, instead of reducing migration overall.[20] Similarly, efforts to crack down on smuggling networks have typically pushed up the price migrants pay for a journey, increased the involvement of criminal elements, led to greater abuse (and more deaths), and ultimately removed a key source of income for local economies along the route. All of these consequences can undermine the authority of and destabilize governments in already fragile states.

The most successful partnerships address border enforcement as one segment of broader cooperation on migration issues that is, in turn, embedded within a larger relationship encompassing economic, cultural, political, and security ties. For instance, cooperation between Spain and Morocco has flourished because of Spain's relative openness to allowing Moroccan immigration to continue and ensuring the proper treatment of Moroccan immigrants in Spain (almost regardless of legal status), and because of Morocco's growing need for technical and operational assistance in managing its own borders.[21] This cooperation is built on a deep existing relationship between the two countries, rooted in complex economic and cultural ties, and constantly reinforced by the sizeable Moroccan diaspora in Spain.[22]

Another example is the longstanding relationship between the United States and Mexico. Cooperation on managing migration has in recent years come to form part of a much larger relationship of economic interdependence that builds on labor-market and sociocultural ties (dating back more than a century) and on a shared commitment to democracy, free trade, and the rule of law.[23] This shift has been accompanied by substantial foreign assistance targeted to addressing the drivers of drug trafficking and, less directly, illegal immigration.[24] In 2014, this close working relationship enabled the two countries to coordinate their responses to the surge in Central American families and unaccompanied children transiting through Mexico to cross the U.S. border. Mexico's launch of its Southern Border program in July 2014 to tighten control over its borders with Guatemala and Belize and to monitor migration routes through Mexican territory was quickly paired with financial and technical support from the United States. This not only included support for efforts to combat migrant smuggling and enforce the southern Mexican border, but also increasing development assistance to address the drivers of migration in the region.[25]

While some components of these cooperative border-management relationships are specific to the countries involved and have developed over a long period of time, they are instructive nonetheless. One key lesson is to focus attention and resources on building a relationship with a partner country that is both

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19   Operations Hold the Line and Gatekeeper reinforced borders and increased surveillance capacity in San Diego, California and El Paso, Texas—two key points along migration routes—anticipating that this would lead to a long-term drop in crossings. See Doris Meissner, Donald M. Kerwin, Muzaffar Chishti, and Claire Bergeron, *Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2013), 24, www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-enforcement-united-states-rise-formidable-machinery.

20   Lixi, *Beyond Transactional Deals*.

21   Ibid.

22   As of 2015, there were 699,800 Moroccan migrants living in Spain, excluding individuals born in Spain to Moroccan parents. See United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), Population Division "Trends in International Migration Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin—Table 16. Total Migrant Stock at Mid-Year by Origin and by Major Area, Region, Country or Area of Destination, 2015" (dataset, December 2015), www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/data/UN_MigrantStockByOriginAndDestination_2015.xlsx.

23   This economic relationship is rooted in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), resulting in massive private-sector investments by entities on both sides of the border.

24   Demetrios G. Papademetriou, "Does the Way in Which the United States Engages with its Neighborhood Offer Potential Insights for Europe?" (discussion paper tabled at the 17th plenary meeting of the Transatlantic Council on Migration, Migration Policy Institute, Oslo, February 2017).

25   Rosenblum, *Unaccompanied Child Migration to the United States*; Peter J. Meyer, Rhoda Margesson, Clare Ribando Seelke, and Maureen Taft-Morales, *Unaccompanied Children from Central America: Foreign Policy Considerations* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43702.pdf.

deeply invested in cooperating on migration management and has the capacity to do so. Once a suitable partner is identified, policymakers can:

- **_Identify, agree on, and pursue shared priorities._** Partner countries' divergent goals and priorities on migration can impose significant limits on what is politically feasible to negotiate, formalize, or implement. Sustained cooperation on borders is only possible when all parties view this as a priority, even if for different reasons. For example, a country of origin or transit may wish to expand its capacity to secure its borders to manage the flow of foreign nationals into its territory, tackle smuggling or other criminal activities, or strengthen governance in border regions. By providing support in these areas, a destination country can improve the odds that cooperation will be sustained and that unauthorized migration will decrease overall.

- **_Invest in capacity-building._** Donor countries need to realistically gauge the ability of their partners to implement agreements and offer support where needed. Cooperation on border security ranges from providing resources for training and bolstering surveillance capacity to supporting the passage and implementation of legislation that criminalizes people smuggling and trafficking. In addition, longer-term steps to address broad governance issues—including tackling corruption and improving government services in areas with weak rule of law—are often crucial to the success of migration-management efforts and must be a priority.

