BUILDING A BRITISH MODEL OF INTEGRATION IN AN ERA OF IMMIGRATION:
POLICY LESSONS FOR GOVERNMENT

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May 2012

TransAtlantic
Council on
Migration

A Project of the Migration Policy Institute

10th ANNIVERSARY
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MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE

Acknowledgments

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Executive Summary

The United Kingdom has not developed a formal integration program, despite experiencing large-scale immigrant flows and settlement over the past half century. The political debates around integration that have accompanied these flows have often been fraught and destabilizing, reflecting a deep-seated ambivalence about immigrants and immigration in British society.

Integration is a dazzling[1] and treacherous[2] concept that policymakers must define with care. It means different things to different people, with overlapping definitions dating from at least the 1930s.

The British model of integration has never been clearly defined.

This report's definition of integration draws on previous work undertaken by the present authors (with Rob Ford and Maria Sobolewska) for the Migration Advisory Committee[3] and characterizes integration by the empirical survey measures used by academics and policymakers in their assessments of identity, integration, and cohesion. Examined this way, there are three main categories of integration:

1. *National identity.* Integration is often seen as important to the identity of the country. In part, integration policies and measures may be deployed to respond to the "crisis of confidence" that has arisen in several Western democratic societies in the past decade and the perceived dilution of distinctive national identities. This crisis has been both fueled by and reflected in the rise of far-right, anti-immigrant political movements that are principally concerned with perceived cultural threats to Western societies.[4]

2. *Immigrant outcomes.* Integration additionally refers to the outcomes of immigrants themselves — whether they have jobs, what level of education they attain, and so on. This comes closest to the US understanding of immigrant integration. Typically the measure reflects how well immigrants are doing compared to the societal average across a range of indicators, accompanied by an assurance that gaps in performance are not, over time, attributable to immigrant background.

3. *Successful communities.* Local or neighborhood integration (sometimes dubbed community cohesion or social cohesion) is best understood as successful, harmonious communities, defined as those that are safe and where residents coexist harmoniously and demonstrate respect for one another.

The British model of integration has never been clearly defined and wraps up these three categories of definition. Rhetoric has waxed and waned depending on the decade and has been more or less exclusionary. Policies aimed at improving immigrant outcomes have tended to be anchored in empirical pragmatism and have been influenced by the civil-rights movement in the United States. However, the most

1 Michael Bommes and Holger Kolb, *Economic Integration, Work, Entrepreneurship,* State of the Art Report Cluster B4 (Osnabrück, Germany: Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies, 2004), 5, www.eukn.org/dsresource?objectid=147405.
2 Michael Banton, "National Integration in France and Britain," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27, No. 1 (2001): 151–52.
3 Shamit Saggar, Will Somerville, Robert Ford, and Maria Sobolewska, *The Impacts of Migration on Social Cohesion and Integration* (London: Migration Advisory Committee, 2012).
4 See Cas Mudde, *The Relationship between Immigration and Nativism in Europe and North America* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, forthcoming).

effective routes to long-term integration — opening up the labor market to immigrants and enacting major mainstream public service programs — have not been adequately emphasized in the integration policy framework. The emphasis instead has been on a system based on group rights that is designed to protect ethnic minorities rather than immigrants from poor treatment in public services and private markets. While these two groups overlap, the amount of overlap has been shrinking.

Few public policies have specifically sought to advance immigrant integration, and those that have existed have lacked sustained funding. Small, stand-alone programs have been launched, but few have survived, and fewer still have delivered outcomes that can be attributed to such programming. Instead, integration has depended on the design and implementation of broad social policies that affect schooling, neighborhoods, housing, employment, health care, and so on. Britain has consequently relied a great deal on pinpointing, adapting and targeting mainstream policies to reach the needs of immigrants and minorities. While not a failure, this has not been done systematically, and there has been little coordination among programs.

At a local level, policies have contributed to successful communities, especially through area-based funding programs. However, again we have seen specific policies to help incorporate newcomers lack sustained funding or prove inadequate to the scale of arrivals. Moreover, the public narrative assigns long-term negative impacts of immigration on communities when the academic evidence suggests it is negligible or even positive.

Few public policies have specifically sought

to advance immigrant integration.

Immigration to the United Kingdom is likely to continue at relatively high rates. A substantial new generation will emerge from current and future influxes. Already, more than half of London's school-age pupils are the children of immigrants. The case for a well-thought-out approach to lowering the barriers to integration is clear. Equally clear is the need to nest that approach in the history and context of British practice.

To this end, the following actions should be taken:

- Adjust the practices, resources, and incentives of agencies responsible for new arrivals.

- Intelligently adapt mainstream social policies and programs. This must acknowledge that successful integration is about ensuring all groups are moving toward parity and that the development of successful local communities relies on addressing deprivation, diversity management, and sensitive delivery of public services (especially housing).

- Assess and mitigate policies that impact negatively on integration outcomes. Relevant policies should be assessed for their proportional value in meeting other policy objectives, and adjusted accordingly.

- Show leadership by deploying a national narrative that emphasizes civic contribution, inclusiveness, participation by all, and access to the body politic.

I. Introduction

The United Kingdom has not developed a fully coherent immigration integration program, despite experiencing large-scale immigrant flows and settlement over the past half century.[5] The political debates around immigrant integration that have accompanied these flows have often been fraught and destabilizing, reflecting a deep-seated ambivalence about immigrants and immigration in British society.

This report analyzes developments in integration policy over the past 15 years in the United Kingdom, dating from the election of the Labour government in May 1997 until the present day. The analysis focuses on whether or not policy has influenced (or has been perceived to influence) national identity, immigrant integration outcomes and neighborhood cohesion in communities. Part I explores integration policy in the context of the overall immigration picture and public opinion. Part II focuses on key trends in national identity, differences in outcomes between immigrant groups and the national average, and neighborhood cohesion — the three definitional categories we draw out of the literature and extant empirical measures. Part III reviews integration policy developments, tracking immigrant integration measures the government has introduced over the 15 years and the policy drivers behind them — the aggregate of which could be considered a British model of integration. Part IV analyzes whether integration policy affects integration outcomes or perceptions of integration. Finally, the report draws conclusions about the future direction of policy.

II. The Context of Integration

A. *Snapshot of Immigration in the United Kingdom*

Immigration to the United Kingdom has changed over the past 15 years: migration has grown in volume and has become more temporary in nature, and its composition has become more diverse.

From 1999 to 2009, net migration to the United Kingdom added 2 million people to the total population.[6] This significant net inflow explains the 70 percent increase in the foreign-born population over recent years, from 3.8 million in 1993 to 6.5 million in 2010, amounting to 12 percent of the United Kingdom's population.[7] Furthermore, emigration has risen steeply, dropping only with the advent of economic recession.

Migration has become more temporary in nature. Net annual long-term migration (defined as those coming to stay in the United Kingdom for more than one year, minus those leaving for more than one year) reached 252,000 in 2010. The gross inflow (i.e., ignoring emigration) stands at approximately 600,000. The short-term inflow (migrants coming for more than three months but less than one year) adds another approximately 300,000.

This picture of human movement is vastly different from that seen even a decade ago. This contrasts significantly with earlier waves of immigration to the United Kingdom mainly from the Caribbean, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, which in part gave rise to the race-relations model of addressing

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5   Note there have been integration programs dating back at least a century — for example, there were resettlement programs for Belgian refugees in the 1910s and Polish refugees in the 1940s that catered to hundreds of thousands of people. See Jill Rutter and Matt Cavanagh, *Back to Basics: Making Integration Work in the UK* (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, forthcoming, 2012).

6   Figures calculated from John Salt, *International Migration and the United Kingdom* (report of the United Kingdom SOPEMI Correspondent to the OECD, 2010, Table 1.1), www.geog.ucl.ac.uk/research/mobility-identity-and-security/migration-research-unit/pdfs/Sop10_final_2112.pdf.

7   Cinzia Rienzo and Carlos Vargas-Silva, *Migrants in the UK: An Overview* (Oxford: Migration Observatory, 2011), http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/Migrants%20in%20the%20UK-Overview2_0.pdf.

integration and inter-group relationships that has been in place since the 1960s. Moreover, a major proportion of immigrants are coming for short periods of time: 72 percent of migrants come for less than five years.[8] A majority of long-term migrants now state that they intend to stay for one to two years only.