Another key lesson is the importance of reorienting government priorities internally so policymakers can balance enforcement goals against other policy objectives, thus managing the ever-present tradeoffs of increasing enforcement:

- **_Balancing enforcement with protection._** While the immediate aim of border enforcement is to apprehend migrants who cross the border illegally, its more important function is gradually deterring other would-be unauthorized migrants from making the journey. Deterrence, however, is a blunt instrument when dealing with mixed flows. It requires developing the capacity to create borders that are "sealed" against economic (illegal) migration yet capable of allowing asylum seekers with strong claims to protection to access the territory and have their case adjudicated. For instance, since most refugees now rely on smugglers to facilitate their journey to a country where they can seek protection, working with transit countries to crack down on all illegal crossings raises important legal and ethical considerations.[26] And, of course, policymakers must balance the tension between the dual purposes of sea patrols: to guarantee the safety of migrants yet intercept them before they reach their destination.

- **_Understanding and preparing for the tradeoffs of increasing enforcement._** Stronger enforcement makes it harder for migrants to cross borders alone, pushing many towards riskier routes and more elaborate and expensive smuggling operations that are often controlled by criminal syndicates, rather than the small local actors that long controlled many border regions (e.g., the U.S.-Mexico border).[27] Unless much greater thought _and coordination_ are given to the broader context in which immigration controls operate and to managing the effects of investments across the region, stronger border enforcement may simply raise the ante for smugglers without achieving its deterrent purpose. This would lead to greater extortion, trafficking, and abuse, and could extend the reach of smuggling networks into destination-country labor markets as migrants struggle to pay back fees.

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26   See Meyer, Margesson, Ribando Seelke, and Taft-Morales, _Unaccompanied Children from Central America_; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), _Smuggling of Migrants: A Global Review and Annotated Bibliography of Recent Publications_ (Vienna: UNODC, 2011), www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Migrant-Smuggling/Smuggling_of_Migrants_A_Global_Review.pdf.
27   For instance, a 2016 study of migrants in Greece, Italy, Malta, and Turkey found that many had enlisted the services of smugglers only for the segments of the journey where they could not cross borders alone. See Heaven Crawley et al., _Destination Europe? Understanding the Dynamics and Drivers of Mediterranean Migration in 2015_ (Coventry, UK: MEDMIG, 2016), www.medmig.info/research-brief-destination-europe/.

B.   *Coordinating Returns*

In the wake of the European migration crisis, the United States' ongoing border challenges, and intermittent attempts by migrants and refugees to reach Australia by boat, the removal of individuals without legal permission to stay has become an enforcement priority for many countries. Returns, whether of unauthorized economic migrants or failed asylum seekers, are crucial to the credibility and effectiveness of any immigration system. They signal to would-be migrants that they will not be allowed to remain in the country without authorization or a legitimate claim to protection (a fundamental rule-of-law issue), and they allow governments to demonstrate to the public that they remain in control of who is admitted to their territory and on what terms.

For most countries, however, commitment to returns remains primarily rhetorical.[28] In the European Union, for example, the return rate is low: only about half of those issued deportation orders are returned.[29] Returns remain low in most Member States: Germany deported 26,654 people in 2016, Italy deported 4,505, Spain deported 9,280, and Sweden deported 2,490.[30] Carrying out returns hinges on the cooperation of origin countries, which are responsible for issuing travel documents to their nationals and for accepting these travel documents and admitting their national upon return. (Less commonly, one country may agree to take another's returned nationals.) This process can be both very slow and yield limited results.[31]

Destination-country policymakers have tried a number of strategies to strengthen cooperation with origin or transit countries on returns and readmissions. This includes efforts to improve rates of return by expediting the process, typically through measures such as readmission agreements, voluntary return programs, and investments in reintegration support. Both the European Union and many of its Member States have entered into agreements on returns with key origin or transit countries. In a notable example of policy leadership, Germany guided negotiations that culminated in the European Union and Afghanistan signing the Joint Way Forward agreement in October 2016, setting out the procedures for returning failed Afghan asylum seekers from Europe.[32] This agreement came as the European Union and EU Member States pledged USD 5.6 billion in support over the 2017–21 period, and it was accompanied by bilateral

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28   Australia is a notable exception, having introduced Operation Sovereign Borders in 2013 to intercept and push back all irregular maritime arrivals. However, as in many countries, returns from Australia's interior (including of asylum seekers whose claims are denied and of people who overstay their visas or have their status revoked) remain a policy challenge. See Jiyoung Song and Neil Cuthbert, *Removal of Failed Asylum Seekers in Austria: A Comparative Perspective* (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2017), www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/removal-failed-asylum-seekers-australia-comparative-perspective; Glen Swan, *Strengthening Australia's Assisted Voluntary Return Migration Program* (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2017), www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/strengthening-australia-s-assisted-voluntary-return-migration-program.

29   While EU data on returns remains imprecise, they give some indication of scale. In 2016, 493,785 non-EU nationals were issued orders to leave; in the same year, 247,165 non-EU nationals were returned following an order to leave. See Eurostat, "Third Country Nationals Ordered to Leave – Annual Data (Rounded) [migr_eiord]," updated June 15, 2017, http://ec.europa. eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/migr_eiord; Eurostat, "Third Country Nationals Returned Following an Order to Leave – Annual Data (Rounded) [migr_eirtn]," updated July 17, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/ migr_eirtn; Sergo Mananashvili, "EU's Return Policy: Mission Accomplished in 2016? Reading between the Lines of the Latest EUROSTAT Return Statistics" (policy brief, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna, May 22, 2017), www.icmpd.org/fileadmin/2017/Policy_Brief_22.05.2017_Mananashvili.pdf.

30   By comparison, Germany rejected 91,514 asylum applications in 2015 and 173,846 in 2016; although it can take considerable time to carry out returns, these figures give some indication of how many migrants may stay in the country without authorization. See Mananashvili, "EU's Return Policy"; Eurostat, "Third-Country Nationals Who Have Left the Territory by Type of Return and Citizenship [migr_eirt_vol]," updated June 13, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/migr_eirt_vol; German Contact Point for the European Migration Network, *Migration, Integration, Asylum: Political Developments in Germany 2016* (Nuremberg: German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/ home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/11a_germany_apr_part2_en.pdf.

31   Countries may refuse to issue travel documents to nationals without proof of identity, which in some cases may be impossible to secure.

32   For a broader discussion of returns to Afghanistan, see Nassim Majidi, *From Forced Migration to Forced Returns in Afghanistan: Policy and Program Implications* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2017), www.migrationpolicy.org/ research/forced-migration-forced-returns-afghanistan.

readmission agreements between Afghanistan and Finland, Germany, and Sweden.[33] EU Member States including Germany, Italy, and Spain have also negotiated or signed formal agreements with several North and West African countries to cooperate both on migration management (broadly defined) and returns.[34] At the same time, some destination countries have stepped up their efforts to stop people at the border because, relative to returns from the interior, border returns have lower legal, bureaucratic, and even ethical and practical costs as migrants turned back at the border have not yet established extensive ties in the country. These agreements and enforcement initiatives, however, do not resolve the issue of how to balance ensuring migrants in need of international protection have access to reasonable due process and appeals against the need for expediency in removing those without legal grounds to stay.

The topic of returns is politically sensitive for many origin countries, making it difficult not only to secure their buy-in but also to sustain their cooperation.

Readmission agreements are often accompanied by (though not explicitly linked to) favorable trade or visa liberalization arrangements, investments, or aid, all of which can be used to encourage a partner country to agree to the terms of the deal. But the topic of returns is politically sensitive for many origin countries, making it difficult not only to secure their buy-in but also to sustain their cooperation. The collapse of an agreement between the European Union and Mali on returns in late 2016 illustrates some of these sensitivities. In December 2016, the European Union (represented by the Netherlands) and Mali agreed a deal according to which Mali would accept returns from Europe in exchange for support for border management, security, and development assistance. But when the details of this deal were publicized and protests flared up both in Mali and in diaspora communities, Mali was quick to deny that such an agreement had been signed and subsequently blocked returns from France later that month.[35]

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33 Council of the European Union, "Brussels Conference on Afghanistan: Main Results" (press release, Brussels, October 5, 2016), www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/10/05/bca-main-results/; Jelena Bjelica, "EU and Afghanistan Get Deal on Migrants: Disagreements, Pressure, and Last Minute Politics," Afghanistan Analysts Network, October 6, 2016, www.afghanistan-analysts.org/eu-and-afghanistan-get-deal-on-migrants-disagreements-pressure-and-last-minute-politics/.

34 Examples include Italy's memorandum with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) and German officials' trips to North and West African countries. See Government of Italy and Libyan GNA, "Italy-Libya Agreement: The Memorandum Text," February 2, 2017, www.asgi.it/english/italy-libya-agreement-the-memorandum-text/; Government of Germany, "Maghreb States Willing to Readmit Citizens," updated February 29, 2016, www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2016/02_en/2016-02-29-de-maiziere-maghreb-rueckfuehrungen-abgelehnte-asylbewerber_en.html.

35 Government of the Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Koenders Concludes Migrant Return Agreement with Mali for EU" (news release, December 11, 2016), www.government.nl/ministries/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/news/2016/12/11/koenders-concludes-migrant-return-agreement-with-mali-for-eu; BBC News, "Mali Sends Back Migrants Deported by France," BBC News, December 30, 2016, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38467244; Government of the Republic of Mali, "Statement by the Government of the Republic of Mali" (press release, Bamako, Mali, December 29, 2016), www.statewatch.org/news/2017/jan/mali-statement.htm; Agence France-Presse, "Mali Denies Agreement on Failed EU Asylum Seekers," Modern Ghana, December 19, 2016, www.modernghana.com/news/744146/mali-denies-agreement-on-failed-eu-asylum-seekers.html; Council of the European Union, "Draft Standard Operating Procedures between the EU and the Republic of Mali for the Identification and Return of Persons without an Authorisation to Stay" (working document, Brussels, December 6, 2016), www.statewatch.org/news/2016/dec/eu-council-standard-operating-procedures-mali-return-15050-16.pdf.