Poland and India are now the main origin countries of long-term migrants, and London and the South East of England are the main destinations of choice, as they have been since the 19th century. Fully half of all immigrants live in these areas. However, across all UK regions there have been significant percentage increases in the size of the foreign-born populations. This is in part due to the scale of immigration in recent times, and in part because Eastern European immigrants have a higher propensity to locate outside of Greater London and have accounted for a substantial proportion of flows since 2004.

Immigrants have lower employment rates than UK-born people overall, though, critically, the rates vary widely according to gender and nationality. Men have similar employment rates, while immigrant women have much lower employment rates.[9] In 2010 the employment rates of male workers from the A8 countries[10] (90 percent), other European Union (EU) countries (76 percent), India (81 percent), and Australia (86 percent) were higher than that of UK-born men (75 percent); migrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh, however, experienced significantly lower employment rates than the UK-born. In other words, there has been considerable variation of experiences across different migrant groups, a factor that has been poorly transmitted into policy formulation.

The unauthorized resident population has been estimated at 618,000,[11] or around 10 percent of the foreign-born population. This proportion has been judged higher than those in comparable EU countries such as Germany and France.[12]

B.   *Public Opinion on Integration*

The critical context to public opinion on integration is British hostility to immigration. Around three-quarters of the population are hostile to immigration (both legal and illegal), higher than across Europe and North America,[13] making the British public an outlier. Moreover, immigration has been a prominent political issue for a decade after a period when it had not been a feature of political or media debate at all. Its salience rose significantly in the early 2000s, and immigration has consistently ranked among the top issues facing Britain in public opinion surveys ever since — a condition not seen for over a generation.[14]

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8   Carlos Vargas-Silva, *Long-term International Migration Flows to and from the UK* (Oxford: Migration Observatory, 2011).
9   Cinzia Rienzo, *Outcomes and Characteristics of Migrants in the UK Labour Market* (Oxford: Migration Observatory, 2011), http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/Briefing%20-%20Characteristics%20and%20Outcomes%20 of%20Migrants%20in%20the%20UK%20Labor%20Market%20v2.pdf.
10   This refers to eight out of the ten countries that joined the European Union in 2004: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
11   Ian Gordon, Kathleen Scanlon, Tony Travers, and Christine Whitehead, "Economic Impact on London and the UK of an Earned Regularisation of Irregular Migrants in the UK," in *GLA Economics* (London: Greater London Authority, 2009), http://legacy.london.gov.uk/mayor/economic_unit/docs/irregular-migrants-report.pdf.
12   Bastian Vollmer, *Irregular Migration in the UK, Definitions, Pathways, Scale* (Oxford: Migration Observatory, 2011), http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/Briefing%20-%20Irregular%20Migration%20v2.pdf.
13   See German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS), *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* (Washington, DC: GMFUS, 2010), http://trends.gmfus.org/immigration/doc/TTI2010_English_Key.pdf.
14   See Ipsos-MORI Issue Index polls of public opinion in the United Kingdom over the past 15 years, www.ipsos-mori.com/ researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemID=56&view=wide. In December 1999 fewer than 5 percent of respondents identified immigration or race relations as one of the most important issues facing the country; in December 2007 this figure was 46 percent. The percentage of people identifying immigration or race relations as one of the most important issues facing the country has declined since 2008 as economic concerns have become dominant (the other most common responses of crime, education, and the National Health Service have followed the same pattern). Nonetheless, immigration (or race relations) has remained almost constantly among the top four issues identified by the British public. For further

Public opinion on integration is rather different. There are two identifiable trends. First, slightly over half of the British public thinks that the integration of immigrants is "poor."[15] This is lower than general hostility to immigration but still substantial. Importantly, the public is much more positive about the children of immigrants: two-thirds report positive integration (including for Muslim second-generation immigrants, where opinion is only slightly less favorable).[16] Importantly, disaggregating public opinion on immigrant integration by age, social class, and education does not reveal major differences (as it would with immigration), with the exception of more sympathetic urban dwellers. Broadly speaking, British society has a consensus view on immigrant integration, but what the public understands integration to mean is less clear. The more positive feelings of city residents are probably related to direct experience and comparative proximity — a finding that underscores the hypothesis that social contact affects how relationships and perceptions are molded.

The critical context to public opinion on integration is

British hostility to immigration.

Second, the general public in the United Kingdom (England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland) reports that 75-80 percent of people in their neighborhoods get along well with one another — a finding that has been stable over time.[17] The neighborhoods where people do not get along well are often associated with immigration, but analyses controlling for other factors suggest that this effect is principally caused by poverty and social deprivation.[18] The impacts of further immigrant settlement may, however, serve to exacerbate existing stresses and strains on, for instance, certain public services.

The public may take a skeptical line, believing certain policies (such as anti-discrimination or equality policies[19] that are often assumed to connote integration) as having gone too far and yet also believe that day-to-day relationships work well.

Put differently, immigration and integration are "vortex" issues that may suck in views on a range of other issues such as trust in politicians, ability to influence decisions affecting local communities, provision of public services, and so on.

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discussion see Scott Blinder, *UK Public Opinion toward Immigration: Overall Attitudes and Level of Concern* (Oxford: Migration Observatory, 2011), http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/Public%20Opinion-Overall%20Attitudes%20and%20Level%20of%20Concern%20Briefing_0.pdf.

15   GMFUS, *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* (Washington, DC: GMFUS, 2011), 20–3, http://trends.gmfus.org.php5-23.dfw1-2.websitetestlink.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/TTImmigration_final_web.pdf.

16   Ibid.

17   Robert Ford, *Public Opinion and Immigration: Policy Briefing* (London: All-Party Parliamentary Group on Migration, 2011), http://appgmigration.org.uk/sites/default/files/APPG_migration-Public_opinion-June_2011.pdf.

18   Patrick Sturgis, Ian Brunton-Smith, Sanna Read, and Nick Allum, "Does ethnic difference erode trust? Putnam's hunkering-down thesis reconsidered," *British Journal of Political Science* 41 (1): 57-82 (2011).

19   Such policies are rarely reported as popular in public opinion surveys.

III.   Trends in Britishness, Integration, and Cohesion

Integration means different things to different people with overlapping definitions dating from the 1930s: integration is a concept both dazzling[20] and treacherous,[21] and policymakers must use and define it with care.

An examination of the (many) empirical measures used to assess identity, integration, and cohesion reveals three categories:[22] national identity (Britishness or measures of whether someone feels more or less English, Scottish, Welsh, or Irish); integration outcomes (this refers to the performance of immigrants, usually set against the national average, in various spheres such as employment and education and is probably the definition closest to "immigrant integration" as understood by scholars in comparative analysis of immigrant integration); and cohesion, usually at the local or neighborhood level. (Cohesion at the local level may be termed neighborhood cohesion, or in the United Kingdom, community cohesion or social cohesion.

There are various trends and patterns to be observed in each of these three broad categories.

A.   National Identity: The Changing Meaning of "Britishness"

The concept of Britishness has changed in recent decades. There has been a shift in national identity from an ethnocentric view — a focus on British ancestry — to a civic understanding of Britishness as respect for the rule of law and shared (broadly liberal) values.[23] This trend also applies to conceptions of Englishness, Scottishness, Welshness, and Irishness.[24]

The reasons for this shift are open to debate. Studies of British national identity, whether written by historians such as Linda Colley or sociologists such as Tom Nairn, have posited that the core British national identity is shaped by recurring wars (especially with France), the Protestant religion, and the image of Britain as an empire builder.[25] As these nation-building elements have lost relevance — via diminishing religious affiliation, loss of empire, globalization, and devolution of power to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland — a civic understanding of Britishness has replaced the ethnocentric view of national identity. Regardless of the exact causes, immigration and immigrant integration are often embroiled in debates on Britishness.

The immediate implications for integration *policy* are limited in that building a sense of national identity is not the subject of tangible initiatives or public policy programs, and is more located in the arena of public debate and political rhetoric. The most obvious concern is that immigrants — by not sharing certain values or ancestral connections — will weaken a sense of British or national identity. This anxiety has been a staple element of critiques of immigration in Britain over several decades. However, the shift to a civic conception of national identity suggests a more capacious identity, one that could

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20 Bommes and Kolb, *Economic Integration, Work, Entrepreneurship*, 5.
21 Banton, "National Integration in France and Britain," 151–52.
22 For more detail on empirical measures and how they can be grouped, see Saggar et al., *The Impacts of Migration on Social Cohesion and Integration.*
23 Tilly, Exley, and Heath report that the shift is largely generational, suggesting a civic understanding of Britishness is likely to become standard. See James Tilley, Sonia Exley, and Anthony Heath, "Dimensions of British Identity," in *British Social Attitudes: The 21st Report*, eds. Alison Park, John Curtice, Katrina Thomson, Catherine Bromley, and Miranda Phillips (London: Sage, 2004).
24 Whether people see themselves as British or as Scottish, English, and so on is a more complicated question. Citizens with minority heritage are more likely to consider themselves British, for example. Meanwhile, the Scottish National Party's majority in Holyrood and plans for a referendum on independence are factors now affecting trends in Scottish identity.
25 Linda Colley, *Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Linda Colley, *Britishness in the 21st Century* (Prime Minister's Millennium Lecture, 1999, 10 Downing Street website); Tom Nairn, *After Britain: New Labour and the Return of Scotland*, (London: Granta Books, 2000).

include a greater number of immigrants.

That said, it has been argued that the attempt to define national identity (whether UK or other) in universal and civic terms is paradoxical; since these are by definition universal values, or at least values shared by all liberal states, they cannot be used to define and delimit a particular national identity.[26] It is not immediately clear how greater civic understanding eclipsed earlier voids left by decolonization and the decline of religion. Certainly, a fairly active role has been taken by liberal-inclined elites who have pursued a civic discourse of what it means to be British and have selectively drawn from an earlier liberal settlement that tackled discrimination and promoted integration.[27]

More concerning is that the insertion of immigration into debates about shifting national identity can make immigrants the vessel of opposition to that trend. In particular, the perceived dilution of national identity (in the ethnocentric sense) has become one of the appeals of the far-right British National Party (BNP). Extremist voting for the far right has been on the rise for the past decade. The BNP received almost 1 million votes in the 2009 European parliamentary elections (a 6.2 percent share of the vote),[28] which fell to about 560,000 votes in the 2010 general election (1.9 percent of the vote) although the BNP did not contest all seats nationwide.[29] BNP supporters are especially motivated by anti-Muslim sentiment and are troubled by cultural insecurity. Preexisting skepticism and grievances around ethnic diversity are also bound up in their views toward current and past immigration.[30] In short, when immigration and integration trends are pulled into debates over national identity, they can shape policy directly — or indirectly, by changing the climate in which policy is made.

B.   *Immigrant Outcomes*

The second major understanding of integration is gained by comparing the differences between immigrants and natives: what are the gaps in educational, social, and labor-market outcomes, and are they closing over time? However, using an immigrant average can be misleading, as immigrant outcomes vary considerably across particular groups.[31] This means that policy interventions that concentrate on average immigrant outcomes are likely to miss the mark of greatest need. Instead, interventions should be targeted with much greater sophistication. For example, first-generation women of Pakistani background living in economically distressed northern mill towns will typically experience employment outcomes that do not remotely compare with second-generation men of Indian descent living in suburban London boroughs. Additionally, where certain groups have experienced notably successful outcomes, it is useful to consider how far the responsible factors can or cannot be transplanted to groups whose progress has been more muted.

We will examine two integration indicators — the economic and employment outcomes of immigrants[32] and intermarriage rates — in order to compare outcomes over time. Much of the political anxieties over immigration in recent years have been driven by worries that particular groups have been left behind. Although we do not examine it directly, there are numerous other indicators and dimensions that we

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26   Christian Joppke, *Citizenship and Immigration* (Oxford: Polity, 2010).

27   Shamit Saggar, "Integration and adjustment: Britain's liberal settlement revisited", in *Immigration and Integration: Australia and Britain*, ed. David Lowe (Canberra: Bureau of Immigration, Multi-cultural and Population Research/Sir Robert Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, 1995).

28   See House of Commons Library, "European Parliament Elections 2009" (paper 09/53, 2009), www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2009/rp09-053.pdf.

29   See BBC News, "Election 2010 National Results," http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/election2010/results/.

30   Matthew Goodwin, *New British Fascism: Rise of the British National Party* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011).

31   There are many other issues with such comparisons as well, such as the fact that the national average may be moving. For a description of some the problems see Saggar, Somerville, Ford, and Sobolewska, *The Impacts of Migration on Social Cohesion and Integration.*

32   As noted above, one of the key issues in analyzing immigrant integration in the United Kingdom is that scholarship has mainly focused on minorities and their integration trajectories, eschewing a focus on generation (first, second, third) in favor of a focus on race or ethnicity.

could propose. An obvious one is political integration, where the sources of differences in political behavior among immigrants and natives prompt questions about differential socialization, mobilization, and attitude formation.[33]

The foreign-born population in the United Kingdom has experienced lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates than the native population for the past 15 years. On average, unemployment rates are 2-3 percentage points higher, much of it due to unemployment among foreign-born women.[34] At an aggregate level, the 2008-09 recession impacted the foreign and native born at similar levels, and the preexisting gap has remained. However, underneath these not particularly alarming outcomes is a wide variation in trajectories among different immigrant groups, masked by the broad average in employment rates.

Similar trends may be observed across a range of other domains, such as health, housing, and political representation. Explaining differences is difficult, but crucial for policymaking. In particular, there is little policy consensus about the root causes of observed patterns of under- or overrepresentation. Separating immigrant- or minority-specific drivers from wider circumstantial causes is central to arriving at such a consensus.

Immigration and integration are "vortex" issues that may suck in views on a range of other issues.

Unemployment rates are due at least in part to the characteristics of immigrants on arrival. For example, immigrants from low-income countries (where educational qualifications might not match the needs of the complex, service-based UK economy) and who do not speak English exhibit unemployment rates of at least 25 percent. Further evidence can be found by disaggregating the data by age and gender — where the "immigrant penalty" disappears if we take out women (immigrant women, as mentioned earlier, have much higher unemployment, probably due to a mix of cultural mores and childcare responsibilities) or look at youth (immigrant youth largely track UK averages). On the other hand, visible minorities have higher unemployment rates, which have been only exacerbated by the recession.[35] In addition, the negative impact of policy on those from refugee-producing countries cannot be discounted from the high unemployment rate such communities exhibit. Current policies such as the dispersal of asylum seekers outside London and the South East (entailing relocation away from community networks and from tighter labor markets) and policy prohibiting asylum seekers from accessing the labor market for 12 months are good examples of regulations likely to exacerbate unemployment.

Intermarriage rates (considered by many US scholars as the gold standard of integration due to the intimacy and social implications) suggest the same headline: rates of intermarriage vary enormously. For example, one in four Black Caribbean men have married whites, compared to one in 20 Indian men. Higher social class and income are typically viewed as predictors of out-marriage rates. This is challenged in the United Kingdom, as Indian men in Britain have higher educational achievement and labor-market outcomes than Black Caribbean men. In addition, it is worth noting the pace of change. A

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33   Anthony Heath, Stephen Fisher, David Sanders, and Maria Sobolewska, "Ethnic heterogeneity and the social bases of voting at the 2010 British General Elections," *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 21 (2): 255-77.

34   Rienzo, *Outcomes and Characteristics of Migrants in the UK Labour Market*.

35   Earlier evidence on this has pointed to visible minorities experiencing hypercyclicality over the economic cycle: fragility in their job tenure resulting in a greater chance of losing jobs during an economic downturn. See, for example, Cabinet Office, *Ethnic Minorities in the Labour Market* (London: Cabinet Office, 2003).

generation ago, fewer than one in 50 Indians "married out"; the rate was so low among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis that it could not be measured in major national surveys.[36]

Behind such intermarriage rates sit changing public attitudes toward ethnic pluralism. Data from the long-running British Social Attitudes surveys highlight significant erosion of earlier opposition and hostility among indigenous white Britons toward visible minorities as workplace colleagues, bosses, neighbors, and in-laws. The pace of change has been greatest among younger generations, particularly when combined with the effects of higher education, white-collar employment, and existing political orientation.

The crux of much of the discussion around integration (where integration is understood to be how different immigrant groups perform over time) lies in choosing the indicators of integration or the measures of progress. Which yardstick should we use for measuring group integration? Should it be marriage, employment, language, or a vast number of even softer measures around social interaction and group reputation? There is no public agreement or policy consensus on which of these are the most important indicators; there is no "gold standard" used consistently.