And even when a formal agreement is signed, implementation can be slow. Partner countries may drag their feet when asked to identify their nationals, refusing to accept *laissez-passer* documents[36] or to issue the identity documents that would make returns possible.[37] For example, Norway has struggled to return failed asylum seekers to Ethiopia, even after a readmission agreement was signed in 2012. The reluctance of Ethiopian authorities to issue identity documents has meant that between 2013 and 2016, just 60 returns occurred—a far cry from Norway's ambitions of eventually returning more than 700 Ethiopian failed asylum seekers.[38] For some origin countries, the prospect of disrupting remittance flows and alienating their diaspora is simply too great a risk.

> *Austria, for example, has called for the European Union to employ a "less-for-less principle" by cutting development aid to countries that do not cooperate on returns.*

One destination-country response to meager progress on returns is to make broader sources of funding conditional on a country taking back their nationals. But there is little consensus on when this type of conditionality is likely to be effective and when—if ever—it would be appropriate.[39] While negative conditionality has gained considerable rhetorical traction among European policymakers frustrated with the slow pace with which failed asylum seekers are being returned, many development and foreign affairs ministers are deeply skeptical or outright oppose this approach. Nonetheless, its proponents continue to push the idea forward. Austria, for example, has called for the European Union to employ a "less-for-less principle" by cutting development aid to countries that do not cooperate on returns.[40] Some of these countries, such as Mali, already enjoy substantial EU security support and development aid (1.7 billion euros between 2014 and 2017[41]) and would thus have clear incentives to maintain good relations with donors.[42] This approach was considered in the run up to the announcement of the Joint Way Forward, with a leaked internal memo suggesting that the European Union was considering making some of its aid to Afghanistan conditional on implementation of the agreement and acceptance of returns. However, the

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36   A *laissez-passer* document is a travel document issued by a national government or international body (e.g., the United Nations). In this context, *laissez-passer* documents may be issued to people who do not have ID and cannot obtain a new travel documentation from their country of origin. *Laissez-passer* documents are usually issued for humanitarian reasons, but some countries (and the European Union) have also issued them to unauthorized migrants as a last resort when their country of origin won't issue them new documentation.

37   The difficulties of gaining the cooperation of countries of origin on removal were tragically illustrated in the December 2016 terrorist attack in Berlin, which was carried out by a Tunisian national whom both Italian and German authorities had reportedly been unable to deport to Tunisia.

38   Eurostat, "Third-Country Nationals Who Have Left the Territory by Type of Return and Citizenship [migr_eirt_vol]"; Maja Janmyr, "The Effectiveness of Norway's Readmission Agreements with Iraq and Ethiopia," *International Migration* 54, no. 4 (2016): 5–17.

39   Collett and Ahad, *EU Migration Partnerships*.

40   Kate Brady, "Austrian Foreign Minister Threatens Refugee Homelands with Severe Sanctions," Deutsche Welle, December 29, 2016, www.dw.com/en/austrian-foreign-ministers-threatens-refugee-homelands-with-severe-sanctions/a-36946752.

41   Mali's total GDP was 11.8 billion euros in 2015 (USD-to-Euro conversion rate of 1.08, as of December 2015, from investing. com). See World Bank, "GDP (Current US$) – Mali," updated August 2, 2017, http://data.worldbank.org/country/mali.

42   European Commission and EEAS, "Joint Commission-EEAS Non-Paper on Enhancing Cooperation on Migration, Mobility and Readmission with Mali" (briefing note, Brussels, February 24, 2016), www.statewatch.org/news/2016/dec/eu-com-eeas-readmission-mali-6473-16.pdf.

European Union later denied this, amid strong pushback from civil society.[43] Of primary concern is the fact that negative conditionality risks causing conditions in countries of origin to deteriorate, particularly for vulnerable populations, and exacerbating instability in already fragile countries—outcomes that would likely undermine future cooperation.[44]

The challenge thus lies in identifying the conditions that foster *sustained* cooperation on returns, going beyond signing agreements to ensure that returns are carried out. This includes:

- *Carrying out returns swiftly.* It is crucial that destination countries have efficient procedures in place that can swiftly process new arrivals and return those without strong grounds to stay. Returns should be credible, effective, and fast. Strengthening administrative capacity at the border to apprehend and assess the strength of protection claims filed by unauthorized migrants is practically—and politically—much easier and less expensive than later attempting to remove them from the interior. Such returns also generally pose fewer reintegration challenges, as the migrants will have been away from their country of origin for less time and their home networks are more likely to be intact. Nonetheless, this speed must not come at the expense of due process and access to appeals.