Confusingly, public opinion may well conflate the performance of national groups with perceived changes in both national identity and local neighborhoods.

C.   *Successful Local Communities*

The third definition of immigrant integration assesses the success of the community as a whole rather than that of immigrant groups, and is oriented around relationships and reputations, usually in neighborhoods. This might be called local integration or cohesion.[37] It is connected to the idea that different groups cannot only coexist harmoniously in local communities, but can also thrive regardless of differences between them. In public opinion surveys, people are almost unanimously agreed (across ethnic and social groups) on the ingredients necessary for successful communities: respect, understanding, awareness, trust, safety, friendliness, and stability.

In ascertaining whether or not the presence of immigrants (and how they are doing) affects how much a community is deemed cohesive, we rely heavily on a set of opinion polls and academic survey questions with a variant on one particular theme. This is probing opinion on whether groups (not immigrants) do actually coexist harmoniously. The most regularly asked question is: "Do you feel that, on average, people in your neighborhood get on better or worse than they did a year ago?"

Academic analyses of the datasets that are produced by this question show that the most important predictors of unsuccessful communities are not immigration but socioeconomic deprivation and the quality of public services. In other words, the poorer the community, the less people feel it is integrated — irrespective of the presence of immigrants.[38] Lack of economic resources is seen as the factor most responsible for patterns of atomization and community disintegration. This is in stark contrast to the seminal findings of Robert Putnam[39] in the United States, who found that diversity reduces cohesion

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36   Shamit Saggar, *Pariah Politics: Understanding Western Radical Islamism and What Should Be Done* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

37   The Labour government (1997-2010) had a set of policies under the rubric community cohesion, which it introduced in 2001-03 and which is roughly approximate to this definition.

38   Natalia Letki, "Does Diversity Erode Social Cohesion? Social Capital and Race in British Neighbourhoods," *Political Studies* 56, no. 1 (2008): 99–126; James Laurence and Anthony Heath, *Predictors of Community Cohesion: Multi- Level Modelling of the 2005 Citizenship Survey* (report for the Department for Communities and Local Government, 2008), www.communities.gov. uk/documents/communities/pdf/681539.pdf; James Laurence, "The Effect of Ethnic Diversity and Community Disadvantage on Social Cohesion: A Multi-Level Analysis of Social Capital and Interethnic Relations in UK Communities," *European Sociological Review* 27, no. 1 (2011): 70–89.

39   Robert Putnam, "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century. The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30 (2): 137-74.

and trust. In fact, some scholars, such as Patrick Sturgis,[40] find diversity *increases* cohesion. These findings are common in studies across the United Kingdom, but are also true of studies in Norway[41] and elsewhere.

Views on neighborhood or local integration (cohesion) are therefore driven by poverty levels and public service delivery, and not by immigrants themselves. However, this does not mean that a sudden influx of immigration will not cause local issues and negatively affect social cohesion. Immigrants may, for example, affect community stability or be perceived to drain public resources. For example, a rapid influx of newcomers entails lower per-person funding of public services, and for major influxes there is inevitably going to be significant and difficult adjustment. However, in the longer term there is no evidence that immigrants or the diversity they produce negatively affect neighborhood cohesion.

There are important insights here for the management of immigration. For instance, where opinion regarding immigrants in local communities is particularly sensitive, it is useful to know how far this is connected to the scale or proportion of immigrant settlement. It may be that the crucial destabilizer is not absolute numbers but rather the rate of settlement across relatively short time periods. This is borne out in polling evidence that highlights the rate of population change as driving local patterns of hostility toward immigration.[42] This, again, will have ramifications for the adaptability and responsiveness of public services (additional school places, expanded primary health services, etc). Where responsiveness is poor, there are clear risks to community relations.

IV.   Integration Policies

A.   The Arc of Integration Policy from the Mid-1990s to the Present Day

It is important to recognize that the United Kingdom's immigration profile today is very different from the picture prior to 1997. In the past decade and a half immigration has become more temporary and more diverse in its sources. The country's previous experience of large-scale New Commonwealth immigration now appears a dated chapter from a different era. The integration challenges created by the earlier wave gave rise to a specific policy framework that focused on race/ethnicity and skin color to the exclusion of other factors that have either advanced or held back long-term integration. The more recent experience involving large-scale white migration from Eastern European sources has created a substantially different framing context for integration, arguably rendering the earlier race-centered approach anachronistic (at best) and distorting of priorities (at worst).

The government's approach to integration has changed substantially since the mid-1990s, with the emphasis shifting toward increasing the obligations on new, first-generation immigrants to integrate (for example, a language examination and citizenship test were introduced in 2004). Beginning with the 1997-2010 Labour administration, followed by the current Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition (in power since May 2010), there has been a clear reaction to the doctrine of multiculturalism (defined as state support and funding for minority groups to preserve their culture and blamed for

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40 Patrick Sturgis, Jonathan Jackson, and Ian Brunton-Smith, "Ethnic Diversity and the Social Cohesion of Neighbourhoods: the Case of London" (draft paper, European Consortium for Political Research), www.ecprnet.eu/MyECPR/proposals/reykjavik/uploads/papers/470.pdf.

41 Elisabeth Ivarsflaten and Kristin Stromsnes, "Inequality, Diversity and Social Trust in Norwegian Communities" (paper presented to National Norwegian Conference in Political Science, Kristiansand, January 6-8, 2010), www.humanities.manchester.ac.uk/socialchange/seminars/documents/Diversityandsocialcapital.pdf.

42 See Ipsos-MORI (2005) for public opinion data on the relationship between the rate of population change and attitudes to immigration.

leading to segregation and a concomitant backlash).

However, this reaction is based on a gross mischaracterization: there was never a clear doctrine or programming on multiculturalism in the United Kingdom; so replacing it with obligations on immigrants to adapt to majority values and practices has been seen through piecemeal initiatives. Policy change has not been on the grand scale implied by rhetoric. This may both represent and result in greater repressive liberalism that requires subscription to certain beliefs as a precondition of acceptance and belonging.

Rhetorical U-turns should not be dismissed, however. They signal an appetite among today's leaders to distance themselves from the policies and priorities of the past. In some cases, such rhetoric has pointed to much larger changes in policy direction and even in national reassessments, as seen in the Netherlands since 2002. Again, the caveat remains, namely that any golden age of multiculturalism may be exaggerated by critics and supporters of recent directional change.

In the past decade and a half immigration has become more temporary and more diverse in its sources.

Nevertheless, significant changes can be inferred from new integration programs for refugees; new citizenship classes, testing, and ceremonies; predeparture language testing; and efforts to promote community cohesion. They can also be seen in the introduction of a points-based system to assess immigrants' potential utility for the UK economy and that favors specific labor-market needs. Ongoing work to improve the accessibility of major public services to certain newcomers (such as low-income immigrant women with minority heritage in the health service or ethnic minority children with poor English in schools) has also been critical, but is not a departure from past practice.

The new approach can be summed up as "liberal coercion" and loosely reflects the instincts of political leaders in various Western democracies. The key element has been an in-built, liberal corrective force that has applied moderate new pressures on immigrants to shift behavior if not necessarily beliefs or attitudes. Notably, the United Kingdom (where far-right parties have had few breakthroughs) has not gone as far as the more conservative approaches witnessed in Austria, the Netherlands, and Denmark (where the far right has entered government and, partly as a consequence, heaped new demands on immigrants and linked mass immigration to a wider social crisis).

Up until around the turn of the century, a "race-relations" model was the standard shorthand description of UK policy. Integration policy was built around anti-discrimination law, inspired by the US civil-rights movement. The most potent legal measures came in the form of antidiscrimination law, initiated in 1965 and subsequently strengthened in 1968, 1976, and 2000. The legal framework was reinforced by institutions led nationally by the Commission for Racial Equality and by local governments. Furthermore, in line with a history of British empiricism influencing policy and practice, significant government-appointed commissions led to changes in institutional practices, particularly in policing methods and educational curricula.[43]

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43   Lord Swann, *Education for All: The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1985); Lord Scarman, *Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981: Report of an Inquiry by the Rt. Hon. the Lord Scarman (The Scarman Report)* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1981).