- *Exploring informal avenues for cooperation.* Returns are always a sensitive topic for partner countries, many of which may be reluctant to enter into formal readmission agreements for fear of political backlash. Successful returns often hinge on close bilateral relationships, sometimes built up over decades. With this in mind, destination countries should explore more informal routes for cooperating on returns, including taking time to build close working relationships with their origin- or transit-country counterparts. In turn, one way to foster greater trust (and shared interest) among partners is to couple cooperation on returns with other issues that are priorities for partner countries, such as support on security and enforcement issues or the introduction of legal migration pathways. Doing so can create a more supportive environment in which to pursue cooperation on returns and ease procedural bottlenecks.

- *Supporting the reintegration of returnees.* Helping returnees rebuild their lives—including, crucially, offering training and assistance in finding employment—lessens the burden on origin countries and may mitigate some of their reluctance to comply with returns. Yet reintegration programs often lack the funding to cover these longer-term services, instead focusing on immediate expenses (such as accommodation, food, and travel costs) through cash or in-kind assistance. Policymakers can also be reluctant to increase cash assistance for fear of funding cycles of repeat migration, despite recognition that a lack of opportunity at home is often what spurs people to leave in the first place.

C.   Preventing Future Mass Migration Flows

Policymakers in a number of countries are increasingly focusing on building understanding of the drivers of migration so as to prevent future mass flows. The July 2017 G20 Summit in Germany, for example, focused to a significant degree on how to stimulate meaningful economic opportunities in Africa as an antidote to mass migration. This follows several high-level summits on this topic in 2016, including the UN General Assembly's Summit for Refugees and Migrants.

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43   European Commission and EEAS, "Joint Commission-EEAS Non-Paper on Enhancing Cooperation on Migration, Mobility and Readmission with Afghanistan" (briefing note, Brussels, March 3, 2016), http://statewatch.org/news/2016/mar/eu-council-afghanistan-6738-16.pdf; David M. Herszenhorn and Jacopo Barigazzi, "EU Denies Plan to Deport Afghans Linked to Foreign Aid," *Politico*, October 5, 2016, www.politico.eu/article/eu-denies-plan-to-deport-afghans-linked-to-foreign-aid-immigration-asylum-afghanistan/.

44   Collett and Ahad, *EU Migration Partnerships*.

Donor countries and international organizations alike have pledged significant new funding to address the drivers of migration and development issues more broadly. Since 2016, this support has included additional commitments for UN agencies and other international organizations and the launch of new financial instruments, such as the World Bank's Global Concessional Financing Facility that has pledged USD 1 billion in financing for refugee and host communities in Jordan and Lebanon.[45] And in July 2017, the G20 launched its Compact with Africa, which aims to forge investment compacts between African and G20 countries, the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund to stimulate private investment and encourage investment in infrastructure.[46] The private sector is also contributing to these efforts. Examples include the responses to former U.S. President Obama's Call to Action for Private Sector Engagement on the Global Refugee Crisis that included pledges of more than USD 650 million from 51 companies as well as a pledge from the philanthropist George Soros to invest up to USD 500 million in companies or initiatives providing services for refugees, migrants, and their host communities.[47]

Destination countries are coming to terms with the realization that their policy behavior in the years and months before a crisis is critical to how deep and chaotic the crisis will be.

This flurry of activity reflects a growing recognition that responding to migration challenges requires thinking much harder about how to invest in strategies that, over time, reduce the conditions that fuel unwanted migration (see Box 1). Increasingly, destination countries are coming to terms with the realization that *their* policy behavior in the years and months before a crisis is critical to how deep and chaotic the crisis will be and how long it will last. These same policymakers understand they must try to address the ever-present drivers of migration that seem likely to lead to increased movement, primarily *within* Africa but also to Europe. This requires treating origin or transit countries as partners (rather than relatively passive recipients of assistance) that can help destination-country policymakers develop a more nuanced understanding of the complex drivers of migration and identify the investments needed to provide people with alternatives to dangerous journeys.

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45   World Bank, "New Support for Refugees and Host Communities in Jordan and Lebanon Brings Total Concessional Financing to US$1 Billion" (press release, Washington, DC, April 21, 2017), www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/04/21/new-support-for-refugees-and-host-communities-in-jordan-and-lebanon-brings-total-concessional-financing-to-us-1-billion.

46   The Compact with Africa is a central element of the broader G20 Africa Partnership. See G20 Compact with Africa, "About the Compact with Africa," accessed August 8, 2017, www.compactwithafrica.org/content/compactwithafrica/home/about.html; European Council, "European Fund for Sustainable Development: Council Confirms Final Deal with the EP" (press release, Brussels, June 28, 2017), www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/28-european-fund-sustainable-development/; BMZ, "G20 African Partnership" (fact sheet, Hamburg, March 2017), www.bmz.de/de/zentrales_downloadarchiv/g20/2017_03_Fact_Sheet_G20_Africa_Partnership.pdf.