Critically, it is ethnic diversity, and not immigration, that has driven the UK integration agenda. Statistics have traditionally been collected on ethnic minorities (i.e., not on place of birth or on parental place of birth), and minorities have been the targets of social and economic policies.[44] The adoption of such a race-centered approach was critiqued as a poor match to the immigrant integration context of Britain in the mid-20th century,[45] reflecting instead the racial scar that hung over the United States at that time, and this lack of fit is a much more relevant critique today.

In 2001 three events shook public and government confidence in a race-relations model already facing rhetorical backlash: riots involving minority communities in the northern towns of Bradford, Burnley, and Oldham; the Sangatte refugee crisis; and the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. These events fueled the sense that existing immigration and immigrant integration policy was unsuccessful and in need of change. The July 7, 2005, terrorist attacks on London provoked further concerns about white and minority ethnic and religious groups (especially Muslims) leading segregated lives and mutually suspicious of one another.

Further, throughout this period there was rising support in a limited number of areas of the United Kingdom for far-right political parties, particularly the BNP.[46] Against the backdrop of a general renewal of far-right parties across Europe, the BNP's appeal underlined concern about popular attitudes toward diversity and immigration, and the success of Britain's race-relations model more generally.

The focus of immigrant integration policies consequently shifted away from a race-relations model. There are at least six strands of policy to consider when characterizing this shift: refugee integration policy, community cohesion from 2001 to 2010, a strong and broad emphasis on equality, counterterrorism (CT) policy, mainstream policies with some targeting of immigrant groups embedded within them, and citizenship policy.

B.   *Policy Measures*

1.   Immigrant Integration Policy

A formal immigrant integration policy has been applied in the United Kingdom to only one subcategory of migrants: recognized refugees. A coherent vision was first set out in 2000[47] (and expanded in 2005[48]), with an aim to raise refugees' awareness of and adjustment to British societal norms and values.

In its third term, from 2005 to 2010, the Labour government briefly flirted with a broader strategy of immigrant integration. This involved a mapping of strategies and projects and some funding for local projects in places with significant numbers of new arrivals (called the Migration Impacts Fund, this was short-lived). Overall, the approach can be called a stock-taking rather than goal-driven approach. Whitehall politics, where responsibility for integration (except, illogically, refugee integration) moved in 2007 to the Department of Communities and Local Government from the Home Office, could have

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44   The General Census from 1971 and 1981 did not contain a direct ethnic origin item, and therefore estimates of the UK ethnic minority population were derived using a complicated methodology based on the birthplace of heads of households (responsible for completion of the Census pro forma). In 1991 a direct ethnic origin item was introduced, and updated and repeated in 2001 and 2011. This was complemented by a religious background item in 2001 and repeated in 2011.

45   A significant proportion of UK immigrants are white, coming from European countries and former colonies of Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand. Immigrants from the United States also form a significant inflow. That said, over the past few decades two factors have contributed substantially to increasing ethnic diversity in the United Kingdom: immigration from the Commonwealth (notably from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Caribbean, and African countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda), and new inflows from countries such as Somalia, Afghanistan, China, and Iraq.

46   Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin, "Angry White Men: Individual and Contextual Predictors of Support for the British National Party," *Political Studies* 58, no. 1 (2010): 1–26.

47   Home Office, *Full and Equal Citizens — A Strategy for the Integration of Refugees into the United Kingdom* (London: Home Office, 2000).

48   Home Office, *Integration Matters: A National Refugee Strategy* (London: Home Office, 2005).

proved decisive but ultimately led to stasis. Any decision on the nascent national immigrant integration strategy was delayed by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion. The commission's remit was not the integration of newcomers, but a response to the 7/7 London attacks. It sought to balance the interests of immigrant identities on the one hand with wider concerns about the long-term failure to integrate some, but not all, settled immigrant communities. Ultimately, however, "no clear rationale for developing an integration agency" was found, or for committing extensive funding and capacity to an integration strategy.[49]

The coalition government has been supportive of refugees and has made efforts to improve the asylum system (e.g., with reforms to reduce the number of families in the detention estate). However, there have also been significant cuts to advice services, core support, and training programs directly benefiting refugees (e.g., funding for the Refugee Integration and Employment Service [REIS] has ended). More predictably, the Migration Impacts Fund has been terminated. This must be seen in the context of a major decrease in voluntary-sector funding generally but is likely to have disproportionately affected refugees.

2.   Community Cohesion Policy

Community cohesion policies are closely associated with a response to the 2001 riots in the northern mill towns of Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford. A series of reports, including the main government enquiry, led by Ted Cantle, suggested that a major cause of the riots was the segregation of Asian and white communities and recommended a new set of community cohesion policies, aimed at bringing those (segregated) communities together.[50] Community cohesion policies followed, including initiatives such as summer youth programs, school-twinning projects, and ethnically mixed housing policies — all largely promulgated at a local level.

Unsurprisingly, questions still remain as to whether the promotion of cohesion through programs that increase intergroup interaction is an appropriate way to accommodate social and cultural differences in the United Kingdom. The current coalition government appears skeptical of this approach, and funding in this area has been severely cut (in the context of an overall decrease in funding to the voluntary sector).[51]

It is noteworthy that the communities targeted by community cohesion policies (and from whence the anxiety of integration sprang) are not home to many new immigrants; instead, they belong overwhelmingly to the children of immigrants. This confirms that integration is rarely about new immigrants only.

3.   Equality and Human Rights Policy and Legislation

Major equality measures have reinforced and extended the anti-discrimination framework. There was incremental but (in aggregate) very substantial change in the equalities framework between 1999 and 2010. Following the Macpherson report in 1999, which identified institutional failings in the police and other parts of the public sector that affected ethnic minorities, the *2000 Race Relations* (Amendment) *Act* aimed to eradicate institutionalized racism by obligating certain public authorities, including the police and immigration services, to take action to correct ethnic inequalities and latent biases in recruitment, employment, and service delivery. The *2010 Equality Act* brought together existing

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49   Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG), *Review of Migrant Integration Policy in the UK* (London: DCLG, 2008), www.northwestrsmp.org.uk/images/stories/documents/pdfs/cohesion/838994.pdf.

50   Burnley Task Force, *Report of the Burnley Task Force, Chaired by Lord Clarke* (Burney: Burnley Council, 2002); Ted Cantle, *Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team, Chaired by Ted Cantle* (London: Home Office, 2001); Oldham Independent Panel Review, *One Oldham, One Future, Panel Report, Chaired by David Ritchie* (Oldham: Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council, 2001).

51   Elizabeth Collett, *Immigrant Integration in Europe in a Time of Austerity* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2011), www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/TCM-integration.pdf.

duties and a series of changes over the previous decade into a broad and proactive legal framework for a range of minorities and disadvantaged or vulnerable communities.

The *1998 Human Rights Act*, which enshrined the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law, has further reinforced the anti-discrimination framework. The majority of jurisprudence that has reinforced or developed the rights of refugees and migrants comes from the passage of the 1998 Act.

There has also been some institutional infrastructure that has supported the implementation of rights. For example, a single public body — the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) — was created in 2007 to further equal rights across ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, faith, and disability. However, EHRC and its predecessor commissions (notably the Commission for Racial Equality) have always had limited purview over immigration issues and have not taken the lead on immigrant integration.

> *There has been at best a draw between government and immigrant advocates on advancing rights.*

There is no doubt that immigrants — especially vulnerable groups — have been assisted by the equality and human rights legislation passed over the past 15 years. However, there have been consistent official attempts to undercut or circumvent developments in rights *as they apply to immigrants*. On one side, the *Human Rights Act* has been successfully used to reduce destitution in asylum cases, to ensure appeal rights in asylum and deportation cases, to remove barriers to family reunion, and so on. Similarly, equality legislation has led to some improvements in service planning, while the passage of the *Children's Act* and the dropping of the immigration reservation to the Convention on the Rights of the Child have increased standards of care for immigrant children, especially unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. And yet, on the other side, there has been, in parallel, a sustained effort to remove or stop the accretion of immigrants' rights — for example, the government has passed legislation to reduce appeal rights, to remove access to welfare, to limit access to the labor market, and, most recently, substantially curb legal aid for immigration cases. The courts have curtailed only some of these developments.