47   The White House, "Fact Sheet: White House Announces Commitments to the Call to Action for Private Sector Engagement on the Global Refugee Crisis" (press release, Washington, DC, September 20, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/20/fact-sheet-white-house-announces-commitments-call-action-private-sector; George Soros, "Why I'm Investing $500 Million in Migrants," *Wall Street Journal,* September 20, 2016, www.wsj.com/articles/why-im-investing-500-million-in-migrants-1474344001.

Box 1.   Drivers of Migration in Africa

Across Africa, where many new investments and partnerships are concentrated, research on the drivers of migration points to numerous different factors. These include:

- *Rapid demographic growth.* The population of sub-Saharan Africa is predicted to expand rapidly over the next few decades, fueled by high fertility rates (an average of 4.9 births per woman in sub-Saharan Africa in 2015) and falling mortality rates. If these trends hold constant, the population of sub-Saharan Africa will double by 2050. This trend is particularly acute in some countries, such as Niger which has an average age of 14.8 and a total fertility rate of 7.6. Without substantial investments to expand education and employment opportunities to help African countries realize the demographic dividends of this growth, this "youth bulge" could fuel competition for limited jobs and services and create incentives for more people to seek opportunities in other countries.

- *High levels of unemployment, particularly among young people.* Young people have limited access to stable, well-paid jobs in safe conditions with opportunities to grow. In the formal sector, unemployment rates remain high in many countries—and underemployment even higher—fueled by skills mismatches, a small private sector, and rapid population growth that stokes competition. The majority of jobs remain in the informal sector, where positions are insecure and workers are vulnerable to poor working conditions, low pay, and (for those with qualifications) underemployment. With limited opportunities at home, those with the means to do so migrate (legally or illegally) to other countries.

- *Political instability.* Protracted conflicts, violence, and persecution have driven significant displacement within Africa. In 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated there were 5.1 million people in refugee-like situations in sub-Saharan Africa, many in protracted situations. Conflict in destination and first-asylum countries can also displace existing migrant and refugee populations, as was the case for 790,000 migrant workers who fled Libya following the outbreak of civil war in 2011. Most of these displaced populations settle in other African countries, but a small share seeks protection further afield, particularly in Europe.

- *Climate change.* Climate change is another important driver of migration in East Africa and the Sahel. Climate events, such as droughts and flooding, and environmental degradation, such as soil erosion, are linked to greater food insecurity and can trigger large-scale displacement. In 2016, climate- or weather-related events, such as flooding in Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan, were estimated to have internally displaced about 1 million people in sub-Saharan Africa. The worsening effects of climate change are expected to lead to greater displacement both within and across borders.

Sources: Aderanti Adepoju, *Migration within and from Africa: Shared Policy Challenges for Africa and Europe* (Stockholm: Delmi Research, 2016), http://delmi.se/upl/files/133123.pdf; Wolfgang Lutz, William P. Butz, and Samir KC, *Human Population and Human Capital in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Publishing, 2014); United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), Population Division, "World Population Prospects 2017," accessed September 28, 2017, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), *Global Report on Internal Displacement* (Geneva: IDMC, 2017), www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2017/; UNHCR, *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2017), www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/5943e8a34/global-trends-forced-displacement-2016.html.

Even as donors pledge more money to address the root causes of migration, questions remain about how, when, and where these investments will be most effective. The countries receiving investments are among some of the most fragile and impoverished in the world,[48] where the challenges of providing development assistance that can meaningfully improve outcomes are compounded by factors such as weak governance, corruption, and insecurity. Furthermore, research has overwhelming demonstrated that development is typically associated with more migration, at least at first, as higher incomes provide more people the means to move.[49] Any investments made in these countries will represent a risk and will take time to bear results.

While it will take both time and input from origin and transit countries to guide donor-country investment in building opportunities for would-be migrants at home, some progress is being made. Government efforts to engage the private sector and diaspora communities in creating opportunities are promising steps. Coordination will be key to ensure the overall success of these efforts. For example, initiatives that create jobs should be coupled with training and thoughtful interventions that address barriers to trade (such as poor transport infrastructure or tariffs) and that improve conditions for private-sector investment. And investments in education (particularly for girls) and health-care systems, essential tools for social and economic progress, hinge on building capacity to deliver public services more efficiently and cost-effectively.

Government efforts to engage the private sector and diaspora communities in creating opportunities are promising steps.

These investments are necessary to shift the migration calculus for young people—but they must be made on a scale that can really move the needle in the long run. While donor countries are beginning to invest more seriously in job creation, these investments remain small compared to the challenges they seek to address. For example, a 2016 UK-EU-World Bank initiative to build two industrial parks in Ethiopia aimed to create 100,000 jobs, with 30,000 earmarked for refugees; yet as of the end of 2016, Ethiopia hosted 791,600 refugees, meaning this initiative would provide jobs for less than 4 percent of this population.[50] Moreover, crises have tended to push donor countries towards short-term investments that can produce quick and visible results. What is needed now are investments for the long haul, coupled with measured expectations of what behavioral shifts will be seen immediately.