There has been at best a draw between government and immigrant advocates on advancing rights, but at no point was the government *intending* for the advance in rights to increase the integration of immigrants. This is arguably a classic example of the unintended consequences (and subsequent boomerangs) of policy in action. In this case no one predicted how the passage of human-rights legislation would affect immigrants.[52]

4. Tweaking Mainstream Policies

The very limited support for refugees and the short-lived Migration Impacts Fund, together with the fact that community cohesion and equality measures are largely targeted at existing minority populations, may provide the impression that there is no provision or thinking on any aspect of immigrant integration. This is misleading.

Hidden inside most British mainstream government programs and social policies are deliberate correctives that favor integration, especially of disadvantaged populations. When applied to immigrants,

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52   One can extend this analysis to another landmark legislative achievement of the first Labour term — devolution. At no point did any politician or senior official see the unintended consequence of that policy for immigration and immigrant integration. However, the Scottish government has developed, at various points, bespoke immigration visas with integration elements attached, and has invested in tailored schemes that are greater in scope than in England. This point should not be belabored, but is worth highlighting.

the most obvious example is in relation to education policy. Early childhood education programs have outreach components dedicated to minorities, which favor immigrants. In schools, the Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant (EMAG) released upwards of £250 million for language learning alone in 2009-2010(it was also used for other purposes).[53] More generally, area-based grants and additional premiums to schools based on their number of low-income pupils will likely disproportionately favor immigrant youth and second-generation immigrants.[54] For adults, there was a major increase in the budget for English language instruction, especially in the early 2000s.[55]

Put differently, while bespoke measures are small — often little more than garlands — the major weight of social welfare programs favors integration. This reflects a long-standing tenet of British social policy that employs the proxies of area and participation to deliver loose targeting of programs. The result is that socially disadvantaged groups — including many immigrants and second-generation communities — are disproportionate beneficiaries of policies that were originally conceived without reference to the objectives of immigrant integration.

The coalition government is broadly in favor of continuing a focus on the disadvantaged within policy areas such as education, but has moved away from increased tailoring. This suggests that advances in immigrant integration through more tailored policy measures are unlikely, at least in the near future.

5.   Counterterrorism Policy

Prior to the July 2005 London attacks, government CT policy focused surveillance and intelligence on likely threats from foreign sources and also from domestic ones. The "home-grown" dimension of the 2005 London bombings changed that framework irrevocably. The policies pursued since contain two core elements. First, measures have been adopted to strengthen the resilience of potential targets of violence such as transport infrastructure and revolving targets such as media outlets in response to particular controversies. Second, government policy has sought to tackle potential support for violent extremism from within Muslim communities. This strand has acknowledged the dangerous effects of tacit backing within British Muslim communities for confrontation and violence. A recurring feature of terrorism trials since 2005 has been the appetite of public prosecutors to indict (with mixed results) those who have given practical support to specific plots.

One criticism has been that very little is known about the effectiveness of these local programs; another is that hardly any have been subject to cost-benefit assessments or value-for-money studies. A criticism from a completely different perspective has been that CT measures have themselves contributed to a hardening of attitudes and grievances among peaceful Muslims.[56]

Under the coalition government, the CT strategy has focused on the roots and causes of domestic radicalization, looking at the problem further upstream than had previously been the case. Tackling extremist ideology was placed at the heart of the new policy, a move designed to create a much larger distinction between general measures to support integration and a strong new push against radical Islamist ideas and values. Such a drive is particularly difficult to implement. It has mostly been couched in a toughened official rhetoric on the unintended consequences of Britain liberal multiculturalism. That said, the balance of CT has now shifted firmly towards bringing integration and security policy

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53 The EMAG program was preceded by programs that date to the 1960s and focused on adapting classrooms for the specific needs of immigrant schoolchildren.

54 Other examples can be found throughout British welfare state policies and programs. The Child Benefit program supported large families almost as generously as smaller ones (in per-capita terms) and thus benefited many immigrant households. The Educational Maintenance Allowance has channeled funds toward continuing full-time education for youth ages 16-19. Both programs have been significantly cut back under the coalition administration.

55 English language provision over the past 15 years has changed substantially, and the impact on integration outcomes is difficult to judge. On the demand side, strategic objectives have changed and along with them entitlement criteria, with consequent confusion. On the supply side, provision has been incomplete and of inconsistent quality.

56 Tuyful Choudhary and Helen Fenwick, "The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on Muslim Communities," *International Review of Law, Computers and Technology* 25, no. 3 (2011): 151–81.

aims into alignment, and also in favor of neo-conservative skepticism toward cultural pluralism and cultural relativism.

6.   Citizenship Policy

Citizenship and naturalization, long a policy backwater, has undergone a "quiet revolution,"[57] with policymakers deliberately encouraging a more proactive (and a longer-horizon and far more expensive) regime to those seeking to acquire citizenship or long-term residency rights.

The promotion of citizenship began in earnest under Home Secretary David Blunkett (2001-04) and his adviser Bernard Crick[58] and involved "activating" the naturalization process. This included the introduction of citizenship tests (which came into force in October 2005), language tests (also mandatory for long-term residence), and, in British terms, eye-catching citizenship ceremonies (first piloted in 2004). This was further elaborated by the 2008 Goldsmith Commission on Citizenship that endorsed an oath of allegiance, tax rebates for volunteering, and a national British public holiday (none of which have been enacted).

The period required before long-term residence rights are acquired has also been extended. The change to citizenship law and practice has been substantial and marks the biggest direct change in immigrant integration policy. The policy driver behind the changes has been rising numbers of immigrants and a consequent rise in awards of settlement.

Overall, it should be noted, these programs are regarded positively by immigrants, particularly the provision of English-language instruction, though increasing restrictions and extending the period before people can apply for citizenship are unlikely to be viewed favorably.[59] Aside from citizenship education in schools, little attention has been given to the importance of citizenship among native and settled immigrant communities, and the reaction to the Goldsmith Commission suggests this is not likely to change.

Debates over citizenship since 2008 have largely been proxy debates over who is entitled to settle in the United Kingdom. The coalition government looks to be placing even more value on citizenship and settlement, partly by constraining access to them and partly by increasing testing. (Reducing the overall number of immigrants is an expected by-product that would aid other government objectives.)

C.   *Future Policy Directions*

There are, therefore, at least six strands that make up immigrant integration policy, or have been conflated or associated with immigrant integration policy. Only changes to settlement and citizenship — typically associated with the democratic state — actually constitute a targeted area of policy directed at immigrants. The others are either tangential or aimed at other targets entirely.

An important dynamic that has not been discussed thus far is the role of the European Union, which has assumed greater power over immigration policymaking on an incremental basis, particularly since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). Driven by intergovernmentalism in the main, there has been a significant pooling of sovereignty on asylum and illegal immigration issues. There have also been significant efforts toward immigrant integration. These include the Common Basic Principles, agreed in 2004, and a range

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57   Nick Pearce, quoted in Will Somerville, *Immigration under New Labour* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2007).

58   Bernard Crick, also a political philosopher, had previously led efforts to include citizenship in the national curriculum in schools. In driving change to the citizenship process, he chaired the Advisory Board on Naturalisation and Integration (ABNI), which advised the government on the content of language and citizenship tests.

59   Sherilyn MacGregor, Gavin Bailey, and Andrew Dobson, "The New British Citizen: The Political Implications of Citizenship Tests and Ceremonies in the UK" (paper presented at Political Studies Association annual conference, Challenges for Democracy in a Global Era, April 7-9, 2009, University of Manchester), www.psa.ac.uk/2009/pps/MacGregor.pdf.

of research, network building, and dissemination to spread best practices on immigrant integration.

Three observations are relevant to the European dimension. First, the Lisbon Treaty made clear that immigrant integration was subject to the subsidiary principle and is therefore unlikely to see any major policy influence coming from the European Union in the foreseeable future. However, the European Union will continue to have a gentle effect through sharing of best practice and, in particular, through dedicated resource allocation. Looking back at the last decade, it is clear that cofinancing from the European Refugee Fund and later the European Integration Fund has been significant. Finally, intergovernmental networks and exposure at a European level have led to at least some policy transfer, for example, in predeparture integration tests. This is not related to the sharing of best practices, but rather government concerns over immigration and the interplay with integration issues.

Elsewhere, on CT policy, the coalition government has chosen to concentrate on tackling risks to public safety (as before), while publicly challenging extremist doctrines that are said to encourage radicalization (a change of direction). The general outlook of the coalition toward cultural and religious pluralism is far from settled, given the very broad spread of opinion across the two political parties, and is likely to remain so.