As destination countries and donors invest more political, financial, and physical capital in building partnerships with origin and transit countries to address the drivers of migration, several principles can help guide this cooperation:

- *Don't reinvent the wheel.* Many prospective partner countries already base an array of different bilateral, regional, or multilateral agreements on migration and are already receiving considerable development and humanitarian assistance from different sources. With this in mind, destination-country policymakers should work closely with other donors

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48 For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) ranks many of the countries that the European Union is pursuing cooperation on migration with as fragile states, such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria. Similarly, Guatemala and Honduras—countries that receive U.S. assistance to address root causes of migration through the Alliance for Prosperity plan and other channels—are also listed as fragile states. See OECD, *States of Fragility 2016: Understanding Violence* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2016), www.oecd.org/dac/states-of-fragility-2016-9789264267213-en.htm; Fund for Peace, "Fragile States Index 2017," accessed September 27, 2017, http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data/.

49 Michael Clemens, "Does Development Reduce Migration?" (working paper 359, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC, March 2014), www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/does-development-reduce-migration_final_0.pdf.

50 BBC News, "Refugee Crisis: Plan to Create 100,000 Jobs in Ethiopia," BBC News, September 21, 2016, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37433085; UNHCR, *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2017), www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/5943e8a34/global-trends-forced-displacement-2016.html.

and regional actors to ensure their investments and new initiatives add value and, where possible, build on existing efforts.

■ *Seek the guidance of on-the-ground partners in priority countries.* Building a broad coalition of partners (including local governments, civil society, and private-sector representatives) is key to understanding what is needed in these communities and to setting realistic expectations about the outcomes of investments. The perspectives and knowledge of such partners are critical to the success of any collaboration.

■ *Bring initiatives up to scale.* While donor countries have begun to invest more seriously in initiatives to address the underlying conditions that fuel migration, these remain small in scale compared what is needed to make a difference. And the effect of these endeavors is likely to remain limited without addressing the systemic issues (such as weak governance, limited government capacity, and barriers to trade) that constrain them.

■ *Constantly evaluate what works and what doesn't.* While donor countries have developed a dizzying array of frameworks and processes to pursue cooperation on migration, there is often limited evaluation of how initiatives and investments could complement each other and, more to the point, whether they are effective and worthwhile. The pressure to rapidly produce results can lead policymakers to stick with the status quo and overlook smart, longer-term investments—and even to skip key design considerations. Among these overlooked elements are the development of clear outcomes and evaluation mechanisms and crucial mapping exercises to prevent overlap with, or undermining of, the myriad other investments, frameworks, and processes launched in the last few years.

III.   Conclusions and Recommendations

The lingering consequences of the 2015–16 migration crisis in Europe, as well as ongoing migration-management challenges in the Americas and elsewhere, have prompted a growing recognition that destination countries need to rethink their approaches to how they work with origin and transit countries.

As the sense of crisis in Europe lessens—for now—policymakers are presented with an opportunity to reflect on what does and doesn't work when it comes to cooperation on migration. One thing is clear: destination counties can no longer afford to focus narrowly on just one piece of the puzzle, such as enforcing a border. Instead, they need to look ahead and think strategically about how to crisis-proof their migration systems by building closer working relationships with countries of origin and transit to better manage flows (and return people without legal grounds to stay) and by making the significant investments needed to shift the calculus behind individuals' decisions to move on from countries of origin (or first asylum). For cooperation to ultimately succeed, donors need to think creatively and be prepared to do more—and to do it well.

As policymakers pursue cooperation in response to these migration challenges, they should consider the following recommendations:

■ *Ensure that both parties derive real benefits from the deal.* Migration partnerships have a well-earned reputation for being deeply asymmetrical and transactional, with destination countries setting the agenda and the interests of their origin- or transit-country partners becoming a secondary consideration. In this scenario, partner countries are offered incentives to comply or, failing this, coerced through threats of negative conditionality

or other penalties. But this approach can backfire: the terms of these agreements may be implemented poorly (or not at all), and migration risks becoming a bargaining chip to raise the price destination countries will pay for compliance despite uncertain outcomes. Without taking time to build trust and forge a relationship that incorporates the priorities and needs of both parties, partnerships will continue to produce little in the way of results.

- *Think creatively about how to cooperate on politically sensitive issues.* Misalignment of destination-country and origin- or transit-country policy goals and priorities remains one of the key sticking points in many partnerships. Destination-country priorities, such as returns, can be political poison for their partners, whose economies and political stability may rely on remittances from their diaspora. Mali's hasty retreat from its 2016 return agreement illustrates how acutely this peril is felt. With this in mind, policymakers should think more creatively about how to embed returns within a broader program of cooperation that addresses key concerns of partner countries (such as investments in vocational training and jobs, work visas, or ways to maximize the benefits of remittances) while also building ties and trust between relevant agencies, even on an informal basis.