The government's policymaking direction became clearer in spring 2012, as the Department of Communities and Local Government released its broad integration strategy, *Creating the Conditions for Integration*.[60] It is a slim document that contains no program of action or coordination, but rather a list of government initiatives from a range of departments of varying degrees of relevance. It is also the first statement in nearly three years of a government position on integration and clearly notes that the state's role should be that of facilitator and, as matter of a principle, an actor only of last resort — noting clearly, for example, that the "government will only act exceptionally."[61]

The direction of integration policy — as indicated by the new strategy — is likely to stay on a similar path for the short term. There are, for example, references to encouraging "mainstream liberal values," which echo past approaches. However, while there is no proactive change of direction, there is a coming change in the direction of integration policy. Whether by default or design, reductions in spending will change how resources are allocated. If the prevailing view (that government should not lead integration activity) holds, resources from government look unlikely to radically increase. For instance, grants to schools for additional language support that have been amalgamated will not likely be replaced — a policy change that will reduce educational support for children with poor English, especially in the medium term as more schools become academies. Second, immigration policy changes will begin to be felt; the impacts of some (such as the current effort to curb settlement rights for work visas)[62] will have integration impacts that are difficult to predict.

Conservative traditionalism is another subliminal influence in both the coalition government's general philosophy and in its initial integration strategic framework. This comprises at least two interlocking elements. The first of these is (and, centuries after the Enlightenment, remains) skepticism towards and about the power of reason. Modern policymaking that aims to alter or transform social relationships is therefore questionable as a Burkean principle. Secondly, there is instinctive opposition to allocating natural, let alone human, rights to citizens and to potential citizens as opposed to "prescriptive rights" — rights established by practice over time. For example, there is strong opposition to the *Human Rights Act* among the majority of Conservative politicians and this inevitably constrains the operational headroom available for current rights-based strategies to integrate migrants.

The new integration strategy, spearheaded by Secretary of State Eric Pickles, has been contained by this caution and also by a general reluctance to become too closely involved (as a national government) in

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60   DCLG, *Creating the Conditions for Integration* (London: DCLG, 2012), www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/ pdf/2092103.pdf.

61   Ibid, 9.

62   The government has stated its intention of "breaking" the link between immigration and settlement, largely in order meet another policy objective (the government's "cap" on immigration numbers).

fostering positive inter-group relations. In that sense, the approach is a minimalist one that represents a modest retrenchment and focusing of effort. It also chimes with a much longer empiricist tradition in Britain that does not start by defining long-term immigrant integration as a public policy challenge for government, let alone one that necessitates an overarching, fixed model of what integration is and how it should be attained.

D.   *Multiculturalism: Crisis and Continuity*

In précis, the various strands of immigrant integration indicate a policy shift away from multicultural-ism but not a regression to the acculturation and assimilationist frameworks publicly adopted by some European countries in recent years. Much as French republicanism has been a label, the British race-relations model has also been the poster child for certain proponents or opponents of multiculturalism.

Quantitative comparative indices[63] of integration policy and citizenship laws (such as MIPEX or the Citizenship Observatory) tend to report the United Kingdom as neither favorable nor unfavorable to immigrant minorities and place it in the middle of the European spectrum, though they also highlight that the United Kingdom has recently implemented less-generous policies than in the past.

There has been a noticeable tendency to criticize the excesses and unintended consequences of British multiculturalism. This tendency, it should be stressed, has been largely couched in political rhetoric, albeit influential in its reach.

Crucially, the central principle has shifted towards a loosely framed public acceptance that migrants themselves must change outlooks and behaviors in order to "fit in." In many other Western democra-cies this may not be novel, let alone challenging. In Britain today, it represents a substantive move away from the past. Thus, "liberal coercion" is reasonable shorthand for the current model — and a heavy hint about the direction of future travel.

V.   Policy Impact

Does policy have an identifiable impact on immigrant outcomes? This question is relevant in relation to both the small handful of policies that deliberately target immigrants and refugees and, as previously emphasized, the much larger volume of policy measures that affect immigrants' integration indirectly. Evidence tends to be locked into individual program and project evaluations (often on the community scale), and the counterfactual (outcomes in the absence of policy intervention) is problematic.

The limited evidence on specific immigrant integration policies suggests small-scale projects have only marginally impacted immigrant outcomes, which are more affected by mainstream public policy. Given the small investments made in targeted programs, this is unsurprising.

Employment outcomes, for example, are affected more by active labor-market policy interventions and the aggregate demand for particular kinds of labor within the economy. In schools, the impacts of general policies aimed at raising attainment have far overshadowed the impacts of a very limited number of policy interventions aimed at immigrants. Likewise, where a bundle of policy measures have targeted particular schools or school districts (using geography as a proxy for group in effect), the resulting impacts have been crucial in evaluating the drivers of educational integration. A good example of this approach has been the floor target regime used by the previ   ous government to

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63   Examples include: the Multiculturalism Policy Index (www.queensu.ca/mcp/index.html), MIPEX (www.mipex.eu/), and the European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship (http://eudo-citizenship.eu/comparative-analyses).

help drive up educational attainment performance. The successful use of this regime in several East London education districts in the past ten years has been linked to significantly improved attainment scores for thesestudents in general, with a turnaround in scores among second-generation Bangladeshi girls in particular.[64]

Critically, advocacy and much academic investigation centers on the inverse of impact. It assumes that policy is a key variable *but one that negatively affects outcomes by erecting barriers to opportunity*. This is most clear among a subset of immigrants who have limited rights, such as asylum seekers or illegally resident immigrants. Some relatively new immigrant groups (e.g., Somalis and Sri Lankans), many of whom enter as refugees, have very poor employment outcomes.[65] The question is how far their skills, knowledge, awareness, and lack of employment-related networks preclude advancement and how far policy (which for example bars access to the labor market during the asylum process) is responsible.

Immigrant outcomes are more affected by broad currents of public policy: active labor-market policy interventions, the state of the economy, regional economic drivers, public spending on deprived areas, and education policies. Thus, previous Labour government efforts to raise school standards had a major impact on new immigrant children and second-generation immigrant children.[66] However, that impact was not as high as it could have been, even with "top up" or "add-on" policies such as EMAG[67] — now subsumed into the schools grant. One cause of this shortfall was that even large and successful mainstream policy levers can result in poor outcomes for particular subgroups, as success is measured and rewarded across an entire cohort. Thus, successful, high-attaining schools can also be the same schools where immigrants and minorities "slip between the cracks."

Nevertheless, tweaks to mainstream policy offer a more cogent and long-term solution to integration challenges. The history of integration initiatives for refugees is one of bespoke, small-scale, well-intentioned projects that are not scaled up and therefore inadequate to the task. For instance, experts learned from integration initiatives with the Vietnamese in the 1980s that it was important to embed employment advice in mainstream job centers (which was lacking). Some of the poor labor-market outcomes among Vietnamese immigrants can be attributed in part to patchy advice. Similar outcomes are now being recorded for more recent refugee populations as, once again, significant public monies are being spent on isolated projects not connected to mainstream job advice and placement services. As advocates correctly point out, few mainstream welfare-to-work programs have the expertise to understand complex needs (or in some cases to access certain groups at all); as a result tailored programming is essential. Where mainstream programs are "tweaked" — as was done for the Trellis project in Birmingham and Solihull[68] — outcomes are typically positive.

64 Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (OFSTED), *Achievement of Bangladeshi Heritage Pupils* (London: OFSTED, 2004), www.ofsted.gov.uk/resources/achievement-of-bangladeshi-heritage-pupils; Steve Strand, Augustin de Coulon, Elena Meschi, John Vorhaus, Lara Frumkin, Claire Ivins, Lauren Small, Amrita Sood, Marie-Claude Gervais, and Hamid Rehman, *Drivers and Challenges of Raising the Achievement of Pupils from Bangladeshi, Somali and Turkish Backgrounds* (London: Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2010), www.education.gov.uk/publications/eOrdering-Download/DCSF-RR226.pdf.

65 Greater London Authority (GLA), *Country of Birth and Labour Market Outcomes in London*, DMAG Briefing 2005/1, (London: GLA, 2005), http://legacy.london.gov.uk/gla/publications/factsandfigures/DMAG-Briefing-2005-1.pdf.