- *Be prepared to crack down on illegal migration at home.* Destination countries must be prepared to demonstrate that irregular migration will not be tolerated. This requires fully implementing border and interior controls, quickly adjudicating asylum claims, and removing those without valid claims for legal protection. Undertaking these steps not only sends a message to would-be migrants and reassures anxious national publics, they also convey to partner countries that destination-country policymakers are willing to enact politically difficult decisions too.

- *Invest in policies that can change people's migration calculus—and be patient about results.* Policymakers cannot manage migration by simply focusing on deterrence (whether enforcing borders or carrying out returns) without also committing to addressing the underlying drivers of migration, whether instability and conflicts or a dearth of livelihood opportunities. If migration-management agreements are to succeed, they must draw on an array of other policy portfolios, such as development, foreign policy, humanitarian aid, security, and trade. Policymakers must not only develop common objectives on migration, but also think carefully about how to deploy the considerable expertise of different agencies and how to best pool resources (and avoid duplication or counterproductive efforts). Policymakers must also be prepared to make sustained investments on a scale that can make a difference over the medium to long term, while taking a longer view on how to measure success. If this is done, sustained investments can enable donor countries to both equip their partners to deal with multifaceted migration challenges and to address the more systemic issues (such as weak governance or limited institutional capacity) that can limit the overall impact of investments.

- *Take steps to preempt rather than live with the consequences of crises.* Policymakers must employ a much more forward-looking approach to their investments if they are to be better prepared for the next crisis. In part, this is a question of evaluating their own crisis-response systems and building the capacity to mobilize resources and scale up support much more quickly. Almost regardless of what they do, destination countries in Europe and elsewhere will likely have to contend with increasing migration pressures. To avoid or lessen the severity of further crises—and, crucially, to convey to their publics that someone is truly "minding the store" and that illegal immigration will not be tolerated—policymakers must invest in external border and interior controls, and find the courage to remove those without authorization to remain. Preventing the next crisis also requires governments to invest in opportunities to peer over the horizon: not only monitoring current migration routes and patterns, but systematically collecting, analyzing, and sharing data on simmering instability and conflicts, economic downturns, and climate events. The insights such analysis

can provide will prove instrumental in mobilizing the resources to respond rapidly to these situations before they produce massive migrant and refugee flows.

▪ *Prepare for a renewed surge in arrivals.* The fall in irregular arrivals since early 2016 should not be understood as having "solved" the migration crisis. The EU-Turkey deal and accompanying border closures in the West Balkans led to a significant drop in maritime arrivals from Turkey to Greece, but they have not addressed the more systemic issues driving people to migrate. And the Italy-Libya agreement and cooperation are even more tenuous despite promising early results in reducing maritime arrivals on this route.[51] When the political calculus for maintaining these deals eventually shifts, a renewed surge in flows seems likely. Meanwhile there is increased activity on the Western Mediterranean route.[52] Because only a small share of migrants along the Western and Central Mediterranean routes are likely to qualify for protection, Europe will need to step up its diplomacy to facilitate returns and its testing of new investment strategies[53] or contend with a rapidly growing unauthorized population.

Moving from transactional agreements to true partnerships will require shared ownership, mutual benefits, and plenty of trust and patience. The most successful partnerships are those embedded within broader cooperation and built upon deep social and economic ties that have developed gradually over many years. Destination-country policymakers must invest sufficient time and resources into building relationships with their neighbors and be much more realistic about their partners' capacity to deliver over the short to medium term. Cooperation with key origin and transit countries is not a panacea for migration challenges, and particularly not if donors are unwilling to produce and sustain the massive investments—and political patience—needed to tackle fully the underlying drivers of migration.

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51 European Commission, "Fifth Progress Report on the Partnership Framework with Third Countries under the European Agenda on Migration" (COM [2017] 471 final, September 6, 2017), https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/20170906_fifth_progress_report_on_the_partnership_framework_with_third_countries_under_the_eam_en_0.pdf.

52 As of August 31, 2017, there had been 10,866 sea arrivals thus far in 2017, compared to 8,162 in the whole of 2016. See UNHCR, "Mediterranean Situation: Spain," accessed September 27, 2017, http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5226.

53 Such strategies may include investing more deeply in strategically located countries that are in the later stages of demographic transition. These states have a lower fertility rate (closer to Europe's), fairly stable governance structures, a commitment to the rule of law, and growing middle classes that are keenly interested in the stability that can help them maintain and advance their economic interests. With the right economic incentives and concessions, these countries will find greater economic and social engagement with Europe deeply advantageous. Such engagement is also likely to make them attractive alternative destinations for immigrants who might otherwise head for Europe. The Mexico-U.S. relationship is a perfect example of the sort of relationship envisioned here, and Morocco and Tunisia may be good candidates for European policymakers interested in this strategy.

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
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