66 Christian Dustmann, Stephen Machin, and Uta Schönberg, *Educational Achievement and Ethnicity in Compulsory Schooling* (London: Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, 2008); Strand et al., *Drivers and Challenges of Raising the Achievement of Pupils from Bangladeshi, Somali and Turkish Backgrounds*; Rutter and Cavanagh, *Back to Basics*.

67 Ibid. There is consensus in the literature that language fluency raises attainment. Some academic observers credited the EMAG grant and its predecessors with raising attainment directly. For example: Coretta Phillips, *Ethnic Inequalities under New Labour: Progress or Retrenchment?* in *A more Equal Society?* eds. John Hills and Kitty Stewart (Bristol: Policy Press, 2005). EMAG was subsumed into a general "schools grant" in April 2011, and the tailored provision doesn't currently exist.

68 Kemal Ahson, *Refugees and Employment: The Trellis Perspective* (Lifeworld, 2008), www.employabilityforum.co.uk/documents/TrellisImpactReportFINAL2008.pdf. The Trellis project is one of several that have not been continued.

VI.   Conclusions and Recommendations for Policy

A.   *Dimensions of Integration*

This report has sought to draw lines among three sets of policies and debates: national identity, immigrant group outcomes, and local neighborhood integration or local cohesion. All are captured under the rubric of integration in debates in the United Kingdom.

1.   National Identity

National identity involves confidence in the idea that the values, traits, and allegiance of newcomers do not collide with those of natives. Where these understandings are nested in various ethnocultural factors, this can be hard to achieve; however, shared ideas of national belonging that are contingent on attachment to civic values can make this easier. This first understanding of government measures on integration — which often dominate public debate — is clearly important but only loosely connected to integration policy. The realm is the public square — of debate, commentary, and political rhetoric. Where policy measures are involved, they refer mainly to citizenship or to grand projects, such as the national volunteering service that is being undertaken by the coalition government, or the projection of institutions, such as the massive engagement with the public regularly undertaken by the BBC with an intention to speak to the United Kingdom as a whole.

One key question for policymakers is whether, or how far, immigration policy or immigration itself undermines integration. In 1965, at the height of an earlier chapter of immigration controversy, notable Labour politician Roy Hattersley said in the House of Commons: "Integration without limitation is impossible; equally, limitation without integration is indefensible." The causal link, if there is one, can operate indirectly via polarized, heated national debates on immigration (that create a lack of confidence locally); alternatively, it can be more directly via substantial, unplanned local settlement (that disrupts existing expectations, distribution and consumption patterns, and, critically, extant fairness norms).

One key question for policymakers is whether, or how far, immigration policy or immigration itself undermines integration.

2.   Immigrant Outcomes

There are several concrete factors that drive successful immigrant outcomes. One of these is proximity to, and flexibility in relation to, buoyant local labor markets. In London, the professional service and corporate business sectors have been important in generating demand for highly educated and skilled employees. This signal has been received and reflected in middle-class Indian educational patterns that have prized such employment opportunities. This has not been seen in the case of many Pakistani immigrants, whose settlement patterns were concentrated in declining heavy industrial areas of northern England.

A further important driver has been a basket of social-capital factors. Some of these have allowed immigrants to gain rapid knowledge of changing opportunity structures in education and in housing markets. Others have been vital in pointing to growth-oriented sectors for entrepreneurial investment.

Mainstream social policies (schools, welfare-to-work, labor-market regulation, health, and so on) have been more important in closing outcome gaps for immigrants than smaller-scale initiatives aimed at particular groups.

Immigration policies also have an impact, which is usually assumed to be negative, especially for the outcomes of immigrant groups who have come largely through humanitarian routes.

3.   Successful Communities

The quality and cohesion of a neighborhood is not primarily driven by immigration or immigrant integration outcomes. Nevertheless, new arrivals may add to existing diversity and less-than-optimal delivery of services (such as health and housing), both of which have some predictive value for less-cohesive communities. It is therefore critical that local needs are (and are perceived to be) met efficiently and equitably.

B.   *Recommendations*

Immigration to the United Kingdom is likely to continue at relatively high rates. A substantial, new generation will emerge from current and future influxes (over half of London's school-age pupils are the children of immigrants, for example). The need for a well-considered approach that is responsive to the barriers to integration is clear. Equally clear is the need to nest that approach in the history and context of British practice. Reassuringly, there is strong support for integration policy by the public. This report points to three key recommendations.

Setting priorities lies at the heart of tackling the most persistent integration challenges of "at-risk" populations.

First, there has been insufficient attention paid to planning for and understanding the changing characteristics and movement of new arrivals. A system that can finance the adjustments to services equitably is important, as is finding new ways to deliver services to mobile populations (some new arrivals, others the children of new arrivals) and mitigate any negative impacts on existing populations and communities. In short, immigrant integration cannot be left to chance and requires that close attention be given to immigrant selection, pressure points in local neighborhoods, and bottlenecks and muddled priorities in local public services facing large numbers of newcomers.

Second, and related, a strategy to improve immigrant integration outcomes in the United Kingdom should focus on improving mainstream social policies. Where necessary, this would involve adapting intelligently and incrementally to identify and address the "negative trends" for underperforming migrant groups. The biggest danger is on one hand, immigrant groups settling into long-term disadvantage in conjunction with a grievance-based identity against the broader society and on the other, a broader society that blames immigrant groups for issues of community security and failures in public service delivery. Heading off this danger requires some shared-risk calculus if it is to address the biggest challenges, achieve buy-in politically, and remain sustainable beyond the short term.

Setting priorities lies at the heart of tackling the most persistent integration challenges of "at-risk" populations. Currently, that amounts to targeting the poor educational and employment achievements of second-generation Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Black Caribbean boys, as compared to those of white working-class boys. Even more fine-grain analysis is needed moving forward — for example, targeting the educational underachievement of Somali and Portuguese students. In the future, policy may target other population groups and subgroups. It is as much a craft as a science to arrive at the optimum blend of incrementally adapted macro policies to meet these specific group needs. For example, it may be more effective to target particular areas with an expectation that certain groups will be beneficiaries as a result.

Ensuring accurate information is a precondition to effective priority setting and intelligent adaptation, and policymakers should work harder to understand where the disadvantage lies and what drives it.[69] Furthermore, policymakers should work creatively to adjust mainstream policies — for instance in the commissioning of services (procurement), various levers are open to policymakers, many of them cost-neutral. Similarly, policymakers have much to learn from pilots and initiatives that do work and could be scaled up.

Survey respondents are able to distinguish between the experiences of particular immigrant groups. Therefore, we should be cautious in extrapolating these group-centered trajectories into significant area-centered impacts. In practice, both places and groups are bundled together in polling on where and who is best or most integrated. This fusion has implications for the reputation of immigrant integration. Members of the public sense — but may not effectively articulate — what has worked and what has not, and how existing policies align with the grain of British public attitudes and norms. It is equally important, therefore, to focus on strengthening neighborhoods; this will contribute to and change perceptions on immigrant integration. The better immigrant outcomes are, the more room there will be for immigration policy and change. The two are — to some degree — interwoven.

An evidence-based strategy of intelligent adaptation should be overlaid with a strong and inclusive national narrative that acknowledges that successful integration is about ensuring that *all* groups move toward parity. The development of successful local communities relies on addressing deprivation, diversity management, and sensitive delivery of public services (especially housing).

Third, a clearer assessment of negative *policy* impacts on the trajectory of immigrant outcomes is necessary. This could lead to better outcomes and greater refinement in the design of policy interventions to meet specific barriers to progress. Where negative policy impacts exist, they should be proportionate to the policy goal being addressed. For example, refusing asylum seekers access to the labor market is expensive to the public purse and affects integration outcomes negatively, to a degree that is disproportionate to the policy goal of reducing the incentives of illegal immigration. In contrast, the retargeting of English-language support may adversely affect some immigrant-group outcomes but is based on a wider effort to target the need more effectively. There are a range of other examples, from credentialing through to the incentives and disincentives associated with access to welfare and training and support programs.

An evidence-based strategy of intelligent adaptation should be overlaid with a strong and inclusive national narrative.

Together, these recommendations would ensure large policy levers target needs more effectively while highlighting the rationale to intervene to support integration when it would be damaging and costly to take a laissez faire stance.

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69   Examples might include better use of the extended ethnicity codes in the National Pupil Database or the refugee marker in Jobcentre Plus.

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